

The Politically Incorrect Reader

xxiv

Introduction

In December 1983 Tom traveled to Burbank, California, to visit with Kelly Johnson of the Lockheed California Company, the man who brought the term "skunk work" to American industry. Johnson and his determined band are responsible for an astonishing share of what flies in the sky. They developed the first of the military jets right after the end of the World War II, the YP or F-80 (143 days from concept to first and successful flight); subsequently they turned out the F-104, C-130, U-2, SR-71 and others. That's quite a showing, but Johnson isn't the real story. What lies behind it is, in one instance, a program to first and way above budget; launch effectiveness ran behind schedule in an ailing satellite program. It was a couple of months long. While wandering around after taking charge, Kelly discovered other things, 1,271 inspectors working with a single program back on schedule, and simultaneously that an arch rival of Lockheed's visit with Johnson were working on projects of about equal magnitude with 3,750 people involved. Johnson was on with 126 people. (A formal Rand Corporation extraordinary figures.)


Johnson's numbers that he took a little product, thinking about marketing Johnson epitomizes what's possible is a function of good man-

...ken several hundred
...close to 60 percent,
...nd, Washington,
...Disneyland
...after the
...arter of
...alance

AND ON IT
...written, and
...a lot, and yet
...is nothing new
...Excellence: custom
...But here's the issue
...colleague at the end of the
...presidents in late 1983. All were
...white wine, and he blurted out,
...to, so far? A blinding flash of the obvious
...sun, nothing new in In Search of Excellence
...everyone in the organization the space to

giants
task
xxv
same

Flash
obvious



vol
1.

JULY 2016

Pol Reader #1 - July 2016

Why I Write	3
The Global Favela	7
Election 2048 - Under the Peace of Islam	12
Don't Tread on Dhimmi: The Alt-Right Guide to Islam	17
Is the West Guilty?	25
The Benefits of Thinking About Your Ancestors	30
Human Biodiversity vs The Phony Blank Slate "Consensus"	32
Two Paths	37
How Universal Is Empathy?	42
Cousin Marriage, The Islamic World, and Low Trust Societies	49
Ethnocentrism is Natural and Normal	57
White Ethnocentrism: Can Americans Really Be Brainwashed?	62
What Makes Western Culture Unique?	69
What Race Were the Greeks and Romans?	100
Why the West Dominated	109
Ricardo Duchesne's Intellectual Defense of the West	120
Moorish Spain: A Successful Multicultural Paradise?	129
How and Why Sweden Became Multicultural	143
The Jewish Origins of Multicultural Britain	151
Feminism and the Assault on European Civilization	160
Why Democracy Sucks	169
Ideological and Geopolitical Origins of the EU - Part I	178
Ideological and Geopolitical Origins of the EU - Part II	190

Why I Write

F. Roger Devlin, 2010

I came late to the issues characteristically discussed in *The Occidental Quarterly*.

I had no interest in politics during my early adult years, a circumstance for which I am now grateful. Like most Americans, I assumed that “politics” meant electoral contests between hardly-distinguishable parties.

In early adulthood I encountered *The Gulag Archipelago* and gained a proper appreciation of just how high the stakes of politics could be. Initially, I gravitated toward that combination of anti-Communism and status quo Social Democracy known as neo-conservatism. In the academic bubble I then inhabited, such a stance was viewed as radical.

As a college instructor, I was baffled to receive student essays vehemently maintaining the “equality” of black and white, or singing the heroism of Rosa Parks. My classes were in philosophy, and I never mentioned race at all. Clearly, this was the stuff students had been taught to write for their professors before they got to me.

The stridency of their language suggested they were defending an idea under heavy attack. But where was the attack? All I had *ever* heard anyone say about races is that they were “equal.” If this is all the students wanted to say, what were they getting so worked up about? They wrote as if they were trying to scratch an itch.

I wished to devote my life to learning and scholarship, with no thought of practical application beyond eventually sharing my knowledge with the generation that came after me. Of course, I quickly learned that few of my colleagues shared this elevated, quasi-monastic notion of the scholar’s calling. Some turned out to hold beliefs weirdly similar to the jailors described by Solzhenitsyn; many more did not, but were untroubled by — or afraid of — those who did.

Accordingly, my first practical cause belonged to the realm of academic politics: defending the life of the mind from ideological corruption. I was also fascinated by the sheer power which ideology exercised over many men’s minds, and by how a band of resentful mediocrities armed with little else had infiltrated and virtually subjugated an institution made up of highly intelligent people.

The ideologues talked a great deal about race, of course; but this did not lead me to

take any interest in the subject myself. I vaguely hoped that once the imposters had been purged from the academy we could forget about race and get back to learning and teaching.

I devoted several years to investigating the first principles of modern “progressive” thought, publishing a little philosophical primer on the subject (*Alexandre Kojève and the Outcome of Modern Thought*). But this still did not lead me to the issue of racial differences, which are an empirical rather than philosophical matter. The entire drama of ideological politics can be played out within a homogeneous society, as students of the French Revolution know.

Nevertheless, I have come to the point where I prefer to publish even purely sociological analysis (e.g., “From Salon to Guillotine,” Summer 2008) in an explicitly racial-realist venue such as *The Occidental Quarterly*.

Here is why. Those traditional conservatives who continue to admonish us against the dangers of “biological determinism” are increasingly condemning themselves to irrelevance. The plea that “race isn’t everything” is valid *per se*, but not especially germane to the situation in which we find ourselves. For we are not the aggressors in the battle now being fought. And in any battle, it is the aggressors’ prerogative to choose the point of attack: if they come at you by land, you do not have the option of fighting them at sea.

Race *is* everything to our enemies, and it is the angle from which they have chosen to attack our entire civilization. It is also where they have achieved their greatest victories: you can see this from the way “conservative” groups feel they must parrot the language of the egalitarians just to get a hearing (see: www.edmundburkeinstitute.org/programs.htm). Such well-meaning but naive friends of our civilization are in effect consenting to occupy the status of a “kept” opposition.

The more we try to avoid confronting race directly, the more our enemies will press their advantage at precisely this point. Tactically, they are correct to do so. And they will continue until we abandon our defensive posture and turn to attack them on their own chosen ground.

The Occidental Quarterly is blessed with contributors who have made racial differences and ethnic conflict their lives’ study, and I cannot match them in their own fields. But I prefer to throw in my lot with them because they are unambiguously not part of any “kept” opposition. Being a pariah at least keeps one honest.

A turning point for me was reading Glayde Whitney’s “The Biological Reality of Race” in *American Renaissance* ([October 1999](#)). Like everyone else in America, I had

been subjected to years of race-talk, but the aim had always been to lead me to “feel” in a predetermined way. Even my students’ papers had been apprentice work in this genre. Whitney, by contrast, was simply setting forth information. Reading him was like being addressed as an adult after years of being talked down to. This by itself was enough to get me to sit up and take notice of what he was saying.

Moreover, he contradicted everything I had ever been told. And he did so while showing that race could be as interesting as any other scientific topic. I had never seen anyone actually *diagram* the human family tree, showing which groups were most closely related and which most distantly separated. I was particularly struck by the revelation that the deepest evolutionary cleft within the human race was that between black Africans and everyone else.

But even a complete racial science based upon exhaustive knowledge of the human genome would never make a dent in anti-white ideology. This is because ideologies are not scientific theories: they are systems of ideas mobilized by groups of men in their struggle to acquire or maintain power over other men. They are a misuse — a prostitution — of the faculty of human reason, whose proper end is the discovery of the true. Ideological doctrines are true, in the best of cases, only *per accidens*; more often they are falsehoods publicly maintained through violence and intimidation.

Not being based upon knowledge, the content of ideologies change with the elites and counter-elites which champion them. Past ideological regimes have been governed by Marxists who spoke of class rather than race. Still earlier regimes (and revolutionaries) invoked religious concepts. And, yes, racial science itself has been prostituted in the service of what was essentially a political ideology.

The masters of the West long ago ceased performing even the minimum function required of any governing elite: seeing to the physical survival of the people it rules. Instead, it maintains its power by setting its clients (“designated victims”) against the rest of us. “Antiracism” is the ideology, but what is really going on underneath is the mobilization of envy, covetousness, and the *libido dominandi*.

Much of the elite itself is white, of course. But this is really no more paradoxical than a company getting rich by staging a “going out of business sale” that never ends. Except, of course, that the “white anti-racism” game *will* have to end soon.

The regime’s greatest crime, however, lies not in setting its clients against us; it is what it has done to our own young people. Those indoctrinated students whose essays so perplexed me had been formed into instruments of an alien will: pawns in a struggle inimical to their own interests, and whose real nature they could not grasp. They were no less victims for being willing.

Writing for *The Occidental Quarterly* is essentially a continuation of the work I had always intended to do, adapted to a hostile political situation I have come to understand better. In the most general terms, this work remains: the pursuit of knowledge, teaching, and the fight against the same ideological enemies I encountered in the academy. For a professor-*manqué*, writing for an independent journal is the equivalent of what home-schooling is for a parent: a quiet revolt against institutions which have lost all claim to allegiance.

The Global Favela

Gregory Hood, 2016

Reality has a well-known racist bias. And the [White minstrel](#) and courtier [Stephen Colbert](#) veered a little too close to what leftists used to call the reality-based community when describing the chaos of the upcoming Rio Olympics.

To the laughter of his SWPL audience, [Colbert hammed it up](#) and made silly faces as he recounted the violence, corruption, and incompetence as Brazil scrambles to put together the infrastructure needed to host the Summer Games. He noted billions of dollars were sent to companies which are currently being investigated for price fixing and kickbacks. He smirked about Brazil having one of the “highest violent crime rates in the world” and, making sure to trill his r’s for comedic effect, quoted the soccer player Rivaldo telling foreigners to “stay in their country of origin” because “here you will be running the risk of your life.” The meme-ready warning from police to arriving tourists “Welcome to Hell” was also featured. And though Colbert didn’t mention this, body parts [recently washed ashore](#) next to one of the key venues for the games.

Brazil, as de Gaulle said, is the country of the future and always will be. It will never be the First World nation its boosters fondly imagine. For racially aware American whites, this ironic prophecy has always held a more ominous connotation. Brazil was always the nightmare racially aware American Whites were seeking to avoid, a frenzied völker-chaos of crime and social dysfunction where the poor slaughter each other in the streets and the rich hide behind gated communities and militarized police.

As Colbert’s snark indicates, even the most deeply insulated shitlib shares this premise at some level. Leftists might find something like City of God romantic, but they don’t want to live there anymore than they want to spend time in the Baltimore neighborhoods they fetishize in *The Wire*.

Yet Brazil might actually be a best-case scenario. At least in the highly Germanized south of the country, there are areas which are wealthy and relatively free of crime and corruption. Not coincidentally, there is also a simmering secessionist movement. And in the recent controversy over impeaching leftist Dilma Rousseff, most of her opponents [came from the whiter south](#).

Interestingly, [The Hive](#) leaped into action to defend Rousseff during the impeachment crisis, with [the Huffington Post](#), *Salon* and other sources of [Cat Lady morality](#) warning

against the “right-wing” coup. As the subtleties of Brazilian politics are poorly understood by American reporters and even less by American audiences, the situation was explained using the same Narrative applied to politics in every other nation. Rousseff’s defeat, [warned](#) one leftist, would mean a “roll back [of] affirmative action and efforts to redress discrimination against peoples of indigenous and African descent.” In other words, the pro-impeachment forces were Bad Guys because they wouldn’t steal enough of White people’s stuff. And Rousseff’s opponents were mostly males with light skin, ipso facto proof of malicious intent, racism, and sexism.

In a way, this Narrative captures something essential. Race creates the underlying conditions of all politics. The great deception of race relations in the West, the lie which justifies the entire political apparatus, is that people of European descent somehow benefit from the presence of “black bodies” and people of color to exploit. In reality, the most consistent pattern we see from Latin America to Europe is the desire of whites to escape multiculturalism, all while they continue to praise it in the abstract. [Even in Sweden](#), the natives move away from “diverse” neighborhoods after only a small number of non-European immigrants enter. And this what really drives contemporary policy disputes, even if it is framed in terms of “limited government,” “local control,” “property values,” or “good schools.”

We flee, they follow, and then they complain we’ve oppressed them. From [communist cult leaders](#) to [deformed actresses](#), the response we get is as to why these people are running to join us racists is the same – it’s Our Fault their society is the way it is.

But the truth is their societies are undesirable because they live there. If enough of them come here, our societies will be indistinguishable from theirs. Even if they were given a structural or environmental advantage, the outcome will be the same.

They need us. We don’t need them. We never did.

On those occasions in history when Europeans sought to integrate nonwhites into our system either as equals, slave labor, or something in between, we’ve always paid for it collectively. Whatever wealth was generated by slavery or colonization is nothing compared to the wealth and lives lost in the fratricidal conflicts and rebellions ultimately engendered.

Perhaps more than any other society in human history, status in the modern West is shown by loudly preaching egalitarian principles while isolating yourself from their effects. It’s not just right-wing snark to point out how Mark Zuckerberg is shilling for more immigration while buying property and building walls so as to protect himself from the rabble. This is the governing principle of our world.

The Open Society is a lie. It always was. The only question is where the borders will be drawn. We can have larger barriers outside the neighborhoods, countries and civilization we want to preserve, or we can have innumerable barriers around each home, shop, and gated community as we try to carve out a little space where we can watch our screens and live our virtual life as everything crumbles around us. And even if you've managed to find a decent community to raise a family, the American government has already made it quite clear [it is coming for you](#).

In response to Brexit, we've seen a few "mainstream" columnists get excited about the idea that "nationalism vs globalism" will define the coming century. The "National Question" is certainly what Trump is staking his campaign on. In the aftermath of the EU Referendum, it was especially amusing to see the far Left shriek about the result on the grounds it would endanger the profits of stock jobbers. The mutual dependence of global finance and Cultural Marxism has never been more apparent.

But the conflict goes deeper than simply a dispute over sovereignty. While Brexit was certainly a sign of hope, the overwhelming support by young voters for [remaining within the European Union](#) is ominous. As the rapid progression of concepts like gay marriage and transsexuals in the military through the Overton Window has shown, most Millennials are quite comfortable with accepting the given Narrative. If "nationalism" is to triumph, there's a time limit to recapture the state and the commanding heights of the culture to push new values.

Whether this is the beginning of some new age or the last gasp of the old Western order is wholly dependent on the electoral fate of figures like Donald Trump (who also relies heavily on elderly voters) and Marie Le Pen. If they win, they may set something in motion. If they don't, things are going to get much worse before they get better.

If there are not victories in the short term, we're going to see something far more existential and dangerous. Technology and transportation allow the elite to travel from global city to global city, unmooring them from traditional loyalties and reducing any stake they have in their native countries.

We have a ruling class with "no skin in the game" and to them, our entire society is expendable. The gamble most are making is they will remain invulnerable from the chaos of multiculturalism and global economic and technological progress, broadly defined, will continue. And if a self-conscious elite can beat back their own peoples, as *Foreign Policy* [recently argued](#), they believe they will be able to change the demographic situation such that their position will be invulnerable.

But as global society becomes more integrated and complex, it also becomes less

stable. And now, the Western core countries are beginning to rot away, subsumed beneath a never ending and heavily subsidized tide of Third World humanity. The German government will [spend](#) over \$100 billion to support “refugees” over the next five years, [most of whom are worthless in terms of their ability to economically contribute](#). Sweden is already [buckling](#) under the weight of what they have admitted. And this is only the beginning of what is coming next, as Western subsidies have ensured an African population boom.

Assuming a nationalist or populist backlash can be beaten down by the System and Muammar Gaddafi’s [prophecy](#) of a “black” Europe is realized, what future does the West have, even for the wealthy? The global utilitarianism pursued through open borders is becoming a worldwide scheme of dysgenics, creating a deracinated, mediocre, and helpless human race.

If you were a wealthy South African businessman who didn’t care about his people, the end of apartheid was good for you. No sanctions, more opportunities for trade, and no social penalties. What do you care about the white trash leaving in squatter parks or gross Boers being butchered on their ancestral farmlands in front of their wives and children? You can watch the Springboks from your hotel in London.

But even these options are going to be cut off when bastions like Germany, the United Kingdom, and America itself buckle under the weight of demographic transformation. And can the “elite,” especially Jews, be as confident they will be able to penetrate East Asian markets as they did the West?

The events in Rio are simply a harbinger. A nation like Brazil can’t host something like the Olympics. As the West turns Brazilian (or worse), there will be fewer countries who can.

And as even though the Olympics themselves are just a variation of corporate degeneracy, it means something when a global fête backed by billions of dollars can’t guarantee the basic safety of its athletes, let alone guests. Even when the Soviet Union couldn’t supply supermarkets, it could accomplish great things if it bent every effort. Now, the “country of the future” can’t accomplish one big project.

When White America was about to fly to the moon, a group of blacks [showed up in a mule wagon at the launch site](#), demanding welfare. As the entire world is converted into a giant favela, we’re going to see this on a mass scale. The astonishing advances in technology and health care which appear so close will never be realized. Instead, we’ll use the astonishing resources at our command to subsidize populations who hate us and make our lives worse by their sheer presence.

And as the walls close in, at least some SWPL's are going to start to get it. [Even Boulder, CO suddenly finds itself in the crosshairs](#) for being insufficiently diverse. More broadly, we can only hope some of those who do have the ability to escape this dystopian future realize, some class traitors from the "elite," realize what is coming is [not worth living in and take action to build a different world](#).

The Alt Right is not just about grand dreams or some glorious destiny for our people. It's the sole movement that can even consider real solutions to the problems destroying the lives of millions. Every father looking for a safe place to raise his family, every mother who worries about what will happen to her children, and every red-pilled Millennial who is beginning to understand he has no future has to look to us because no other movement offers him anything but annihilation.

We have a system that actively punishes virtue, destroys families, abolishes communities, and imports foreigners precisely *because* they have nothing to offer except votes for the leftist political party. It's a conglomeration of monstrous evil. It has to be entirely destroyed not just so we can pursue the highest aspirations of our race but so a decent life is possible for ordinary people.

It's not just a battle between nationalism and globalism. It's about what kind of people we want to be. We can carve out a future for ourselves. Or we can acquiesce to being part of a global slum. But if nothing changes, we can see the "country of the future" and what it always will be.

It's corpses washing up on a polluted beach. It's hostile mobs using their dependence as a weapon. It's a cultureless wasteland choking on its own filth. And unlike every other time in history, there will be nowhere to escape.

Election 2048 – Under the Peace of Islam

Daniel Greenfield, 2015

Election Coverage 2048 - Al-CNN

As the election of 2048 approaches, the candidates from both parties continue to exchange strong views on the issues that affect the lives of Americans. The Party of Democracy and Justice (Hezb-Al-Dimukratie-Wa'al Adalah) continues to maintain that the election will come down to social justice issues.

“With 34 percent unemployment and the price of goat so far out of range of most working families that they have been forced to switch to chicken, it is time that our opponents stopped dodging the issues and took a serious look at the economic consequences of their policies,” Bashar Mohammed Hussein Al-Hamdani, said during a campaign stop at a HalalBurger in Peoria, Illinois.

However the ruling Freedom and Religion Party (Hezb Al-Hurriyah Wa'al Allah) denounced this as class warfare. Still preoccupied with the ongoing occupation of the Netherlands and Greece, the party has taken criticism for ignoring the economic problems of the United States while being preoccupied with waging foreign wars in the name of Islam.

Nevertheless President Mohammed Al-Thani, fresh off a pilgrimage from Mecca, vigorously defended his record while conducting a photo op at a San Diego Madrassa. “The Freedom and Religion Party believes in creating opportunities, rather than offering hand outs. Our subjugation of infidel nations has opened up new territories to be dominated by the believers and our vigorous drive for national morality has revived the family unit as an economic force. Our program of heavily fining women who go out with their naked hair exposed and raising the Jizya tax on the People of the Book has also raised billions of dollars that will go toward repaying the nation 93 trillion dollar debt.”

The high Jizya tax has provoked outrage in some parts of the United States, but the continuing decline of the nation’s non-Muslim population has made the Christian vote much less of a factor in the election. Hamdani has promised to cut the Jizya tax by 20 percent if elected, but it is unclear whether conservative elements in his own party will

allow him to do it. National surveys show that since making the proposal, Hamdani's ratings have gone down 9 points in Illinois and 14 points in California.

President Al-Thani's advisors view the 2 million conversions to Islam since the Jizya tax was tripled as a major benefit to the party which lost its Christian support during the Great Transition. Since then the Freedom and Justice Party has picked up a Christian and Jewish bloc vote, but the value of that bloc has not held up well over the last two elections.

Christian rights activists attribute the decline of American Christians to the Jizya tax which has made it impossible for many Christian families to earn a living. They also blame the bloody 2045 Riots which marked the end of the Christian presence in former strongholds such as Nashville and Cedar Rapids, as well as rumors about the kidnapping and forced conversion of Christian girls.

However popular talk show host and pundit, Abdul Greene countered that the decrease was best explained by the large scale immigration of Christians out of the country. "The Christians are too bigoted to live in the same country with us, just like their parents and grandparents. If they can't control the country, they refuse to live here and accept our laws."

Christian rights activists have accused Greene of playing a major role in stirring up the 2045 Riots which torched Christian areas in major cities across the United States after a Christian man was accused of having an intimate encounter with a Muslim woman. Greene however insists that the Christians are the ones to blame. Greene's support of the Freedom and Religion Party has been controversial, but President Al-Thani has refused to disavow him.

The latest round of attacks by Greek guerrillas on liberation forces in Athens led to smaller attacks on Christian businesses in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles last month. They also accentuated the debate over the continuing occupation of Greece which began in 2031 when the United States government intervened to protect the territorial claims of the Turkish Republic of Cyprus. Much as in the Netherlands, the intervention to protect a Muslim community turned into a full blown occupation and a war against an insurgency that is believed to be backed and supplied by rogue states such as the breakaway Arctic Republic and the Zionist Entity.

The Freedom and Religion Party under President Al-Thani continues to take the position that American prosperity is closely linked to the welfare of the rest of the Muslim world. In the State of the Union address the president stated that, "We cannot repeat the folly of the Americans of the pagan period who believed that they could have material wealth without religion. Our prosperity comes from Allah and it is only

by spreading the way of Allah and conducting our Jihad in the way of Allah on behalf of our endangered brothers and sisters in Europe and Asia that we will be deserving of Allah's bounty."

Hoping to exploit the widespread economic dissatisfaction, Hamdani, a former Wisconsin governor, has promised to withdraw troops from Greece within two years and the Netherlands within five years with the majority of remaining liberation forces being drawn from other Muslim countries. "We can best aid our fellow believers in the Muslim world by being a model of stability and a beacon of tolerance."

Yusuf Al-Amiriki, a member of Hamdani's foreign policy defense team and a first generation convert descended from two American presidents, courted controversy with a proposal to set up a coalition government of Muslim and moderate Christian groups in the Netherlands. Such governments had been tried in Europe before during the 2030's, but invariably fell apart. Leading Senators from the Freedom and Justice Party accused Hamdani of selling out Muslim interests in order to court the Christian vote. Hamdani's spokeswoman, Aisha Zubedi, has refused to comment on the Amiriki proposal except to say that Hamdani was open to any solution that would restore peace to the people of the Netherlands and protect the rights of European Muslims.

Hamdani courted further controversy by appearing at the funeral of former President Bob Thompson. Thompson had served two terms and while his administration had worked hard on outreach to the Muslim world, he also engaged in the targeted murder of Muslim religious leaders and provided aid to the Zionist entity. For these reasons, President Al-Thani chose not to appear at his funeral even though President Thompson had been a member of the pre-transition Freedom and Religion Party, which was then known as the Republican Party.

Despite the official disapproval, Thompson was viewed positively by many in the Muslim community. Tens of millions of Pakistani-Americans remember how after the India-Pakistan war, the Thompson Administration generously opened its borders to victims of the nuclear fallout in Pakistan. Without that step it might have taken decades more before America achieved a Muslim majority.

During the beginning of his second term, Thompson became the first president to take the oath of office on both a Bible and a Koran declaring that he wanted to make no separation between the books of god. At the Thompson funeral, Hamdani appeared to promise that he would repeat that gesture, but his spokeswoman quickly disavowed any notion that he would ever take an oath on a text that was not the Koran.

"No American president has taken an oath on a bible in over a decade, all that the governor meant was that he would keep both Christians and Muslims in mind as the

people of Allah when he takes his oath to protect and defend the Sharia," Aisha Zubedi said.

While the Democracy and Justice Party has often appealed to the poor, its missteps have raised concerns in traditional Muslim communities that Hamdani is going too far in pandering to non-Muslims. "Next thing you know he'll say we should let the Jews come back to America," Congressman Mohammed Mogabe declared. "If Hamdani wants votes out of Cleveland then he is going to show he will fight for us, not for the enemies of the prophets."

Hamdani has hurriedly scheduled an upcoming visit to the Ground Zero Mosque, but it may not be enough to improve his image in the eyes those who have accused him of flirting with apostasy. While the Mosque is a traditional stop for presidential candidates, Hamdani is unlikely to pay tribute to the souls of the 19 martyrs as Al-Thani did during the previous election.

Hoping to refocus attention on his economic program, Hamdani called for higher corporate taxes and accused some corporations of abusing Islamic banking, in particular Hibah payments, to avoid paying taxes. Such charges are not new, but particularly galling at a time when over half the country is out of work and tycoons like Ahmed Shalafi and Sheikh Johnson have used their connections with the Al-Thani government to become billionaires.

To counter Hamdani, Al-Thani's economic advisers have offered up a stimulus plan that raises the Jizya tax on infidels for the second time in a year and vowed to cut spending even further without affecting subsidies to Islamic schools or military preparedness for the Global Jihad. Though the election is still some time away, the Al-Thani campaign has also rolled out a series of ads targeting poor communities which accuse Hamdani of plotting with Jewish and Christian tycoons to subvert the Islamic system of finance through freemasonry and Communist class warfare tactics.

Adding further drama to the election is the possibility of a third party campaign. Andrew McMillan who has been running as an independent in elections for almost twenty years without appealing to anyone but the same racist groups who have been disavowed even by most Christians and Jews, but there is talk that McMillan's America Party might consider replacing the eccentric millionaire with sports star Ted March. As leading goalscorer who helped the United States win the 2042 World Cup, March is one of the most admired non-Muslims in the country. With him on the ticket, the America Party might be able to adopt a new moderate image that is no longer associated with bigotry and intolerance.

But frustrating his own party members, the septuagenarian McMillan appeared to an

event commemorating the 2045 riots and gave a rousing speech which hit on many of the same old themes. "For thirty-six years I've been involved in politics and the only thing that I can tell you about politics is that it's all bunk. We weren't talking about the things that mattered thirty-six years ago and we aren't talking about them now."

Don't Tread on Dhimmi: The Alt-Right Guide to Islam

Lawrence Murray, 2016

In the aftermath of failures to manage diversity in [Paris](#) and San Bernardino, cucking for Islam is now in vogue among the signaling classes. After all, not all Muslims are [terrorists](#) and as a designated oppressed group—a group identified as a permanent victim in Western society and therefore morally authoritative over indigenous Whites and encouraged to rent-seek—they apparently require White liberal apologists to champion their cause. Siding with Middle Easterners/Muslims or any non-White group on the basis of their otherness is not new; since at least the 1960s, the (((New Left))) has primarily championed ethnic or gender-based conflict over class conflict as the engine of progress and liberation. This grew out of the international ideological and physical struggle over decolonization, but in the contemporary absence of colonies to side with against *metropoleis*, the conflict comes home, especially for [so-called nations](#) which practice multiculturalism. Here we witness a vibrant coalition of White leftists, overseas Israelis and other minorities organized as a bloc in the name of abstract principles, ethnocentric interests and gibsmedats against the receding White majority. In the wake of repeated diversity containment failures, standing with Islam takes on new urgency for signaling liberals because more and more people are becoming [xenoskeptic](#) about foreigners and heathens, as exemplified by the political successes of [The Unstumpable One](#). The coalition's most *other* members, Muslims, have come under intense scrutiny by the Trvmpenkrieg, and despite them being electorally worthless, liberals feel obliged to defend kebab. But of everyone to cuck for, why Muslims?

Relating to Islam in the Postmodern West: Victimhood, Altruism and the Primacy of Color

There are essentially three reasons why Muslims are the ultimate designated oppressed group, and why therefore signaling tolerance for them becomes a drug abuse problem for liberals. *The first is that Muslims are easily the least liked ethnoreligious demographic in the United States.* This is unsurprising given that 9/11 was not that long ago, all of our wars since the 1990s have [involved Islam](#), and Muslims are highly unassimilable and dissimilar to Westerners. Anti-Muslim

sentiments are widely considered *racist*, which automatically makes the left oppose them. The leading Republican primary candidate, Donald J. Trump, [wants to ban](#) Muslim immigration to the United States. A [2014 survey](#) by Pew Research found that both Republicans and Democrats rated Muslims very poorly on a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 being positive and 0 being negative. At 33, Republicans ranked Muslims a point below atheists making them the least liked group, while Democrats ranked Muslims a couple of points above atheists and Mormons at 47. Another survey found that 82% of Republicans were “very concerned” about the rise of Islamic extremism in the world and 67% agreed that Islam was more likely to encourage violence among believers. The numbers for Democrats were 51% and 42%.

A majority of both parties feel threatened by Islamic extremism, though most Democrats appear to believe it isn't the fault of Islam that Muslims are violent (they may actually be right for the wrong reasons). If you are looking for a cause to support in Western countries that will truly show how brave you are in the face of terror, it's Islamic apologetics. Don't give into the (((politics of fear))). I mean, “Daesh” wants you to be afraid of Islam, right? That's why you shouldn't even call them the Islamic State. Don't let the terrorists win! We must be brave and continue to welcome the Afro-Islamic *Völkerwanderung*. For an anti-racist progressive who thinks Whiteness and Christianity are a blight on our big happy human family, taking the side of such a disliked class of people is irresistible. There are so many bigots for her to rack up points against by signaling how brave she is for defending this designated oppressed group. #IllRideWithYou

The second reason why Islam is so great to signal on behalf of is that Muslims won't return the favor, establishing the signaler as a true altruist. Their ingroup morality doesn't reward infidels, a lot like another group of desert-dwelling volcano worshipers. You can champion Islam and turn a blind eye—as well as try to blind others—to the demographics of terrorism as much as you want, but Muslims don't have to embrace you. A great example of this phenomenon is the famous (((feminist))), (((queer theorist))) and (((critical theorist))) known as (((Judith Butler))), who once described Hamas and Hezbollah as “social movements that are progressive, that are on the Left, that are part of a global Left.” I can't help but feel that a Jewish lesbian would be thrown off a building if she found herself living in their world. The frog can ferry the scorpion across the pond if he chooses, but it is in the scorpion's nature to sting and thus [drown them both](#). The liberal frog knows it did the right thing though. What could be more altruistic than supporting a people who did not ask for your help, will not be reciprocating it, and may actually be dangerous? Therefore, to cuckold Muslims is one of the most selfless things a degenerate leftist can do.

Finally, there is the issue of Muslims being a Third World population, something the New Left idolizes as authentic in its struggle against oppression and for liberation. Again, think of the archetypal contemporary (((leftist academic))), (((Judith Butler))). Muslims in the United States are like an internal colonial people resisting oppression for the left to side with against the ‘racist, imperialist, [white supremacist](#)’ establishment (which no longer exists and actually works to bring them here by the hundreds of thousands). Yet, the colonized have no love for their colonizers; in most cases they harbor resentment. Westerners who supported the decolonization of African and Asian territories got nothing in return from those territories as thanks; their inhabitants wanted Whites [expelled and purged](#) from their countries (and some of their descendants would end up migrating to Europe and North America so they could continue to be oppressed under a functioning White government with jobs and welfare). What fucks did get was the approval of other White people, which is the objective of social signaling as a means of raising social capital and standing among one’s peers. What really did South Africa and Rhodesia in was their abandonment by Europe and Anglo-America, not the grumbling of the Non-Aligned Movement. Any perceived approval from colonial peoples was not so much actual approval as it was the mirth of victory. That same phenomenon of phishing for approval for morally correct opinions about our dispossession is now playing out inside our own borders.

For leftists, there are strong pull factors to side with Muslims in the event of any Muslim attack on our society—designated oppressed groups are morally superior because of their sacred victimhood and since they are so disliked they need protection from society. But what conservatives and the alt-right are left scratching their heads over is the dromedary camel in the room: “Didn’t any of you notice the *push* factors?” There are a lot of good reasons *not* to cuck for Islam, which Muslims are pretty transparent about if you read what they have to say. Let’s review what those are ideologically, to say nothing of the impact of Muslim terrorist acts on our conclusion, which are known and ignored by liberals anyway in their quest for context denial.

Islam is Neither Ecumenical with Other Faiths nor at Peace with Secularism

When people argue against the underappreciated motif of “Islam is incompatible with modern/Western society,” they might as well be saying that our society means nothing. Over a thousand years of separate cultural and geopolitical developments and population differences are just gone because reasons. The Islamic theology behind the conflict with the West is either not even grasped or just ignored entirely. The alt-right and even some of the normie right are not irrationally ‘Islamophobic’ but reasonably

skeptic. It is the left that is irrationally afraid of giving up their tactical nihilism regarding the meaning of the world's religions. Diversity is real, even if it isn't [particularly valuable](#) to us.

Islam, unlike most Western forms of organized religion, has an agenda against existing subordinate to the secular state—their world never had Westphalia. There is seldom peace with other denominations and wherever mass Islam and populist democracy exist there is an Islamic government. Because Islam is as much of a political system as it is a creed, they cannot be separated in most cases. And most Muslims don't want them to be—they favor [sharia](#), or Islamic law. They don't do [Constitution-worship](#) or 'rights,' at least not in the sense that we have them. Muslims have more rights than non-Muslims in an Islamic country, the complete opposite of how minorities are delicately handled in Western countries. In the aftermath of Islamic terror attacks, liberals want to give Muslims with blood on their hands the benefit of the doubt even though they were merely following the traditional interpretation of their religion—war over peace and church over state.

Muslims are not uniquely warlike or devout, but they don't have to be for us to find a conflict of interest between identity-driven bellicosity and secular postwar democracy, assuming we want to keep our secular postwar democracy (which the left mostly does). While I am no expert on Islamic theology and jurisprudence, I certainly know more than my rival non-Muslim but pro-Muslim polemicist, archetypically a 26 year-old pansexual Seattle barista with a degree in postcolonial studies and a shelf of (((Chomsky))) books, who is a future member of the Catlady Ascendancy and invariably an ardent champion of the rights of the designated oppressed. And even if I don't, I have enough agency to read up on Islam using sources other than Occupy Democrats or the *Huffington Post*. It's honestly a fascinating religion, and I think it would be best that it continue to be fascinating somewhere far away from me.

The simple fact of the matter is that Islam was born of war against non-Muslims, its theology teaches Muslims to make war and discriminate against non-Muslims, and its history encourages Muslims to follow in the footsteps of Islamic warriors before them, thus providing enduring inspiration to commit violence in the name of the great snackbar in the sky. *Against us*. Meanwhile, the interpretation of Islam that liberals incorrectly believe is dominant around the world—so-called [moderate Islam](#)—is one practiced by upper-class, college-educated Westernized Muslims who treat their religion like the average White liberal Catholic treats theirs. But even those moderates can become “radicalized.”

There is a huge problem of understanding here and while [true believers in the innocence of designated oppressed groups](#) are unlikely to recant when presented with

evidence, our own side should be rhetorically equipped with a powerful counter-narrative to the idea that Islam is just like any other religion but with Third-World flavor text. The text actually matters. So let's learn some Arabic, the language of algebra and al-Qaeda.

Sharif Don't Like It: Words Every Kafir Should Know

Dhimmi — This would be you in an ideal Islamic world. A non-Muslim citizen of an Islamic country is called a *dhimmi*. Since Islam is both a religion and a method of political organization, it contains rules for governing conquered infidel populations, which would have made up the majority of the “Islamic” world in its early days of expansion. Historically, dhimmis paid a higher punitive tax, called *jizya*, for the privilege of being allowed to live under an Islamic state as a second-class infidel. Convert or die had a loophole—turn over your shekels on a regular basis. It's why places like Greece and Serbia are still Christian after hundreds of years of Muslim rule and why you can still find native Christian minorities in Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine. In the contemporary Islamic world, charging higher taxes on non-Muslims is no longer practiced since that's a tough human rights violation to maintain if these countries want to participate in international organizations and forums chaired by Europeans and Americans, who ostensibly care about ‘human rights.’ Less difficult to pull off is generic persecution of and discrimination against religious minorities, which can be easily found in places like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. And [Rotherham](#).

Dhimmitude survives in spirit—though not as strictly as it was historically—anywhere Muslims oppress non-Muslims, which is to say anywhere Muslims are a majority. The only place where 'Golden Age' dhimmitude is practiced is the Islamic State, which makes Christians who refuse to flee or convert pay *jizya*. But don't be fooled, *kafir*. Muslims didn't give up their right to treat non-Muslims as second-class citizens because they wanted to—*égalité* was a value of the European colonizers foisted upon them, much like [anti-slavery](#).

I would argue that when the Afro-Islamic *Völkerwanderung* comes to our lands, they bring dhimmitude (along with other Islamic concepts) with them, just as all immigration brings varieties of cultural enrichment. The arrogance with which many overseas Muslims dismiss our culture and civilization and expect to be treated well is telling of how we are conceived of as future dhimmis. Britain's Anjem Choudary comes to mind. In some ways, we are already dhimmis in the contemporary West. Our *jizya* taxes go towards resettling Muslim colonists and expensive counter-terrorism programs necessary to manage diversity, while our opposition to Muslim immigration

and 'refugees' is largely ignored or pathologized by establishment politicians. French novelist Michel Houellebecq's recent novel [Submission](#) describes a world in which a degenerate France ends up taken over by an alliance of leftists with the nation's growing Muslim population in order to block nationalists from being elected to power. Dhimmitude is just around the corner if Muslims have their way, and I would never put it past the left to ally with an alien people to counter nationalism. Antifa welcomes dhimmi status if it means no more White privilege.

Taqiyya — This is one that many are familiar with and one that, ironically, Muslims will deny at every opportunity. Mainstream Muslim jurists say *taqiyya* is something a Muslim can do to defend his faith under persecution, but let's just call this what it is, a codified form of dual morality. It's okay to lie to infidels if telling the lie advances the interests of Muslims. That's the rule. Isn't that great? That interest could be saving one's skin before a religious inquisition, telling the infidels that Islam is a religion of peace, denouncing terror attacks only because you fear reprisals from the infidels, etc. Really makes you wonder about those 'moderate Muslims' that are always squawked about after an Islamic attack, though. Once you make it clear your code of ethics allows you to deceive outgroups for your benefit, why would any non-cucked individual trust you? People who are cucking for Islam need to realize that what immigration you permit is a lot like [choosing a roommate](#); is this really something we want tossed into our already dysfunctional, heterogeneous society? A religious and often ethnic minority with a dual morality and supremacist attitudes?

Jihad — This is another concept that everyone has heard of and one that Islamic apologists and jurists will attempt to explain away with Semitic semantics. The narrative is that *jihad* just means "struggle" and that those evil terrorists who have no religion have stolen or misappropriated this concept in a way that stains the reputation of Islam. Struggle can basically mean anything since it's so subjective, so don't even worry about what jihad means because it don't matta.

In actuality, defining jihad as non-violent is the shallow and obfuscating interpretation, not the other way around. The original "struggle" of Mahomet was against the infidels of Mecca and Medina who did not embrace his own original monotheism. Subsequently, Muslims would struggle against the Persians, the Byzantines, the Egyptians, the Berbers, the Visigoths, the Franks, the Sicilians, the Africans, the Afghans, the Indians, the Greeks, the Venetians, the Serbs, the Hungarians, the Bosnians, the Croats, the Albanians, the Romanians, the Russians, the Israelis and so forth. Those poor struggling Muslims. Make no mistake, jihad is war—war against the infidel, which is indeed a struggle as it is a contest of arms. I don't see how it could possibly *not* be recognized as a form of jihad—if not the Platonic form of

jihad—by anyone aware of any history at all. I will accept that at least some Muslims are sincere when they say that jihad is not inherently war and primarily means one's daily struggle to live religiously. But I will have to call taqiyya on the notion that war is not a well-practiced form of jihad. The geopolitical history of the Mediterranean suggests otherwise.

Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harab — Generally speaking, these refer to places under Islamic rule (the House of Islam) and places under non-Islamic rule (the House of War). Ooosh. Looks like we live somewhere destined to be conquered by the followers of the prophet Mahomet. Now, if we lived in a less cucked society, like 8th-century France, 17th-century Habsburg Austria or [21st-century Hungary](#), stopping the encroachment of Islam into our lands would be considered a [national priority](#). It is something that would be [very easily stopped](#) with some backbone and self-interest.

The Muslim concepts of the House of War and the House of Islam need to be memorized by every Western policy maker. The goal has always been to expand the House of Islam into the House of War. Even without any fancy theological trimmings, this is just basic territorial behavior, something the West has been neutered of since WWII. If the German quest for *Lebensraum* was such a great evil, what of non-negotiable Islamization? A population cannot survive where it currently exists by renouncing its claims to its own territory. Open borders with the Muslim world is basically an invitation to the House of Islam to annex the House of War. We have ceded control of our lands to whoever wishes to occupy them. Conquest will happen if nothing is done. Muslim populations are younger and more fertile than European ones, and so long as it is better to live in Europe (or Anglo-America) than it is to live in the Middle East and minimal effort is required to conquer, they will continue to trek north. The Moors and the Turks were stopped with a violent reassertion of central authority on the part of European states bordering them, whether it was the Frankish army at Tours or the Holy Roman-Polish armies at Vienna. Today the central authorities of Europe and Anglo-America, rather than defending their territories, choose to chastise anyone who dares bolt the gates shut to invasion. The defenders do not consider themselves at war and cannot win in the long run if this persists.

Concluding Remarks

I recognize that not all Muslims in the bag of vibrancy are poisoned. Some don't care about their religion enough to inform their decisions and political views by it. But enough do, and furthermore we have no meaningful obligation to let in every single one that that wants to enter our lands. Indeed, much of Western history from 700 to 1700 was about resisting, halting and beginning to roll back the high tide of Islamic

invasion. Some places, such as Bosnia, Albania, Asia Minor, North Africa, and the Levant were never permanently recovered. History seems like a million years ago to the deracinated Homo economicus, but it is much closer than that to those with a sense of identity, be they Muslim or nationalist. This stuff matters. What Muslims believe matters. What their scriptures say matters. How our society will change from immigration matters. Our future matters.

I hope I have made it clear that Islam practices a dual morality and that leftists are foolish, anti-White or both for siding with Islam against Western civilization. Cucking for Muslims is perhaps the highest form of cucking there is, owing to Muslim dual morality—you get *no* reciprocal treatment for supporting them. I should clarify that I am not against dual morality per se as an ingroup survival strategy. It works quite well. What I am against is when Whites refuse to take their own side in a conflict and align themselves with an anti-White religious tradition that has such a blatant dual morality against the outgroup, to the point of exploiting that outgroup for its own enrichment. In fact, if our survival necessitates we abandon the universalism we've cultivated since the Enlightenment and embrace a wholly tribal worldview like most other peoples have historically done and continue to do, then that must be the synthesis of the cuck thesis and the jihadist antithesis. We need to [take our own side](#).

Is the West Guilty?

**No. We have been fighting
for our lives for 1,500 years.**

Roland Johnson, 2013

According to the trendy nonsense of our time, the history of Europe and Western Civilization is a legacy of shame. The West bears the mark of Cain for its sins of aggression, colonialism, slavery, and racism. It does not matter that the West gave birth to the ideals of liberty and human dignity—and practiced those ideals by eliminating the slave trade and colonial rule. Or that our political systems have promoted freedom around the world, and our science has improved the lives of people everywhere.

For a sense of balance, let us consider the history of non-Western aggression against the West. The fact that so many of us are unaware of these aggressions is proof of the bias of our media and educational systems.

A good place to start is the invasion of Europe by Central-Asian Huns in the fourth and fifth centuries. This fierce warrior people launched a series of aggressive attacks against Germanic tribes living in what is now Russia and Eastern Europe. Fleeing pillage and slavery, many Germans sought sanctuary in the Roman Empire, but the Huns kept advancing into Roman territory. Finally, in 451, a combined Roman and Germanic army drove Attila's armies back at the Battle of Châlons (near Châlons-en-Champagne in modern-day France).

Alas, that victory did not save Rome. The movement of the Germanic tribes into the Western Empire destabilized and overwhelmed it. What followed was a Dark Age during which Europeans languished for centuries. Part of the blame rests with the Huns.

Scarcely had Europe emerged from the Dark Age when it faced another Asiatic invasion. This was the onslaught of the Mongols who turned west in the 13th century after conquering large parts of Asia. They pillaged Russia and Eastern Europe, leaving behind devastation and slavery. This is an account written by Giovanni de Plano Carpini, the Pope's envoy to the Mongol Great Khan, who traveled through Kiev in February 1246:

They [the Mongols] attacked Rus [Russia], where they made great havoc, destroying cities and fortresses and slaughtering men, and they lay siege to Kiev, the capital of Rus; after they had besieged the city for a long time, they took it and put the inhabitants to death. When we were journeying through the land we came across countless skulls and bones of dead men lying on the ground. Kiev had been a very large and thickly populated town, but now it has been reduced almost to nothing, for there are at the present time scarce two hundred houses there, and the inhabitants are kept in complete slavery.¹

The Mongols wanted all of Europe, and might have gotten it if the death of the great Ogedei Khan in 1242 had not sent Batu Khan, the leader who was ravaging Europe, back to the Mongolian capital to ensure his succession. Batu Khan left Eastern Europe depopulated and in ruins, but his return to Ulan Bator saved Western Europe. Still, Mongols remained in southern and central Russia for centuries in the Crimean, Kazan, and Astrakhan Khanates, which became hubs for slave raiding and trading. Some historians estimate that they enslaved more than three million Ukrainians, Russians, and Poles.² The word “slave” is etymologically close to the word “Slav” because of the number of Slavs who were enslaved over the centuries.

Although the heart of Europe was spared, the Mongols may have inflicted an even more horrible toll. In 1347, as bubonic plague raged from central Asia to the edges of their empire, Mongol forces besieged a Genoese outpost in the Crimea. They catapulted infected corpses into the city, thereby infecting Genoese traders who later traveled to southern Europe. The plague broke out in those areas and spread across the continent. Between 1348 and 1350, bubonic plague—the Black Death—wiped out a third or more of Europe’s population.³

The predations of the Huns and Mongols, however, were short-lived, compared with the thousand years of aggression unleashed against Europe by Moors, Turks, and other Muslims. A mere century after its founding, Islam advanced by the sword across the Middle East and North Africa and stood at the gates of Spain in 711.

Muslims quickly conquered most of that country and then surged into France. The fate of Europe hung in the balance at the Battle of Tours in 732, when the forces of Charles Martel defeated the Muslims and drove them back into Spain. The war in Iberia between Islam and Christendom waxed and waned for seven more centuries. Spanish Christians under Muslim rule lived in varying conditions at different times, but always had the status of *dhimmi*: non-Muslims subject to discriminatory laws.

Spaniards managed to gain back some of their territory, but in 1085 the Muslim commander Yusef ibn Tashufin led a fierce African army in an attempt to reconquer all of Spain. Mayhem and slavery followed in his wake, and he was stopped only by the courage of the legendary El Cid and other Spanish warriors. In the next century, another African army tried to finish what Yusef started. Brutal warfare continued until the Spaniards decisively defeated the Muslims at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. Nevertheless, Islam maintained an outpost in Europe until the Spaniards overran the last Muslim stronghold, Grenada, in 1492.

Many Muslims who left settled in North Africa. Some of them took to slave raiding along the coasts of Europe. In his book [*Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500-1800*](#), Professor Robert Davis noted that between those dates, “Enslavement was a very real possibility for anyone who traveled in the Mediterranean, or who lived along the shores in places like Italy, Spain and Portugal, even as far north as England and Iceland.” During that time, which was approximately the same period as Atlantic slave trade, Davis estimates that Muslim slavers captured one to one-and-a-quarter million Europeans, **often working them to death in quarries and oarsmen in galleys.**⁴ This number well exceeds the 800,000 black slaves estimated to have been taken to North America.

After the victory of Las Navas de Tolosa and the retreat of the Mongols, the heartland of Europe enjoyed only a brief period of peace. In the middle of the 13th century a new force gathered under the flag of Islam: the Ottoman Turks. Originally from Central Asia, the Ottomans drove into southeastern Europe in the early 14th century. In 1389 they crushed the Serbs at the battle of Kosovo and continued north for the next century-and-a-half. Europe’s defenders finally managed to halt them at the gates of Vienna only in 1529.

The Turks were renowned for their cruelty. During their rule of southeastern and central Europe they enslaved millions of people—three million from Hungary alone—sending many to the slave markets of Asia Minor and the Middle East. Some of the women went to harems; some of the men were made eunuchs. In Eastern Europe, as in Spain, Christians were *dhimmis*, and were forced to offer a regular quota of their sons to serve in the Ottoman army’s Janissary corps. These men had to embrace Islam and cut all ties to their families.⁵

The threat to Europe subsided somewhat in the 16th century, following two stunning Christian victories. The first was in 1565 when the Turks attacked Europe’s western flank by trying to capture the island of Malta. The heroic defenders—Spaniards, Italians, Maltese, outnumbered eight to one—hurled the Turks back with heavy losses, in what was one of the most bloody and bitterly contested sieges in history.

The second victory was at Lepanto, off the coast of Greece in 1571, when Christians met a Turkish armada of galleys intent on destroying Christian naval power once and for all. The Turks were stopped by the Holy League fleet, largely manned by Spaniards and Venetians and commanded by Don John of Austria. Shortly before the battle, the Europeans learned that the Turks had captured Cyprus, cut off the ears and nose of the Christian commander, and flayed him alive. Don John's men vowed vengeance—which they took abundantly. Most of the Turkish fleet was either destroyed or captured. Don John's men liberated 15,000 European slaves who had been Turkish galley slaves.⁶

The Turkish threat subsided but did not disappear. In 1683, the Ottomans launched their final attempt to conquer Europe, advancing once again to the gates of Vienna, where they lay siege to the city. Coming to its rescue was a Polish-German force commanded by King Jan Sobieski of Poland. The Ottoman army outnumbered Sobieski's, but the Polish king launched a surprise attack that routed the invaders.

For approximately two more centuries, the Ottomans fought a losing battle to keep their European possessions. They could not keep up with European military technology, and by the dawn of the 20th century, Europeans had long forgotten their fear of Muslim conquest. That danger was over—or so it seemed.

Long before the Muslim collapse, the nations of Europe began to establish their own colonies. Some, like the Spanish conquests in the New World, were harshly run, but centuries of Islamic aggression forged the Spanish character. In any case, European colonialism rarely lasted much more than two centuries, a short span compared to the foreign domination of large portions of Europe. European rule often ended peacefully, unlike the alien rule of Europe, which had to be thrown off by force of arms.

Europeans conducted their own slave trade, but they also did more than any other people to end slavery. Africans who made fortunes selling tribal enemies as slaves bitterly resisted the abolition of the trade, and slavery has still not been eradicated in Africa. In modern times, the West has given enormous amounts of aid to the Third World.

Why hate the West?

Why do so many Westerners hate the West? The roots of their thinking go back to classical Marxism, which aimed to incite working class rebellion. The workers refused to rebel, however, and sided with their national governments during World War I. After the war, a number of Marxists decided to revise their dogma. Prominent among them was a group living in Frankfurt, Germany, known as the Frankfurt School, who

believed that class struggle was not enough to bring about revolution. What was necessary was cultural Marxism that would attack the key pillars of Western Civilization: religion, patriotism, and family life. They called this attack on Western identity and culture “critical theory,” and members of the Frankfurt School brought this theory to the United States.⁷

Today, critical theory holds tremendous power. It endlessly harps on the West’s colonial past without mentioning the colonization *of* the West. It holds up Hitler and the Third Reich as symbols of Europe, without conceding that most of the West united against Hitler.

In Europe, cultural Marxists are using Muslim immigration to destroy the West claiming, ironically, that Europeans must atone for their sins by surrendering to those who sinned against them for so long. In America, Latin American immigration serves the same purpose. Cultural Marxists use Western guilt, manipulated by critical theory, to neutralize opposition—and yet these ideological heirs to the Cheka dungeons, the Ukrainian famine, the Gulag camps, and the Cambodian genocide have no moral authority to condemn the West

Today the fate of our civilization is in the balance, just as much as it was at Tours and Vienna. If they are to have a future, Europe and its overseas outposts must revisit their past. They must shed their guilt and rekindle their will to live. The spirits of Charles Martel, El Cid, Jan Sobieski, and all their valiant company will point the way.

Notes:

1. Wikipedia: Mongol Conquests-Europe. [Original source](#).
2. Mike Bennighof Ph.D. Soldier Khan, September 2007, www.avalanche.com.
3. The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol 2, 15th edition p. 253.
4. Davis, Robert *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary coast, and Italy, 1500-1800* P.23, Palgrave MacMillan, 2003.
5. Fregosi, Paul. Jihad, P.328, Prometheus Books 1998.
6. *Ibid.*, P.328.
7. William Lind, the Origins of Political Correctness, Accuracy in Academia (www.academia.org), February 5, 2000.

The Benefits of Thinking About Your Ancestors

British Psychological Society, 2010

Psychologists have shown previously that thinking about our own [mortality](#) - 'where we're going' - prompts us to shore up our cultural world view and engage in self-esteem boosting activities. Little researched until now, by contrast, are the psychological effects of thinking about where we came from - our ancestors.

Anecdotally, there's reason to believe that such thoughts are beneficial. Why else the public fascination with genealogy and programmes like the BBC's Who Do You Think You Are? Now [Peter Fischer](#) and his colleagues at the Universities of Graz, Berlin and Munich have shown that thinking about our ancestors boosts our performance on intelligence tests - what they've dubbed 'the ancestor effect'.

'Normally, our ancestors managed to overcome a multitude of personal and society problems, such as severe illnesses, wars, loss of loved ones or severe economic declines,' the researchers said. 'So, when we think about them, we are reminded that humans who are genetically similar to us can successfully overcome a multitude of problems and adversities.'

An initial study involved 80 undergrads spending five minutes thinking about either their fifteenth century ancestors, their great-grandparents or a recent shopping trip. Afterwards, those students in the two ancestor conditions were more confident about their likely performance in future exams, an effect that seemed to be mediated by their feeling more in control of their lives.

Three further studies showed that thinking or writing about their recent or distant ancestors led students to actually perform better on a range of intelligence tests, including verbal and spatial tasks (in one test, students who thought about their distant ancestors scored an average of 14 out of 16, compared with an average of 10 out of 16 among controls). The ancestor benefit was mediated partly by students attempting more answers - what the researchers called having a 'promotion orientation'.

These benefits weren't displayed by students in control conditions that involved writing about themselves or about close friends. Moreover, the ancestor effect exerted its benefit even when students were asked to think about negative aspects of their

ancestors.

'We showed that an easy reminder about our ancestors can significantly increase intellectual performance,' the researchers said. 'Hence, whenever people are in a situation where intellectual performance is extraordinarily important, for example in exams or job interviews, they have an easy technique to increase their success.'

Fischer and his colleagues emphasised their research is at an exploratory phase. Future work is needed to find out what other benefits thinking of ancestors might have, and also to uncover other possible mediating factors, which they speculated might have to do with 'processes of social identity, family cohesion, self-regulation or norm activation elicited by increased ancestor salience.'

Source:

Fischer, P., Sauer, A., Vogrincic, C., and Weisweiler, S. (2010). The ancestor effect: Thinking about our genetic origin enhances intellectual performance. *European Journal of Social Psychology* DOI: [10.1002/ejsp.778](https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.778)
<http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/241607/223513579/name/The%2BAncessor%2BEffect.pdf>

Human Biodiversity vs The Phony Blank Slate “Consensus”

Peter Frost, 2015

Original Title: *Sometimes the Consensus is Phony*

A synthesis has been forming in the field of human biodiversity. It may be summarized as follows:

1. Human evolution did not end in the Pleistocene or even slow down. In fact, it speeded up with the advent of agriculture 10,000 years ago, when the pace of genetic change rose over a hundred-fold. Humans were no longer adapting to relatively static natural environments but rather to faster-changing cultural environments of their own making. Our ancestors thus directed their own evolution. They created new ways of life, which in turn influenced who would survive and who wouldn't.
2. When life or death depends on your ability to follow a certain way of life, you are necessarily being selected for certain heritable characteristics. Some of these are dietary—an ability to digest milk or certain foods. Others, however, are mental and behavioral, things like aptitudes, personality type, and behavioral predispositions. This is because a way of life involves thinking and behaving in specific ways. Keep in mind, too, that most mental and behavioral traits have moderate to high heritability.
3. This gene-culture co-evolution began when humans had already spread over the whole world, from the equator to the arctic. So it followed trajectories that differed from one geographic population to another. Even when these populations had to adapt to similar ways of life, they may have done so differently, thus opening up (or closing off) different possibilities for further gene-culture co-evolution. Therefore, on theoretical grounds alone, human populations should differ in the genetic adaptations they have acquired. The differences should generally be small and statistical, being noticeable only when one compares large numbers of individuals. Nonetheless, even small

differences, when added up over many individuals and many generations, can greatly influence the way a society grows and develops.

4. Humans have thus altered their environment via culture, and this man-made environment has altered humans via natural selection. This is probably the farthest we can go in formulating a unified theory of human biodiversity. For Gregory Clark, the key factor was the rise of settled, pacified societies, where people could get ahead through work and trade, rather than through violence and plunder. For Henry Harpending and Greg Cochran, it was the advent of agriculture and, later, civilization. For J. Philippe Rushton and Ed Miller, it was the entry of humans into cold northern environments, which increased selection for more parental investment, slower life history, and higher cognitive performance. Each of these authors has identified part of the big picture, but the picture itself is too big to reduce to a single factor.

5. Antiracist scholars have argued against the significance of human biodiversity, but their arguments typically reflect a lack of evolutionary thinking. Yes, human populations are open to gene flow and are thus not sharply defined (if they were, they would be *species*). It doesn't follow, however, that the only legitimate objects of study are sharply defined ones. Few things in this world would pass that test.

Yes, genes vary much more within human populations than between them, but these two kinds of genetic variation are not comparable. A population boundary typically coincides with a geographic or ecological barrier, such as a change from one vegetation zone to another or, in humans, a change from one way of life to another. It thus separates not only different populations but also differing pressures of natural selection. This is why genetic variation within a population differs qualitatively from genetic variation between populations. The first kind cannot be ironed out by similar selection pressures and thus tends to involve genes of little or no selective value. The second kind occurs across population boundaries, which tend to separate different ecosystems, different vegetation zones, different ways of life ... and different selection pressures. So the genes matter a lot more.

This isn't just theory. We see the same genetic overlap between many sibling species that are nonetheless distinct anatomically and behaviorally. Because such species have arisen over a relatively short span of time, like human populations, they have been made different primarily by natural selection, so the genetic differences between them are more likely to have adaptive, functional consequences ... as opposed to "junk variability" that slowly accumulates over time.

Why is the above so controversial?

The above synthesis should not be controversial. Yet it is. In fact, it scarcely resembles acceptable thinking within academia and even less so within society at large. There are two main reasons.

The war on racism

In the debate over nature versus nurture, the weight of opinion shifted toward the latter during the 20th century. This shift began during the mid-1910s and was initially a reaction against the extreme claims being made for genetic determinism. In reading the literature of the time, one is struck by the restraint of early proponents of environmental determinism, especially when they argue against race differences in mental makeup. An example appears in *The Clash of Colour* (1925), whose author condemned America's Jim Crow laws and the hypocrisy of proclaiming the rights of Europeans to self-determination while ignoring those of Africans and Asians. Nonetheless, like the [young Franz Boas](#), he was reluctant to deny the existence of mental differences:

I would submit the principle that, although differences of racial mental qualities are relatively small, so small as to be indistinguishable with certainty in individuals, they are yet of great importance for the life of nations, because they exert throughout many generations a constant bias upon the development of their culture and their institutions. (Mathews, 1925, p. 151)

That was enlightened thinking in the 1920s. The early 1930s brought a radical turn with Hitler's arrival to power and a growing sense of urgency that led many Jewish and non-Jewish scholars to declare war on "racism." The word itself was initially a synonym for Nazism, and even today Nazi Germany still holds a central place in antiracist discourse.

Why didn't the war on racism end when the Second World War ended? For one thing, many people, feared a third global conflict in which anti-Semitism would play a dominant role. For another, antiracism took on a life of its own during the Cold War, when the two superpowers were vying for influence over the emerging countries of Asia and Africa.

Globalism

The end of the Cold War might have brought an end to the war on racism, or at least a winding down, had it not replaced socialism with an even more radical project:

globalism. This is the hallmark of "late capitalism," a stage of historical development when the elites no longer feel restrained by national identity and are thus freer to enrich themselves at their host society's expense, mainly by outsourcing jobs to low-wage countries and by insourcing low-wage labor for jobs that cannot be relocated, such as those in construction and services. That's globalism in a nutshell.

This two-way movement redistributes wealth from owners of labor to owners of capital. Businesses get not only a cheaper workforce but also weaker labor and environmental standards. To stay competitive, workers in high-wage countries have to accept lower pay and a return to working conditions of another age. The top 10% are thus pulling farther and farther ahead of everyone else throughout the developed world. They're getting richer ... not by making a better product but by making the same product with cheaper and less troublesome inputs of labor. This is not a win-win situation, and the potential for revolutionary unrest is high.

To stave off unrest, economic systems require legitimacy, and legitimacy is made possible by ideology: a vision of a better future; how we can get there from here; and why we're not getting there despite the best efforts. Economic systems don't create ideology, but they do create conditions that favor some ideologies over others. With the collapse of the old left in the late 1980s, and the rise of market globalization, antiracism found a new purpose ... as a source of legitimacy for the globalist project.

I saw this up close in an antiracist organization during the mid to late 1980s. Truth be told, we mostly did things like marching in the May Day parade, agitating for a higher minimum wage, denouncing the U.S. intervention in Panama, organizing talks about Salvador Allende and what went wrong in Chile ... you get the drift. Antiracism was subservient to the political left. This was not a natural state of affairs, since the antiracist movement—like the Left in general—is a coalition of ethnic/religious factions that prefer to pursue their own narrow interests. This weakness was known to the political right, many of whom tried to exploit it by supporting Muslim fundamentalists in Afghanistan and elsewhere and black nationalists in Africa, Haiti, and the U.S. Yes, politics makes strange bedfellows.

With the onset of the 1990s, no one seemed to believe in socialism anymore and we wanted to tap into corporate sources of funding. So we reoriented. Leftist rhetoric was out and slick marketing in. Our educational materials looked glossier but now featured crude "Archie Bunker" caricatures of working people, and the language seemed increasingly anti-white. I remember feeling upset, even angry. So I left.

Looking back, I realize things had to happen that way. With the disintegration of the old socialist left, antiracists were freer to follow their natural inclinations, first by

replacing class politics with identity politics, and second by making common cause with the political right, especially for the project of creating a globalized economy. Antiracism became a means to a new end.


This is the context that now frames the war on racism. For people in a position to influence public policy, antiracism is not only a moral imperative but also an economic one. It makes the difference between a sluggish return on investment of only 2 to 3% (which is typical in a mature economy) and a much higher one.

References

- Clark, G. (2007). *A Farewell to Alms. A Brief Economic History of the World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.
- Clark, G. (2009a). *The indicted and the wealthy: surnames, reproductive success, genetic selection and social class in pre-industrial England*,
<http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/Farewell%20to%20Alms/Clark%20-Surnames.pdf>
- Clark, G. (2009b). The domestication of Man: The social implications of Darwin, *ArtefaCTos*, 2(1), 64-80.
http://campus.usal.es/~revistas_trabajo/index.php/artefactos/article/viewFile/5427/5465
- Clark, G. (2010). *Regression to mediocrity? Surnames and social mobility in England, 1200-2009*
<http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/papers/Ruling%20Class%20-%20EJS%20version.pdf>
- Cochran, G. and H. Harpending. (2010). *The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution*, New York: Basic Books.
- Frost, P. (2011a). Human nature or human natures? *Futures*, 43, 740-748.
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/251725125_Human_nature_or_human_natures/file/504635223eaf8196f0.pdf
- Frost, P. (2011b). Rethinking intelligence and human geographic variation, *Evo and Proud*, February 11
<http://evoandproud.blogspot.ca/2011/02/rethinking-intelligence-and-human.html>
- Harpending, H., and G. Cochran. (2002). In our genes, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U.S.A.*, 99, 10-12.
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC117504/>
- Hawks, J., E.T. Wang, G.M. Cochran, H.C. Harpending, and R.K. Moyzis. (2007). Recent acceleration of human adaptive evolution, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U.S.A.*, 104, 20753-20758.
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/5761823_Recent_acceleration_of_human_adaptive_evolution/file/9c9605240c4bb57b55.pdf
- Mathews, B. (1925). *The Clash of Colour. A Study in the Problem of Race*, London: Edinburgh House Press.
- Miller, E. (1994). Paternal provisioning versus mate seeking in human populations, *Personality and Individual Differences*, 17, 227-255.
<http://www.prometheism.net/paternal/>
- Rushton, J. P. (2000). *Race, Evolution, and Behavior*, 3rd ed., Charles Darwin Research Institute.
http://lazypawn.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Race_Evolution_Behavior.pdf

Two Paths

Peter Frost, 2015



Compendium on agriculture, Japan, 1782. Rice farming, which requires community planning of water use and irrigation, may have favored a less individualistic mindset in East Asia.

Kinship is the organizing principle of small human societies, such as bands of hunter-gatherers or small farming villages. This is seen in their notions of right and wrong—the same behavior may be wrong toward kin but right toward non-kin, or at least not punishable. Morality is enforced by social pressure from fellow kinfolk, which in extreme cases can lead to ostracism and banishment.

This kin-based morality breaks down as societies grow larger and as the circle of regular interaction spreads beyond close kin. Wrongdoers are less easily brought into line because they and their victims no longer share the same kinfolk. Wrongs have to be avenged through vendettas: my clan against yours. Since vendettas can go on

indefinitely, causing much more harm than the initial wrongdoing, a society cannot be both large and orderly unless it can resolve disputes between unrelated individuals. Hence, the development of codified law and justice systems. Hence the prohibition of violence as a means to resolve personal disputes.

In much of the world, this is as far as cultural evolution has gone. The circle of trusting relationships extends no farther than one's kinship ties; beyond, morality is enforced only by the force of law, and court justice is expensive, time-consuming, and not always impartial. So dealings with non-kin are kept to the minimum necessary. This low level of trust restricts trade, keeping it bottled up spatially and temporally in marketplaces and family businesses. A true market economy cannot self-generate.

Cultural evolution has gone farther in two parts of the world: Northwest Europe and East Asia. The outcomes are rather similar—peaceful, orderly societies encompassing large numbers of people—but they have come about differently. Northwest Europeans could pursue this trajectory because they already had relatively weak kinship when they began to develop larger and more complex societies in the 12th century. There was a pre-existing tendency to live outside kinship structures, as seen in the Western European Marriage Pattern: men and women married relatively late and many never married; children usually left the family household to form new households; and many individuals circulated among non-related households, typically young people sent out as servants ([Hajnal, 1965](#); [Hallam, 1985](#); [Hartman, 2004](#); [Seccombe, 1992](#)). This weak kinship environment was made possible by three mental adaptations: greater capacity for involuntary guilt and empathy; greater receptiveness to absolute moral norms, as opposed to relativistic ones based on kinship; and stronger desire to punish, exclude, and even kill violators of these norms ([Frost, 2014a](#); [Frost, 2014b](#)).

When the Dark Ages came to an end, Northwest Europeans were well positioned to exploit the possibility of creating a larger and more complex social environment. Their mental makeup “pre-adapted” them for a trajectory of increasingly radical change: strengthening of Church and State, expansion of Christian guilt culture, pacification of social relations, and reorganization of these relations independently of kinship to create new forms of social organization (market economy, nation state, ideological regime, etc.).

East Asians have followed a different trajectory to a similar end, relying less on internal means of behavior control (guilt, empathy) and more on external means (shaming, family discipline, community surveillance, notions of moral duty). The main difference is in the relationship between self and society. Whereas a greater sense of self has helped Northwest Europeans to transcend the limitations of kinship and, thus, build larger societies, East Asians have relied on a lesser sense of self to

create a web of interdependence that extends beyond close kin. There is a stronger tendency toward holistic attention, emphasis on social (versus personal) happiness, and suspension of self-interest. Conversely, there is a weaker tendency toward self-expression, self-esteem, and self-efficacy ([Kitayama et al., 2014](#)).

This trajectory may have been particularly favored by rice farming, which requires community planning of water use and community construction of irrigation networks. Even when neighboring districts are compared in China, individualism seems to be much weaker where rice is grown than where wheat is grown. This pattern holds up even in urban residents who have never actually lived on a farm and whose connection to rice farming is only genealogical ([Talhelm et al., 2014](#)).

Gene-culture co-evolution

Our biological selves have evolved to meet not only the demands of our natural environment but also those of our cultural environment. There has thus been selection for certain aptitudes, predispositions, and personality types.

For instance, if a culture favors individuals who respond more readily to the problems of others, this response will become more common with each passing generation, since affective empathy has a heritability of 68% ([Chakrabarti et al., 2013](#)). There is no need to create this mental trait from scratch. Affective empathy exists to varying extents in all humans, although it is stronger in women, perhaps because it originally served to strengthen the caring relationship between a mother and her children ([Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004](#); [Frost, 2014a](#)). In Northwest Europeans, it has become more generalized, being felt by all normal individuals toward all people, except for those who are judged to be morally worthless. The result is a higher level of interpersonal trust and the development of social relations that would otherwise be impossible ([Medrano, 2010](#)).

Are there biological markers of this gene-culture co-evolution in Northwest Europeans? Enlargement of the amygdala is known to be associated with high altruism toward strangers, and two studies, one in southern California and the other in London, have found a larger amygdala in “conservatives” than in “liberals” ([Kanai et al., 2011](#); [Marsh et al., 2014](#); [Schreiber et al., 2013](#)). The difference may actually be an ethnic one, given the voting patterns in both areas.

In East Asians, pro-social behavior is supported not so much by empathy as by notions of duty toward the community ([Frost, 2014b](#)). This trajectory of gene-culture co-evolution seems to have its own biological markers, notably certain changes to the dopamine signaling system. In a recent study, a sample of Euro-Americans was

compared with a sample of East Asians born in China, Korea, or Japan. The participants were genotyped for the dopamine D4 receptor gene (*DRD4*) and then administered a test on their social orientation. The test showed that the East Asians were less individualistic than the Euro-Americans, but this psychological difference was limited to carriers of *DRD4* variants that increase dopamine signalling, i.e., 7- or 2-repeat alleles. Non-carrier East Asians were just as individualistic as non-carrier Euro-Americans ([Kitayama et al., 2014](#)). It seems that the East Asian cultural environment can reduce individualism only among individuals who carry these variants.

This finding is puzzling in one sense. Previous work has shown that the same *DRD4* variants are associated with risk seeking and heavy drinking. The authors suggest that these variants make people more willing to imitate their peers, be they drinking buddies or ma and pa:

It might be the case that the 7R and 2R alleles are associated with greater acquisition of culturally sanctioned social orientations under generally favorable conditions of socialization, such as careful guidance and scaffolding of norm-congruous behaviors by socialization agents (e.g., parents, relatives, neighbors), but with markedly different, deviant behaviors (e.g., delinquency and risk proneness) under unfavorable social conditions or adversity, which might “reward” externalization or risk taking. ([Kitayama et al., 2014](#))

Although one gene may largely explain why East Asians differ from Euro-Americans in social orientation, other genes may be involved in this and other differences between the two groups:

The current work has some bearing on the coevolution of cultural systems and genetic polymorphisms. [Chiao and Blizinsky \(2010\)](#) suggested that certain alleles of the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism of the serotonin transporter gene might have coevolved with cultural collectivism and individualism. They argued that although a short allele of 5-HTTLPR is linked to anxiety and depression, especially under traumatic life conditions ([Caspi et al., 2003](#)), this genetic risk might be mitigated by cultural collectivism, which involves more caring social relations and support networks. Cultural collectivism might therefore “buffer genetically susceptible populations from increased

prevalence of affective disorders” (p. 529), which in turn might lead to a relatively high prevalence of the short allele of 5-HTTLPR. (Kitayama et al., 2014)

References:

- Baron-Cohen, S. and S. Wheelwright. (2004). The Empathy Quotient: An investigation of adults with Asperger Syndrome or high functioning autism, and normal sex differences. *Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders*, 34, 163-175. http://ftp.aspires-relationships.com/the_empathy_quotion_of_adults_with_as.pdf
- Caspi, A., K. Sugden, T.E. Moffitt, A. Taylor, I.W. Craig, H. Harrington, et al. (2003). Influence of life stress on depression: Moderation by a polymorphism in the 5-HTT gene, *Science*, 301, 386-389. <http://fire.biol.wvu.edu/trent/trent/lifestress.pdf>
- Chakrabarti, B. and S. Baron-Cohen. (2013). Understanding the genetics of empathy and the autistic spectrum, in S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, M. Lombardo. (eds). *Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Social Neuroscience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://books.google.ca/books?hl=fr&lr=&id=eTdLAAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA326&ots=fHpygaxaMQ&sig=_sJsVgdoe0hc-fFbzaW3GMEslZU#v=onepage&q&f=false
- Chiao, J. Y., and K.D. Blizinsky. (2010). Culture-gene coevolution of individualism-collectivism and the serotonin transporter gene, *Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, 277, 529-537. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2842692/>
- Frost, P. (2014a). How universal is empathy? *Evo and Proud*, June 28 <http://www.unz.com/pfrost/how-universal-is-empathy/>
- Frost, P. (2014b). Affective empathy. An evolutionary mistake? *Evo and Proud*, September 20 <http://www.unz.com/pfrost/affective-empathy-an-evolutionary-mistake/>
- Hajnal, J. (1965). European marriage pattern in historical perspective. In D.V. Glass and D.E.C. Eversley. *Population in History*. London: Arnold. <http://www.popline.org/node/517620>
- Hallam, H.E. (1985). Age at first marriage and age at death in the Lincolnshire Fenland, 1252-1478, *Population Studies*, 39, 55-69. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0032472031000141276#.VMKUzuk5DCs>
- Hartman, M.S. (2004). *The Household and the Making of History. A Subversive View of the Western Past*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <http://books.google.ca/books?hl=fr&lr=&id=Ynta0T8XCXgC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=%22household+and+the+making+of+history%22&ots=RKOGFT0iX3&sig=yJCKWta8-HpHsyfn1eLaCmbe26A>
- Kanai, R., T. Feilden, C. Firth, and G. Rees. (2011). Political orientations are correlated with brain structure in young adults, *Current Biology*, 21, 677 – 680. [http://www.cell.com/current-biology/abstract/S0960-9822\(11\)00289-2](http://www.cell.com/current-biology/abstract/S0960-9822(11)00289-2)
- Kitayama, S., A. King, C. Yoon, S. Tompson, S. Huff, and I. Liberzon. (2014). The Dopamine D4 Receptor Gene (DRD4) Moderates Cultural Difference in Independent Versus Interdependent Social Orientation, *Psychological Science*, 25, 1169-1177. <http://pss.sagepub.com/content/25/6/1169.short>
- Marsh, A.A., S.A. Stoycos, K.M. Brethel-Haurwitz, P. Robinson, J.W. VanMeter, and E.M. Cardinale. (2014). Neural and cognitive characteristics of extraordinary altruists, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 111, 15036-15041. <http://www.pnas.org/content/111/42/15036.short>
- Medrano, J.D. (2010). Interpersonal trust. World Values Survey Archive <http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurveyMaps.jsp?Idioma=I&SeccionTexto=0404&NOID=104>
- Schreiber, D., Fonzo, G., Simmons, A.N., Dawes, C.T., Flagan, T., et al. (2013). Red Brain, Blue Brain: Evaluative Processes Differ in Democrats and Republicans. *PLoS ONE* 8(2): e52970. <http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3A%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0052970>
- Siu, A.M.H. and D.T. L. Shek. (2005). Validation of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index in a Chinese Context, *Research on Social Work Practice*, 15, 118-126. <http://rsw.sagepub.com/content/15/2/118.short>
- Secombe, W. (1992). *A Millennium of Family Change. Feudalism to Capitalism in Northwestern Europe*, London: Verso. <http://books.google.ca/books?hl=fr&lr=&id=MiTztZI-pzUC&oi=fnd&pg=PP13&ots=E-rMsM8u-P&sig=ifA6uDqYFLomOGQwyBfNfrDKTp#v=onepage&q&f=false>
- Talhelm, T., X. Zhang, S. Oishi, C. Shimin, D. Duan, X. Lan, and S. Kitayama. (2014). Large-scale psychological differences within China explained by rice versus wheat agriculture, *Science*, 344, 603-607. <http://internationalpsychoanalysis.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RiceversusWheatScience-2014-Talhelm-603-8.pdf>

How Universal Is Empathy?

Peter Frost, 2014



Bronislaw Malinowski with natives on the Trobriand Islands (1918 - [source](#)). Pro-social behavior seems to be a human universal, but is the same true for full empathy?

What is empathy? It has at least three components:

- pro-social behavior, i.e., actions of compassion to help others
- cognitive empathy, i.e., capacity to understand another person's mental state
- affective or emotional empathy, i.e., capacity to respond with the appropriate emotion to another person's mental state ([Chakrabarti and Baron-Cohen, 2013](#))

In their review of the literature, Chakrabarti and Baron-Cohen (2013) conclude that all three components are moderately to highly heritable, although the affective component seems to show the highest heritability (68%). This is in line with Davis et al. (1994), who found significant heritability for the affective facets of empathy (empathic concern and personal distress) but not for non-affective perspective taking.

All three components can vary from one individual to another, although studies to date have focused on pathological variation:

For example, it is suggested that people with psychopathic personality disorder may have intact cognitive empathy

(hence being able to deceive others), but impaired affective empathy (hence being able to hurt others), whilst people with autism may show the opposite profile (hence finding the social world confusing because of their deficit in cognitive empathy, but not being over-represented among criminal offenders, having no wish to hurt others, suggesting their affective empathy may be intact) ([Chakrabarti and Baron-Cohen, 2013](#))

People with depression may suffer from too much empathy, i.e., being too sensitive to the needs or distress of others ([O'Connor et al., 2007](#)). In short, these disorders seem to be the tail ends of a normal distribution. By focusing on these extremes, we forget that most of the genetic variability in empathy occurs among healthy individuals (Gillberg, 2007).

Using research findings on autism and Asperger syndrome, Chakrabarti and Baron-Cohen (2013) have identified nine candidate genes that seem to promote empathy. They fall into three functional categories: sex-steroid synthesis and metabolism; neural development and connectivity; and social-emotional responsivity. The first category includes the degree to which a fetus is androgenized or estrogenized before birth, as shown by digit ratio ([Frost, 2014](#)).

Variation among human populations

If the genes associated with empathy vary among healthy individuals, do they also vary among human populations? This would be expected because populations have differed in their needs for different components of empathy, particularly since hunting and gathering gave way to farming some 10,000 years ago—when genetic change speeded up over a hundred-fold. At that time, humans were no longer adapting to new physical environments. They were adapting to new cultural environments that differed in social structure, in division of labor, in means of subsistence, in norms of conduct, in future time orientation, in degree of sedentary living, and so on. Our ancestors were now reshaping their environments, and these human-made environments were now reshaping them—in other words, gene-culture co-evolution ([Hawks et al., 2007](#)).

Humans have been transformed especially by the shift from small bands of hunter-gatherers to larger and more complex groups of farmers and townsfolk. With social relations expanding beyond the circle of close kin, kinship obligations were no longer enough to ensure mutual assistance and stop free riding. There was thus selection for pro-social behavior, i.e., a spontaneous willingness to help not only kin but also non-kin.

Pro-social behavior is attested across a wide range of cultures. It is the subject of a recent book about the nature and limits of empathy in Oceanic cultures. The Banabans of Fiji for instance express the idea of pro-sociality through the term *nanoanga*, which they normally translate into English by “compassion” or “pity.”

[...] compassion is the basis for their capacity to bond socially with others, even compassion to the point of readiness to take strangers into their community. Their empathy therefore relates causally to how they act socially toward others. Here compassion or pity embraces both understanding and fellow feeling: the islanders understand that the stranded mariner is at the end of his strength, which is why they succor him and treat him as one of their own. They understand him because he, like them, is a human being, a person. [...] Thus, for example, when someone passing by a house does not belong to the immediate family of those inside, it is customary to welcome the passer-by by calling out the words *mai rin!* (Come in!), which carry the implication that food and drink will not be found wanting inside. (Hermann, 2011, p. 31)

This desire to help non-kin is not unconditional. The author notes that prior experiences with an individual in distress can determine whether compassion will be given or withheld. Moreover, Barnabans can “proceed strategically when deciding whether to extend trust to others or to keep thoughts and feelings to themselves” (Hermann, 2011, p. 31). This is not the affective empathy of entering another person’s mind to feel his or her pain.

When the Barnabans compare themselves with others, and when by their behavior toward the stranger they show that they understand him and feel with him, they do not, however, equate themselves fully and entirely with him. (Hermann, 2011, p. 32)

Another contributor to the same book writes similarly about the inhabitants of Vanatinai, in the Trobriand Islands.

On the island of Vanatinai, when someone, including an ethnographer, privately asks a trusted confidant, “Why did she/he act like that?” “What was she/he thinking?” the common answer, often uttered in tones of puzzlement and despair, or anxiety and fear, expresses one of the islanders’

core epistemological principles: “We cannot know their *renuanga*.” *Renuanga* is a word that refers to a person’s inner experiences, both and inseparably thought and emotion.

[...] And their psychic states, their inner thought and feelings, are inherently unknowable. It may never be clear why they were angry or sympathetic, and what caused them to act and influence an event in someone’s life [...] (Lepowsky, 2011, p. 44)

In short, Oceanic cultures display hospitality but not full empathy, which would be considered undesirable anyway:

The philosophical principle of personal opacity, the interiority of others’ thoughts/feelings (*renuanga*), is closely bound to the islanders’ fierce insistence on personal autonomy, both as cultural ideology and as daily social practice (Lepowsky, 2011, p. 47)

From pro-sociality to full empathy

Whereas pro-sociality is attested across a wide range of cultures, full cognitive/affective empathy is more localized. The difference is like the one we see between shame and guilt. Most cultures primarily use shame to enforce correct behavior, i.e., if other people see you breaking a rule, you feel ashamed and this feeling is reinforced by social disapproval. In contrast, only a minority of cultures—largely those of Northwest Europe—rely primarily on guilt, which operates even when only you see yourself breaking a rule or merely think about breaking a rule (Benedict, 1946; [Creighton, 1990](#)).

Northwest Europeans have thus undergone two parallel changes in behavioral control: 1) a shift from pro-sociality to full cognitive/affective empathy; and 2) a shift from shame to guilt. Indeed, full empathy and guilt may be two sides of the same coin. Both are the consequences of a mental model that is used to simulate how another person thinks or feels (an imaginary witness to a wrongful act, a person in distress) and to ensure correct behavior by inducing the appropriate feelings (anguish, pity).

Finally, full empathy and guilt are most adaptive where kinship ties are relatively weak and where rules of correct behavior require a leveling of the playing field between kin and non-kin. This has long been the case in Northwest Europe. There seems to be a longstanding pattern of weak kinship ties west of a line running from

Trieste to St. Petersburg, as shown by several culture traits that are rare or absent elsewhere:

- relatively late marriage for men and women
- many people who never marry
- neolocality (children leave the family household to form new households)
- high circulation of non-kin among different households (typically young people sent out as servants) (Hajnal, 1965)

Commonly called the Western European Marriage Pattern, this geographic zone of relatively weak kinship was thought to have arisen after the Black Death of the 14th century. There is now good evidence for its existence before the Black Death and fragmentary evidence going back to 9th century France and even earlier (Hallam, 1985; Seccombe, 1992, p. 94). Historian Alan Macfarlane likewise sees an English tendency toward weaker kinship ties before the 13th century and even during Anglo-Saxon times ([Macfarlane, 2012](#); [Macfarlane, 1992](#), pp. 173-174).

This weak kinship zone may have arisen in prehistory along the coasts of the North Sea and the Baltic, which were once home to a unique Mesolithic culture ([Price, 1991](#)). An abundance of marine resources enabled hunter-fisher-gatherers to achieve high population densities by congregating each year in large coastal agglomerations for fishing, sealing, and shellfish collecting. Population densities were comparable in fact to those of farming societies, but unlike the latter there was much “churning” because these agglomerations formed and reformed on a yearly basis. Kinship obligations would have been insufficient to resolve disputes peaceably, to manage shared resources, and to ensure respect for social rules. Initially, peer pressure was probably used to get people to see things from the other person’s perspective. Over time, however, the pressure of natural selection would have favored individuals who more readily felt this equivalence of perspectives, the result being a progressive hardwiring of compassion and shame and their gradual transformation into empathy and guilt ([Frost, 2013a](#); [Frost, 2013b](#)).

Empathy and guilt are brutally effective ways to enforce social rules. If one disobeys these internal overseers, the result is self-punishment that passes through three stages: anguish, depression and, ultimately, suicidal ideation.

People suffering from depression are looking at both others and themselves with suspicion, often believing whatever they have was obtained by cheating, and that it is more than they deserve. Depressives, burdened by moralistic

standards, are harsh evaluators of both themselves and others. The self-punishment meted out by depressives is a common if disturbing symptom; while thinking 'I deserve this', they may engage in altruistic punishment turned upon the self. Just as altruistic punishers experience a neuronally based reward from punishing defectors, despite material costs, depressed patients report a sense of relief upon inflicting self-punishment. Patients who are 'cutters', describe relief from tension after cutting and depressives with suicidal ideation may describe the relief they felt when on the verge of attempting a suicidal action. ([O'Connor et al., 2007](#), p. 67)

This pathology is progressively less common in populations farther south and east, not so much because each stage is less common but rather because depression is much less likely to result from empathic guilt and much less likely to lead to suicide (Stompe et al., 2001). This 3-stage sequence does not seem to be a human universal, at least not to the same extent as in Northwest Europeans, a reality that Frantz Fanon noted when describing clinical depression in Algerians:

French psychiatrists in Algeria found themselves faced with a difficult problem. When treating a melancholic patient, they were accustomed to being afraid of suicide. The melancholic Algerian kills, however. This disease of the moral conscience that is always accompanied by self-accusation and self-destructive tendencies assumes hetero-destructive forms in the Algerian. The melancholic Algerian does not commit suicide. He kills. (Fanon, 1970, pp. 219-220)

References:

- Benedict, R. (1946 [[2005](#)]). *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. Patterns of Japanese Culture*, First Mariner Books.
- Chakrabarti, B. and S. Baron-Cohen. (2013). Understanding the genetics of empathy and the autistic spectrum, in S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, M. Lombardo. (eds). *Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Social Neuroscience*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://books.google.ca/books?hl=fr&lr=&id=eTdLAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA326&ots=fHpygaxaMQ&sig=_sJsVgdoe0hc-fFbzaW3GMEslZU#v=onepage&q&f=false
- Creighton, M.R. (1990). Revisiting shame and guilt cultures: A forty-year pilgrimage, *Ethos*, 18, 279-307. http://sfprg.org/control_mastery/docs/revisits ShameGuilt.pdf
- Davis, M.H., C. Luce, and S.J. Kraus. (1994). The heritability of characteristics associated with dispositional empathy, *Journal of Personality*, 62, 369-391.
- Fanon, F. (1970). *Les damnés de la terre*, Paris: Maspero.

- Frost, P. (2013a). The origins of Northwest European guilt culture, *Evo and Proud*, December 7 <http://www.unz.com/pfrost/the-origins-of-northwest-european-guilt/>
- Frost, P. (2013b). Origins of Northwest European guilt culture, Part II, *Evo and Proud*, December 14 <http://www.unz.com/pfrost/origins-of-northwest-european-guilt/>
- Frost, P. (2014). A pathway to pro-social behavior, *Evo and Proud*, May 10. <http://www.unz.com/pfrost/a-pathway-to-pro-social-behavior/>
- Gillberg, C. (2007). Non-autism childhood personality disorders, in: T.F.D. Farrow and P.W.R. Woodruff (eds). *Empathy in Mental Illness*, (pp. 111-125). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hajnal, J. (1965). European marriage pattern in historical perspective. In D.V. Glass and D.E.C. Eversley (eds). *Population in History*, Arnold, London.
- Hallam, H.E. (1985). Age at first marriage and age at death in the Lincolnshire Fenland, 1252-1478, *Population Studies*, 39, 55-69.
- Hawks, J., E.T. Wang, G.M. Cochran, H.C. Harpending, & R.K. Moyzis. (2007). Recent acceleration of human adaptive evolution. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (USA)*, 104, 20753-20758. http://harpending.humanevo.utah.edu/Documents/accel_pnas_submit.pdf
- Hermann, E. (2011). Empathy, ethnicity, and the self among the Barnabans in Fiji, in D.W. Hollan, C. J. Throop (eds). *The Anthropology of Empathy: Experiencing the Lives of Others in Pacific Societies*, (pp. 25-42), New York: Berghahn.
- Lepowsky, M. (2011). The boundaries of personhood, the problem of empathy, and “the native’s point of view” in the outer islands, in D.W. Hollan, C. J. Throop (eds). *The Anthropology of Empathy: Experiencing the Lives of Others in Pacific Societies*, (pp. 43-68), New York: Berghahn.
- Macfarlane, A. (1992). On individualism, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 82, 171-199. http://www.alanmacfarlane.com/TEXTS/On_Individualism.pdf
- Macfarlane, A. (2012). The invention of the modern world. Chapter 8: Family, friendship and population, *The Fortnightly Review*, Spring-Summer serial <http://fortnightlyreview.co.uk/2012/07/invention-8/>
- O’Connor, L.E., J.W. Berry, T. Lewis, K. Mulherin, and P.S. Crisostomo. (2007). Empathy and depression: the moral system in overdrive, in: T.F.D. Farrow and P.W.R. Woodruff (eds). *Empathy in Mental Illness*, (pp. 49-75). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <http://www.eparg.org/publications/empathy-chapter-web.pdf>
- Price, T.D. (1991). The Mesolithic of Northern Europe, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 20, 211-233. <http://www.cas.umt.edu/departments/anthropology/courses/anth254/documents/annurev.an.TDouglasPrice1991MesolithicNEurope.pdf>
- Secombe, W. (1992). *A Millennium of Family Change. Feudalism to Capitalism in Northwestern Europe*, London: Verso.
- Stompe, T., G. Ortwein-Swoboda, H.R. Chaudhry, A. Friedmann, T. Wenzel, and H. Schanda. (2001). Guilt and depression: a cross-cultural comparative study, *Psychopathology*, 34, 289-298.

Cousin Marriage, The Islamic World, and Low Trust Societies

Steve Sailer, 2003

Original Title: *Cousin Marriage Conundrum*

Many prominent neoconservatives are calling on America not only to conquer Iraq (and perhaps more Muslim nations after that), but also to rebuild Iraqi society in order to jumpstart the democratization of the Middle East. Yet, Americans know so little about the Middle East that few of us are even aware of one of one of the building blocks of Arab Muslim cultures — cousin marriage. Not surprisingly, we are almost utterly innocent of any understanding of how much the high degree of inbreeding in Iraq could interfere with our nation building ambitions.

In Iraq, as in much of the region, nearly half of all married couples are first or second cousins to each other. A 1986 study of 4,500 married hospital patients and staff in Baghdad found that 46% were wed to a first or second cousin, while a smaller 1989 survey found 53% were “consanguineously” married. The most prominent example of an Iraqi first cousin marriage is that of Saddam Hussein and his first wife Sajida.

By fostering intense family loyalties and strong nepotistic urges, inbreeding makes the development of civil society more difficult. Many Americans have heard by now that Iraq is composed of three ethnic groups — the Kurds of the north, the Sunnis of the center, and the Shi’ites of the south. Clearly, these ethnic rivalries would complicate the task of ruling reforming Iraq. But that’s just a top-down summary of Iraq’s ethnic make-up. Each of those three ethnic groups is divisible into smaller and smaller tribes, clans, and inbred extended families — each with their own alliances, rivals, and feuds. And the engine at the bottom of these bedeviling social divisions is the oft-ignored institution of cousin marriage.

The fractiousness and tribalism of Middle Eastern countries have frequently been remarked. In 1931, King Feisal of Iraq described his subjects as “devoid of any patriotic idea, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil; prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatever.” The clannishness, corruption, and coups frequently observed in countries such as Iraq appears to be in tied to the high rates of inbreeding.

Muslim countries are usually known for warm, devoted extended family relationships, but also for weak patriotism. In the U.S., where individualism is so strong, many assume that “family values” and civic virtues such as sacrificing for the good of society always go together. But, in Islamic countries, loyalty to extended (as opposed to nuclear) families is often at war with loyalty to nation. Civic virtues, military effectiveness, and economic performance all suffer.

Commentator Randall Parker wrote, “Consanguinity [cousin marriage] is the biggest underappreciated factor in Western analyses of Middle Eastern politics. Most Western political theorists seem blind to the importance of pre-ideological kinship-based political bonds in large part because those bonds are not derived from abstract Western ideological models of how societies and political systems should be organized. Extended families that are incredibly tightly bound are really the enemy of civil society because the alliances of family override any consideration of fairness to people in the larger society. Yet, this obvious fact is missing from 99% of the discussions about what is wrong with the Middle East. How can we transform Iraq into a modern liberal democracy if every government worker sees a government job as a route to helping out his clan at the expense of other clans?”

Retired U.S. Army colonel Norvell De Atkine spent years trying to train America’s Arab allies in modern combat techniques. In an article in *American Diplomacy* entitled, “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” a frustrated De Atkine explained, “First, the well-known lack of trust among Arabs for anyone outside their own family adversely affects offensive operations? In a culture in which almost every sphere of human endeavor, including business and social relationships, is based on a family structure, this orientation is also present in the military, particularly in the stress of battle. “Offensive action, basically, consists of fire and maneuver,” De Atkine continued. “The maneuver element must be confident that supporting units or arms are providing covering fire. If there is a lack of trust in that support, getting troops moving forward against dug-in defenders is possible only by officers getting out front and leading, something that has not been a characteristic of Arab leadership.”

Similarly, as Francis Fukuyama described in his 1995 book “*Trust: The Social Virtues & the Creation of Prosperity*,” countries such as Italy with highly loyal extended families can generate dynamic family firms. Yet, their larger corporations tend to be rife with goldbricking, corruption, and nepotism, all because their employees don’t trust each other to show their highest loyalty to the firm rather than their own extended families. Arab cultures are more family-focused than even Sicily, and thus their larger economic enterprises suffer even more.

American society is so biased against inbreeding that many Americans have a hard

time even conceiving of marrying a cousin. Yet, arranged matches between first cousins (especially between the children of brothers) are considered the ideal throughout much of a broad expanse from North Africa through West Asia and into Pakistan and India.

In contrast, Americans probably disapprove of what scientists call “consanguineous” mating more than any other nationality. Three huge studies in the U.S. between 1941 and 1981 found that no more than 0.2% of all American marriages were between first cousins or second cousins.

Americans have long dismissed cousin marriage as something practiced only among hillbillies. That old stereotype of inbred mountaineers waging decades long blood feuds had some truth to it. One study of 107 marriages in Beech Creek, Kentucky in 1942 found 19% were consanguineous, although the Kentuckians were more inclined toward second cousin marriages, while first cousin couples are more common than second cousin pairings in the Islamic lands.

Cousin marriage averages not much more than one percent in most European countries, and under 10% in the rest of the world outside that Morocco to Southern India corridor.

Muslim immigration, however, has been boosting Europe’s low level of consanguinity. According to the leading authority on inbreeding, geneticist Alan H. Bittles of Edith Cowan U. in Perth, Australia, “In the resident Pakistani community of some 0.5 million [in Britain] an estimated 50% to 60+% of marriages are consanguineous, with evidence that their prevalence is increasing.” (Bittles’ Web-site www.Consang.net presents the results of several hundred studies of the prevalence of inbreeding around the world.)

European nations have recently become increasingly hostile toward the common practice among their Muslim immigrants of arranging marriages between their children and citizens of their home country, frequently their relatives. One study of Turkish guest-workers in the Danish city of Ish?und found that 98% — 1st, 2nd and 3rd generation — married a spouse from Turkey who then came and lived in Denmark. (Turks, however, are quite a bit less enthusiastic about cousin marriage than are Arabs or Pakistanis, which correlates with the much stronger degree of patriotism found in Turkey.)

European “family reunification” laws present an immigrant with the opportunity to bring in his nephew by marrying his daughter to him. Not surprisingly, “family reunification” almost always works just in one direction — with the new husband moving from the poor Muslim country to the rich European country.

If a European-born daughter refused to marry her cousin from the old country just because she doesn't love him, that would deprive her extended family of the boon of an immigration visa. So, intense family pressure can fall on the daughter to do as she is told.

The new Danish right wing government has introduced legislation to crack down on these kind of marriages arranged to generate visas. British Home Secretary David Blunkett has called for immigrants to arrange more marriages within Britain.

Unlike the Middle East, Europe underwent what Samuel P. Huntington calls the "Romeo and Juliet revolution." Europeans became increasingly sympathetic toward the right of a young woman to marry the man she loves. Setting the stage for this was the Catholic Church's long war against cousin marriage, even out to fourth cousins or higher. This weakened the extended family in Europe, thus lessening the advantages of arranged marriages. It also strengthened broader institutions like the Church and the nation-state.

Islam itself may not be responsible for the high rates of inbreeding in Muslim countries. (Similarly high levels of consanguinity are found among Hindus in Southern India, although there, uncle-niece marriages are socially preferred, even though their degree of genetic similarity is twice that of cousin marriages, with worse health consequences for offspring.)

Rafat Hussain, a Pakistani-born Senior Lecturer at the U. of New England in Australia, told me, "Islam does not specifically encourage cousin marriages and, in fact, in the early days of the spread of Islam, marriages outside the clan were highly desirable to increase cultural and religious influence." She adds, "The practice has little do with Islam (or in fact any religion) and has been a prevalent cultural norm before Islam." Inbreeding (or "endogamy") is also common among Christians in the Middle East, although less so than among Muslims.

The Muslim practice is similar to older Middle Eastern norms, such as those outlined in Leviticus in the Old Testament. The lineage of the Hebrew Patriarchs who founded the Jewish people was highly inbred. Abraham said his wife Sarah was also his half-sister. His son Isaac married Rebekah, a cousin once removed. And Isaac's son Jacob wed his two first cousins, Leah and Rachel.

Jacob's dozen sons were the famous progenitors of the Twelve Tribes of Israel. Due to inbreeding, Jacob's eight legitimate sons had only six unique great-grandparents instead of the usual eight. That's because the inbred are related to their relatives through multiple paths.

Why do so many people around the world prefer to keep marriage in the family? Hussain noted, “In patriarchal societies where parents exert considerable influence and gender segregation is followed more strictly, marriage choice is limited to whom you know. While there is some pride in staying within the inner bounds of family for social or economic reasons, the more important issue is: Where will parents find a good match? Often, it boils down to whom you know and can trust.”

Another important motivation — one that is particularly important in many herding cultures, such as the ancient ones from which the Jews and Muslims emerged — is to prevent inheritable wealth from being split among too many descendants. This can be especially important when there are economies of scale in the family business.

Just as the inbred have fewer unique ancestors than the outbred, they also have fewer unique heirs, helping keep both the inheritance and the brothers together. When a herd-owning patriarch marries his son off to his younger brother’s daughter, he insures that his grandson and his grandnephew will be the same person. Likewise, the younger brother benefits from knowing that his grandson will also be the patriarch’s grandson and heir. Thus, by making sibling rivalry over inheritance less relevant, cousin marriage emotionally unites families.

The anthropologist Carleton Coon also pointed out that by minimizing the number of relatives a Bedouin Arab nomad has, this system of inbreeding “does not overextend the number of persons whose deaths an honorable man must avenge.”

Of course, there are also disadvantages to inbreeding. The best known is medical. Being inbred increases the chance of inheriting genetic syndromes caused by malignant recessive genes. Bittles found that, after controlling for socio-economic factors, the babies of first cousins had about a 30% higher chance of dying before their first birthdays.

The biggest disadvantage, however, may be political.

Are Muslims, especially Arabs, so much more loyal to their families than to their nations because, due to countless generations of cousin marriages, they are so much more genealogically related to their families than Westerners are related to theirs? Frank Salter, a political scientist at the Max Planck Institute in Germany whose new book “Risky Transactions: Trust, Kinship, and Ethnicity” takes a sociobiological look at the reason why Mafia families are indeed families, told me, “That’s my hunch; at least it’s bound to be a factor.”

One of the basic laws of modern evolutionary science, quantified by the great Oxford biologist William D. Hamilton in 1964 under the name “kin selection,” is that the

more close the genetic relationship between two people, the more likely they are to feel loyalty and altruism toward each other. Natural selection has molded us not just to try to propagate our own genes, but to help our relatives, who possess copies of some of our specific genes, to propagate their own.

Nepotism is thus biologically inspired. Hamilton explained that the level of nepotistic feeling generally depends upon degree of genetic similarity. You share half your personally variable genes with your children and siblings, but one quarter with your nephews/nieces and grandchildren, so your nepotistic urges will tend to be somewhat less toward them. You share one eighth of your genes with your first cousins, and one thirty-second with your second cousin, so your feelings of family loyalty tend to fall off quickly.

But not as quickly if you and your relatives are inbred. Then, you'll be genealogically and related to your kin via multiple pathways. You will all be genetically more similar, so your normal family feelings will be multiplied. For example, your son-in-law might be also be the nephew you've cherished since his childhood, so you can lavish all the nepotistic altruism on him that in an outbred family would be split between your son-in-law and your nephew.

Unfortunately, nepotism is usually a zero sum game, so the flip side of being materially nicer toward your relatives would be that you'd have less resources left with which to be civil, or even just fair, toward non-kin. So, nepotistic corruption is rampant in countries such as Iraq, where Saddam has appointed members of his extended family from his hometown of Tikrit to many key positions in the national government.

Similarly, a tendency toward inbreeding can turn an extended family into a miniature racial group with its own partially isolated gene pool. (Dog breeders use extreme forms of inbreeding to quickly create new breeds in a handful of generations.) The ancient Hebrews provide a vivid example of a partly inbred extended family (that of Abraham and his brothers) that evolved into its own ethnic group. This process has been going on for thousands of years in the Middle East, which is why not just the Jews, but also why tiny, ancient inbreeding groups such as the Samaritans, the John the Baptist-worshipping Sabeans, and the Lucifer-worshipping Yezidis still survive.

In summary, although neoconservatives constantly point to America's success at reforming Germany and Japan after World War II has evidence that it would be easy to do the same in the Middle East, the deep social structure of Iraq is the complete opposite of those two true nation-states, with their highly patriotic, cooperative, and (not surprisingly) outbred peoples. The Iraqis, in contrast, more closely resemble the

Hatfields and the McCoys.

Pol Reader note - in 2012, the following paper was published:

From the *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*:

[Consanguinity as a Major Predictor of Levels of Democracy: A Study of 70 Nations](#)

Michael A. Woodley and Edward Bell

Abstract

This article examines the hypothesis that although the level of democracy in a society is a complex phenomenon involving many antecedents, consanguinity (marriage and subsequent mating between second cousins or closer relatives) is an important though often overlooked predictor of it. Measures of the two variables correlate substantially in a sample of 70 nations ($r = -0.632$, $p < 0.001$), and consanguinity remains a significant predictor of democracy in multiple regression and path analyses involving several additional independent variables.

The data suggest that where consanguineous kinship networks are numerically predominant and have been made to share a common statehood, democracy is unlikely to develop. Possible explanations for these findings include the idea that restricted gene flow arising from consanguineous marriage facilitates a rigid collectivism that is inimical to individualism and the recognition of individual rights, which are key elements of the democratic ethos. Furthermore, high levels of within-group genetic similarity may discourage cooperation between different large-scale kin groupings sharing the same nation, inhibiting democracy. Finally, genetic similarity stemming from consanguinity may encourage resource predation by members of socially elite kinship networks as an inclusive fitness enhancing behavior.

Quote:

Consanguinity ... appears to severely restrict the political and social fluidity characteristic of democratic systems, as individual allegiances are primarily to kinship groupings where sophisticated group-level free-rider detection and social identity mechanisms serve to discourage expressions of self-interest that do not maximize collective utility (MacDonald, 2001, 2002). This process of collective utility maximization is consistent with the notion of inclusive fitness in which individuals exhibit altruistic behaviors toward those with whom they share genes, thus indirectly increasing their fitness (Hamilton, 1964; Rushton, 1989, 2005; Trivers, 1971).

Ethnocentrism is Natural and Normal

RaceRealist (<https://notpoliticallycorrect.me/>), 2016

Original Title: *Genetic Similarity Theory as a Cause for Ethnocentrism*

[Genetic Similarity Theory](#) evolved so we could better spread on shared genes in our immediate population, as well as those closest to ourselves. Meaning those of our race/ethnicity. People say “how could altruism evolve if it’s self-sacrifice, selfishness would win out”. Well, what’s being preserved is not the individual, obviously, but **shared genes**. To those who say (JayMan) that ethnic genetic interests don’t exist, there is a mountain of evidence that says otherwise.

Rushton and Nicholson ([1988](#)), tested predictions from genetic similarity theory and found that spouses select each other on the basis of more genetically influenced cognitive tests. It’s known since *The Bell Curve* came out in 1994 that spouses select each other based on IQ. What Rushton and Nicholson noted in the study was that estimates of genetic influence calculated on Koreans and Canadians predicted assortative mating in European Americans in Hawaii and California. Americans of mixed ancestry made up for *ethnic dissimilarity* by matching up on the more heritable traits, whereas the correlation is lower for those traits that are more influenced by the environment. The observations on genetic selection were weaker but still had a positive correlation, when the g factor was taken out of the equation. This suggests that we choose mates based on the general intelligence factor.

In studies on bereavement, it’s noted that those parents who believe their children resembled their side of the family grieved more than if they believed their child resembled the opposite side of their family ([Littlefield and Rushton, 1986](#)). This has huge implications for Genetic Similarity Theory.

Henry Harpending showed that against the background of worldwide genetic variance, ***the average similarity between people in a single population is on the order of magnitude of half siblings***. [To quote Rushton:](#)

Political scientist [Frank Salter](#) calculated that compared to the Danes, any two random English people have a kinship of 1/32 of a cousin. Two English people become the

equivalent of 3/8 of a cousin by comparison with people from the Near East, 1/2 cousin by comparison with people from [India](#), half-siblings by comparison with people from [China](#), and like full-siblings compared with people from [sub-Saharan Africa](#).

Thus, the aggregate of genes people share with co-ethnics dwarfs those shared with extended families. Rather than being a poor relation of [family nepotism](#), ethnic nepotism is virtually a proxy for it.

His conclusion being:

Conclusion: the reason people engage in [ethnic nepotism](#), as well as marry similar others, and like, make friends with, and help the most similar of their neighbors, is that doing so benefits copies of their genes.

The sense of a [common ethnicity](#) remains a major focus of identification for individuals today. It is no more likely to diminish in the future than is that of the family.

Genetic similarity theory explains why.

In Rushton's paper [*GENE-CULTURE COEVOLUTION AND GENETIC SIMILARITY THEORY: IMPLICATIONS FOR IDEOLOGY, ETHNIC NEPOTISM, AND GEOPOLITICS*](#), two individuals will be, on average, more genetically similar to those of their own ethnicity than to those two from different ethnic groups. Therefore, it will be in the individual's own self-interest to help one genetically similar to himself, and therefore, derogate the out-group, causing ethnic strife when two genetically dissimilar groups meet up and live together.

Jews that have been separated for thousands of years still show more genetic similarity to each other than to other populations. This shows in how [ethnically nepotistic Ashkenazi Jews are](#) to themselves. Jews from Iraq have more in common from a genetic viewpoint than do those 2 groups in comparison to other populations in the world. We can, therefore, expect Jews, as well as all populations in the world, to adopt ideologies that will proliferate their own genes, but come at the expense of derogating out-groups.

Genetic Similarity Theory may also explain how well and with how much tenacity the German military fought in WWII, as well as the lack of morale in the American Army during Vietnam.

He says that if genetic distance measures were calculated, that American liberals will be more genetically distant from the WASP average. The growth of white survivalism is also explained by genetic similarity theory. To quote Rushton:

The growth of “white survivalism” and militant “Christian Identity” groups such as the Aryan Nations, and the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord, represent a more extreme response to these perceived threats to the AngloSaxon gene pool. If this overall analysis is correct, one might expect similar correlations in deviations from both genetic and ideological norms in other groups. Preserving the “purity” of the ideology might be an attempt at preserving the “purity” of the gene pool. Are ideological “conservatives” typically more genetically homogeneous than the same ideology’s “liberals”?

This can be seen today, no matter where you look in the world. From the Rwandan genocide involving the Tutsis and the Hutus to La Raza in the American Southwest to Black Lives Matter to the KKK and other white interest groups, to even how East Asians and other Asian immigrants basically isolate themselves in areas with those who are culturally, as well as genetically like themselves. Genetic similarity manifests itself in our societies and makes itself evident every day.

We can also view conflicts from other parts of the world to see genetic causes for them as well. We can look at the Northern Ireland conflicts between the Irish Protestants and Catholics to see if it represents a thousand-year-old continuation of the war between the AngloSaxons and the Celts, to the conflict of the Babylonians and the Egyptians which could be manifesting itself today between the Jews and the Arabs, ethnic dissimilarity shows itself in world geopolitics, as well as showing that ethnic dissimilarity is a driving focus in most of our wars and problems.

Rushton then finally asks the question:

If the replication of genetically similar genes is as strong a biological imperative as sociobiological theorizing suggests, why are descendants of North European populations everywhere in the world currently experiencing negative growth, while concurrently allowing extensive immigration from genetically less similar gene pools? Why, at the same time have North European populations adopted an ideology of secular humanism which discourages racist attitudes and encourages antipathies toward religious sentiment

proportional to the degree to which those ideologies combat the new orthodoxy?

Cultural and organic evolution are different, yet linked in many ways and may ultimately share certain properties. Both strive to replicate at the expense of other groups, so we can see how ideologies could evolve that *dramatically decrease fitness for one group over another*. This also goes back centuries. This is seen in classes, and sometimes race. Those at the top, i.e., the more intelligent, have fewer children than the people that they rule over. Then, it's not too long until the ruled become the rulers and the cycle repeats itself. Rushton says:

There is indeed evidence that this trade off exists at a quite profound level and moreover is related to other characteristics, the whole complex being partly genetic in origin (Rushton, 1985). My own guess is that low fertility may be partly mediated by a psychological process in which the desire to be in control of both oneself and one's environment is taken to an extreme.

This is one of the many reasons that Europeans today have such a low birth rate. I have written before on how to ameliorate this effect, i.e., positive things shown to women in the media such as being happy with babies. That was shown to increase the birth rate in pre-WWII Germany as well as having a positive benefit on the psyche of the German women seeing other women happy with children. The effects of media socialization, though, go both ways, which is one reason for low European birthrates.

Successful cultures ultimately arise in those that the top of the society limits its reproduction, which, in turn, didn't give others more genetically similar the chance to replace them. This may be a cause, as Rushton says, for the fall of the Graeco-Roman Empire, stating that the Roman Empire and other similar cultures were, presumably, evolutionary dead ends. He then asks: "If this perspective is accurate, are North Europeans headed for the same fate as the ruling classes of ancient Greece and Rome?"

Rushton ends the paper as follows:

The question is: if that time comes, in whose image will it be shaped? People will differ in their moral prescriptions. The choices they make are likely to reflect both their genetic and their ideological interests.

This is why I say, that, on an individual level, morals are subjective. Society as a

whole sets morals, but this says to me that on an individual level that morals are subjective, but that's for another time.

There are [many reasons why altruism and ethnocentrism evolved](#), as well as many reasons why [that same altruism is being used against Europeans, as well as some more environmental factors](#). This is also seen in [Non-Western people who are abnormal to our societies](#) due to differing evolution and culture, which culture is a product of genetics.

It's clear that we are more altruistic to people who look more phenotypically similar to ourselves, to pass on and benefit copies of our genes. This evolved in spite of the negative impact on behalf of the altruist. The altruist is helping copies of his shared genes survive so that they may be copied into the next generation of progeny. The tendency to favor co-ethnics is the tendency to attempt to help pass on shared genes, as if the phenotype is similar, more often than not, the genotype is as well. This is the basis for ethnocentrism.

White Ethnocentrism: Can Americans Really Be Brainwashed?

Kevin MacDonald, 2008

One of the great intellectual divides is the venerable [nature/nurture](#) dichotomy.

[Conservatives](#) tend to be on the side of [nature](#):

Race exists as a biological reality; there are race differences in [socially important traits like IQ](#); people's brains are wired to [prefer people like themselves](#); they are more likely to contribute to public goods like health care and education if the [beneficiaries are of the same ethnic group](#); people trust others more if they live in [homogeneous societies](#).

The left takes the opposite tack:

Race [doesn't exist](#); the idea that it does exist is a fantasy of [moral reprobates](#). To the extent that differences in traits like IQ are interesting at all, they are the result of [capitalism](#), discrimination, or general [evil](#). If it weren't for white people behaving badly, we could easily build a strong, racially diverse multicultural society where all people can live happily ever after.

I am not going to try to convince you of the merits of either side of this debate. Over the years, VDARE.COM has certainly published some of the premier writers on the nature side.

But if you pick up the [New York Times](#), you'll get a very different version of these issues. It's a version which, sad to say, has a lot more influence.

So what makes culture so powerful and how does it work at the psychological level?

Psychologists have shown that there are two different types of processing systems—the implicit and the explicit.

Implicit processing is the way the ancient parts of our brain operate—automatically

and unconsciously.

Say you are talking to a [salesman](#) about a used car. Without any conscious effort on your part, your brain is processing an enormous amount of information. Some parts of your brain are processing the colors and shapes of the furniture, while others are responsible for recognizing the face of the salesman and picking up on his emotional expressions. Your brain is also assessing how similar this salesman is to yourself, and, without any conscious awareness on your part, it is making you trust him more if he is more like yourself. Furthermore, if he is from a [different race or ethnic group](#), it is flagging that fact and it is coloring your interactions with stereotypes—whether negative or positive—that your unconscious mind associates with that race or ethnic group.

These implicit mechanisms – psychologists call them “**modules**” – are like zombies or robots. They go about their business without any conscious effort, and quite a few of them are beyond our control.

A good example is the face recognition module. If I am looking at someone I know, I can't help but recognize him. I can't simply turn off the module. The module takes in the information from the environment and simply does its thing in a preprogrammed way.

Importantly, the implicit brain includes mechanisms related to ethnocentrism. There are several [different evolved mechanisms](#) that make us prefer people like ourselves and be wary of people in outgroups.

Phil Rushton's Genetic Similarity Theory [[PDF](#)] is a good example. Birds of a feather do indeed flock together. People tend to make friends and marry people who are like themselves on a wide range of traits, from [IQ and personality](#), to ethnic group and even wrist size.

Research in Genetic Similarity Theory finds a biological basis to this flocking tendency. Each system of genes wants to reproduce itself, and has the best chance of doing so if it chooses to mate with a system of genes which has some overlap.

But some aspects of ethnocentrism may be learned as well. The human mind is prone to rapidly learning [negative stereotypes about outgroups](#). And even if these stereotypes are learned, they act just like the biological ones—they are triggered automatically via implicit processing.

The point is that in either case people tend to have negative stereotypes of other races and they prefer people from their own race. But, of course, that's not the end of the story—only the beginning.

The other part of the brain is the more recently evolved part—the part responsible for *explicit processing*. Explicit processing involves language and thought.

The implicit brain processes information in a zombie-like reflexive way, but explicit processing is effortful and controlled. It's the kind of processing that we use when we are solving a problem in math class, where we have to make a plan to solve the problem.

And it's the part of the brain that takes in cultural information. When a person reads the *New York Times*, there a lot of explicit messages—[immigration is good](#); people who [oppose immigration](#) are [uneducated](#) racist Neanderthals; there are no [genetic differences between the races](#), yada, yada.

It's easy to see that there can be conflicts between implicit processing of our ancient brain and the explicit messages one gets from the *New York Times*. The implicit part of the brain makes you more comfortable socializing with people like yourself. In fact, the implicit part of the brain leads white people to seek out implicit white communities — communities like [NASCAR](#), [country music](#), and certain kinds of rock music ([like AC/DC](#)) where the faces are pretty much all white.

White flight is one of the most salient phenomena of the late 20th century. And where are these [white people fleeing to?](#) To the [suburbs where there are lots of other white people](#) and where their children go to schools with other white children.

As sociologist [Kevin Kruse](#) notes in his book [White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism](#), race is never part of the explicit rhetoric of white flight. Instead, white flight tends to be expressed as opposition to the federal government, the welfare state, taxation, and perceived moral dangers like abortion and [homosexuality](#). But at the implicit level, the desire for white communities and the aversion to contributing to [public goods for nonwhites](#) are the overriding motivations.

Each of these identities allows white people to associate with other whites without any explicit acknowledgement that race plays a role.

Indeed, the granddaddy of implicit white communities is the Republican Party. In the recent election, the Republicans received at least 90% of their votes from white people. The delegates [to the Republican convention](#) in August were 93% white, 5% Latino, and 2% black. If these were all rich white oligarchs at the Republican convention, as Jon Stewart's *Daily Show* [would have it](#), that would be one thing.

But most Republicans are [not rich white oligarchs](#). The fact is that the Republican base is really about the [Sarah Palin phenomenon](#)—white Christians—many with small town roots in the South and West—who yearn for the America they are rapidly losing:

a white America.

But all of that is down deep in their brains, at the implicit level. In the upper reaches of their prefrontal cortex, they would never dream of saying explicitly that they are a [party](#) of white Americans. [That would be "racist."](#)

The same goes for their spokesmen—although calling these people spokesmen for the Republican base is being a bit generous. “**Conservative**” commentators like Sean Hannity, Rush Limbaugh and Bill O’Reilly studiously avoid saying anything that could be construed as “**racist**”. Nor do they dare to oppose the massive [legal immigration](#) that will make the [Republican base a permanent electoral minority](#) even if we stopped illegal immigration immediately. That’s because the explicit processing system is in charge, at least at the conscious level.

Here’s how it works. Implicit attitudes on race are assessed by tests like the [Implicit Association Test](#). (You can take the test [here](#).) Subjects are presented with photos of blacks and whites in succession and asked to pair positive or negative words (e.g., “**intelligent,**” “**law-abiding,**” “**poor,**” “**success**”) with the photos.

Eighty percent of whites take longer to associate positive words with blacks than with whites. This is interpreted as indicating that whites have implicit negative stereotypes of blacks.

The interesting thing is that there is a gap between whites’ explicitly positive attitudes about blacks and their implicitly negative attitudes. Even white liberals show implicit negative attitudes toward blacks, although their implicit attitudes are less negative than those of conservatives.

In fact, white liberals are more hypocritical about race than conservatives: There is a larger gap between implicit attitudes and explicit attitudes toward blacks among white liberals than among white conservatives.

What’s happening is that the conscious, explicit brain is thinking positive thoughts about blacks because [it reads the New York Times](#). And it is suppressing the negative thoughts that are deep below the surface in the implicit part of the brain.

In one study, subjects were shown photos of blacks and whites while hooked up to an fMRI machine that takes pictures of the brain in action. When the photos were shown for very brief periods—too short to be explicitly processed, the fMRI showed that whites had a negative response to the photos of blacks. This procedure therefore measures implicit negative attitudes toward blacks.

However, the photos of blacks were presented for a much longer period, so that they were processed by the explicit part of the brain. The difference in negative reaction to

black and white faces decreased.

This happened because the prefrontal cortex and explicit processing were activated. In other words, people who are consciously aware that they are seeing photos of blacks are able to suppress the [negative automatic responses](#) produced by their ancient brain. The explicit part of the brain suppresses the implicit part.

So implicitly processed feelings and perceptions are suppressed out of conscious awareness. But that doesn't mean they have no influence. Besides affecting responses on the Implicit Association Test, the implicit brain is seeking out white communities like the Republican Party, and it has negative gut feelings about massive non-white immigration.

This disconnect between the implicit and the explicit brain produces some interesting phenomena. Young children tend to have unabashedly explicit bias in favor of their own race. Explicit race bias emerges early, as young as age three or four, peaks in middle childhood, and then undergoes a gradual decline through adolescence, and disappears in adulthood. Quite a bit of this decline is doubtless due to [active campaigns](#) to instill the [official racial ideology of the Left](#) in schools. Multicultural propaganda [permeates](#) education, from kindergarten through college, [pushed by groups](#) of [cultural Marxists](#) such as the [National Association for Multicultural Education](#): **"NAME celebrates cultural and ethnic diversity as a national strength that enriches a society and rejects the view that diversity threatens the fabric of a society."**

However, there is no such decline in implicit racial preferences, which remain strong into adulthood. Indeed, there is also a decline in cross-racial friends and companions as children get older. White schoolchildren are much more likely to have white friends than chance expectation would account for, and this trend increases as they get older.

This means that at the same time that explicit racial preference in white children is declining, children are becoming less and less likely to actually interact with and form friendships with children from other races. In effect, schools undergo a process of self-segregation. And among adults, whites are significantly less likely than other racial groups to report interracial friendships and contacts.

The bottom line, then, is that as children get older they become increasingly aware of the [official explicit racial ideology](#), and they conform to it. The explicit processing centers are becoming stronger, so that they are better able to suppress positive attitudes about their own race in order to [conform to the demands of their teachers](#). At the explicit level, they are free from any negative attitudes toward nonwhite groups and may even be politically liberal or radical.

At the same time, however, they are ["voting with their feet"](#) by choosing [friends and companions of the same race](#).

And their parents are doing the same thing. I have noted that liberals show a greater gap between explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes and behavior than do conservatives. Indeed, while highly educated white parents tend to have liberal explicit attitudes on racial issues, a [recent study](#) shows that these same highly educated whites [seek out schools](#) that are [racially segregated](#) and are more likely to live in racially segregated neighborhoods. In other words, there is a positive correlation between the average education of white parents and the likelihood that parents will remove their children from public schools as the [percentage of black students](#) increases.

[Michael Emerson](#), an author of the study, is quite aware of the gap between explicit attitudes and behavior. He [writes](#):

"I do believe that white people are being sincere when they claim that racial inequality is not a good thing and that they'd like to see it eliminated. However...their liberal attitudes about race aren't reflected in their behavior."

The explicit parts of their brains have been [programmed to say and believe the right things](#). But the implicit parts of their brain are [controlling their behavior](#).

This might be cause for hope for those of us whose explicit brain is more in tune with their implicit brain.

But the fact is that if explicit messages on race are repeated often enough, they start to become automatic and implicit. People can be brainwashed. This is the great hope of the cultural Marxists—that constant repetition and propaganda actually could produce what the [Frankfurt School](#) — the *fons et origo* of cultural Marxism in the West — [called](#) a **"genuine liberal"**: someone who in his heart of hearts really has the gut instincts of a cultural Marxist; a [white person](#) who [prefers non-whites](#) on an Implicit Association Test.

They have a ways to go on that. But the election of Barack Obama will probably aid the [cultural Marxist onslaught](#) on the educational system. I can't see any principles of human psychology that would prevent them from getting there eventually. (Of course the collapse of the Soviet Union indicates that religion and national identity are harder to eradicate than Stalin thought they were, and he [tried very hard](#).) It would probably take a [1984](#)-like police state to do it. But quite obviously that is not seen as a drawback by its proponents.

My conclusion: *The New York Times* is important because it and media like it control the explicit messages on vital issues like race and immigration. The [culture of critique](#) has become the explicit culture of the West, endlessly repeated in media messages but packaged differently for people of different levels of intelligence and education.

The message here is that by programming the higher areas of the brain, this explicit culture is able to control the implicit ethnocentric tendencies of white people.

The explicit culture may not be able to prevent white people from moving to white neighborhoods, and it may not prevent them from going to a NASCAR race. But it does make them supine in the face of a massive invasion of other peoples and cultures. It prevents the Republican Party from [saying explicitly that they are a party of European-Americans](#) intent on ending immigration and retaining their political majority and their cultural dominance. And it makes them cringe in horror when someone calls them a “**racist**”.

In attempting to find a way out of this morass, therefore, changing the explicit culture is critical. That’s why media like VDARE.COM and my own [The Occidental Observer](#) are so important. To paraphrase Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign slogan, it’s the explicit culture, stupid.

Changing the explicit culture won’t be easy. I suggest that the first step is a psychological one: Proud and confident explicit assertions of ethnic identity and interests among white people, and the creation of communities where such explicit assertions are considered normal and natural rather than a reason for ostracism.

The fact that such assertions appeal to our implicit psychology is certainly an asset. It’s always easier to go with a natural tendency than to oppose it.

And in this case, our natural preference for people like ourselves is [intellectually defensible](#): That is, it can withstand the probing rationality of the explicit processing system.

It’s the ideology of *New York Times* and the cultural Marxists that can’t withstand intellectual scrutiny.

What Makes Western Culture Unique?

Kevin MacDonald, 2002

In general, cultural uniqueness could derive from either nature or nurture—the same old ageless dichotomy, but I think now we are in a better position to deal with these issues than in times past, and I will be arguing that both are important. Western cultures have experienced certain unique cultural transformations that cannot be predicted by any biological/evolutionary theory, but they also have had a unique evolutionary history. Western culture was built by people who differ genetically from those who have built the other civilizations and cultures of the world. In the following I will argue that Western cultures have a unique cultural profile compared to other traditional civilizations:

1. The Catholic Church and Christianity.
2. A tendency toward monogamy.
3. A tendency toward simple family structure based on the nuclear family.
4. A greater tendency for marriage to be companionate and based on mutual affection of the partners.
5. A de-emphasis on extended kinship relationships and its correlative, a relative lack of ethnocentrism.
6. A tendency toward individualism and all of its implications: individual rights against the state, representative government, moral universalism, and science.

My background is in the field of evolutionary biology, and one of the first questions that struck me when I was exposed to the evolutionary theory of sex was "why are Western cultures monogamous?" The evolutionary theory of sex is quite simple: Females must invest greatly in reproduction - pregnancy, lactation, and often childcare require an extraordinary amount of time. As a result, the reproduction of females is highly limited. Even under the best of conditions women could have, say, 20 children. But the act of reproduction is cheap for men. As a result, males benefit from

multiple mates, and it is expected that males with wealth and power should use their wealth and power to secure as many mates as possible. In short, intensive polygyny by wealthy, powerful males is an optimal male strategy i.e., it is behavior that optimizes individual male reproductive success.

This theory is well supported. There are strong associations between wealth and reproductive success in traditional societies from around the world. Wealthy, powerful males are able to control very large numbers of females. The elite males of all of the traditional civilizations around the world, including those of China, India, Muslim societies, the New World civilizations, ancient Egypt and ancient Israel, often had hundreds and even thousands of concubines. In sub-Saharan Africa, women were generally able to rear children without male provisioning, and the result was low-level polygyny in which males competed to control as many women as possible. In all of these societies, the children from these relationships were legitimate. They could inherit property and were not scorned by the public. The Emperor of China had thousands of concubines, and the Sultan of Morocco is in the *Guinness Book of World Records* as having 888 children.

To be sure, there are other societies where monogamy is the norm. It is common to distinguish ecologically imposed monogamy from socially imposed monogamy. In general, ecologically imposed monogamy is found in societies that have been forced to adapt to very harsh ecological conditions such as deserts and arctic conditions.¹ Under such harsh conditions, it is impossible for males to control additional females because the investment of each male must be directed to the children of one woman. The basic idea is that under harsh conditions a woman would be unable to rear children by herself but would require provisioning from a male. If these conditions persisted for an evolutionarily significant time, one might expect to find that the population would develop a strong tendency toward monogamy. In fact, one might imagine that the tendency toward monogamy could become so strong that it would result in psychological and cultural tendencies toward monogamy even in the face of altered ecological conditions. Later I will propose that this is exactly what happened in the evolution of Europeans.

Richard Alexander used the term "socially imposed monogamy" (SIM) to refer to situations where monogamy occurs even in the absence of harsh ecological conditions.² Harsh conditions imply that men are needed to directly provision children, but in other situations we expect and generally find that males compete to have as many wives as they can command.

The First Example of Western Uniqueness

Whereas all of the other economically advanced cultures of the world have been typified by polygyny by successful males, Western societies beginning with the ancient Greeks and Romans and extending up to the present have had a powerful tendency toward monogamy.

Ancient Rome had a variety of political institutions and ideological supports that tended toward monogamy.³ The origins of socially imposed monogamy in Rome are lost in history, but there were several mechanisms for maintaining monogamy, including laws that lowered the legal status of offspring born outside monogamous marriage, customs opposing divorce, negative social attitudes toward non-conforming sexual behavior, and a religious ideology of monogamous sexual decorum. Variations of these mechanisms have persisted throughout Western history down to the present.

During the period of the Roman Republic, there were also mechanisms that prevented political despotism by any one aristocratic family, including term limits on the consulship, having two consuls concurrently. Legal requirements for the political representation of the lower orders gradually developed e.g., the Tribune of the Plebes. There were also extensive laws that prevented close relatives from marrying. These laws prevented the concentration of wealth within kinship groups and thus prevented the predominance of any one aristocratic family.⁴

Roman monogamy was far from complete. This was especially so in the Empire when there was a general breakdown of the earlier family functioning due to increases in divorce, and a decline in the ideology of monogamous sexual decorum that typified the early Republic. Nevertheless, from a legal point of view, and at least in theory, Roman culture remained monogamous to the end. Polygynous marriage was never sanctioned in law, and children born outside of monogamous marriage had no inheritance rights and took the social and legal status of the mother.

Battles over monogamy became an important feature of the Middle Ages as the Catholic Church attempted to impose monogamy on elite males.⁵ The Catholic Church is a unique aspect of Western culture. When Marco Polo visited the Chinese in the 13th century and when Cortez arrived among the Aztecs in 1519, they found a great many similarities with their own society, including a hereditary nobility, priests, warriors, craftsmen, and peasants all living off an agricultural economy. There was thus an overwhelming convergence among the societies. But they did not find societies where the religious establishment claimed to be superior to the secular

establishment and was successfully regulating the reproductive behavior of the secular elite. Nor did they find a king like Louis IX (St. Louis) who ruled France while living like a monk with his one wife and went on a Crusade to free the Holy Land.

The Catholic Church was the heir to Roman civilization where monogamy was ingrained in law and custom, and during the Middle Ages it took it upon itself to impose monogamy on the emerging European aristocracy. To be sure, the level of polygyny found among European aristocrats in the early Middle Ages was quite low compared to the harems of China and the Muslim countries, but that may well have been due partly to the relatively undeveloped economic situation of the early Middle Ages. After all, the emperor of China presided over a vast and populous country with huge surplus economic production. They were much wealthier than the tribal chieftains of early medieval Europe, and they used that wealth and power to obtain vastly more women.

In any case, polygyny did exist in Europe, and during the Middle Ages it became the object of conflict between the Church and the aristocracy. The Church was "the most influential and important governmental institution [of Europe] during the medieval period" and a major aspect of this power over the secular aristocracy involved the regulation of sex and reproduction.⁶ The result was that the same rules of sexual conduct were imposed on both rich and poor. The program of the Church "required above all that laymen, especially the most powerful among them, should submit to the authority of the Church and allow it to supervise their morals, especially their sexual morals. It was by this means, through marriage, that the aristocracy could be kept under control. All matrimonial problems had to be submitted to and resolved by the Church alone."⁷

Attempting to understand the behavior of the Church during this period in terms of evolutionary psychology is beyond the scope of this paper.⁸ However, one might note that the desire for power is a human universal but, like all human desires, it need not be linked with reproductive success. In the same way, people desire sex, but engaging in sex does not necessarily lead to having lots of children even though Mother Nature designed it that way.

One unique feature of the Church is that its popularity was aided by the image (and reality) that the Church was altruistic. The medieval Church successfully portrayed the image that it was not concerned with controlling women or having a high level of reproductive success. This was not always the case. Before the reforms of the Middle Ages, many priests had wives and concubines. Writing of the French Church in 742,

Saint Boniface complained to the pope about "so-called deacons who have spent their lives since boyhood in debauchery, adultery, and every kind of filthiness, who entered the diaconate with this reputation, and who now, while they have four or five concubines in their beds, still read the gospel."⁹

Nevertheless, reform among the clergy was real. No English prelate of the 13th century is known to have had a wife or family. Married clergy even at lower levels were exceptional during this period in England, and low levels of clerical incontinence continued into the Reformation period.

The Church therefore projected the image of chastity and altruism. Its power and wealth were not directed at reproductive success. True reproductive altruism appears to have been a factor in the very widespread attraction of extremely ascetic monastic lifestyles. This asceticism was an important part of the public's perception of the Church during the high Middle Ages. During the 11th and 12th centuries thousands of monasteries were founded. Composed of celibate and ascetic males and recruited mainly from the more affluent classes, monasteries "set the tone in the spirituality of the whole church, in education and in art, [and] in the transmission of culture . . ." ¹⁰ The image of monastic altruism was also fostered by an ideology in which the prayers of monks were believed to aid all Christians.

These orders provided a very popular public image of the Church. During the 13th century, mendicant friars (Dominicans, Franciscans) were instrumental in reforming the Church to extend the power of the Pope over the Church, to enforce rules on clerical celibacy, to prevent nepotism and simony (the buying and selling of Church offices), and to give the Church substantial power over secular powers, including the ability to regulate sexual relationships. "The voluntary poverty and self-imposed destitution that identified the early Mendicants with the humblest and most deprived sections of the population, in loud contrast to the careerism and ostentation of the secular clergy and the corporate wealth and exclusiveness of the monasteries, moved the conscience and touched the generosity of commercial communities."¹¹

It is one of the most remarkable phenomena in the whole of history that in the high middle ages . . . many members of the highest and wealthiest or at least prosperous strata of society, who had the best chances of enjoying earthly pleasures to the full, renounced them. . . The flow of new candidates was particularly impressive in those places where the rules of monastic life had been restored to their ancient strictness, imposed more rigorously or even redefined more severely. . . We must assume that the main motive for the choice of a monastic life was always the eschatological ideal

of monasticism, even if this may have lost something of its driving force in the course of a long life or was mixed with other motives from the start.¹²

During the 13th century, the mendicant friars were typically recruited from the aristocracy, the landed gentry, and other affluent families. Their parents often disapproved of their decision, presumably because, like most parents, they wanted grandchildren. "It was a nightmare for well-to-do families that their children might become friars."¹³ These families began to avoid sending their children to universities because of well-founded fears that they would be recruited into a religious life.

At the center of society was an institution with an ideology that people ought to be altruistic, that they ought to be celibate even when they were born to wealth. This explains popular acceptance of the authority of the church in matters of marriage and sex, but it still makes one wonder why these well-off people were entering monasteries and becoming celibate in the first place. Like it or not, whatever else one might say about Western Europe during this period, eugenics was not a part of the picture.

The medieval Church was a unique feature of Western culture, but a theme of this paper is that in critical ways it was most un-Western. This is because medieval Europe was a collectivist society with a strong sense of group identification and commitment, and I will be arguing that Western societies are also unique in their commitment to individualism—that in fact individualism is a defining feature of Western civilization.

The collectivism of Western European society in the late Middle Ages was real. There was intense group identification and group commitment to Christianity among all levels of society, as indicated, for example, by the multitudes of pilgrims and the outpouring of religious fervor and in-group fervor associated with the Crusades to free the Holy Land from Muslim control. The medieval Church had a strong sense of Christian group economic interests *vis-à-vis* the Jews, and often worked vigorously to exclude Jews from economic and political influence and to prevent social intercourse between Christians and Jews.¹⁴

As described above, there were also high levels of reproductive altruism, particularly among the mendicant friars, many other religious personnel, and eventually the secular elite. Reproductive altruism among the secular elite was mainly the result of coercion but there are also cases of voluntary restraint, as in the case of Louis IX of France—St. Louis. St. Louis was not only a paragon of proper Christian sexual behavior. He also had a powerful sense of Christian group economic interests *vis-à-*

vis the Jews and he was heavily involved in the crusades to return the Holy Land to Christian control.¹⁵ Europeans considered themselves part of a Christian in-group arrayed against non-Christian out-groups (particularly Muslims and Jews) who were seen as powerful and threatening enemies.¹⁶

There were indeed gaps between the ideal of a unified Christian society based on the power of the Church and sexual restraint among the elite. But these gaps must be balanced by the recognition that many medieval Christians, and especially the central actors in medieval society such as: The monastic movements, the mendicant friars, the reforming popes, the fervent Crusaders, the pious pilgrims, and even many elite aristocrats, saw themselves to be part of a highly unified, supranational collectivity. It is this fundamentally collectivist orientation—so foreign to contemporary Western life—that renders the high levels of group commitment and altruism characteristic of the medieval period comprehensible in psychological terms.

Social Controls & Ideology Maintaining Socially Imposed Monogamy in Western Europe

In Western Europe the Church adopted an ecclesiastical model of marriage that was diametrically opposed to the reproductive interests of the aristocracy. As a direct result of these efforts, there was a transformation of family structure and the social imposition of monogamy by the Christian Church by the end of the 12th century. The following factors appear to have been most important in the imposition and maintenance of monogamy:

Prohibitions on Divorce. Wealthy males benefit most by being able to divorce easily because they can more easily remarry. While divorce was common in other Eurasian societies and was legal among the pre-Christian tribes of Europe, the Church's point of view was that marriage was monogamous and indissoluble. Divorce became ever more restricted under the Christian Roman emperors, and between the 9th and the 12th century the Church engaged in a successful conflict with the aristocracy centering around a series of divorce cases involving the nobility. For example, in the late 12th century, King Phillip of France was prevented from divorcing his wife even though he disliked her and she was infertile. The king had to apologize to a group of religious personnel at an abbey in Paris.

At times divorce was allowed, but only if the goal was to obtain a male heir in cases where the first marriage had failed to produce one e.g., Louis VII and Eleanor of Aquitaine in Medieval France. (But the Pope did not allow Henry VIII to divorce his

wife even though they did not produce a son.) Divorce "was virtually impossible except for a handful of the very rich" in England until the reform of 1857. But even then divorce rates remained very low. "In those parts of Europe that had legalized divorce in the sixteenth century, it was three hundred years and more before any line of divorce could be distinguished from the horizontal axis of a graphic depiction of divorce rates." In England the divorce rate remained at less than 0.1/1000 marriages until 1914 and less than 1/1000 until 1943 (Stone 1990); in 1910 no European country had a divorce rate higher than .5/1000 population. So far as I know, this powerful tendency in opposition to divorce is unique to Western European civilization.

Penalties for Illegitimacy. From an evolutionary perspective, the most crucial aspect of social controls related to reproduction is the control of concubinage. Controls on illegitimacy oppose the reproductive interests of wealthy males by making concubinage difficult or impossible and by affecting the prospects of illegitimate children by, e.g., preventing them from inheriting property.

The Church was actively opposed to concubinage, especially concubinage in the presence of a legitimate wife. It would appear that social controls on the abilities of illegitimate children to inherit were often effective. Church held the attitude that legitimate marriage produced legitimate children and that others had no legal standing, although in certain periods bastards had more standing than others (see below). The estates of bastards were subject to confiscation by the Church or the state, so that even if a man wanted to leave property to a bastard his wishes could be thwarted by the authorities. Bastards disappeared from wills altogether during the Puritan era in England.

Besides direct Church influence, there were a variety of other penalties attached to illegitimate birth arising from the secular authorities and public opinion. Being the father and especially the mother of an illegitimate child were causes for ostracism and jail, and it was common for the woman to take every effort to conceal the pregnancy, including leaving the area. These social controls had effects on mortality of illegitimate children. Infant mortality was higher for illegitimate children in both early modern England and France. Women often abandoned illegitimate children. Illegitimate children were often reported as stillborn, indicating infanticide, and women sometimes sought to avoid bearing illegitimate children via abortion.

Controls on Concubinage among the Elite. Controls on concubinage by elite males became increasingly effective during the Middle Ages. The 12th century thus appears to be pivotal. There are good examples from this period of elite males who were able

to avoid social and ideological controls favoring monogamy as well as examples where such individuals were entirely monogamous. The general patterns may be perceived by considering the illegitimate fertility of English kings. Ten of the 18 kings who ruled England from 1066 to 1485 are known to have taken mistresses, and are known to have fathered 41 illegitimate offspring who can be identified with a fair degree of certainty. Henry I, who ruled from 1100 to 1135 sired 20 of these, and 5 more are listed as probable. No other Medieval king sired more than 3, and no certain illegitimate children are recorded for 8 of the kings. Henry I is unique in his apparent interest in obtaining large numbers of offspring to further his territorial ambitions. However, Henry treated his illegitimate children far less well than his legitimate children, the latter being pampered, tutored at court, and prepared for life as great nobles. Bastards, on the other hand, were excluded from inheriting the throne, and they were often not offered marriages. Reflecting the general change in attitudes and practices related to marriage occurring in the 12th century, there is a decline in both the numbers and importance of illegitimate children in the following centuries.

Policing Sexual Behavior in the Middle Ages and Later. One of the prime goals of the medieval Church was to police sexual behavior outside of monogamous marriage. Policing sexual violations was an important function of the ecclesiastical courts beginning in the Middle Ages and extending at least to the end of the 17th century. These courts were very active in 17th century England prosecuting cases of fornication, adultery, incest, and illicit cohabitation. Although the effectiveness of these ecclesiastical sanctions varied by region and period, there were examples of devastating consequences in which "the victim was hounded by his fellows, deprived of his living by a community boycott, and treated as an outcast".

In the 17th century the ability of the High Commission of the Ecclesiastical Court system to impose sanctions, including sanctions for adultery, on the propertied who could expect to be immune from other judicial processes: "This enforcement of equality before the law did not endear the court to those who mattered in seventeenth-century England".¹⁷ The secular authorities, such as justices of the peace, also stood ready to prosecute such offenses. For example, pursuant to Elizabethan statutes, Justices of the Peace in the 16th and 17th centuries commonly sentenced sexual offenders of both sexes to a public whipping while stripped to waist (the woman "until her back be bloody") and placed in the stocks.¹⁸

Ideologies Promoting Monogamy. Although ultimately relying on social controls, the Medieval Church developed elaborate ideologies to promote monogamy and sexual restraint. In general these writings emphasized the moral superiority of celibacy and

the sinfulness of extra-marital sex of any kind. All sexual relationships, apart from monogamous marriage, were universally condemned by religious authority throughout the early modern period into contemporary times. Marital sex was viewed as a regrettable and sinful necessity, and excess passion towards one's wife was considered adultery. While there was a relative relaxation of attitudes during the 18th century, a powerful anti-hedonist religious sexual ideology rose to prominence in the 19th century.

Conclusion. Beginning in the Middle Ages an elaborate system of social controls and ideologies resulted in the more or less complete imposition of monogamy in large areas of Western Europe. "The great social achievement of the early Middle Ages was the imposition of the same rules of sexual and domestic conduct on both rich and poor. The King in his palace, the peasant in his hovel: neither was exempt."¹⁹ Nevertheless, the system was by no means completely egalitarian. There was a positive association between wealth and reproductive success throughout pre-industrial Europe.

In Western Europe there has been a remarkable continuity within a varied set of institutions, which have penalized polygyny and channeled non-monogamous sexuality into non-reproductive outlets or suppressed it altogether. Despite changes in these institutions and despite vast changes in political and economic structures, Western family institutions deriving ultimately from Roman civilization have clearly aimed at the social imposition of monogamy. By and large, this effort has been successful.

Effects of Monogamy

Monogamy is a very central aspect of Western uniqueness with some important effects. Monogamy may well be a necessary condition for the unique European "low-pressure" demographic profile.²⁰ This demographic profile results from late marriage and celibacy of large percentages of females during times of economic scarcity. The connection with monogamy is that monogamous marriage results in a situation where the poor of both sexes are unable to mate, whereas in polygynous systems an excess of poor females merely lowers the price of concubines for wealthy males. For example, at the end of the 17th century approximately 23% of both sexes remained unmarried between ages 40-44. But, as a result of altered economic opportunities, this percentage dropped at the beginning of the 18th century to 9%, and there was a corresponding decline in age of marriage. Like monogamy, this pattern was unique among the stratified societies of Eurasia.²¹

In turn, the low-pressure demographic profile appears to have had economic consequences. Not only was the marriage rate the main damper on population growth, but this response, especially in England, had a tendency to lag well behind favorable economic changes so that there was a tendency for capital accumulation during good times rather than a constant pressure of population on food supply:

The fact that the rolling adjustment between economic and demographic fluctuations took place in such a leisurely fashion, tending to produce large if gradual swings in real wages, represented an opportunity to break clear from the low-level income trap which is sometimes supposed to have inhibited all pre-industrial nations. A long period of rising real wages, by changing the structure of demand, will tend to give a disproportionately strong boost to demand for commodities other than the basic necessities of life, and so to sectors of the economy whose growth is especially important if an industrial revolution is to occur.²²

There is therefore some reason to suppose that monogamy, by resulting in a low-pressure demographic profile, was a necessary condition for industrialization. The overall pattern, then, is not one in which there is a constant tendency toward late marriage and/or celibacy in females. Instead, marriage is influenced by economic constraints. In times of prosperity the age of marriage for both sexes declined and fewer females remained non-reproductive. The result was a marriage system which is highly sensitive to resource availability: "An important distinguishing feature of Europe, the pivot upon which the system turned, was the flexible marital regime, which allowed population to adjust to economy."²³ This suggests that monogamy may indeed be a central aspect of the necessary architecture of Western modernization.

Monogamy and investment in children. Polygynous mating systems tend to result in resources being devoted to reproduction and relatively less to investment in children. For a male in a polygynous society it is attractive to invest in another wife or concubine and her low investment offspring.²⁴ In polygynous societies, investment in additional concubines tends to have a large payoff and requires little investment in children. Offspring of concubines were typically given relatively small inheritances and allowed to descend the social ladder. There is a low sex ratio of offspring among harem women—a preponderance of daughters.²⁵ In theoretical terms this implies a bias toward low investment offspring because in general it is easier for females to be able to mate.²⁶ Although the daughters of these concubines will have low social status compared to their father, they will tend to mate. On the other hand, sons of the upper classes were targets of dowry competition for lower status families. In either case, there is little need for fathers to invest time, energy, or money in the offspring of their

concubines.

Monogamy, however, restricts the investment of individual males to the offspring of one woman. With the decline in extended kinship relations (see below) and the institutionalization of monogamy on all social classes, support for children came to rest completely upon the independent nuclear family. As described below, this "simple" family was the critical vehicle of Western modernization.

Decline of Extended Kinship Relations and the Rise of the Simple Household

As in the case of monogamy, the Church also had a role in the decline of extended kinship relationships. In this case, however, Church policy was aided by the rise of strong central governments, which discouraged extended family relationships and replaced the role of the extended family in guaranteeing individual interests.

From an evolutionary perspective one can scarcely overestimate the potential importance of kinship relationships. Because of the ties of biological relatedness, kin are expected to have common interests and lower thresholds for cooperation and even self-sacrificing behavior. The Germanic tribes who settled much of Western Europe at the end of the Roman Empire were organized as kinship groups based on biological relatedness among males. They tribes had a strong sense of group solidarity based on these ties of kinship. "Since the early Germans could not rely upon the protection and assistance of a bureaucratic empire when they were threatened with attack or famine, it was incumbent upon each man and woman of the community to adhere to the fundamental sociobiological principle of group survival embodied in the bonds of familial and communal solidarity."²⁷ It was this world of tribally based kinship groups that the kings and the Church wanted to eradicate.

Forces Opposing Extended Kinship. The eradication of large, powerful kinship groups was in the interests of both the Church and the aristocracy. A higher degree of centralized state power by itself has a tendency to lessen the importance of extended kinship relations, especially if that power protects the interests of individuals. From an evolutionary perspective, extended kinship groups have costs and benefits. The benefits accrue from the protection and support provided by the wider kindred, but these benefits entail costs in terms of: 1.) increased demands by kin for reciprocated services; 2.) the fact that kin will tend to prevent any individual from rising too much above the others in the kinship group; and 3) the difficulty of establishing oneself in a kinship structure which is far from egalitarian. As a result, individuals are expected to

avoid becoming enmeshed in extended kinship groups when their interests are protected by other institutions i.e., the benefits of extended kinship are removed, but the costs remain. In general individuals tend to seek the protection of the extended kinship group when centralized power fails, and they correspondingly flee the extended kinship group when state power is sufficient to protect their interests.²⁸

The picture one gets is the gradual development in the West of an aristocracy based on the simple family and freed from obligations to collateral kin dominating a peasantry characterized by the simple family and embedded in a society of neighbors and friends, not an extended kinship group. This social structure was an achievement of the late Middle Ages. Extended kinship relations were not important among the peasantry in late Medieval England or France.²⁹

Church Policy. For its part, the Church contributed to the eradication of extended kinship ties in Western Europe by opposing consanguineous marriage (marriage of blood relatives) and supporting marriage based solely on consent of the partners. In the case of consanguinity, the Church prohibited marriage between an ever-expanding set of individuals. In the sixth century the prohibition was extended to second cousins and by the eleventh century it was extended to 6th cousins i.e., individuals with a common great-great-great-great-great grandfather. Clearly these prohibitions on consanguinity go far beyond those predicted by evolutionary theory.³⁰ Moreover, biological relatedness was not crucial here, since marriage was forbidden to similarly distant affinal relatives (i.e., relatives by marriage) as well as to individuals with spiritual kinship (i. e., relatives of godparents). The effect of the policy was to undermine extensive kinship networks and to create an aristocracy freed from obligations to the wider kin group.

Whatever the rationale given to these prohibitions by the Church, there is evidence that the aristocracy obeyed the ecclesiastical rules. There were very few marriages closer than 4th or 5th cousins among the French nobility of the 10th and 11th centuries.³¹ These practices weakened the extended kinship group, since the expanded range of incestuous marriages prevented the solidarity of extended kinship groups by excluding "the reinforcing of blood with marriage."³² The result was that biological relatedness was spread diffusely throughout the nobility rather than concentrated at the top. The direct descendents of the family rather than the wider kinship group also benefited: "Men in high secular positions . . . strove to consolidate their fortunes and their families in order to secure as much as possible for their direct descendants to the detriment of wider kin."³³

In addition to its policy on consanguinity, the Church's doctrine of consent in marriage acted as a force against extended kinship relationships. "The family, the tribe, the clan, were subordinated to the individual. If one wanted to marry enough, one could choose one's own mate and the Church would vindicate one's choice."³⁴ Marriage came about as a result of consent and was ratified by sexual intercourse. By removing the fundamental nature of marriage from the control of the family and the secular lord to the individuals involved, the Church established its authority against the traditional ties of kinship and family. Freedom of choice of marriage partner was the rule in England throughout the modern period and that parental control was exercised only in the top 1% of the population.³⁵

An Ethnic Basis for Western Individualism

The Magian [Eastern] man is but part of a pneumatic "We" which, descending from above, is one and the same in all members. As body and soul he belongs to himself alone, but something else, something alien and higher, dwells in him, making him with all his glimpses and convictions just a member of a consensus, which, as the emanation of God, excludes all possibility of the self-asserting Ego. Truth is for him something other than for us i.e., for us of specifically European mentality. All our epistemological methods, resting upon the individual judgment, are for him madness and infatuation and its scientific results a work of the Evil One, who has confused and deceived the spirit as to its true dispositions and purposes. Herein lies the ultimate, for unapproachable secret of Magian thought in its cavern world — the impossibility of a thinking, believing, and knowing Ego is the presupposition in all the fundamentals of all these religions.

The Faustian Worldview: "In Wolfram von Eschenbach, Cervantes, Shakespeare, and Goethe, the tragic line of the individual life develops from within outward, dynamically, functionally." ". . . willing to question even God if the mask that he shows—or is said to have shown—rings hollow when struck," Oswald Spengler.³⁶

Thus far one might suppose that the creation of the individualistic nuclear family based on consent and love, monogamy, and the decline in the importance of extended kinship is simply the result of the social processes I have mentioned. But the fact is that these changes occurred much more quickly and much more thoroughly than in other parts of the world. The Western world remains the only culture area fundamentally characterized by all of the markers of individualism: Monogamy, the conjugal nuclear family, representative government with individual rights against the state, moral universalism, and science. Further, this culture was built on the robust

base of Roman civilization, which had several of these features. I suggest therefore that these tendencies are unique to the Western European culture area and that they have an ethnic basis. I do not suppose that Western Europeans have any unique biological adaptations, only that we differ in degree in adaptations characteristic of all humans and that the differences are sufficient to enable the evolution of a unique human culture. Similarly, all humans have the distinctively human mental abilities like symbolic representation and language, but races show quantitative differences in IQ sufficient to have major effects on their cultures—perhaps sufficient to result in at least some qualitative differences.

I suggest that over the course of their recent evolution, Europeans have been less subjected to between-group natural selection than Jews and other Middle Eastern populations. This was originally proposed by Fritz Lenz, who suggested that, because of the harsh environment of the Ice Age, the Nordic peoples evolved in small groups and have a tendency toward social isolation.³⁷ Such a perspective would not imply that Northern Europeans lack collectivist mechanisms for group competition, but only that these mechanisms are relatively less elaborated and/or require a higher level of group conflict to trigger their expression.

This perspective is consistent with ecological theory. Under ecologically adverse circumstances, adaptations are directed more at coping with the adverse physical environment than at competing with other groups, and in such an environment, there would be less pressure for selection for extended kinship networks and highly collectivist groups.³⁸ Evolutionary conceptualizations of ethnocentrism emphasize the utility of ethnocentrism in-group competition. Ethnocentrism would thus be of no importance at all in combating the physical environment, and such an environment would not support large groups.

European groups are part of the North Eurasian and Circumpolar culture area.³⁹ This culture area derives from hunter-gatherers adapted to cold, ecologically adverse climates. In such climates there is pressure for male provisioning of the family and a tendency toward monogamy because the ecology did not support either polygyny or large groups for an evolutionarily significant period. These cultures are characterized by bilateral kinship relationships which recognize both the male and female lines, suggesting a more equal contribution for each sex as would be expected under conditions of monogamy. There is also less emphasis on extended kinship relationships and marriage tends to be exogamous i.e., outside the kinship group. All of these characteristics are opposite those found in the Middle Old World culture area, comprising the lower part of Eurasia. This culture group includes Jews and similar

Near Eastern groups.

This scenario implies that Northern European peoples are more prone to individualism because they existed for a very long period in an ecological context that did not support large tribal groups based on extended kinship relations. Based on mitochondrial DNA, around 80% of European genes are from people who arrived in Europe from the Middle East 30-40,000 years ago.⁴⁰ These populations persisted through the Ice Ages. Presumably European populations who evolved in the cold and cloudy environments of the North for 40,000 years developed not just blond hair and blue eyes but temperaments and life style preferences to go with it.

These populations were hunters and gatherers, not agriculturalists. Because of the relatively low level of economic production, hunting favors male provision of females.⁴¹ This is because the energetic requirements of the human brain can only be met with a high quality diet. The human brain makes up only 2% of body mass but requires 20% of all energy, 70% in the fetal period. This then led to pair bonding—the psychological basis of monogamy—in which there is cooperation between nurturing females and provisioning males beginning around 500,000 years ago. Hunting also required "considerable experience, quality education, and years of intensive practice"⁴²—in other words, it requires high-investment parenting. It also pulls for intelligence because hunting for humans relies on cognitive abilities rather than running ability or strength. The hunting scenario is complex and ever changing.⁴³ Every animal species as well as individuals demonstrate unique behavioral characteristics depending on internal conditions of sex, age, weather, topography, etc. All of these trends are intensified in Northern areas because there is less energy per unit area.

The historical evidence shows that Europeans, and especially Northwest Europeans, were relatively quick to abandon extended kinship networks and collectivist social structures when their interests were protected with the rise of strong centralized governments. There is a general tendency throughout the world for a decline in extended kinship networks with the rise of central authority.⁴⁴ But in the case of Northwest Europe this tendency quickly gave rise, at least by the late Middle Ages and probably earlier, to the unique Western European "simple household" type. The simple household type is based on a single married couple and their children. This household style was typical of Scandinavia (except Finland), British Isles, Low Countries, German-speaking areas, northern France. It contrasts with the joint family structure typical of the rest of Eurasia in which the household consists of two or more related couples, typically brothers and their wives.⁴⁵ Before the industrial revolution,

the simple household system was characterized by late age of marriage as well as methods of keeping unmarried young people occupied as servants and circulating among the households of the wealthy. The joint household system was characterized by earlier age of marriage for both men and women, a higher birthrate, as well as means of splitting up to form two or more households when the need arises.⁴⁶

This simple household system is a fundamental feature of individualist culture. The individualist family was able to pursue its interests freed from the obligations and constraints of extended kinship relationships and free of the suffocating collectivism of the social structures typical of the rest of the world. Marriage based on individual consent and conjugal affection quickly replaced marriage based on kinship and, even considerations.

This relatively greater proneness to forming a simple household type is likely ethnically based. Not only does the simple household make compelling ecological sense for people adapted to harsh climates, but as previously pointed out, this tendency is stronger among the Germanic peoples. It is an intriguing finding that there are major differences within France corresponding to the division between the Germanic peoples who lived northeast of "the eternal line," which connects Saint Malo on the English Channel with Geneva in French-speaking Switzerland. This area developed large-scale agriculture capable of feeding the growing towns and cities, and did so prior to the agricultural revolution of the 18th century. It was supported by a large array of skilled craftsmen in the towns, and a large class of medium-sized ploughmen who "owned horses, copper bowls, glass goblets and often shoes; their children had fat cheeks and broad shoulders, and their babies wore tiny shoes. None of these children had the swollen bellies of the rachitics of the Third World."⁴⁷ The northeast became the center of French industrialization and world trade.

The northeast also differed from the southwest in literacy rates. In the early 19th century, while literacy rates for France as a whole were approximately 50%, the rate in the northeast was close to 100%, and differences occurred at least from the 17th century. Moreover, there was a pronounced difference in stature, with the northeasterners being taller by almost two centimeters in an 18th century sample of military recruits. Ladurie notes that the difference in the entire population was probably larger because the army would not accept many of the shorter men from the southwest. Family historians have noted that the trend toward the economically independent nuclear family was more prominent in the north, while there was a tendency toward joint families as one moves to the south and east.⁴⁸

These findings strongly suggest that ethnic differences are a contributing factor to the geographical variation in family forms within Europe. The findings suggest that the Germanic peoples had a somewhat greater biological tendency toward individualism—a greater tendency toward nuclear family social structure because of selection occurring in a prolonged resource-limited period of their evolution in the north of Europe. These groups were less attracted to extended kinship groups, so that when the context altered with the decline of extended kinship networks, the simple household structure occurred quickly. This simple family structure was adopted relatively easily because this group already had relatively powerful psychological predispositions toward the simple household system resulting from its unique evolutionary history.

Although these differences between the Germanic peoples and other areas of Europe system are important, they do not belie the general difference between Western Europe and the rest of Eurasia. Although the trends toward simple households and the demographic transition occurred first in the northwest of Europe, they spread relatively quickly among all the Western countries.

Another element of Western uniqueness was the custom of placing young people from peasant families as servants in the homes of others in areas of Northwest Europe characterized by the simple family. Between 30 and 40% of the youth in pre-industrial England were in service, the largest single occupational group until the 20th century.⁴⁹ The practice of taking in servants went beyond simply providing for one's needs by bringing in outsiders. People would sometimes have their children go to work as servants elsewhere while at the same time taking in unrelated servants.⁵⁰ It was not just the children of the poor and landless who became servants, but even large, successful farmers sent their children to be servants elsewhere. In the 17th and 18th centuries individuals often took in servants early in their marriage, before their own children could help out, and then passed their children to others when the children were older and there was more than enough help.⁵¹

This suggests a deeply ingrained cultural practice, which resulted in a high level of non-kinship based reciprocity. The practice also bespeaks a relative lack of ethnocentrism because people are taking in non-relatives as household members. These pre-industrial societies are not organized around extended kinship, and it is easy to see that they are pre-adapted to the industrial revolution and modern world generally. In the rest of Eurasia, there was a strong tendency for households to consist of kin.⁵²

Interestingly, in a sexually competitive society such as classical China, the female

servants would be concubines of the head of the household,⁵³ so that the resources of the household could be directly translated into reproduction. Thus in the Western European model wealthy males were supporting far more non-relatives than in the sexually competitive societies of Eurasia. It is intriguing that hunter-gatherer societies living in harsh climates often have very elaborate systems of reciprocity aimed at sharing resources such as meat. I suspect that the system of non-kinship based reciprocity so typical of pre-industrial Western Europe was another relic of a prolonged evolution in harsh northern climates.

This establishment of the simple household freed from enmeshment in the wider kinship community was then followed by all the other markers of Western modernization: limited governments in which individuals have rights against the state, capitalist economic enterprise based on individual economic rights, and science as individualist truth seeking. Individualist societies develop republican political institutions and institutions of scientific inquiry that assume that groups are maximally permeable and highly subject to defection when individual needs are not met.

Individualistic Marriage: Consent, Love, and Companionship as the Basis of Marriage

The rise of the simple household based on consent between the partners meant that personal qualities of the mate became more important compared to the situation where families are enmeshed in extended kinship relationships. In situations where the extended family reigns supreme, marriage is typically consanguineous and affected by family strategizing. In the simple household system, the personal characteristics of the mate become more important, i.e., all those characteristics on which humans choose mates, including intelligence, personality, psychological compatibility, and socioeconomic status.

While collectivist societies emphasize genealogy and degree of genetic relatedness in marriage, individualist societies tend to emphasize personal attraction, e.g., romantic love, common interests.⁵⁴ John Money has noted the relatively greater tendency of Northern European groups toward romantic love as the basis of marriage.⁵⁵ Frank Salter has suggested that Northern European groups have a number of individualistic adaptations related to sexual behavior, including a greater tendency toward romantic love and genetic rather than social control mechanisms to prevent cuckoldry.⁵⁶ At the psychological level, the evolutionary basis of individualism involves mechanisms like romantic love in which adaptive behavior is intrinsically rewarding⁵⁷ rather than imposed by family strategizing or coerced, as in collectivist cultures. It is the

difference between individual courtship between freely consenting and more or less equal partners, versus institutions like the purdah of Near Eastern civilization where the woman is sequestered and controlled by her male relatives until an arranged marriage is concluded.

There has been a trend, beginning in the Middle Ages, toward the companionate marriage based on affection and consent between the partners, eventually affecting even the marriage decisions of the high aristocracy.⁵⁸ "Whereas in industrial Western societies the emotional relationship between man and wife is primary, it is not the pivot of social structure in the majority of societies."⁵⁹ Indeed, this is a general point of contrast between Eastern and Western stratified societies.⁶⁰ The idealization of romantic love as the basis of monogamous marriage has also periodically characterized Western secular intellectual movements, such as the Stoics of late antiquity and 19th-century Romanticism.⁶¹ It's not that love and affection between mates do not exist in other societies; it is just that there is greater emphasis on this in Western societies.

Individual consent to marriage, a characteristic of Western marriage since the Middle Ages, is expected to result in individuals weighing more heavily the personal characteristics of a prospective mate. One effect of this is greater age parity in marriage partners. Relative age parity of spouses combined with a late age of marriage is a mark of the Western European system of marriage.⁶² The age of marriage for women was higher in Western Europe than elsewhere in Eurasia or Africa, including peasant societies characterized by joint families.⁶³ Indeed, in a large English sample from 1550-1775 the average age of marriage for females fluctuated around 26 years of age until 1675, when it began a decline to slightly above 24 years of age in 1800.

Another consequence of the simple household was that affection and pair bonding became the basis of marriage. Marriage became much less a matter of political alliance between and within kinship groups or a purely economic affair, or simply an aspect of sexual competition, and became based on interpersonal attraction, including affection. Affection within marriage became a cultural norm with the rise of the simple household. The Western phenomenon of courtship (unique among the cultures of Eurasia and Africa) provided a period in which prospective mates could assess personal compatibility; in Malthus' terms, an opportunity was given for both sexes "of finding out kindred disposition, and of forming those strong and lasting attachments without which the married state is generally more productive of misery than of happiness."⁶⁴

Individualism & the Decline in Ethnic Consciousness Among Europeans

Thus far I have sketched a scenario, which may be summarized by saying that Western Europeans are relatively non-ethnocentric because of a prolonged period of natural selection in an adverse environment where extended kinship relationships had relatively little utility. Freed from the shackles of extended kinship relationships, Westerners returned to their roots, readily adopting the simple household which set in motion all the other features of modernization: companionate marriage, individual rights against the state, representative government, moral universalism, and science. The result was an extraordinary period of creativity, conquest, and creation of wealth that continues into the present. However, one of the theses of my books on Judaism is that individualism is a poor strategy compared to cohesive group strategies. In the West, extended kinship groups were eliminated as a necessary prelude to modernization, but this did not eliminate between-group competition entirely. Beginning in the 19th century there has been competition between Jews as a collectivist, ethnically conscious group and Western individualistic elites.

Anthropologically, Jews derive from the Middle Old World Culture area. This culture area is quite the opposite from the characteristics of Western social organization. As indicated in Table 1, Judaism is collectivist and highly prone to ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and moral particularism.⁶⁵

	<i>European Cultural Origins</i>	<i>Jewish Cultural Origins</i>
Evolutionary History	Northern Hunter-Gatherers	Middle Old World Pastoralists (Herders)
Kinship System	Bilateral; Weakly Patricentric	Unilineal; Strongly Patricentric
Family System	Simple Household;	Extended Family; Joint Household;
Marriage Practices	Exogamous Monogamous	Endogamous, Consanguineous;

Marriage Psychology	Companionate; Based on Mutual Consent and Affection	Polygynous Utilitarian; Based on Family Strategizing and Control of Kinship Group
Position of Women	Relatively High	Relatively Low
Social Structure	Individualistic; Republican; Democratic;	Collectivistic; Authoritarian; Charismatic Leaders
Ethnocentrism	Relatively Low	Relatively High; "Hyper-ethnocentrism"
Xenophobia	Relatively Low	Relatively High; "Hyper-xenophobia"
Socialization	Stresses Independence, Self-Reliance	Stresses Ingroup Identification, Obligations to Kinship Group
Intellectual Stance	Reason; Science	Dogmatism; Submission to Ingroup Authority and Charismatic Leaders
Moral Stance	Moral Universalism: Morality is Independent of Group Affiliation	Moral Particularism; Ingroup/Outgroup Morality; Is it good for the Jews?

Table 1: Contrasts between European and Jewish Cultural Forms.

A prominent theme appearing in several places in my books on Judaism is that individualistic societies are uniquely vulnerable to invasion by cohesive groups such

as has been historically represented by Judaism. Recent research by evolutionary economists provides fascinating insight on the differences between individualistic cultures versus collectivist cultures. An important aspect of this research is to model the evolution of cooperation among individualistic groups.⁶⁶ People will altruistically punish defectors in a "one-shot" game—a game in which participants only interact once and are thus not influenced by the reputations of the people with whom they are interacting. This situation therefore models an individualistic culture because participants are strangers with no kinship ties. The surprising finding was that subjects who made high levels of public goods donations tended to punish people who did not, even though they incurred a cost in doing so. Moreover, the punished individuals changed their ways and donated more in future games even though they knew that the participants in later rounds were not the same as in previous rounds. The researchers suggest that people from individualistic cultures have an evolved negative emotional reaction to free riding that results in their punishing such people even at a cost to themselves—hence the term "altruistic punishment."

Essentially this research provides a model of the evolution of cooperation among individualistic peoples. Their results are most applicable to individualistic groups because such groups are not based on extended kinship relationships and are therefore much more prone to defection. In general, high levels of altruistic punishment are more likely to be found among individualistic, hunter-gather societies than in kinship-based societies based on the extended family. Their results are least applicable to groups such as Jewish groups or other highly collectivist groups which in traditional societies were based on extended kinship relationships, known kinship linkages, and repeated interactions among members. In such situations, actors know the people with whom they are cooperating and anticipate future cooperation because they are enmeshed in extended kinship networks, or, as in the case of Jews, they are in the same group.

Europeans are thus exactly the sort of groups modeled by this research: They are groups with high levels of cooperation with strangers rather than with extended family members, and they are prone to market relations and individualism.

This suggests the fascinating possibility that the key for a group intending to turn Europeans against themselves is to trigger their strong tendency toward altruistic punishment by convincing them of the moral blameworthiness of their own people. Because Europeans are individualists at heart, they readily rise up in moral anger against their own people once they are seen as free riders and therefore morally blameworthy—a manifestation of their stronger tendency toward altruistic punishment

deriving from their evolutionary past as hunter gatherers. In making judgments of altruistic punishment, relative genetic distance is irrelevant. Free-riders are seen as strangers in a market situation; i.e., they have no familial or tribal connection with the altruistic punisher.

As a very interesting and influential European group, the Puritans exemplified this tendency toward altruistic punishment. A defining feature of Puritanism was the tendency to pursue utopian causes framed as moral issues—their susceptibility to utopian appeals to a ‘higher law’ and the belief that government’s principal purpose is moral. New England was the most fertile ground for "the perfectibility of man creed," and the "father of a dozen ‘isms’."⁶⁷ There was a tendency to paint political alternatives as starkly contrasting moral imperatives, with one side portrayed as evil incarnate—inspired by the devil. Puritan moral intensity can also be seen in their "profound personal piety"⁶⁸—their intensity of commitment to live not only a holy life, but also a sober and industrious life.

Puritans waged holy war on behalf of moral righteousness even against their own genetic cousins. The suggestion is that this is a form of altruistic punishment found more often among cooperative hunter-gatherer groups than among groups based on extended kinship. For example, whatever the political and economic complexities that led to the Civil War, it was the Yankee moral condemnation of slavery that inspired the rhetoric and rendered the massive carnage of closely related Anglo-Americans on behalf of slaves from Africa justifiable in the minds of Puritans. Militarily, the war with the Confederacy rendered the heaviest sacrifice in lives and property ever made by Americans.⁶⁹ Puritan moral fervor and its tendency to justify draconian punishment of evil doers can also be seen in the comments of "the Congregationalist minister at Henry Ward Beecher’s Old Plymouth Church in New York [who] went so far as to call for ‘exterminating the German people . . . the sterilization of 10,000,000 German soldiers and the segregation of the woman.’"⁷⁰

Thus the current altruistic punishment so characteristic of contemporary Western civilization: Once Europeans were convinced that their own people were morally bankrupt, any and all means of punishment should be used against their own people. Rather than see other Europeans as part of an encompassing ethnic and tribal community, fellow Europeans were seen as morally blameworthy and the appropriate target of altruistic punishment. For Westerners, morality is individualistic—violations of communal norms by free riders are punished by altruistic aggression.

On the other hand, group strategies deriving from collectivist cultures, such as

Judaism, are immune to such a maneuver because kinship and group ties come first. Morality is particularistic—whatever is good for the group. There is no tradition of altruistic punishment because the evolutionary history of these groups centers around cooperation of close kin, not strangers.

The best strategy to destroy Europeans, therefore, is to convince the Europeans of their own moral bankruptcy. A major theme of my book, *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements*,⁷¹ is that this is exactly what Jewish intellectual movements have done. They have presented Judaism as morally superior to European civilization and European civilization as morally bankrupt and the proper target of altruistic punishment. The consequence is that once Europeans are convinced of their own moral depravity, they will destroy their own people in a fit of altruistic punishment. The general dismantling of the culture of the West, and eventually its demise as anything resembling an ethnic entity, will occur as a result of a moral onslaught triggering a paroxysm of altruistic punishment. And thus the intense effort among Jewish intellectuals to continue the ideology of the moral superiority of Judaism and its role as undeserving historical victim while at the same time continuing the onslaught on the moral legitimacy of the West.⁷²

Individualist societies are therefore an ideal environment for highly collectivist, group-oriented strategies such as Judaism. It is significant that the problem of immigration of non-European peoples is not at all confined to the United States but represents a severe and increasingly contentious problem in the entire Western world and nowhere else: Only European-derived peoples have opened their doors to the other peoples of the world and now stand in danger of losing control of territory occupied for hundreds of years. And they have done so to a considerable extent as a consequence of a self-perceived moral imperative that was utilized successfully by immigration activists to attain their own ethnic aims.⁷³

Western societies have traditions of individualistic humanism, which make immigration restriction difficult. In the nineteenth century, for example, the Supreme Court twice turned down Chinese exclusion acts on the basis that they legislated against a group, not an individual.⁷⁴ The effort to develop an intellectual basis for immigration restriction was tortuous; by 1920 it was based on the legitimacy of the ethnic interests of Northwestern Europeans and had overtones of racialist thinking. Both these ideas were difficult to reconcile with the stated political, moral, and humanitarian ideology of a republican and democratic society in which, as Jewish pro-immigration activists such as Israel Zangwill emphasized, racial or ethnic group

membership had no official intellectual sanction. The replacement of these assertions of ethnic self-interest with an ideology of "assimilability" in the debate over the McCarran-Walter act immigration act of 1952 was perceived by its opponents as little more than a smokescreen for "racism." At the end, this intellectual tradition collapsed largely as a result of the onslaught of the intellectual movements reviewed in this volume, and so collapsed a central pillar of the defense of the ethnic interests of European-derived peoples.

One very prominent strategy for Jewish intellectuals has been to promote radical individualism and moral universalism to the point that the entire ethnic basis of the society is undermined. In other words, these movements capitalized on the fact that Western societies had already adopted a paradigm of individualism and moral universalism, and were highly prone to altruistic punishment of their own people. These movements had the collective effect of undermining remaining sources of group cohesion among Europeans while leaving intact Judaism as a highly cohesive, group-based movement. The exemplar of this strategy is the work of the Frankfurt School of Social Research, but similar comments could be made about leftist political ideology and psychoanalysis. At its simplest level, gentile group identifications are regarded as an indication of psychopathology.

Despite the decline of extended kinship and the rise of individualism, Europeans had not entirely shed all sense of being part of a larger community. In the U.S., Europeans retained a sense of peoplehood based on race well into the 20th century. This sense of peoplehood and being a member of a race was buttressed by Darwinian-inspired scholarship, which not only viewed racial differences as well-established scientific findings, but also viewed the white race as uniquely talented. But this final attempt to find a biological sense of peoplehood went into steep decline, and is now widely viewed with horror in the academic establishment, largely because of the intellectual movements I discuss in *The Culture of Critique*.⁷⁵

Conclusion

Whether Western individualistic societies are able to defend the legitimate interests of the European-derived peoples remains questionable. The present tendencies lead one to predict that unless individualism is abandoned the end result will be a substantial diminution of the genetic, political, and cultural influence of European peoples. It would be an unprecedented unilateral abdication of such power and certainly an evolutionist would expect no such abdication without at least a phase of resistance by a significant segment of the population—presumably the more ethnocentric among

us. Ironically perhaps, this reaction would emulate aspects of Judaism by adopting group-serving, collectivist ideologies and social organizations. Whether the decline of the European peoples continues unabated or is arrested, it will constitute a profound impact of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy on the development of Western societies.

End Notes

1. Alexander 1979; see Flinn & Low (1986) and MacDonald (1983) for ethnographic examples.
2. Alexander 1979.
3. MacDonald 1990.
4. Corbett 1930; Raaflaub 1986a,b; Watson 1975.
5. The following is based on MacDonald 1995.
6. Ullman 1970, 1.
7. Duby 1983, 162.
8. See MacDonald 1995.
9. In Lynch 1972a, 33.
10. Tellenbach 1993, 101.
11. Lawrence 1994, 126.
12. Tellenbach 1993, 103.
13. Tellenbach 1993, 105.
14. Cohen 1982; Cohen 1994; Jordan 1989; MacDonald 1994a 1995; Parkes 1976.
15. Chazan 1973; ; Gilchrist 1969; Jordan 1989.
16. Lynch 1992, 161-164.
17. Hill 1967, 349.
18. Marchant 1969, 224.
19. Herlihy 1985, 157.
20. Wrigley & Schofield 1981.
21. Hajnal 1965, 1983; Laslett 1983; MacFarlane 1986; Wall 1983; Wrigley & Schofield 1981.
22. Wrigley & Schofield 1981, 439; see also Hajnal 1965; MacFarlane 1986.
23. MacFarlane 1983, 33.
24. Draper & Harpending 1988.
25. Guttentag & Secord 1983.
26. Trivers 1986.
27. Russell 1994, 120.
28. Stone 1977. The protective function of the extended family is a common phenomenon in intermediate level, tribal societies as well as many peasant societies characterized by joint family structure.
29. Hanawalt 1986; Barthelemy 1988.
30. From an evolutionary perspective, marrying close relatives leads to inbreeding depression and an increased risk for genetic diseases caused by recessive genes. Many societies allow first cousin marriage and a few, such as the Jews, allow uncle-niece marriage. As discussed here, Western societies tend to be more exogamous than Near Eastern societies.
31. Bouchard 1981.
32. Goody 1983, 145; one effect of this policy, emphasized by Goody, was that families were often left without direct heirs and left their property to the Church.

- [33.](#) Leyser 1979, 50.
- [34.](#) Noonan 1973, 430.
- [35.](#) MacFarlane 1986.
- [36.](#) In Campbell 1959, Vol. 3 233-234 & Vol. 4, 553-554.
- [37.](#) Lenz 1931, 657.
- [38.](#) Southwood 1977, 1981
- [39.](#) Burton et al., 1996.
- [40.](#) Sykes 2000
- [41.](#) Roebroeks 2001
- [42.](#) Roebroeks 2001, 450.
- [43.](#) Frison 1998.
- [44.](#) Alexander 1979; Goldschmidt & Kunkel 1971; Stone 1977
- [45.](#) Hajnal 1983.
- [46.](#) Hajnal 1983; Laslett (1983) further elaborates this basic difference to include four variants ranging from West, West/central or middle, Mediterranean, to East.
- [47.](#) Ladurie 1987.
- [48.](#) E.g., Laslett 1983.
- [49.](#) Laslett 1977.
- [50.](#) Hajnal 1983.
- [51.](#) Stone 1977.
- [52.](#) Hajnal 1983.
- [53.](#) E. g., Ebrey 1986.
- [54.](#) Triandis 1990.
- [55.](#) Money 1980.
- [56.](#) Salter 1994.
- [57.](#) MacDonald 1992.
- [58.](#) Brundage 1987; Hanawalt 1986; MacFarlane 1986; Stone 1977; Stone 1990.
- [59.](#) MacFarlane 1986, 174.
- [60.](#) Westermarck 1922.
- [61.](#) E.g. Brown 1987; Brundage 1987; Corbin 1990; Porter 1982; Veyne 1987.
- [62.](#) Laslett 1983.
- [63.](#) See Hajnal 1965 1983; MacFarlane 1986; Malthus 1976.
- [64.](#) In MacFarlane 1986, 294.
- [65.](#) See MacDonald 1998/2002.
- [66.](#) Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Henrich et al., 2001.
- [67.](#) Fischer 1989, 357.
- [68.](#) Vaughn 1997, 20.
- [69.](#) Phillips 1989, 477.
- [70.](#) In Phillips 1999, 556.
- [71.](#) MacDonald 1998/2002.
- [72.](#) MacDonald 1998/2002.
- [73.](#) MacDonald 1998/2002, Chap. 7.
- [74.](#) Petersen 1955, 78.
- [75.](#) MacDonald 1998/2002.

References

- Alexander, R. D. *Darwinism and Human Affairs*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979.
- Bouchard, C. B. "Consanguinity and noble marriages in the tenth and eleventh century," *Speculum* 56: 268-287, 1981.
- Barthelemy, D. *Portraits "Kinship,"* in *A History of Private Life*, Vol. II, P. Aries & G. Duby (eds.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988.
- Brown, P. "Late antiquity," in P. Veyne (ed.) *A History of Private Life*, Vol. I. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987.
- Brundage, J. A. "Concubinage and marriage in Medieval Canon law," *Journal of Medieval History* 1: 1-17, 1975.
- Burton, M. L., Moore, C. C., Whiting, J. W. M., & Romney, A. K. "Regions based on social structure," *Current Anthropology* 37: 87-123, 1996.
- Campbell, J. *The Masks of God* (4 Vols.), New York: Viking, 1959.
- Chazan, R. *Medieval Jewry in Northern France: A Political and Social History*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
- Cohen, J. *The Friars and the Jews: The Emergence of Medieval Anti-Judaism*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982.
- Cohen, M. *Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Corbett, P. E. *The Roman Law of Marriage*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1930.
- Corbin, A. "Intimate relations," in M. Perrot (ed.) *A History of Private Life: IV. From the Fires of the Revolution to the Great War*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.
- Draper, P., & Harpending, H. "A sociobiological perspective on human reproductive strategies," in K. MacDonald (ed.) *Sociobiological perspectives on human development*, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1988, pp. 340-372.
- Duby, G. *The Knight, the Lady, and the Priest*, (trans. Barbara Bray) London: Penguin Books, 1983.
- Ebrey, P. "Concubines in Sung China," *Journal of Family History*, 11: 1-24, 1986.
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. "Altruistic punishment in humans," *Nature* 415: 137-140, 2002.
- Fischer, D. H. *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Flinn, M. V., & Low, B. S. "Resource distribution, social competition, and mating patterns in human societies," in D. I. Rubenstein & R. W. Wrangham (eds.) *Ecological Aspects of Social Evolution*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Frison, G. C. "Paleoindian large mammal hunters of the plains of North America," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science* 95:14575-14583, 1998.
- Gilchrist, J. *The Church and Economic Policy in the Middle Ages*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969.
- Goldschmidt, W., & Kunkel, E. J. "The structure of the peasant family," *American Anthropologist* 73:1058-1076, 1971.
- Goody, J. *The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Guttenag, M., & Secord, P. F. *"Too Many Women?"* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983.
- Hajnal, J. "Two kinds of pre-industrial household formation system," in *Family Forms in Historic Europe*, R. Wall, J. Robin & P. Laslett (eds.) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Hanawalt, B. *The Ties that Bound: Peasant Families in Medieval England*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., & McElreath, R. "In search of Homo economicus: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies," *Economics and Social Behavior* 91: 73-78, 2001.
- Herlihy, D. *Medieval Households*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.
- Hill, J. E. C. *Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England*, (2nd ed.) New York: Schocken Books, 1967.
- Jordan, W. C. *The French Monarchy and the Jews: From Philip Augustus to the Last Capetians*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989.
- Ladurie, E. L. *The French Peasantry 1450-1660*, (trans. by A. Sheridan) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986 (Originally published in 1977).

- Laslett, P. "Family and household as work group and kin group: areas of traditional Europe compared," in *Family Forms in Historic Europe*, R. Wall, J. Robin, and P. Laslett (eds.) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Laslett, P. *The World We have Lost*, (3d edition) New York: Scribners, 1984.
- Lawrence, C. H. *The Friars: The Impact of the Early Mendicant Movement on Western Culture*, London: Longman, 1994.
- Lenz, F. "The inheritance of intellectual gifts," in *Human Heredity*, (trans. E. Paul & C. Paul), E. Baur, E. Fischer, & F. Lenz, New York: Macmillan, 1931.
- Leysner, K. J. *Rule and Conflict in Early Medieval Society*, London: E. Arnold, 1979.
- Lynch, J. E. "Marriage and celibacy of the clergy: The discipline of the Western Church: An historical-canonical synopsis," *Jurist* 23:14-38; 189-212, 1972a, b.
- MacDonald, K. B. "Production, social controls and ideology: Toward a sociobiology of the phenotype," *Journal of Social and Biological Structures* 6: 297-317, 1983.
- MacDonald, K. B. "Mechanisms of sexual egalitarianism in Western Europe," *Ethology and Sociobiology* 11:195-238, 1990.
- MacDonald, K. B. "Warmth as a developmental construct: An evolutionary analysis," *Child Development* 63:753-773, 1992.
- MacDonald, K. B. *A People that Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.
- MacDonald, K. B. "The Establishment and Maintenance of Socially Imposed Monogamy in Western Europe," *Politics and the Life Sciences* 14:3-23, 1995.
- MacDonald, K. B. "Focusing on the Group: Further Issues Related to Western Monogamy," *Politics and the Life Sciences* 14:38-46, 1995.
- MacDonald, K. B. *Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998.
- MacDonald, K. B. *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998 (Revised edition, 2002, Bloomington, IN: 1stbooks Library).
- MacFarlane, A. *Marriage and Love in England: Modes of Reproduction 1300-1840*, London: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
- Malthus, T. R. *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1976 (Originally published in 1798).
- Marchant, R. A. *The Church under the Law*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
- Money, J. *Love, and Love Sickness: The Science of Sex, Gender Differences, and Pair Bonding*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980.
- Noonan, J. T. "Power to choose," *Viator* 4: 419-434, 1973.
- Parkes, J. *The Jew in the Medieval Community*, (2nd ed.) New York: Hermon Press, 1976.
- Petersen, W. "The "scientific" basis of our immigration policy," *Commentary* 20 (July): 77-86, 1955.
- Phillips, K.P. *The Cousins' Wars: Religion, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America*, New York: Basic Books, 1999.
- Porter, R. "Mixed feelings: The Enlightenment and sexuality in eighteenth-century Britain," in P. Bouce (ed.) *Sexuality in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1982.
- Raaflaub, K. A. "The conflict of the orders in archaic Rome: A comprehensive and comparative approach," in K. A. Raaflaub (ed.) *Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986a.
- Raaflaub, K. A. "From protection and defense to offense and participation: Stages in the conflict of the orders," in K. A. Raaflaub (ed.) *Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986b.
- Roebroeks, W. "Hominid behaviour and the earliest occupation of Europe: An exploration," *Journal of Human Evolution* 41: 437-461, 2001.
- Russell, J. C. *The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Salter, F. K. "Does female beauty increase male confidence of paternity? A blank slate hypothesis," *Ethology and Sociobiology* 1994.

Southwood, T. R. E. "Habitat, the temple for ecological strategies?" *Journal of Animal Ecology* 46: 337-366, 1977.

Southwood, T. R. E. "Bionomic strategies and population parameters," in R. M. May (ed.) *Theoretical Ecology: Principles and Applications*, Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates, 1981.

Stone, L. *The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England: 1500-1800*, New York: Harper & Row, 1977.

Stone, L. *The Road to Divorce*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.

Sykes, B. *The Seven Daughters of Eve*, New York: Norton, 2001.

Tellenbach, G. *The Church in Western Europe From the Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Triandis, H. C. "Cross-cultural studies of individualism and collectivism," *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 1989: Cross Cultural Perspectives*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990.

Trivers, R. *Social Evolution*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.

Ullman, W. *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages: A Study in the Ideological Relation of Clerical to Lay Power*, (3rd ed.) London: Methuen, 1970.

Vaughn, A. T. *The Puritan Tradition in America, 1620-1730*, (revised ed.) Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1997.

Veyne, P. "The Roman Empire," in P. Veyne (ed.) *A History of Private Life, Vol. I*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987.

Watson, A. *Rome of the XII Tables*, Princeton University Press, 1975.

Westermarck, G. *The History of Human Marriage*, (5th ed.) New York: Allerton, 1922.

Wrigley, E. A., & Schofield, R. *The Population History of England, 1541-1871*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

What Race Were the Greeks and Romans?

The evidence is clear — but often ignored.

John Harrison Sims, 2010

Recent films about ancient Greece such as *Troy*, *Helen of Troy*, and *300*, have used actors who are of Anglo-Saxon or Celtic ancestry (e.g. Brad Pitt, Gerard Butler). Recent films about ancient Rome, such as *Gladiator* and HBO's series *Rome*, have done the same (e.g. Russell Crowe). Were the directors right, from an historical point of view? Were the ancient Greeks and Romans of North European stock?

Most classical historians today are silent on the subject. For example, Paul Cartledge, a professor of Greek culture at Cambridge, writes about his specialty, Sparta, for educated but non-academic readers, yet nowhere that I can find does he discuss the racial origins of the Spartans. Some years ago I asked several classics professors about the race of the ancient Greeks only to be met with shrugs that suggested that no one knew, and that it was not something worth looking into. Today, an interest in the race of the ancients seems to be taken as an unhealthy sign, and any evidence of their Nordic origins discounted for fear it might give rise to dangerous sentiments.

A hundred years ago, however, Europeans took it for granted that many Greeks and Romans were the same race as themselves. The famed 11th edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, published in 1911, noted that “survival of fair hair and complexion and light eyes among the upper classes in Thebes and some other localities shows that the blond type of mankind which is characteristic of north-western Europe had already penetrated into Greek lands before classical times.” It added that the early Greeks, or Hellenes, were Nordic, one of “the fair-haired tribes of upper Europe known to the ancients as Keltoi.” Sixty years ago even Bertrand Russell, the British philosopher and socialist, believed that the Hellenes “were fair-haired invaders from the North, who brought the Greek language with them” (*History of Western Philosophy*, 1946).

Scholars today recoil at this pre-1960s consensus. *The Penguin Historical Atlas of Ancient Greece*, written in 1996, scoffs at the “undoubtedly dubious racial theories underlying much of this reconstruction,” but offers no theory to replace it, conceding

only that “the origin of the Greeks remains a much-debated subject.” The Penguin author makes this startling admission, however: “Many of the ideas of racial origins were developed in the 19th century and, although they may have had some foundation in historical tradition, archaeology or linguistics, they were often combined with more dubious presumptions.” The author fails to list these dubious presumptions. Beth Cohen, author of *Not the Classical Ideal: Athens and the Construction of the Other in Greek Art* (2000), asserts that the Thracians, distant cousins of the Greeks, had “the same dark hair and the same facial features as the Ancient Greeks.”

In fact, there was a good basis for the 1911 *Britannica* to write about blonds in Thebes. Thebes was the leading city of Boeotia, a rich agricultural region in south-central Greece. Fragments from an ancient 150 BC travelogue describe the women of Thebes as “the tallest, prettiest, and most graceful in all of Hellas. Their yellow hair is tied up in a knot on the top of their head.” Pindar, a fifth century Theban lyric poet, refers to the Greeks as “the fair-haired Danaoi,” using a poetical name for the Hellenes. Likewise, in his *Partheneia*, or “Maiden Songs,” the seventh century BC Spartan poet Alcman, praised the beauty of Spartan female athletes, with their “golden hair” and “violet eyes.” He also wrote of Spartan women with “silver eyes,” meaning light gray. The seventh-century BC Greek poet Archilochus praises the “yellow hair” of one of his lovers, and Sappho — also of the seventh century BC — writes of her “beautiful daughter, golden like a flower.”

As late as the fourth century AD, Adamantius, an Alexandrian physician and scientist, wrote in his *Physiognomica*, that “of all the nations the Greeks have the fairest eyes,” adding, that “wherever the Hellenic and Ionic race has been kept pure, we see tall men of fairly broad and straight build, . . . of fairly light skin, and blond.” Several centuries of mixing had presumably changed the racial character of many Greeks, but blonds still survived, and *Xanthos*, which means “yellow” in Greek, was a common personal name.

Professor Nell Painter of Princeton, author of *The History of White People* (see “Whiting Out White People,” AR, July 2010), complains that “not a few Westerners have attempted to racialize antiquity, making ancient history into white race history.” She points out that the Greeks often painted their marble statues — “the originals were often dark in color” — that the paint wore off over time, and Europeans mistakenly concluded from the white marble that the Greeks were white.

Yes, the Greeks painted their statues, but the originals were not dark. Praxiteles’ Aphrodite, from the Greek city of Knidos, was the most famous and most copied statue in the ancient world. Hundreds of copies survive. Experts have determined from microscopic paint particles that Aphrodite was painted blonde. The Romans had their

own name for this goddess, Venus, and likewise her “cult images” were ubiquitous and “painted with pale-coloured flesh and golden-blonde hair” (see Joanna Pitman’s *On Blondes*, 2003).

Phidias’ masterwork, the Athena Parthenos, stood in the Parthenon for nearly 1,000 years until it was lost, probably in the 5th century AD. When American sculptor Alan LeQuire set out to make a faithful copy for the full-scale Parthenon replica in Nashville’s Centennial Park he modeled it on descriptions of the original work. The 42-foot-tall Athena, unveiled in 1990, has light skin, blue eyes, and golden hair (see photo above).

Many small terra-cotta figurines from Greece of the fourth century BC have survived with traces of paint. They show light hair, usually reddish brown, and blue eyes, as do larger statues from the time of the Persian Wars in the early fifth century BC. Even a cursory examination of ancient marble reliefs, statues, and busts reveals European features. Many of the faces could just as easily be those of Celtic chieftains or Viking kings.

There is more evidence of the appearance of the Greeks. Xenophanes, an Ionian Greek philosopher who lived in the fifth century BC, was amused to note that different peoples believed that the gods look like themselves: “Our gods have flat noses and black skins, say the Ethiopians. The Thracians (despite Prof. Cohen’s observations above) say our gods have red hair and hazel eyes.” Indeed, a fourth century BC fresco of a Thracian woman, found in the Ostrusha Mound in central Bulgaria, shows distinctly red hair and European features.

The Greek poet Hesiod (c. 700 BC) called Troy the “land of fair women.” According to the Roman historian Diodorus Siculus, who lived in the first century BC, the Egyptian god Set had “reddish hair,” a color that was “rare in Egypt, but common among the Hellenes.” Plutarch (46–120 AD) tells us that while the Theban general Pelopidas (d. 364 BC) was campaigning in central Greece, he had a dream in which a ghost urged him to sacrifice a red-haired virgin if he wished to be victorious in the next day’s battle.

Two racial types

There were two racial types in ancient Greece: dark-haired whites and fair-haired whites, as well as gradations in between. The earliest known inhabitants were of the former type. These included the Minoans, who were not Greeks at all, and who built an impressive civilization on the island of Crete. The Pelasgians, which is the name later Greeks gave to the pre-Hellenic population of mainland Greece, were also dark.

They tended to have black, curly hair and olive-shaped eyes. Their type is plainly visible on many Attic (Athenian) vases, and has led some scholars to conclude that all Greeks looked as they did.

Neither the Minoans nor the Pelasgians spoke Greek — the linear A inscriptions of the Minoans have still not been deciphered — so the Greek language must have arrived with the light-haired conquerors who migrated from the north, most likely from the middle Danube River Valley. According to Greek national myth, the Hellenes were descended from Hellen (not to be confused with Helen of Troy), the son of Deucalion. Hellen had sons and grandsons, who correspond to the four main tribal divisions of ancient Greece: the Aeolians, Achaeans, Ionians, and Dorians.

Scholars today tend to dismiss such myths but they would not have survived if they had not been generally consistent with the long folk memories of ancient peoples. In this case they point to what classical scholars have long believed was a series of Hellenic descents upon mainland Greece and the Aegean islands. The first Hellenes to arrive were the Ionians and Aeolians; then a few centuries later, the Achaeans, and finally the Dorians.

The early bronze-age Greek civilization (1600-1200 BC) was certainly influenced by Minoan and other eastern Mediterranean cultures, but it was unmistakably Greek. Linear B, which began to dominate Cretan culture around 1500 BC, has been deciphered and found to be an early form of Greek. Around the year 1200 BC this culture, known as Mycenaean, collapsed; its cities were destroyed and abandoned, and Greece entered a 400-year Dark Age. Earthquakes and volcanic eruptions probably played a part in the destruction, and later Greeks attributed it to invasions from the north. Waves of Hellenic warriors swept down and burned the Mycenaean citadels and became the ruling race in Greece. They also sacked the city of Troy, and Homer's *Iliad* is about them. They also seem to have snuffed out much of Mycenaean culture: Greeks stopped writing, and abandoned the arts, urban life, and trade with the outside world.

We know something about the early Hellenes from the *Iliad*. It was first written down in the late eighth century BC, at the end of the Greek Dark Age, after the Phoenicians taught the Greeks how to write again. It recounts events some four to five hundred years earlier. Although we think of the poem as being about the Greeks, Homer's warrior heroes belong to the Achaean nobility, which suggests that it was the Achaeans who overthrew Mycenaean civilization, not the Dorians, who would descend upon Greece and displace the Achaeans a hundred years later. Archeology confirms this supposition, for Troy was burned around 1200 BC, and the traditional date for the Trojan War is 1184 BC. The Dorian invasion is dated by various ancient

historians at 1149, 1100, or 1049 BC.

There is good reason to think that Homer was recording stories handed down during the Dark Age. He was a bard who lived in Ionia, a region on the Aegean coast of what is now Turkey, and if he were making the stories up he would have claimed that the heroes were Ionian. Instead, he sings praises to the light-haired Achaean nobility: Achilles, their greatest warrior, has “red-gold hair,” Odysseus, their greatest strategist, has “chestnut hair,” his wife Penelope has “white cheeks the color of pure snow,” Agamede, a healer and expert on medicinal plants, is “blonde,” and King Menelaus of Sparta, the husband of Helen, has “red hair.” Helen, likewise, has “fair hair,” and even slave girls are light-skinned: “fair-tressed Hecamede,” “fair-cheeked Chryseis,” and “blonde Briseis.” This is significant, for if even some of the slaves were blond it would mean the Nordic type was not unique to the Achaeans, that it was present elsewhere in the Aegean world.

Homer (and Pindar) describe most of the Olympian gods and goddesses as fair haired and “bright eyed,” meaning blue, grey or green. The goddess Demeter has “blond” or “yellow hair,” as does Leto, mother of Apollo, who is also described as “golden haired.” Aphrodite has “pale-gold” hair, and Athena is known as “the fair, bright-eyed one” and the “grey-eyed goddess.” Two of the gods, Poseidon and Hephaestus, are described as having black hair. As noted above, Xenophanes complained that all peoples imagine the gods to look like themselves.

It was the Dorians, the last Greek invaders, who ended Achaean rule and probably provoked a mass migration of Aeolian and Ionian Hellenes — no doubt including Homer’s ancestors — across the Aegean Sea to the coast of Asia Minor. The Dorians who settled in the fertile valley of the Eurotas in the southern Peloponnesus were the direct ancestors of the Spartans of the classical age, and they claimed to be the only pure Dorians.

Werner Jaeger, Director of the Institute of Classical Studies at Harvard, writes:

“The national type of the invader remained purest in Sparta. The Dorian race gave Pindar his ideal of the fair-haired warrior of proud descent, which he used to describe not only the Homeric Menelaus, but the greatest Greek hero, Achilles, and in fact all the ‘fair-haired Danaeans’ [another name for the Achaeans who fought at Troy] of the heroic age” (*Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, 1939).

The classical Greeks made no claim to being *autochthones*, that is to say, “of the earth,” or the original inhabitants of the land. Rather, they took pride in being

epeludes, the descendants of later settlers or conquerors. Two notable exceptions were the Arcadians and the Athenians, whose rocky soils presumably offered little temptation to armed colonizers. The historian Herodotus (484-420 BC) recorded that the Athenians were “a Pelasgian people [who] had occupied Attica and never moved from it,” as were the Arcadians. Language lends support to this view, for both the Athenians and Arcadians spoke unique dialects. They learned Greek from the northern invaders but retained Pelasgian elements.

Thus, classical Greece was a fusion, both cultural and racial, of these two types of whites. Some city-states, such as Thebes and Sparta, were predominantly Nordic. Others, such as Athens, were predominantly Mediterranean, and still others were mixtures of the two.

The Roman patricians

Nell Painter, author of the above-mentioned *History of White People*, finds it “astonishing” that the American Nordacist Madison Grant (1865-1937) argued in *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916) that the Roman nobility was of Nordic origin, yet there is good evidence for this view. There are many lavishly illustrated books about ancient Rome with examples of death masks, busts, and statues that clearly depict the Roman patricians not simply as Europeans but as northern European.

R. Peterson’s fine study, *The Classical World* (1985), which includes an analysis of 43 Greek, and 32 Roman figures, is persuasive. Dr. Peterson explains that the Romans painted their death masks to preserve the color, as well as the shape, of their ancestors’ faces. Blue eyes, fair hair, and light complexions are common. A good example of racial type is the famous portrait bust of Lucius Junius Brutus, the founder of the Roman Republic, which dates from the fourth century BC. Brutus’ face is identifiably Germanic, and so is the color of his eyes. The sculptor used ivory for the whites and blue glass for the pupils. Or take the famous marble head of a patrician woman from the late first century AD, which is often included in illustrated surveys of imperial Rome to demonstrate the fashion for curled hair. Her features are typically northern European: a delicate, aquiline nose, high cheekbones, and a face angular and long rather than round. Another classic example is the famous fresco from the Villa of the Mysteries in Pompeii, which shows four women undergoing ritual flagellation. They are tall, light-skinned, and brown-haired.

There is also evidence from Roman names. *Rutilus* means “red, gold, auburn” and stems from the verb *rutilo*, which means “to shine with a reddish gleam.” *Rufus*, meaning red, was a common Roman *cognomen* or nickname used for a personal characteristic, such as red hair. The Flavians were an aristocratic clan whose family

name was derived from *flavus*, meaning golden-yellow. The Flaminians were another noble family whose clan name came from *flamma*, meaning flame, suggesting red hair.

According to Plutarch, Marcus Porcius Cato had “red hair and grey eyes,” Lucius Cornelius Sulla, the general and dictator, had “blue-grey eyes and blond hair,” and Gaius Octavius (Augustus), the first Roman emperor, had “bright eyes and yellow hair.” Recent analysis of an ancient marble bust of the emperor Caligula found particles of the original pigment trapped in the stone. Experts have restored the colors to show that the demented ruler had ruddy skin and red hair.

The love poetry of Publius Ovidius Naso, better known as Ovid, (43 BC to AD 17) offers much evidence of the color of upper-class Roman women during the early years of the empire. That Ovid ascribes blond hair to many goddesses — Aurora, Minerva, Ceres, Diana, and Venus — tells us something about the Roman ideal of beauty; that he describes many of his lovers the same way tells us that the Nordic type was still found in imperial Rome. “I’m crazy for girls who are fair-haired and pale-complexioned,” he writes in his *Amores* of 15 BC, but “brunettes make marvelous lovers too.” He admires the contrast of “dark-tresses against a snow-white neck,” and adores young girls who blush. One of his favorite lovers is “tall” with a “peaches-and-cream complexion,” “ivory cheeks,” and “bright eyes.” Another was a “smart Greek blonde.”

So where did the Romans come from? They were a Latin people, although according to legend that may have some basis in fact, there were also Greek colonists and Trojan refugees among the founding races. The Latins were one of eight Nordic Italic tribes — Apulii, Bruttii, Lucanians, Sabines, Samnites, Umbrians/Oscians and the Veneti — who migrated into the Italian peninsula around 1000 BC. Of course, Italy was not vacant. The Etruscans lived to the north of Rome in what is now Tuscany, and there were other darker-complexioned whites living in the peninsula. The Etruscans are likely to have been Carians from Asia Minor.

What became of the Nordic Greeks and Romans? Their numbers were reduced and thinned through war, imperialism, immigration, and slavery. Protracted internecine war was devastating. The Hellenes lost relatively few men in their two wars with the Persian Empire (490, 480-479 BC), but they were decimated by the ruinous series of inter-Hellenic wars that followed. The Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) pitted Athens and her subject Ionian cities against the Spartan Dorian confederacy. That was followed by 35 years of intermittent warfare between Sparta and Thebes (396-362 BC), which pitted Nordics against Nordics. These wars so weakened the Greek republics that they fell under Macedonian rule about 20 years later (338 BC), bringing

to an end the classical age of Greece.

Money was, as always, a racial solvent. Theognis, a noble poet from the Dorian city of Megara wrote in the sixth century BC: “The noblest man will marry the lowest daughter of a base family, if only she brings in money. And a lady will share her bed with a foul rich man, preferring gold to pedigree. Money is all. Good breeds with bad and race is lost.”

The Roman experience was similarly tragic. All of her later historians agreed that the terrible losses inflicted by Hannibal during the Second Punic War (218-201 BC) were minor compared to the horrendous losses Rome inflicted on herself during the nearly 100 years of civil war that followed the murder of the reforming Tribune Tiberius Gracchus in 133 BC.

Immigration was the inevitable backwash of imperialism as slaves, adventurers, and traders swarmed into Rome. Over time, slaves were freed, foreigners gave birth to natives, non-Romans gained citizenship, and legal and social sanctions against intermarriage fell away. By the early empire, all that was left of the original Roman stock were a few patrician families.

The historian Appian lamented that “the city masses are now thoroughly mixed with foreign blood, the freed slave has the same rights as a native-born citizen, and those who are still slaves look no different from their masters.” Scipio Aemilianus (185–129 BC), a statesman and general of the famed clan of the Aemilii, called these heterogeneous subjects “step-children of Rome.”

One hundred and fifty years later, Horace (65–8 BC) wrote in Book III of the *Odes*:

Our grandfathers sired feeble children; theirs
Were weaker still — ourselves; and now our curse
Must be to breed even more degenerate heirs.

The last Roman writers therefore came to see their own people as both morally and physically degenerate. The subtext of Tacitus’ (56-117 AD) ethnological treatise *Germania* is a longing for the northern vigor and purity the Romans had lost. He saw the Gauls and Germans as superior to the Romans in morals and physique, and Roman women shared this admiration. Blond hair became the rage, and German and Gaulic slave women were shorn of their blond or reddish-brown hair to make wigs for wealthy women. By the time of Tertullian (160-225 AD), so many Roman women were dying their hair that he complained, “they are even ashamed of their country, sorry that they were not born in Germany or Gaul.” In the early second century AD,

the satirist Juvenal complained of the dwindling stock of “the bluest patrician blood,” which is a figurative phrase for the nobility, whose veins appear blue through their light skin.

Viewed in a historical context, it is almost as if today’s northern Europeans have set out perfectly to imitate the ways in which the Greeks and Romans destroyed themselves. In both Europe and America, patriotic young men slaughtered each other in terrible fratricidal wars. In North America, the descendents of slaves are the majority in many great cities. Both continents have paid for imperial ambitions with mass immigration of aliens. Will we be able to resist the forces that brought down the ancients?

Why the West Dominated

The traits that shaped Europeans.

Steven Farron, 2009

The purpose of this article is to continue the discussion that was begun by Robert Henderson's insightful and important article, [“Why Have Asians Not Dominated?”](#) which appeared in the October 2009 issue of *American Renaissance*. I will first demonstrate the little known but vitally important fact that by 1600 Europe was already far ahead of China in science, mathematics, and technology. Then I will propose a crucial cause of Western pre-eminence.

To illustrate the first point I will use what is arguably the most important single source for differences in achievement and culture between Europe and China: the diaries and reports that the Italian Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci wrote about his experiences in China from 1583 until his death in 1610. An edited version was published in 1615, and an English translation was published in 1953 with the title *China in the 16th Century: The Journals of Matthew Ricci, 1583-1610*. Wherever Father Ricci's account can be checked against Chinese sources, it has been found to be accurate. Sinologists recognize it as an invaluable historical source.

One of the most striking aspects of Ricci's experiences in China was that wherever he went, he was accorded the highest honors, including being welcomed into the Forbidden City of Beijing. This is remarkable because, as Ricci recorded:

“The Chinese look upon all foreigners as illiterate and barbarous ... They even disdain to learn anything from the books of outsiders because they believe that all true science and knowledge belongs to them alone. If perchance they have occasion to make mention of externs [foreigners] in their own writings, they treat them as though there was no room for doubt that they differ but little from the beasts of the field and of the forest. Even the written characters by which they express the word foreigner are those that are applied to beasts.” (pages 88-9)

He added:

“The Chinese are so self-opinionated that they cannot be made to believe that the day will ever come when they will learn anything from foreigners which is not already set down in their own books.” (page 142)

Nevertheless, Ricci was treated with the highest respect. The reason was that Chinese officials, scholars, and common people were struck with awe by his demonstrations of European geographical and astronomical knowledge, theoretical and applied mathematics, and technology.

Wherever Ricci went, his maps and globes aroused amazement. In Nanjing, the president of the magistrates “took great pleasure in studying” a map of the world, “wondering that he could see the great expanse of the world depicted on such a small surface.” (pages 301-2) In Beijing, the emperor had twelve copies made in silk on large panels of a map of the world that Ricci had drawn, so that he could give them to his sons and other relatives. (page 536)

These maps caused such excitement because, as Ricci explained, before he arrived, “the Chinese had never seen a geographical exposition of the entire surface of the earth, either in the form of a globe or as presented on the plane surface of a map, nor had they seen the earth’s surface divided by meridians, parallels or degrees.” (page 326)

“[T]he Chinese ... are grossly ignorant of what the world in general is like ... [T]heir universe was limited to their own fifteen provinces, and in the sea painted around it they had placed a few little islands to which they had given the names of different kingdoms they had heard of. All of these islands put together would not be as large as the smallest of the Chinese provinces.” (pages 166-7)

“Formerly, they had thought that ... the earth is flat. They did not know that the whole surface of the earth is inhabited or that men can live on the opposite side without falling off.” (page 325)

The Chinese were just as astonished by European theoretical mathematics and astronomy. Ricci had studied these subjects under Christopher Clavius, the German Jesuit who was one of the foremost mathematicians of the age and was responsible for the Gregorian calendar, which is now used in all non-Muslim countries.

Aristotle had explained the rules of logical deduction nearly two thousand years earlier. However, Ricci noted that the Chinese “have no conception of the rules of logic.” (page 30) Ricci and a Chinese Christian convert therefore translated the first six books of Euclid’s *Elements* (of geometry) into Mandarin:

“[N]othing pleased the Chinese as much as the *Elements* of Euclid. This was perhaps due to ... the Chinese ... method of teaching, in which they propose all kinds of propositions but without demonstrations. The result of such a system is that anyone is free to exercise his wildest imagination relative to mathematics, without offering a definite proof of anything. In Euclid, on the contrary, they recognize something different, namely, propositions presented in order and so definitely proven that even the most obstinate could not deny them.” (pages 476-7)

As for astronomy, Ricci recorded that the Chinese “did not realize that an eclipse of the moon was caused by the earth coming between the moon and the sun ... It was new to them to learn that the sun was larger than the entire earth.” (pages 325, 327)

More significantly:

“Their count of the stars outnumbers the calculations of our astronomers by fully four hundred ... And yet with all this, the Chinese astronomers take no pains whatever to reduce the phenomena of celestial bodies to the discipline of mathematics ... [T]hey center their whole attention on that phase of astronomy which our scientists term astrology.” (pages 30-31)

Elsewhere Father Ricci observed, “Their primitive science of astronomy knew nothing of eccentric orbits and epicycles.” (page 326) So he made “astronomical spheres and globes ... illustrating the heavens ... When these various devices were exhibited and their purpose explained, showing the position of the sun, the courses of the stars and the central position of the earth,” Ricci “was looked upon as the world’s greatest astronomer.” (page 169)

Ricci still assumed that the earth is in the center of the universe. His knowledge of astronomy had not advanced beyond the ancient Greeks, who were the first people who tried to explain the motion of the heavenly bodies. To do that, they hypothesized orbits. But they thought that the earth is in the center of the universe, and to make these orbits correspond to observed celestial movements, they had to make them off-

center (“eccentric”), and to hypothesize smaller orbits (“epicycles”) that revolved in the larger orbits. That is what Ricci demonstrated to the Chinese. The Chinese were amazed because they had never attempted to explain the movements of heavenly bodies.

It was because Europeans kept trying to conceptualize the movements of heavenly objects that the ancient Greeks created a geocentric model; then Copernicus, dissatisfied with its awkwardness and inconsistencies, revised it; Kepler improved Copernicus’ revision; and Newton figured out the universal laws that explain Kepler’s improved version.

The eminent physicist Stephen Hawking wrote in *A Briefer History of Time* that “ever since the dawn of civilization, people have not been content to see events as unconnected and inexplicable. We have craved an understanding of the underlying order in the world.” (page 18) He is wrong. That craving began with the ancient Greeks and has existed only in European culture and those cultures influenced by the West.

By 1600, European technology and applied mathematics were also already vastly superior to those of China. Ricci wrote that a clock “was an object of wonder.” (page 201) The Chinese were amazed not only by the fact that clocks told time, but also that they rang a bell at each hour. Ricci noted that “they could never quite make out how it could ring of itself, without anyone touching it.” (page 194)

Clocks were hardly the only European invention that dazzled the Chinese. One of the many that Ricci mentions was the use of quadrants with limbs graduated in degrees to measure distances. “They marveled that one could figure the height of a tower, the depth of a ditch or of a valley, or the length of a road by means of quadrants,” Ricci noted. (page 326) In Nanjing, he let the public view the presents he was bringing to the emperor: “[V]isitors came in crowds to see them. The novelty of the gifts surpassed their expectations to such an extent that astonishment robbed many of their power to praise them, and they seemed never to tire of examining them and of talking about them.” (page 348)

Ricci also noted that the Chinese calendar was inaccurate and that although Chinese astronomers spent a great deal of time trying to predict eclipses, they made “innumerable errors.” (page 31) After Ricci’s death, in 1629, the emperor’s astronomers predicted that a solar eclipse would occur at 10:30 on June 21 and last two hours. The Jesuits predicted that the eclipse would be at 11:30 and last only two minutes. The Jesuits’ prediction was accurate. As a result, the emperor asked the Jesuits to revise the Chinese calendar.

Among the other innovations the Jesuits introduced into China in the 16th and 17th centuries were the Archimedes screw pump (a cylinder enclosing a screw used to lift water for irrigation), algebraic notation, the telescope, logarithm tables, the slide rule, and such European tools for making instruments as graduated scales and micrometer screws.

Europeans and Multiculturalism

I will quote one more of Father Ricci's observations:

“When they [the Chinese] set about building, they seem to gauge things by the span of a human life ... Whereas, Europeans in accordance with the urge of their civilization seem to strive for the eternal. This trait of theirs [the Chinese] makes it impossible for them ... to give credence ... when we tell them that many of our buildings have withstood the elements for ... a hundred years and some even for one or two thousand years ... [T]hey do not dig into the ground to build up foundations, but merely place large stones on the unbroken surface of the ground; or, if they do dig foundations, these do not go deeper than a yard or two ... [M]ost of their buildings are constructed of wood, or if made in masonry they are covered in by roofs supported by wooden columns.” (pages 19-20)

It is typical of Ricci's objectivity that he refers to Europeans in the third person: “Europeans in accordance with the urge of *their* civilization.”

Ricci also translated the Confucian *Four Books* into Latin because “it is no use at all to know only our learning without knowing theirs;” and, with another Italian Jesuit, compiled a Portuguese-Mandarin dictionary, for which they developed the first consistent system for transcribing Chinese words in the Latin alphabet. Father Ricci's interest in other civilizations, his objectivity when describing them, and his desire to acquaint other Europeans with them have always been fundamental and unique characteristics of Western civilization.

From the beginning of European civilization, with the ancient Greeks, Europeans have been multiculturalists; and Europeans have been the world's only multiculturalists. The first extant European history was written by Herodotus in the fifth century BC. The Greek word *historia* meant investigation, and Herodotus' *historia* is as much what we call anthropology as history. He recorded and analyzed what he learned during his travels throughout Egypt, as far east as modern Iran, and along the coast of the Black

Sea. He was fascinated by the diversity of human cultures and expected his readers to be fascinated. He was also rigorously non-judgmental, emphasizing that custom determines what people think is right and wrong; as he wrote in Book 3, Chapter 38, “custom is king.”

Ancient Greek literature reflected the same attitude to non-Greeks, beginning with the first extant work of European literature, the *Iliad*, which Homer composed in the eighth century BC. The *Iliad* narrates events in the tenth year of the Greek siege of Troy. Homer showed as much sympathy for the Trojans as for the Greeks. In particular, he portrayed the leading Trojan warrior, Hector, in a loving interaction with his wife and son, as well as the agony of Hector’s bereaved parents after he was killed by the leading Greek warrior, Achilles. Such sympathy is uniquely European. Surely, it never occurred to the author of the First Book of Samuel to depict the grief of Goliath’s parents after David killed him.

Sympathy often became self-flagellation. In the fifth century BC, Euripides wrote two plays — *Hecuba* and *Trojan Women* — in which he depicted the Greeks’ savage cruelty to the defenseless Trojan women and children after the capture of Troy. (All plays in Athens were performed before mass audiences.) The brutality of the Greeks to the defeated, defenseless Trojans was also a favorite subject of ancient Greek vase painting. By contrast, the narrative sculpture of the Assyrians, who dominated the Middle East from the ninth to the end of the seventh century BC, represented defeated enemies with pyramids of stacked-up skulls, communicating no feeling except triumph.

The ancient Romans had the same fascination with foreign cultures as the Greeks. Examples are Julius Caesar’s description of the Gauls in his *Gallic War*; Sallust’s of the peoples of North Africa in his *Jugurtha*; and Tacitus’ of the Germans and natives of Britain in his *Germania* and *Agricola*. No other ancient people had such an interest. When the ancient Egyptians mentioned other nationalities, they nearly always attached adjectives like “vile” and “lowly” to their names.

The Romans also shared the Greeks’ penchant for self-denigration. The Roman Empire extended from Scotland to the Sahara Desert and from the Atlantic Ocean to the border of what is now Iraq. The population of that huge area enjoyed unprecedented peace and prosperity. To take two examples, literacy was so widespread that most orders and regulations in the Roman army were written, because all soldiers were literate; and the cities and towns of the Roman Empire had purer water and more efficient sewage disposal than any European city was to have again until the 1870s. Large areas of North Africa and the Middle East still have not recovered the level of literacy or of sanitation that they had when they were part of the

Roman Empire. Also, contrary to Hollywood depictions, slaves never rowed ships in the ancient world, and slavery played only a minor role in the Roman economy. Nevertheless, the Romans dwelt obsessively on every injustice and brutality that they committed in their history. (When I would point that out to my South African students, at least a few would always observe, “So they were like Americans.”)

One way in which the Romans denigrated themselves was through the ethnographic descriptions of foreign cultures that I mentioned. These served two purposes. One was to provide information, which was usually accurate. But their authors also used them to cast a harshly negative light on their own, Roman, civilization.

Nearly every Roman who wrote a description of a foreign people created at least one vitriolic anti-Roman speech and put it into the mouth of an enemy of Rome. The best known is in Chapters 30-32 of Tacitus’ *Agricola*: The Romans are “robbers of the earth ... They apply the fraudulent name empire to plunder, slaughter, and theft; where they create a desert, they call it peace.”

Another way in which the Romans used ethnographic descriptions to castigate themselves was with comparisons between the (usually imagined) virtues of other peoples and their own (greatly exaggerated) vices. The best known is in chapters 18-19 of Tacitus’ *Germania*, in which he contrasted the Germans’ marital fidelity with the casual attitude towards adultery of Roman society. Among the Germans, “no one laughs at vice; nor is seducing and being seduced called the spirit of the age.” I would add that Tacitus was not just the greatest ancient Roman historian; he was a senator, who held many high positions, including governor of what is now western Turkey.

Europeans have ever since used other cultures, especially primitive cultures (or even talking horses, as in Swift’s *Gulliver’s Travels*), to criticize themselves. Most readers of this article can think of many examples; I will provide only three. Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) was as erudite, intellectually sophisticated, and skeptical a man as ever lived. His motto was *Que sçais-je?* (What do I know?) Yet, in his essay *Des cannibales* (“On Cannibals”), he wrote that the natives of Brazil retain their “vigorous” “natural virtues” and “pure and simple” “naturalness” because they have been “very little corrupted” by contact with the vanity and frivolity of Europeans. The natives of Brazil “surpass ... the conceptions and the very desire of philosophy ... The words that signify lying, treachery, dissimulation, avarice, envy, belittling, pardon are unheard of [among them].”

Europeans have been so desperate to show the superiority of primitive peoples over themselves that they have even praised human sacrifice. That includes a Catholic priest. Father Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484-1566) wrote in his *Apologia* that the

Aztecs “surpassed all other nations in religiosity, because the most religious nations are those that offer their own children in sacrifice for the good of their people.” He explained that “one could argue convincingly, on the basis of God ordering Abraham to sacrifice his only son, Isaac, that God does not entirely hate human sacrifice.” (In fact, one of the main purposes of the story of the sacrifice of Isaac is to show that God does not want human sacrifice. Las Casas must have known that the Old Testament repeatedly and vehemently condemns human sacrifice.)

My third example is more recent. In *Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit* (1992), ex-vice president and anti-global-warming crusader Albert Gore quoted (page 259) as an ecological ideal the reply of Chief Seattle to President Pierce’s offer in 1855 to buy his tribe’s land, “How can you buy or sell the sky? The land? The idea is strange to us ... Every part of the earth is sacred to my people ... [T]he earth does not belong to man, man belongs to the earth.” Gore describes this speech as “one of the most moving and frequently quoted explanations” of American Indians’ attitude to the environment.

It has, indeed, been frequently quoted, but only since 1971, when screenwriter Ted Perry wrote it for an ABC television drama. The real Chief Seattle, who owned slaves and murdered nearly all his rivals, praised President Pierce for the generosity of his offer. The American Indians, like all primitive peoples, slaughtered animals and destroyed vegetation with wanton recklessness.

In addition to a strong propensity to self-denigration, modern Europeans also share with the ancient Greeks and Romans a powerful desire to learn as much as they can about other civilizations. From the time of the Arab conquest of the Middle East and North Africa, Europeans studied Arabic and tried to learn about the Arabs. Pope Clement V (1305-14) urged universities to establish chairs in Arabic. Permanent chairs in Arabic were established at the Collège de France in 1538, the University of Leiden before the end of the sixteenth century, Cambridge in 1632, and Oxford in 1636.

Edward Gibbon recorded in his *Autobiography* (page 79 of the edition by D. A. Saunders) that when he entered Oxford in 1752, he considered studying Arabic because “Oriental [i.e., Middle Eastern] learning has always been the pride of Oxford.” Well before that, Europeans had written many grammars and dictionaries of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish; translations and editions of Muslim books; and analyses of Muslim literature and religion. In fact, the first book printed by a printing press in England (1477), *Dictes [sic] and Sayings of the Philosophers*, was an English version of an Arabic book by Mubashir Ibn Fatik. By 1603, 49 books on the Turks had been published in English. Of all the books published in France between 1480 and 1700, more than twice as many were about the Turkish Empire as about North and South

America. It was Europeans and Americans who deciphered the ancient languages of Egypt, Persia, and Mesopotamia and reconstructed their ancient histories.

This fascination with foreign cultures is uniquely Western. The Chinese attitude to foreigners, which Father Ricci described, has characterized all non-Western societies. The Arabs ruled much of the Iberian Peninsula for nearly 800 years; the Turks ruled most of southeastern Europe for nearly 500 years. But neither the Arabs nor Turks had any interest in learning European languages. They used European converts to Islam as interpreters.

An excellent illustration of this parochialism is the most eminent Muslim historian of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, the Turk, Mustafa Naima (1665-1716), who lived most of his life in Istanbul. Naima was unusually objective, inquisitive, and open-minded for a Muslim historian. He was judicious and critical in his use of sources. Historians still rely on his major work, which was translated in 1832 with the title *Annals of the Turkish Empire from 1591-1659 of the Christian Era*.

However, Naima knew nothing about Europe. In the preface to his *Annals*, he saw nothing incongruous about comparing Europe of the time he was writing (1704) with Europe of the Crusaders. Both had many Germans and both had an emperor! (pages ix-x) Naima was a contemporary of Newton, Leibnitz, Leeuwenhoek, and Locke. Yet, after listing now totally forgotten Turkish religious scholars, he wrote, “This much is sufficient to awaken the envy of the Christians.” (page ix)

The French conquest and occupation of Egypt between 1798 and 1801 forced a few Egyptian Muslims to take Europeans seriously. Fortunately, one of them, Abdul Al-Jabarti, wrote detailed observations about the French in Egypt. An English translation has been published with the title *Napoleon in Egypt: Al-Jabarti's Chronicle of the French Occupation* (expanded edition, 2004). Al-Jabarti criticized the French Republic's hostility to Christianity and the granting of equal rights to Egyptian Christians and Jews. (pages 28, 32, 189-90) But he praised the French for their humane treatment of the Egyptians they employed in public works, to whom they paid wages, instead of conscripting them and driving them with whips, as Egyptian governments had done. (page 195) He also expressed wonder and amazement at European science and technology (pages 110, 195) and at the fact that “the glorious Qur'an is translated into their language! Also many other Islamic books ... many verses of which they know by heart. They ... make great efforts to learn the Arabic language ... In this they strive day and night.” (page 110)

So, an obsession with self-criticism and a passion to learn as much as possible about other civilizations have been among the unique and fundamental characteristics of

Western civilization since its beginning. These characteristics have undoubtedly contributed to another characteristic that is as uniquely and fundamentally Western: ceaseless, incessant change, adaptation, and improvement. This characteristic must be a basic cause of the West's rise to world predominance, even over Orientals, despite their somewhat higher average intelligence.

To illustrate the importance of these characteristics, I will return again to Father Ricci's diaries. He noted that the best Chinese paper was vastly inferior to European paper. "It cannot be written or printed on both sides ... Moreover, it tears easily and does not stand up well against time." (page 16) Yet, the Chinese invented paper centuries before it was used in Europe. In 1620, Francis Bacon observed in Book I, Chapter 129 of his *Novum Organum (New Instrument)* that printing, gunpowder, and the compass "have changed the whole face and state of things throughout the world ... no empire, no sect, no star seems to have exerted greater power and influence in human affairs than these mechanical discoveries." All three were invented in China centuries before Europeans began using them, but only Europeans developed them and applied them to transform their society and then the entire world. Ricci observed that "the Chinese are not expert in the use of guns and artillery and make but little use of them in war." (page 18) By Ricci's time, Europeans had used the compass to explore and map the entire world, while the Chinese thought that the world consisted of China and a few small off-shore islands.

Of these inventions, printing is obviously the most valuable. By 1500, less than fifty years after Gutenberg printed the first book with interchangeable metallic type, 236 European cities and towns had printing presses, and Europeans had printed 30,000 titles — about 20 million books in total — in more than a dozen languages. (By 1483, printing type had been cast in the Cyrillic alphabet and in Greek by 1501.) The Spanish had set up printing presses in Latin America by 1533 and the Portuguese in their colony of Goa, in India, by 1557. By 1600, when the population of Europe was approximately 100 million, between 140 and 200 million books had been printed. By 1605, newspapers had appeared, at first specializing in business news.

Everywhere else in the world, nearly all books continued to be copied by hand into the 19th century. The first printing press in the Muslim world was established in Istanbul in 1727, by a Hungarian convert to Islam, who employed a Jew as master printer. By 1815, 63 titles (an average of fewer than one a year) were printed in Istanbul, the intellectual center of the Muslim world; and most of these titles were printed in quantities of less than a thousand copies. The first printing press in Egypt was established by the French, when they occupied it in 1798. By contrast, the Qur'an in Arabic was printed in Venice in 1530, nearly two centuries before any book was

printed in the Muslim world.


To anyone reared in the West, the indifference of the entire non-Western world to such a spectacularly useful innovation as printing seems amazing. The reason for this indifference is that all non-Western cultures have had the same attitude of smug self-congratulation and disdain for foreigners as Father Ricci noted among the Chinese.

The self-criticism and fascination with other civilizations that have characterized Western civilization from its beginning have been a crucial factor in its rise to predominance.

However, self-criticism and fascination with other civilizations could be positive forces only while large population movements between civilizations did not occur. When large numbers of non-Westerners began to flow into Western countries, these same factors became suicidal. Aristotle observed that there are two types of vices: those that derive from a vicious nature and those that are the excesses of virtues.

Ricardo Duchesne's Intellectual Defense of the West

Kevin MacDonald, 2011



There was a time not long ago when the idea of Western uniqueness was received wisdom in the academic world. The West was characterized as uniquely rooted in individual freedom, representative government, science, and exploration. The intense dynamism of the West was responsible for dragging the rest of the world from its backward slumbers rooted in [collectivism](#), [superstition](#), and unchanging [tradition](#). It was a view that coincided with a period when the West had a [strong sense](#) of [cultural confidence](#).

But all that has changed with the rise of multiculturalism and an academic Establishment that is [decidedly on the left](#). In the new dispensation, the West is seen as a historical backwater whose success is entirely due to luck—combined in some accounts with rapacious exploitation of non-Europeans—rather than anything unique, much less positive, about its people or its culture.

It's no accident that the decline of the West as anything approaching an ethnic entity has coincided with the predominance of this academic Left and its scathing, politically- and ethnically-motivated critiques of the West. With the rise of

multiculturalism in all Western countries, it is not only the people of the West who are in dire danger of losing their dominance over areas they have dominated for hundreds of years—in the case of Europe itself, for many thousands of years. The culture of the West is threatened as well.

Duchesne, a [professor of sociology at the University of New Brunswick](#), is out to [change all that](#). [The Uniqueness of Western Civilization](#) is an extraordinary work written by an exceptionally wide-ranging scholar and thinker.

Duchesne begins by showing that the decline of self-confident assertions of Western uniqueness and cultural confidence began with the rise of the academic left in the 1960s. Any comparison of West and non-West became fraught with concerns about Western ethnocentrism. Standard college courses in “Western Civilization” were [removed](#) in favor of world history courses emphasizing [multiculturalism](#) and a [downgraded role for the West](#). This was the beginning of what Duchesne terms “a crusade against the West”.)

In attempting to explain the rise of the West one fashionable strategy is to invoke luck. These historians “treat history as an unending series of ‘lucky shots’ and abrupt turns”

For example, Duchesne quotes Rosaire Langlois, who maintains that Europeans “weren’t just lucky; they were lucky many times over” [[The Closing of the Sociological Mind?](#), Canadian Journal of Sociology, 2008]

Then there’s Peter Perdue’s [review](#) of Ken Pomeranz’s [The Great Divergence](#) — undoubtedly the most famous and highly praised book on European economic ascendancy, titled “Lucky Europe, normal China.”

This is what one might term an anti-theory of Western uniqueness. In no other area of scientific inquiry would people be satisfied with a theory based on luck.

Another aspect of the intellectual war against the West interprets [Western success](#) as due to exploitation of non-Europeans. “Dependency Theory”, which [proposed](#) that the countries of the West, in Duchesne’s words, “had enriched themselves through the [exploitation of Africa](#), the [Americas](#), and Asia and repudiated the idea that European civilization on its own [generated the means](#) to out-develop the rest of the world” . Thus, according to [Immanuel Wallerstein](#), an influential world historian, Western success was due to exploitation of non-Europeans via imperialism and colonialism.

But ultimately, Duchesne writes, “the attack on the West and on the possibility of universal history ... did not stem from any one person or school of thought. It was the work of many elite groups, cultural relativists, post-colonialists, Foucault-inspired New Historicists, and deconstructionists.”

Although the attack on the West was indeed a very widely dispersed effort, Duchesne emphasizes the role of two preceding intellectual movements identified in my book *The Culture of Critique* (but not by Duchesne) as Jewish: The [Frankfurt School](#) and [Boasian](#) anthropology. The Frankfurt School was active by the 1920s while Franz Boas was in [full culture-war](#) mode by 1910 and his disciples were in control of [academic anthropology](#) by the 1920s.

Duchesne characterizes Boasian anthropology as “the most devastating assault on the idea of Western progress”. Similarly, [Frankfurt School stalwarts](#) Max Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno, characterized the modern West as “the elimination of the Other” and saw Western civilization as inevitably resulting in totalitarianism, thus eliminating the distinction between classical liberalism and fascism.

Much of Duchesne's book deals with the beast of multiculturalism that now overshadows academic discussion of Western accomplishments and uniqueness. Globalism is all the rage, and a corollary is that any developments in the West must ultimately be the result of complex interplay with other parts of the world. History is about interconnections among all the peoples of the world, rather than anything unique about the West. All peoples have the same potentialities and they react passively, not actively, to their surroundings, thus automatically precluding any Western exceptionalism apart from the luck of circumstance. There is no such thing as intra-civilizational change and progress. For example, Duchesne cites [Patrick Manning](#) (*Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past*, 2003) who describes the Renaissance as “global process occasioned by Europe's connections to the New World and the more ‘advanced’ culture of the Near East” .

Duchesne is deliciously contemptuous of these historians, “happily ensconced” as he waspishly notes, “within a world of like-minded academics, backed by multiple grants and prestigious titles” (pp. 53–54).

Much of this “scholarship” is [flagrantly anti-white](#). Duchesne is incredulous at Manning's claim that Africa was interconnected with the rest of the world: “Yes, the same Black Africa that Marlow in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* called ‘[the blankest of blank spaces](#)’ on a map.” He notes that, according to the multicultural Zeitgeist, the story of Africa is an “[idyllic pre-colonial existence](#)” followed by enslavement and racism emanating from the West.

Another trend is the “current ‘need’ for ‘diversity’ and human togetherness.” While the positive features of other cultures are endlessly listed, the West is nothing but oppression and evil. Thus Filipe Fernandez-Armesto (*The World: A History*, 2007) analyzes Greek democracy not by noting its uniqueness and its benefits for many

citizens, but by writing that “When we look at [Greek states] now we see fragments of an oppressive system that made slaves of captives, victims of women, battle fodder of men, and scapegoats of failures”. Duchesne notes that the Greeks were themselves aware of many of their shortcomings. He comments that what really bothers people like Fernandez-Armesto is that “the Greeks [may have been exceptional despite their failings](#)”.

Duchesne reviews several books purporting to show the superiority of Chinese civilization compared to the West, particularly England. This is a technical discussion. Some of the high points are as follows:

- “Colonial trade profits were neither sufficient nor necessary for the industrialization of Western Europe/England”.
- Whatever benefits England obtained from its colonies must be seen as a result of having “*earned* her riches through her own virtues and talents as a nation that deliberately set out to achieve imperial greatness. It was Britain’s development of the best navy in the world, civil institutions, administrative and financial reforms that made it possible for her...to seize upon and appropriate raw materials and slaves in faraway lands” (emphasis in text). This is meant to counter historians blinded by moral considerations to the point of being unable to see England as anything but “inertly parasitic” and contributing nothing to its own greatness.
- Against the claim that the colonies were indispensable for the rise of England, Duchesne points out: “First, the costs of empire (in people, taxes, and warfare) [may have surpassed the benefits](#); second, Spain acquired enormous tracts of land but ended up poor and undeveloped, and third, countries like Switzerland, Germany and Japan, ended up extremely wealthy even though they lacked colonial annexations”.
- “The question is not whether we approve or not of British imperialism. The question is why was the West so [dynamic and original](#) in empire-making, warfare, political theory, philosophy, architecture, and [poetry](#)? Why was it that the same England that created the greatest [maritime empire](#) in history cultivated religious toleration, freedom of expression, and representative government?”
- “China’s post-1400 expansion was mainly *extensive*, in the sense that both total economic output and population were increasing at about the same rate with no increases in output per capita. ... Conversely, ... England [did in fact](#)

[experience a long process](#) of incremental but steady increases in (agricultural) productivity [i.e., output per capita] from 1500 onwards”.

Duchesne contests standard academic works purporting to show that European culture was not creative or original, but borrowed mostly from elsewhere, particularly the East. He does not deny the contributions of the East, but he emphasizes that the Europeans were eager learners who elaborated inventions imported from elsewhere, whereas both China and Islam stagnated after the 13th century.

And unique to Europe was the contribution of the Classical Greeks, who invented scientific reasoning by offering explanations of natural events that were entirely general; Greeks were also unique in “thinking of the universe as a single entity or ‘[cosmos](#)’ with an underlying mathematical reality comprehensible through deduction and proof.”

While the East stagnated, beginning in the 12th century, the West entered into a period of sustained and cumulative invention.

Duchesne argues that the West diverged from the rest in all areas of life, not simply economic production. Although other cultures have managed to have sustained economic growth, none could reasonably be seen as likely to have developed liberal democratic institutions:

“The rise of this culture cannot be abstracted from the special developmental history of the Greek and Roman assemblies of citizens; the parliaments, municipal communes, universities, and estates of the medieval era; the reading societies, salons, journals and newspapers of the Enlightenment; the political parties, trade unions, and nationalist groups of the 19th century. ... At the heart of Western modernity ... is the ideal of freedom, and the ideal of a critical, self-reflexive public culture.”

This is important because the great majority of those who would dismiss Western accomplishments focus only on economic development (typically analyzed, as noted above, as the result of predatory colonial exploitation and simple luck), not on cultural differences that long preceded differences in economic development.

Duchesne argues that Western science is a unique accomplishment. Although the Chinese made many practical discoveries, they never developed the idea of a rational, orderly universe guided by universal laws comprehensible to humans. Nor did they ever develop a “deductive method of rigorous demonstration according to which a conclusion, a theorem, was proven by reasoning from a series of self-evident axioms”.

(The same is said to be true of Indian geometry.)

Whereas there was a strong tendency within China for intellectuals to uphold ancient wisdom, emanating from Confucius, the Greeks

“challenged existing explanations by trying to deliver new and better explanations and by seeking incontrovertible truths [i.e., objectively true—true for all observers] based on the strictest modes of demonstration”.

Thus while the Chinese essentially gravitated to [collectivist reaffirmation of social wisdom](#), the Western tradition was one of individuals questioning received wisdom and the weight of tradition.

Duchesne argues that the roots of the West lie in the aristocratic warlike culture of Indo-European speakers who spread throughout Europe during the 4th and 3rd millennium” BC. The novelty of this culture was that it was not based on a single king but on an aristocratic elite that was egalitarian within the group—what he calls “aristocratic egalitarianism”.

These Indo-Europeans likely originated in the Pontic steppe region of south Russia and the Ukraine. In the Near East, Iran and India, they were absorbed by the local populations. In Europe, they displaced the native languages but not the natives: Originally, at least, as in the other areas they conquered, they were an alien elite ruling over the older Europeans.

Duchesne rejects a purely linguistic conceptualization of the Indo-Europeans. He says they were an ethnic entity, a race of horse-riding conquerors superimposed on an older European culture that was less aggressive, less hierarchical and less individualistic. They prized heroic warriors striving for individual fame and recognition, often with a “berserker” style of warfare — i.e., frenzied, foolhardy intensity.

The men who became leaders of this group were not despots but peers with other warriors. Successful warriors individualized themselves in dress, sporting beads, belts, etc., with a flair for ostentation. This resulted in a “vital, action-oriented, and linear picture of the world” —i.e., as moving forward in pursuit of the goal of increasing prestige. Leaders commanded by voluntary consent, and being a successful leader meant having many clients who pledged their loyalty; often the clients were young unmarried men looking to make their way in the world. The leader was therefore a “first among equals.” Duchesne writes:

“These [‘groups of comrades’](#)...were singularly dedicated to predatory behavior and to ‘wolf-like’ living by hunting and

raiding, and to the performance of superior, even super-human deeds. The members were generally young, unmarried men, thirsting for adventure. The followers were sworn not to survive a war leader who was slain in battle, just as the leader was expected to show in all circumstances a personal example of courage and war-skills.”

Heroes were individuals first and foremost — people who [separated themselves from the others by their feats](#), as shown by these lines from *Beowulf*:

As we must all expect to leave
our life on this earth, we must earn some renown,
If we can before death; daring is the thing
for a fighting man to be remembered by. ...
A man must act so
when he means in a fight to frame himself
a long lasting glory; it is not life he thinks of

When these marauding bands descended to the Near East and India, there was significant interbreeding with the native populations. Because the cultures in these areas were already quite advanced, they ended up having more influence on the Indo-Europeans than the reverse. Thus in India the Indo-Europeans fused with the pre-existing Harappan culture, and similarly in Iran, resulting in non-Western cultures based on Oriental despotism.

In Europe, after the period of conquest by berserker aristocratic military units, the warrior ethic was lost but individualistic competition and the desire to be publicly acclaimed continued. Thus Duchesne writes that in classical Greece (i.e., after the Homeric period),

“the ultimate basis of Greek civic and cultural life was the aristocratic ethos of individualism and competitive conflict which pervaded [Indo-European] culture. Ionian literature was far from the world of berserkers but it was nonetheless just as intensively competitive. New works of drama, philosophy, and music were expounded in the first-person form as an adversarial or athletic contest in the pursuit of truth.

... There were no Possessors of the Way in aristocratic Greece; no Chinese Sages decorously deferential to their superior and expecting appropriate deference from their

inferiors. The search for the truth was a free-for-all with each philosopher competing for intellectual prestige in a polemical tone that sought to discredit the theories of others while promoting one's own."

As the [Western world of antiquity decayed](#), the West was infused with new lifeblood from [the Germans](#):

"It was the vigor, boldness, and the acquisitiveness of Germanic war-bands that kept the West alive. These lads were uncouth and unlettered, much given to quarrelsome rages, but they injected energy, daring, and indeed an uncomplicated and sincere love of freedom, a keen sense of honor and a restless passion for battle, adventure, and life."

Even during the putative nadir of Western freedom and democracy, the medieval period, "the *aristocratic* principle of sovereignty by consent was the hallmark of feudal government. The king was not above the aristocracy; he was first among equals" (emphasis in original).

Duchesne concludes that "it is my contention that the aristocratic culture of Indo-Europeans was *dominated* by men whose souls were 'too high-spirited, too intrepid, too indifferent about fortune'" (emphasis in text; the [inner quote](#) is from David Hume). He continues:

"The expansionist aggression of the West is an inescapable expression of its roots in aristocratic men who are free and therefore headstrong and ambitious, sure of themselves, easily offended, and unwilling to accept quiet subservience. ... The highly strung and obstinate aristocrat has been a fundamental source of destruction in Western history as well as the source of all that is good and inspiring."

Modern liberalism, in Duchesne's analysis, has resulted in this restless and fearless spirit to be just one of several human drives, like survival and comfort. It no longer dominates the West, its spirit "suppressed by the ethical demands of modern democratic liberalism, rechanneled into economic inventiveness, or confounded with bodily appetites.

Some caveats: In the longer version of this review published in *The Occidental Quarterly*, I suggest that the reason that the West retained its characteristic individualism for so long is that the primeval populations of Europe had already

evolved in the direction of individualism prior to the invasion by the Indo-Europeans—thus explaining why other areas conquered by the Indo-Europeans departed dramatically from the Western model.

I argue that the invasion of an Indo-European-speaking elite warrior class is a variant on a previously existing culture of northern hunter-gatherers resulting in two quite different cultural stands in Europe: First, an individualist-egalitarian culture stemming from the older Europeans; second, an aristocratic-egalitarian culture stemming from the Indo-European invaders. This is consistent with the population genetic evidence indicating that the genetic core of European populations dates from Paleolithic times—well prior to the putative Indo-European invasion.


I argue that the older European culture has a tendency toward a more extreme egalitarianism and less ethnocentrism than apparent in the Indo-European warrior elite model. Contemporary Western culture owes far more to the reappearance of tendencies in older European cultures than to the Indo-European warrior elite model.

But no matter how these intellectual issues ultimately play out, Duchesne is to be congratulated on a wonderful effort to stem to tide against the barbarians at the gate in the academic world.

[*The Uniqueness of Western Civilization*](#) is a brilliant critical review of an incredibly wide range of scholarship covering the entire span of Western history. It is a book that is essential reading for anyone interested in understanding the vitality and creativity of Western civilization—and for understanding its current malaise as it struggles for survival against the forces of darkness.

Moorish Spain: A Successful Multicultural Paradise?

F. Roger Devlin, 2016



*The Myth of the Andalusian Paradise:
Muslims, Christians, and Jews under Islamic Rule in Medieval Spain*
by Dario Fernandez-Morera
Wilmington: ISI Books, 2016

Dario Fernandez-Morera, of Cuban extraction, is associate professor of Spanish and Portuguese at Northwestern University. He has previously published *American Academia and the Survival of Marxist Ideas* (1996), as well as numerous papers on the literature of Spain's Golden Age.

In this new book he tackles one of the anti-European left's most cherished delusions, viz., that al-Andalus, or Moorish Spain (711–1492 AD), was a successful multicultural society in which Christians, Jews and Muslims flourished together beneath the tolerant eye of enlightened Islamic rulers. These supposed halcyon days of Moorish tolerance are contrasted favorably with both the Visigothic Kingdom that preceded them and the Spain of the inquisition that followed.

So popular has the romantic image of enlightened Muslim Spain become that it has been publicly endorsed by such distinguished historical scholars as Barack Obama and Tony Blair. Indeed, according to Prof. David Levering Lewis, Europeans missed a golden opportunity by not going down to defeat at the Battle of Tours in 732 AD. If only Charles Martel's Franks had succumbed, he writes,

the post-Roman Occident would probably have been incorporated into a cosmopolitan Muslim *regnum* unobstructed by borders ... one devoid of a priestly caste, animated by the dogma of equality of the faithful, and respectful of all religious faiths.

In two-hundred-forty pages of exposition backed up by ninety-six closely printed pages of notes, Fernandez-Morera methodically demolishes this optimistic multicultural object lesson by means of copious references to the primary documents: writings by Muslims, Christians and Jews who actually lived under Islamic rule in Spain. The cumulative effect of the evidence he cites should be enough to prove to any unbiased observer that Moorish Spain, if no worse than other Muslim-controlled societies of its time, was also no better.

The first point to grasp is that the Muslim invasion of 711 AD did not bring enlightenment to a cultural wasteland:

Spain was under Roman control and influence longer than any Western land outside of Italy and produced more Latin writers and emperors than any other Roman province. The Visigoths were the most Romanized of all the peoples that took over the Latin Roman Empire. Visigothic leaders spoke Latin and had spent generations in military and political service to Rome.

In fact, Visigothic forces first entered Spain in 415 AD in order to *help* the Romans militarily against an invasion by less civilized Germanic tribes such as the Sueves, Alans, and Vandals. The three centuries which followed saw the gradual blending of the Roman and Germanic elements into a new Christian Hispano-Visigothic civilization. Important steps in this process included the allowance of intermarriage between Visigoths and Hispano-Romans by the laws of King Leovigild (reigned 568–586) and the conversion of his son and successor Recared from Arianism to Catholic Christianity, the religion of the native majority, in 589.

The new civilization featured a wealth of sacred art and music, as well as

learned men such as Saint Leander (who lived in the Greek Roman Empire for a number of years and presided over the Third Toledan Council), Bishop Eugene of Toledo (expert in mathematics and astronomy), Conantius of Palencia (expert in music) and the poet-king Sisebut (who wrote an astronomical poem in Latin). Saint Isidore [Bishop of Seville] (560–636) wrote linguistic studies, natural science and cosmology treatises, biographies of biblical personages, historical works, and compendia of Greco-Roman civilization, [becoming] the most widely cited author of the European High Middle Ages.

Visigothic law also demonstrated a typically European concern for limiting the power of the ruler. Sections of the legal code, e.g., bore titles such as “The Royal Power, as well as the Entire Body of the People, should be Subject to the Majesty of the Law” and “How the Avarice of the King should be Restrained.”

While a promising Christian Hispano-Visigothic civilization was developing in Spain, Islam was born amid the tents of largely illiterate Bedouin nomads in the Arabian peninsula. In the latter half of the seventh century, Muslim warriors overran the northern coast of Africa, destroying the Christian kingdoms that had previously existed there. In 711, a mostly Berber Muslim army under the command of Musa bin Nusayr crossed over to Spain and conquered almost the entire peninsula within ten years.

Arabic chronicles record the astonishment of the uncultured Muslim invaders at the splendor of the Spanish cities, and dwell lovingly on the “unimaginable” treasures of gold and jewels the conquerors were able to carry off. An Arab chronicler records, e.g., that when the conqueror Musa visited Damascus to pay homage to the caliph, he took with him

all the spoil ... consisting of thirty skins full of gold and silver coin, necklaces of inestimable value, pearls, rubies, topazes and emeralds, besides costly robes of all sorts; he was followed by eleven hundred prisoners, men, women, and children, of whom four hundred were princes of the royal blood.

In response to the plundering, many Christians buried valuable religious art from the invaders, and archeologists still occasionally dig up such testimonies to the advanced material culture of Visigothic Spain.

The Muslim invaders of 711 were numerically far inferior to the natives, and many historians have expressed surprise at their rapid success. Factors playing into their hands included the inability of the Visigoths to assemble rapidly, and the existence of a discontented royal faction willing to side with the invaders against King Roderigo.

Spanish Jews, subjected by Christian Visigothic rulers to significant legal restrictions, also allied themselves with the invading army in the hope of improving their condition. For a time, they succeeded: Jews were employed guarding captured cities as the Muslims went on to new conquests, relieving the conquerors of concern for protecting their rear and allowing them to show up unexpectedly at key strategic points. Once the Muslims were firmly in control, however, Jews were reduced to a position similar to Christians.

Muslim commanders also offered “pacts” to Christian lords who agreed not to resist the invasion, allowed to keep their lands, servants and religion—for a time. As with the Jews, Muslim rulers reneged upon these agreements when it became convenient to do so. The only reason they were offered in the first place was the numerical weakness of the invaders; they are not indicative of Muslim “tolerance.”

Andalusian legal texts give us an idea of what the conquest must have been like, making clear that both the burning down and the flooding of infidel towns were permissible as part of *jihad*. So was “cutting down their trees and their fruits, killing their animals, and destroying their buildings and everything that can be broken down.” Whether the defeated were allowed to live or were massacred was entirely up to the victorious Muslim commander; there are a number of recorded cases of outright extermination.

A Christian chronicle described the conquest as follows:

The enemies ravaged the land, they burned the houses, they killed the men, they burned the cities, the trees, the vineyards and anything they found green they cut. So much grew this plague that there remained in Spain no good village or city ... that was not burned or brought down or taken over by the Moors; and the cities they could not conquer they tricked them and conquered them with false treaties.

Many modern historians seek to deny that the Muslim invasion of Spain (which they prefer to call a mere “expansion”) was religiously motivated. This view is contradicted by all medieval sources. But the contemporary academy is heavily devoted to a materialist interpretation of history derived from Marxism, and scholars of this

tendency prefer to emphasize economic factors such as the quest for booty.

Yet it is difficult to separate economic from spiritual motivations within the terms of Islamic thought: the Muslim soldier wins booty if he returns home successful and is promised a paradise filled with sensual enjoyment if he is killed. Martyrdom in the cause of Islam is highly praised by Andalusian writers; according to one of them, Muhammad himself once said: “I would like to fight in the way of Allah ... and be killed, then brought to life so I could be killed, then brought to life so I could be killed.”

Islam’s many academic apologists in the West have devoted a great deal of interpretive ingenuity to making out a case that the word *jihad* refers to something other than “Holy War against infidels,” such as “a spiritual exertion” or “interior struggle for self-perfection.” Such ideas are found in Sufi texts of a later date, but appear to have been wholly absent from medieval Andalusia: the author lists over a dozen key texts from Moorish Spain that discuss *jihad* exclusively in the sense of Holy War.

Another gambit of Islam’s apologists is to equate Muslim Holy War with the Christian Crusades, but Fernandez-Morera explains why this does not withstand analysis:

For devout Christians, the sacred war of a Crusade *was a unique event that only a pope could proclaim*. For devout Muslims the sacred war of *jihad* was a *permanent state of being decreed by Islamic law* that the caliph must wage at least once a year.

For more than four decades following the conquest, the victorious Berbers continued to live a primitive, nomadic life, carrying their possessions and wives about from place to place. Only in 755 did the Emir of Cordoba command them to build villages and settle down.

The period which followed is known as the Umayyad dynasty (756–1031), usually cited as the pinnacle of Andalusian civilization. In fact, the Umayyads “elevated religious and political persecutions, inquisitions, beheadings, impaling, and crucifixions to heights unequalled by any other set of rulers before or after in Spain.”

The fourteenth-century Arab historian Ibn Khaldun has this to say about these early Arab rulers:

The Arabs were coarse, without education, and not very skilled in the arts of writing and mathematics. Their nobility in particular were very unskilled because among them a

lack of knowledge was their distinctive characteristic. Thus they used Jews, Christians, and freed foreigners to handle their administrative affairs.

This use of Christians and Jews as administrators, motivated by practical necessity, is one of the points on which modern historians seize to justify their view of the Spanish Muslim rulers as “tolerant.” But the everyday reality for most Spanish Christians and Jews under Islamic rule was an entirely different matter.

Following the conquest of 711, non-Muslims were given a choice between converting, being killed, or accepting the status of *dhimmi*, a “protected” class obliged to pay a special tax called the *jizya*. The law of the time makes clear that one purpose of the *jizya* was to humiliate the “people of the book.” Here is how it was paid:

The *dhimmi*, standing, would present the money to the Muslim collector who would be sitting higher up on a sort of throne; this Muslim bureaucrat would hold the *dhimmi* by the throat telling him “Oh *dhimmi*, enemy of Allah, pay the *jizya* that you owe us for the protection and tolerance we grant you”; the other Muslims present would imitate the collector, pushing around the *dhimmi*. To this amusing spectacle should be admitted any Muslim who wants to enjoy it.

Fernandez-Morera comments: “The *dhimma* system, then, was a gangster-like ‘protection racket’ that was quite profitable for the Muslim rulers.” This profitability is the main reason Spanish Muslims preferred not to make outright slaves of Christians and Jews. All sorts of other taxes could be arbitrarily piled on top of the *jizya* as well, in order to maintain Muslim rulers’ ostentatious lifestyle and subsidize poets, intellectuals, slaves, palaces, harems and city embellishment programs.

Much Islamic law centers around the concepts of purity and impurity, and non-Muslims are considered a major source of impurity. The Maliki school of jurisprudence, which was in force for most of the period of Moorish rule in Spain, devotes much attention to the problems posed by water, garments and food touched by Christians. It was forbidden, e.g., to use the water left over by a Christian, or to use for ablutions anything a Christian has touched, or to eat food left over by a Christian. It was not considered advisable even to eat an animal a Christian had hunted.

Muslim purity requirements meant that, as a practical matter, Christians and Jews had to be physically confined to their own neighborhoods much of the time, and writings from Moorish Spain contain numerous references to such separate neighborhoods.

Interaction seems to have been largely confined to economic transactions.

According to the regulations issued by one Muslim cleric in Seville (c. 1100), Jews and Christians

must be abhorred and shunned and should not be greeted with the formula "Peace be with you," for the devil has gained mastery over them and has made them forget the name of God. They are the devil's party. They must have a distinguishing sign by which they are recognized to their shame.

Christians were required to stand in the presence of Muslims as a sign of respect. They were forbidden to carry weapons or to ride horses. They were normally prohibited from building new churches, and required permission even to repair existing churches. They could not convert mosques into churches, but churches could be, and often were, converted into mosques. The *muezzin* loudly called Muslims to prayer, but churches were forbidden to ring their bells. Christians could display crosses neither on their persons nor on the outside of their churches. Muslims could proselytize, but Christians could not. A Muslim could not only marry up to four wives but also keep as many sexual slaves as he could support. The latter did not have to be Muslim, but any children they bore had to be raised Muslim. Christian men, on the other hand, were prohibited from taking Muslim wives or concubines. All these regulations also applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to Jews as well.

There were occasional outbreaks of resistance from the subject population, always suppressed with ruthless force. The most famous such episode was that of the Martyrs of Cordoba. In 850 AD, a monk named Perfectus was asked by some Muslims to explain what Christianity taught about Muhammad. He responded that they might not like the answer. When they persisted, he made them promise not to tell anyone. He then quoted the gospel passage in which Christ warns that "many false prophets will come in my name," and explained that Christians consider Muhammad such a false prophet. Some days later, the same Muslims spotted Perfectus in town and pointed him out to a crowd of Muslims, saying he had insulted the Prophet. He was thrown in prison, interrogated, and eventually beheaded.

The following year, a monk named Isaac went to Cordoba and declared in the presence of a Muslim judge that Muhammad was a false prophet and Islam a false religion. He was beheaded publicly and his cadaver was hung upside down at one of the city gates.

These events gave birth to a movement. Within a few years, some fifty Christians

publicly proclaimed their belief in Christ and the fraudulence of Muhammad's supposed divine mission. Some were beheaded, others impaled, others flogged to death, others boiled alive. Among these martyrs were a number who had publicly converted to Islam while continuing to practice Christianity privately—the worst form of apostasy, according to Islamic law.

The ruler Abd al-Rahman II responded by confiscating Christian property and taking steps to make life more difficult for all Christians. On the advice of Muslim clerics, he convened a church council in Cordoba which, under pressure, commanded Christians not to seek martyrdom. Eventually, the movement petered out.

The Martyrs of Cordoba have received little sympathy from modern historians, who have called them “troublemakers” and “self-immolators”:

As far back as Reinhart Dozy in the nineteenth century and [Evariste] Lévi-Provençal in the early twentieth, and continuing to the present, scholars have typically described the actions of the martyrs as the foolish decisions of religious fanatics, of recalcitrant and ignorant monks and their unthinking followers. In one representative statement, a scholar called the Christian resistance the work of “an intransigent minority, not at all willing to live in peaceful *convivencia* and respect toward Islam.” [...] The implication is clear: these people should have been grateful to the tolerant Muslim authorities.

This stance would be called “blaming the victim” were the victims anyone but European Christians.

Many Christians fled to the Christian kingdoms of the north (although modern historians prefer to speak of a “migration” rather than a “flight”). By 1200, there were very few Christians left in Andalusia.

It is more difficult to generalize about the situation of Jews in Moorish Spain. Visigothic law regarding the Jewish community was harsh, and designed to make it disappear eventually. Accordingly, as mentioned above, Spanish Jews formed an alliance of convenience with the Muslim invaders. Even after being reduced to *dhimmi* status, however, the position of Jews in early Moorish Spain (before the Almoravid invasion of 1085) was more favorable than it had been under the Christian Visigoths.

Some Muslim rulers found it convenient to employ Jewish officials since, unlike well-born Muslims, they remained entirely dependent on royal favor and were thus easy to

control. Thus, a Jewish scholar named Hasdai (died *c.* 970), e.g., became the *de facto* foreign minister of Caliph Abd al-Rahman III, and was an active benefactor and protector of the Jewish community. Rabbi Samuel Ibn Naghrela (993–1056) became the most powerful Jew in the history of Moorish Spain as vizier to the ruler of Granada, earning the Hebrew title HaNagid (“The Prince”).

But such favored Jews were also resented by the Muslim population. It is recorded that Samuel Ibn Naghrela was regularly insulted by a Muslim merchant each time he rode through the gates of Grenada. His employer became the subject of a satirical poem:

He has chosen an infidel as his secretary
When he could, had he wished, have chosen a Believer.
Through him, the Jews have become great and proud
And arrogant—they, who were among the most abject.
And how many a worthy Muslim humbly obeys
The vilest ape among these miscreants?

Naghrela’s son Joseph, also a high-ranking official, was killed in the anti-Jewish riots which broke out in Granada in 1066.

Rabbi Isaac Ibn Albalia escaped that same riot and became court astrologer to the Muslim ruler of Seville, al-Mutamid. But this same al-Mutamid crucified a Jewish ambassador sent by Alfonso VI of Castile because he did not like the demands the man carried. Clearly, the occasional self-interested employment of Jewish officials by Muslim rulers bears no relation to the modern ideal of “religious tolerance.”

Modern Jewish historians like to emphasize the careers of powerful Jewish officials in Moorish Spain, but the same period also witnessed numerous anti-Jewish riots, expulsions and assassinations. As the Jewish historian Bernard Lewis has written: “The Golden Age of Equal Rights is a myth, and belief in it was a result rather than a cause of Jewish sympathy for Islam.” (NB: Fernandez-Morera mentions in a footnote that Jewish Arabists have played an important role in “disseminating an enthusiastic image of Islamic Spain.”)

Unlike Christians and Muslims, Jews of this period never enjoyed the power to persecute other religions, but this should not mislead us into imagining they were more “tolerant” than the Muslims or Christians of the time. There existed Jewish laws, albeit unenforceable, forbidding non-Jews from occupying public office in a hypothetical Jewish kingdom, as well as forbidding non-Jews from owning Jewish slaves. Jewish writings from Moorish Spain contain furious denunciations not only of both Christianity and Islam, but of heretical Jewish sects such as the Karaites (who did

not recognize the authority of the Talmud).

The Almoravids, who conquered Andalusia in 1085, put an end to the age of Jewish viziers. In later years, many Andalusian Jews sought refuge in the Christian kingdoms of northern Spain.

But granting that Muslim tolerance of other religions is a myth, what about life within the Spanish Muslim community itself? The realities of daily life in Moorish Spain are best reflected in legal texts of the time, texts which have largely been ignored by enthusiasts of the romantic vision of the Andalusian Paradise. Spanish Muslims followed the Maliki school of jurisprudence, one of the stricter of the Sunni legal schools. Representatives of other schools were sometimes subject to forcible expulsion from Spain, and followers of the Maliki school were forbidden to socialize with or even salute them.

In Islamic thinking there is no distinction between the spheres of religion, jurisprudence, and morality. Fernandez-Morera describes pre-modern Islamic societies as “hierocracies” in which both religious and civil authority is exercised by a priestly class. “In no other place within the Islamic empire,” he writes, “was the influence of Islamic clerics on daily life as strong as in al-Andalus.”

The Islamic clerics’ functions explicitly included making sure that Muslims behaved in a religiously proper manner ... always in accord with Islamic teachings and exacting daily ritualistic details as interpreted by the clerics. [For example,] before each of the five daily prayers, the faithful must carry out detailed ablutions of the hands, nose (inside and out by aspiration and respiration), face, [arms] up to the elbows and the two feet up to the ankles.

Similarly detailed rules governed eating and cohabiting.

Music was prohibited by Maliki law. Muslim clerics were empowered to enter any home where music could be heard in order to confiscate and destroy the instruments. To this day, notes the author, “if ever one hears music in Maliki mosques, it is limited to the sound of the tambourine—an instrument not very conducive to the writing of great musical scores.” Chess, backgammon and dice games were also prohibited.

The public spaces of the cities of this Golden Age of Islam were patrolled by a religious functionary, the *muhtasib*, who had the power to enforce *sharia* in the people’s personal, social, and commercial behavior.

So detailed and extensive were the rules to which Muslims were subject that it is doubtful whether they enjoyed greater freedom in their everyday lives than Christians or Jews (although they certainly enjoyed higher *status*). “In medieval Maliki Islamic law and practice,” writes Fernandez-Morera, “higher socioeconomic status actually confers less autonomy and power in the public arena (what Western scholars generally regard as ‘freedom’).” Spanish Muslim authorities did not bother to enforce certain regulations against non-Muslim slaves: Christian slave girls, e.g., were allowed to sing and play musical instruments, and an Arab chronicler mentions that girls with such talents fetched a high price.

Perhaps nothing better illustrates the alienness of Islamic thought to Western ideas about freedom than precisely this circumstance: that the only class of people who enjoyed a certain measure of freedom from the oppressive and detailed application of Islamic law in Spain were *slaves*, and they enjoyed such freedom precisely because they were the most despised members of society. The Muslim men who enjoyed the singing of Christian slave girls would never have permitted such behavior in their Muslim wives. Freedom is never a positive value within Islam, which means *submission*.

Muslim women in Andalusia were banished from the public sphere and subject to circumcision and veiling like women elsewhere in the Muslim world. They were not permitted to speak in their own behalf; a male agent represented them in all legal transactions. A woman’s testimony was not accepted in trials involving bloodshed, and in other trials counted for half the testimony of a man. Like *dhimmis*, women were required to stand in the presence of men. Scourging was the normal punishment for fornication, while adulteresses were stoned to death. Sexual slavery was commonplace. Yet none of this has prevented Western scholars from enthusing over the “surprising degree of freedom” enjoyed by the women of Andalusia.

Other enthusiasts of the romantic vision of medieval Islamic feminism have seized upon references in the Arabic sources to women who were learned in this or that subject. A certain John G. Jackson has written:

In Christian Europe ninety-nine percent of the people were illiterate, and even kings could neither read nor write [while in Islamic Spain] you had Moorish women who were doctors and lawyers and professors.

Such women were either slaves who pursued their studies as part of the training to which they submitted rather than of their own free will, or they were the daughters of learned Muslim men who picked up their knowledge at home. The Spanish Arabist

María Luisa Ávila puts such references in perspective:

Behind these educated women we always find a father who had intellectual prestige: the *fuqaha* [experts in religious law] were daughters of *qadis* [Muslim judges] or of famous jurists; the traditionists [who memorized *hadith*, or sayings attributed to Muhammad] were daughters of some expert in *hadith*; the only medic we know about belonged to the celebrated family of the Avenzoar.

We must avoid allowing ourselves to be impressed by these one hundred and sixteen “learned” women. ... Many are mentioned only because of the family connections; others for having written some smart verses; there are a number of copyists; others are mentioned because they were part of some anecdote about male personages.

To pretend that Hispano-Arabic women enjoyed freedom is out of place. On the contrary, it is logical to deduce from the evidence that in the social realm in which these “learned” women moved, aside from the slave girls, their lives were spent solely within the family circle and their relationships were circumscribed to their parents and to other women.

But did not Islam at least play an important role in preserving classical learning and transmitting it to Western Europe? No, says Fernandez-Morera:

Ancient Greek texts were never “lost” to be somehow “recovered” and “transmitted” by Islamic scholars, as so many academic historians and journalists continue to write; these texts were always there, preserved and studied by the monks and lay scholars of the Greek Roman [or “Byzantine”] Empire.

Some works of Aristotle were translated into Latin in late antiquity, and by the end of the twelfth century, all his logical writings were well-known in Western Europe. French historian Sylvain Gouguenheim (*Aristote au mont Saint-Michel*, 2008) has recently emphasized the importance of Mont Saint-Michel as a center of translation—and has found himself denounced as an “Islamophobe.”

Arab scholars, by contrast, were ignorant of Greek; the versions they read of ancient scientific and philosophical works were “Arabic translations made by Christian scholars from Syriac translations also made by Christian scholars from classical Greek

texts preserved by the Greek scholars of the Christian Greek Roman Empire.”

Many Arab rulers disapproved of the study of such works altogether. Motivated by religious zeal, the famous Moorish ruler al-Mansur (938–1002) “ordered all philosophy and logic books in Cordoba publicly burned.” A chronicler records:

whoever had studied these sciences [philosophy] became regarded as prone to heterodoxy and suspected of heresy. Most of those who until then had studied philosophy ... became terrified and kept secret the fact that they knew the subject.

The principal effect of Islamic expansion on the transmission of Greek texts was to make communication between the Latin West and the Greek Roman Empire far more difficult. As Fernandez-Morera observes:

Of course cultural and especially commercial exchange between East and West continued to occur, and now largely via the Islamic Empire, but this happened not because of the civilizational properties of medieval Islam but *because medieval Islam had interrupted the direct communication in the first place.*

Even the gorgeous Moorish architecture admired by modern tourists to Spain conceals an origin unflattering to its builders. Islam has little in the way of a native architectural tradition: it began as a religion of the nomads of the Arabian desert who had few permanent structures of any kind. As the religion expanded, however, it converted Christian houses of worship into mosques and gradually began imitating Romano-Christian architecture in its own constructions. Ibn Khaldun points out that in North Africa the constructions built by the Arabs themselves did not last very long because of the Arabs’ sloppiness, poor materials, and lack of knowledge of building techniques.

In Spain, Muslim rulers constructed by cannibalizing columns and other building materials from Roman and Visigothic churches. According to Arab sources, e.g., much of the Great Mosque of Cordoba was “built with the materials of demolished churches brought to Cordoba on the heads of the Christian captives.” Even the technique of alternating red brick and white stone employed in constructing the arches of that celebrated jewel of Moorish architecture is adopted from a Roman technique called *opus vittatum mixtum* that can still be seen in surviving Roman aqueducts in Spain. The mosque’s mosaics are of Greek manufacture.

Popularizers of the myth of the Andalusian Paradise like to emphasize all the things we can “learn” from the history of Moorish Spain, but on closer inspection these turns

out to be nothing more than the principles such writers already wish to believe in apart from any historical study: tolerance, feminism and multiculturalism. Why should anyone bother to learn Arabic and study the records of Medieval Spain in order to find out that women should be independent, religions tolerant, and different cultures able to live side-by-side in harmony, when all these things can easily be learned from reading the *New York Times*? Such a mindset does not provide “lessons from the past”; it guarantees that we will never be able to learn anything from the study of the past.

Worse, some scholars are elevating this present-centered historical narcissism into a matter of principle. In the view of one influential school of thought, scholars *ought* to approach the past with present-day concerns firmly in mind, rather than attempting to understand the past on its own terms. Some academic proponents of the “Andalusian paradise” are perfectly frank about their desire to employ historical scholarship in the service of the contemporary multicultural project.

Part and parcel of this academic trend is a conscious effort to downgrade the West which, as Fernandez-Morera says, “often culminates in a denial of its very existence.” On this view, the “West” (always placed in quotation marks) is a mere *essentialist construction*: the Spanish Christian population subjugated by Muslims in the eighth century did not have enough in common with Christian populations across the Pyrenees or elsewhere to justify considering them all as parts of a single civilizational entity that might be called “the West” or “Christendom.” Islam, inexplicably, escapes both placement between quotation marks and the charge of being an *essentialist construction*.

Contemporary historiography concerning Muslim Andalusia is thus yet one more front in the great struggle of our time: that of our declining white European civilization against a multitude of enemies, both internal and external.

How and Why Sweden Became Multicultural

Obekväma sanningar, 2012

No one can deny that multiculturalism and mass immigration are a reality in Sweden today. However, it hasn't always been so. As late as 1965, the social democratic Prime Minister of Sweden [Tage Erlander](#) said: "We Swedes live in an infinitely luckier situation. Our country's population is homogeneous, not only in terms of race, but also in many other respects." The demographic transformation of Sweden did not just happen to happen. It was a direct result of political decisions, which in turn could be undertaken because of some actor's conscious agenda and very active advocacy in the 1960s and 1970s. Earlier, Sweden had an approach towards immigrants and ethnic minorities that was based either on expulsion or assimilation. Immigrants who were ethnically and culturally closely related would assimilate while non-European immigrants, Gypsies and Sami would be excluded from the community. Now, however, suddenly a new approach prevailed: Sweden would become a pluralistic multicultural society and the multicultural paradigm would become the overall goal of Swedish culture, politics and society.

In 1930, 1 percent of the population in Sweden was born in a foreign country and the vast majority of them came from other northern European countries. During the 1950's and 1960's there was a relatively large labor immigration from other European countries. Many of these immigrants returned home after service in Sweden and those who remained were mostly assimilated without major problems. In 2000, Sweden's total population was slightly more than 8.8 million of which one million was foreign born. A fifth of the total population had at least one parent born outside of Sweden of which 547,907 people had at least one parent born outside of Europe and U.S. (Source: Statistics Sweden). In 2011, 93,134 people were granted residence and during the whole period 1980-2011 the figure was 1,529,666 (source: [The Swedish Migration Board](#)), of which approximately one million came from non-Western countries (see previous source and add to [family reunification](#)). Ethnic Swedes are expected to be a minority in Sweden before 2050 if immigration continues at the same rate.

According to Tomas Hammar's (et al.) comparative study [European Immigration Policy](#) (Cambridge University Press, 1985) of Swedish and European immigration

policy, organized interests have had great influence over political decisions in Sweden and elsewhere. Immigration policy is an example of interest groups' (but also bureaucrats') ability to influence decisions. Hammar writes that the political parties have upheld the decisions but they did not initiate them.

Lars-Erik Hansen's dissertation [Equality and freedom to choose. A study in the emergence of Swedish Immigration Policy](#) (Stockholm University, Department of History, 2001) lists the actors who were a driving force in the debate to introduce the new multicultural policy. Regarding the actors, the study confirms previous academic research on how multiculturalism arose, such as Henry Román's study *En invandrarpolitisk oppositionell : debattören David Schwarz syn på svensk invandrarpolitik åren 1964-1993* [An immigration policy opponent: commentator David Schwarz's view of Swedish immigration policy 1964-1993] who attributes Schwarz "a crucial role" in the game behind the introduction of the new policy.

Thus, the ideological change started in 1964 when David Schwarz, a Polish born Jew and "Holocaust" survivor who immigrated to Sweden in the early 1950s, wrote the article "The Immigration problem in Sweden" in Sweden's largest and most important morning newspaper – the Jewish-owned [Dagens Nyheter](#) ("Daily News"). It started a rancorous debate that mostly took place in Dagens Nyheter, but which subsequently continued even in other newspapers, on editorial pages and in books. Hansen (2001) writes in his thesis (p. 115):

The leading debaters who were the first to claim minority rights and conditions were especially David Schwarz, Inga Gottfarb, Amadeo Cottio, Voldemar Kiviaed, Géza Thinsz and Lukasz Winiarki – all of which had an immigrant background.

Besides Schwarz, Gottfarb had Jewish descent. Kiviaed was Estonian, Géza Thinsz immigrated from Hungary in 1956 (the same year as the massive persecution of Jews started which would have the effect that within a few decades half of Hungary's Jews had fled the country) and Lukasz Winiarki immigrated from Poland. Schwarz was by far the most active opinion-former and accounted for 37 of a total of 118 contributions to the debate on the immigration issue in the years 1964-1968. Schwarz and his co-thinkers were so dominant and aggressive that debaters with an alternative view were driven on the defensive and felt their views suppressed. For example, Schwarz played the anti-Semitism card efficiently in order to discredit his opponents. Hansen writes (pp. 114, 126-128, 217):

An increasing number of commentators and publishers made similar criticisms against what they saw as the majority's lack of understanding of minorities' conditions, particularly in the non-clearly stated, yet what many saw as a real policy of assimilation, which they feared would lead to an erasure of the different minority cultures and life patterns to amount to the rectifying or conformist national majority's established pattern. Strongest in this criticism was David Schwarz and Voldemar Kiviaed – they claimed that the assimilation zealots appeared in the spirit of the Russians in the Baltic states and that their approach could also be compared with Eichmann's 'final solution', although in more humane shape. Increased government action was required to avoid assimilation, partly by direct financial support to minorities, partly by an official policy for a pluralistic society. [...]

The policy toward Jewish immigration to Sweden, especially during World War II, was put forward as a blot in the Swedish political history. Bruno Kaplan, head of the teaching of the Jewish community in Stockholm and represented in the World Jewish Congress, lined up a number of examples of this regulatory policy (exclusion model), partly student protest against importation of some Jewish doctors in 1938, partly a number of leading newspapers which warned of this immigration. Leif Zern [who, like Kaplan, is Jewish, blogger's note] emphasized Kaplan's view that it was clear from the then existing policy that there was anti-Semitism, and stressed: "Of course there are no statistics on how many Jews the feature (the regulation of Jewish immigration) led to the gas chambers." [...]


Bruno Kaplan was convinced that the survival of a small Jewish minority depended on how the state and municipalities acted – a policy that advocated tolerance and respect for minority distinctiveness was necessary. In this spirit should the Jewish minority, in their efforts to preserve their identity, get the full support from Swedish society. [...]

David Schwarz was the most active debater in the immigrant issue, his views and values had a major impact.

David Schwarz became the first and foremost spokesman of the pluralistic state intervention model [...]

In the official immigrant debate, some players played a big role in the policy process, especially adherents of multiculturalism. [...] They encouraged the political parties to address the issue of ethnic equality on the agenda. Then, a veritable race began to see who was the biggest and best in the immigrant issue.

The debate gave rise to government investigations such as *Invandrarutredningen* (The Immigrant Investigation) 1968 which formed the basis for the government's bill (1975:26) on guidelines for immigrant and minority policy which was adopted by a totally unanimous Swedish Parliament in 1975. David Schwarz got what he wanted, which was to be a fateful decision whose consequences we see the results of today. The starting point was thus a cultural pluralist perspective, which meant that immigrants with massive government intervention and financial support would be encouraged to preserve their culture (and thus send out signals to the world that Sweden is a tolerant country where everyone is welcome). The meeting between the Swedish culture and minority cultures would be enriching to the whole community and the majority population would begin to adapt to the minorities. The integration goal would be a reciprocal process in which both parties meet on the road (which in practice means increasing rootlessness). Moreover, increased internationalization of Swedish society was seen as an overall objective in the whole community planning.



Source: Schwarz (1971, 111-113), Román (1994)

The established academic research done in this area thus confirm the presented facts in *Hur Sverige blev en mångkultur* (How Sweden became Multicultural), a classic book in Swedish nationalist circles, written by pseudonym M. Eckehart. It also repeats a pattern that is reflected throughout the West about the power interests and ethnic motives which was behind the transformation of formerly homogeneous Western countries into ethnically heterogeneous societies. Professor Kevin MacDonald writes about the [shaping of U.S. immigration policy](#) in his classic work [The Culture of Critique](#) and provides evidence that organized Jewish minority interests played a crucial role in the policy change. MacDonald's conclusion is [supported](#) by scholars like Hugh Davis Graham ([Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America](#). Oxford University Press, 2002).

As mentioned above, the political unity was total at the time of the Parliament's decision in 1975 that Sweden would radically be transformed into a multicultural society. Unlike what one might think, it was the conservative Rightist Party which first embraced the idea of cultural pluralism and greatly contributed to shape the new radical direction. It is worth mentioning that the chairman of the Rightist Party 1961-1965, [Gunnar Heckscher](#), was the party's first leader of Jewish descent. In the beginning, the Social Democrats and unions saw ethnic equality as a threat to social and economic equality, and therefore advocated assimilation of immigrants. Hansen (2001) quotes a motion from the Rightist Party to the Parliament in 1968 (p. 149):

The disappearance of a culture is always a loss, no matter how small or large the group is which supports the culture in question. Therefore, it seems important to us that Sweden, besides the application of a proper immigration policy for the country, also feel responsibility for the organized minorities and offer their cultures opportunity for continued existence and further development on Swedish ground.

The following year, the Rightist Party changed its name to the Moderate Party and put another motion to the Parliament which propagated even more for ethnic minorities. They demanded that the government seriously need to take responsibility for preserving immigrants' original identity (p. 162):

Society should as far as possible meet the minority community's expectations and immigration and minority policy should therefore be designed so that individuals in minority groups have freedom to choose concerning the convergence with the native population, mainly in terms of

such cultural activities as the maintenance and further development of language skills, religion, special arts and other special knowledge, and that society guarantees freedom through active material and personnel support to various minorities' cultural and other activities.

The answer to the question why Jews seem to have a predilection for multiculturalism in the host countries they reside in, is that they as a seemingly invisible minority among lots of other more visible and apparently problematic minorities no more appear as a social category, and thus they can undisturbed continue to exercise their power by promoting their ethnic group interests at the expense of the indigenous peoples. The aim is to destroy the traditional Western culture and weaken its civilization; to divide and weaken the northern European-derived populations, break down their ethnic consciousness and national cohesion, so that they never again will have the opportunity to organize an ethnically conscious and collectivist movement like the German National Socialism of the 1930s.

Thus, reduced solidarity and cohesion in society favors the ethnic interest of the Jewish minority group. Multiculturalism is a Jewish group evolutionary strategy to minimize the presence of potential anti-Semitism among the non-Jewish majority population in each country where the policy has been introduced. The Jewish minority is safer in ethnically heterogeneous countries because they don't stand out from the crowd there. Consequently, persecution of Jews has historically occurred mainly in homogeneous countries. For example, Swedish-Jewish journalist Göran Rosenberg acknowledged this on December 18th 2008 at a [panel discussion](#) on The Future for Jews in Multicultural Europe, organized by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research and The Centre for the Study of European Politics & Society at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel.

Göran Rosenberg recalled that historically, Jews had always thrived in nations and empires with multicultural, pluralistic and tolerant environments, while they fared badly in strong ethnic or nationalistic societies. European Jews have always been the emblematic stranger or 'other'. Therefore, by definition, a society where the stranger is welcome is good for the Jews, although they have not always appreciated this link.[...]The future of European Jewry is dependant on our ability to shape a multicultural, pluralistic and diverse society.

Consequently, it is not a coincidence that Jewish organizations like the American Jewish Committee sees immigration as a specific Jewish issue:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GNIKoSU__Cc

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W11m-IB-mng>

Just as it is not a coincidence that Europe's organized Jews consistently dissociate themselves from politically organized critics of Islam, because every negative generalization towards a minority group ultimately can hit the Jews.

Note that very wealthy democratic countries in East Asia such as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, are almost entirely ethnically homogeneous, due to the lack of Jewish influence and multicultural policies over there. One must not forget the traditional Jewish animosity towards Christianity and the West as a reason why Jews are at the forefront of the socially destructive immigration policy. Jews tend to see anti-Semitism as a basic feature of Christianity and many even claim that the Christian religion was the cause of the "Holocaust". For example, Rabbi Shlomo Riskin wrote in The Jewish Week on September 5th 2012 that the Christian church would not have changed so drastically during the 20th century if it had not been for "the miraculous establishment of the State of Israel and the realization by honest and authoritative Church leaders that the Holocaust could not have taken place had it not been for the seeds of anti-Semitism sown by Christian teachings over the last two millennia."

The multicultural policy has also been made possible because of Jewish influence in anthropology during the 20th century. For example, Jewish anthropologist Gelya Frank writes in her article Jews, Multiculturalism, and Boasian Anthropology in American Anthropologist that egalitarian anthropology was so Jewish that it should be classed as "part of Jewish history". Ironically, Jewish anti-racist anthropologists are often proud of their own special racial purity.

Standard histories of American anthropology have downplayed the preponderance of Jewish intellectuals in the early years of Boasian anthropology and the Jewish identities of later anthropologists. Jewish histories, however, foreground the roles and deeds of Jews. This essay brings together these various discourses for a new generation of American anthropologists, especially those concerned with turning multiculturalist theories into agendas for activism. Although Boas's anthropology was apolitical in terms of theory, in message and purpose it was an antiracist science.

Read more in [chapter 2](#) of professor Kevin MacDonald's book [The Culture of Critique](#) on how ethnocentric Jews such as Franz Boas, Richard Lewontin, Stephen Jay Gould and Claude Lévi-Strauss with unscientific methods influenced the genetics and anthropological sciences and thus managed to get Westerners to believe that there are no human races or average differences between them. Just as influential Jews played a decisive role in the shaping of immigration policy through lobbying in the countries they immigrated to, they have also played a central role for the intellectual movements that opposed the former prevailing evolutionary perspective in the social sciences and biological explanations regarding human behavior. The basically erroneous dogma that all races are identical in genetic conditions and characteristics has been the premise of the multicultural and multiethnic political paradigm.

This article is translated from Swedish and was originally published on the blog [Obekväma sanningar](#) ("Uncomfortable Truths") September 8, 2012.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20130120095020/http://destroyzionism.com/2013/01/13/how-and-why-sweden-became-multicultural/>

The Jewish Origins of Multicultural Britain

Andrew Joyce, 2015

Original Title: *The SS Empire Windrush: The Jewish Origins of
Multicultural Britain*

‘Will you find out who is responsible for this extraordinary action?’

Oliver Stanley, M.P., June 1948.

The SS *Empire Windrush* holds a special place of infamy in the minds of British Nationalists. When the ship arrived at Tilbury docks from Jamaica in June 1948, carrying 417 Black immigrants, it represented more than just a turning point in the history of those ancient isles. In some respects it signalled the beginning of mass, organized non-White immigration into northwest Europe. Back in November, *TOO* published my [research](#) on the role of Jews in limiting free speech and manipulating ‘race relations’ in Britain in order to achieve Jewish goals and protect Jewish interests. I’ve recently been revisiting some of my past essays, delving deeper and expanding each of them in an effort that I hope will result in the publication of a book-length manuscript on aspects of Jewish influence. During this process, I’ve been particularly compelled to research further into the role of Jews in Britain’s immigration and racial questions. What I present in this essay is a survey of some interesting facts, which I hope to document and integrate further as my work on the volume proceeds.

One of the things that struck me most when I began looking into the origins of multicultural Britain was the hazy and confused background to the arrival of that notorious ship. First though, I might point out one of history’s bizarre ironies — the vessel that would signal the end of racial homogeneity in Britain started life as a Nazi cruise liner. The ship began its career in 1930 as the MV *Monte Rosa*. Until the outbreak of war it was used as part of the German *Kraft durch Freude* (‘Strength through Joy’) program. ‘Strength through Joy’ enabled more than 25 million Germans of all classes to enjoy subsidized travel and numerous other leisure pursuits, thereby enhancing the sense of community and racial togetherness. Racial solidarity, rather

than class position, was emphasized by drawing lots for the allocation of cabins on vessels like the *Monte Rosa*, rather than providing superior accommodation only for those who could afford a certain rate. Until the outbreak of war, the vessel was employed in conveying NSDAP members on South American cruises. In 1939 the ship was allocated for military purposes, acting as a troopship for the invasion of Norway in 1940. In 1944, the *Monte Rosa* served in the Baltic Sea, rescuing Germans trapped in Latvia, East Prussia and Danzig by the advance of the Red Army.

Finally, in May 1945, her German career ended when she was captured by advancing British forces at Kiel and taken as a prize of war. The British renamed her *Empire Windrush* on 21 January 1947, and also employed her as a troop carrier. Sailing from Southampton, the ship took British troops to destinations as varied as Suez, Aden, Colombo, Singapore and Hong Kong. Crucially, the ship was not operated directly by the British Government, but by the New Zealand Shipping Company.

It is with this little fact that we begin tumbling down the proverbial rabbit hole. I quickly discovered that the New Zealand Shipping Company, like other crucial players in the story of the *Windrush*, was Jewish owned and operated. The company was for the most part controlled by the Isaacs family, particularly the direct descendants of Henry and George Isaacs. Henry and George left England in 1852 at the instigation of a third brother, Edward, and arrived in Auckland via Melbourne. They established the firm of E & H Isaacs, acting as profiteers during the Taranaki and Waikato war, and winning a number of heavy contracts in connection with the provisioning of the troops.

Henry took a great interest in shipping affairs, and was for many years a member of the Auckland Harbour Board. He was one of the chief shareholders of the Auckland Shipping Company, which was subsequently merged into the New Zealand Shipping Company. The other major shareholders of the company were Laurence and Alfred Nathan, of L.D. Nathan & Company. The Auckland shipping industry, like many colonial shipping routes, had by the 1890s been effectively monopolized by Jews. During 1947 and 1948 many former German vessels were passed on to several of these contracted private companies at the discretion of the Ministry for War and the Ministry for Transport. The Secretary of State for War during these crucial years was none other than [Emanuel Shinwell](#), the socialist son of Polish and Dutch Jews. With a degree of loyalty and patriotism typical of his race, Shinwell was discovered by MI5 to have been passing British secrets to the Irgun in Palestine in November 1947. To Shinwell, disproportionately handing government vessels and contracts to fellow Jews would have been mere grist to the mill.

In 1948 the British Empire was crumbling. India had been granted independence in 1947, and an exhausted, over-stretched, and indebted Britain was busy arranging for the return of colonial troops to their homelands, and the collection of others for present or future conflicts. The *Windrush* was used mainly for this purpose until in May 1948 the ship's Jewish operators were given permission by the British Ministry of Transport to increase their profits by filling to capacity with commercial customers (immigrants rather than contracted troops) at Jamaica before returning to Britain with these new settlers. This momentous decision appears to have been taken very arbitrarily (and certainly un-democratically) since it elicited great shock and confusion among British politicians when it later came to light. They might not have been so shocked had they considered the ethnic origin of the head of the Ministry for Transport who authorized that action. The Minister of Transport in that crucial period was [Harry Louis Nathan](#), formerly a member of the law firm of Herbert Oppenheimer, Nathan and Vandyk, and a distant relative of the owners of the NZ Shipping Company.

If the web is already beginning to look a little tangled, readers would do well to consider some of these developments and 'coincidences' within the context of the [Anglo-Jewish Cousinhood](#), a topic I covered for *TOO* about three years ago. From the early 19th century until the First World War, English Jewry was ruled by a tightly connected oligarchy. Daniel Gutwein states that this Anglo-Jewish elite comprised some twenty inter-related Ashkenazi and Sephardic families including the houses of Goldsmith, Montagu, Nathan, Cohen, Isaacs, Abrahams, Samuel, and Montefiore. Some of these names have featured already, and will feature again in the *Windrush* story. At its head, of course, stood the House of Rothschild.^[1] This network of families had an "exceptionally high degree of consanguinity," leading to it being termed "The Cousinhood."^[2] Conversion and intermarriage in the group was exceptionally rare, if not non-existent. The business activities of the group overlapped to the same degree as their bloodlines. I illustrated this in my previous essay by pointing out that:

In 1870, the treasurer of the London Jewish Board of Guardians was Viennese-born Ferdinand de Rothschild (1838-1898). Ferdinand had married his cousin Elvina, who was a niece of the President of the London United Synagogue, Sir Anthony de Rothschild (1810-1876). Meanwhile, the Board of Deputies was at that time headed by Moses Montefiore, whose wife, a daughter of Levi Barent Cohen, was related to Nathan Meyer Rothschild. Nathan Meyer Rothschild's wife was also a daughter of Levi Barent

Cohen, and thus Montefiore was uncle to the aforementioned Anthony de Rothschild. ... Anthony was married to a niece of Montefiore, the daughter of Abraham Montefiore and Henrietta Rothschild[3]...*et cetera, et cetera*. In financial terms, the houses of Rothschild and Montefiore had united in 1824 to form the Alliance Insurance Company, and most of the families were involved in each other's stock-brokering and banking concerns. Endelmann notes that in these firms "new recruits were drawn exclusively from the ranks of the family." [4] Working tightly within this ethnic and familial network, the Cousinhood amassed huge fortunes, and in the years before World War I, despite comprising less than three tenths of 1% of the population, Jews constituted over 20% of non-landed British millionaires.[5] William Rubinstein notes that of these millionaires, all belonged to the Cousinhood.[6]

It was the Cousinhood that pioneered the way into direct political power for Jews in Britain. By 1900, through a process of ethnic and familial networking, the Cousinhood had secured many of the most significant administrative positions in the Empire. Feldman notes that the Nathan family alone had by that date secured the positions of Governor of the Gold Coast, Hong Kong and Natal, Attorney-General and Chief Justice in Trinidad, Private Secretary to the Viceroy of India, Officiating Chief Secretary to the Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam, and Postmaster-General of Bengal.[7] In Parliament, Lionel Abrahams was Permanent Assistant Under-Secretary at the India Office, working under his cousin Edwin Montagu who was then Parliamentary Under-Secretary for India.[8] Together with the rapid development of a Jewish monopoly over key Imperial positions were countless cases of nepotistic corruption and profit-seeking. The Cousinhood was **instrumental** in disseminating false Russian pogrom narratives throughout the West, in fomenting the profit-driven Boer War, and in the Indian Silver and Marconi scandals.

The Nathan and Isaacs families who owned and operated the New Zealand Shipping Company also comprised part of the Cousinhood, as was the case also with Harry Nathan who occupied the strategically valuable position of Ministry for Transport between 1946 and 1948. These were *crucial years* in which many foreign and domestic ex-military vessels were being re-purposed for commercial purposes and handed over by the Royal Navy to private (most often Jewish-owned) companies. Much like the nepotistic corruption at the heart of the Marconi scandal, having a Jew running the Ministry for War and a Jewish cousin running the Ministry for Transport

was good news for Cousinhood members who had monopolized shipping companies and routes and now stood to gain from successive government contracts to newly acquisitioned vessels like the *Empire Windrush*. These government contracts and the Jewish quest for profit played a huge role in the burgeoning of the commercial passenger industry that would bring wave after wave of Blacks, Indians and Pakistanis to Britain over the next two decades.

It doesn't really concern me whether the beginnings of this movement was part of a concerted campaign to flood Britain with non-Whites, whether the motivation was purely profit-driven, or whether it was a mixture of both. The fact remains that Jews occupied conspicuous roles throughout the process. Even the method by which Blacks were enticed to set sail for Britain must be remarked upon. Around three weeks before the *Empire Windrush* arrived in Jamaica, Blacks were bombarded with ads for cheap travel to Britain and articles extolling the new life they could have in London. Stephen Pollard writes that "the response was almost instantaneous. Queues formed outside the booking agency and every place was sold."^[9] Many of the ads were propaganda pieces that presented an idealized picture of life and job opportunities in Britain — in stark contrast to the bleak reality. Nonetheless, the ads were successful in generating a buzz of excitement among Blacks keen to make the move to the new welfare state.

Daniel Lawrence quotes, as an example, one migrant who explained his move to Britain: "Well, I left Jamaica because I saw the advertisements in *The Gleaner*. ... I left to better my position. That was the chief reason."^[10] *The Gleaner*, is part of the [Gleaner Company](#) which to this day enjoys an effective monopoly of the Jamaican press. The company has its origins in 1834, when it was founded by the Jewish brothers Jacob and Joshua De Cordova. Since its founding it has been a kind of Jamaican micro-Cousinhood. Even when it registered as a private company in 1897, its [first directors](#) possessed a mixture of Ashkenazi and Sephardi names, from Ashenheim to de Mercado. At the time the *Empire Windrush* ads appeared, the managing director was Michael de Cordova. Even as late as the 1960s, and despite numbering no more than six hundred in the whole country, according to Anita Waters the powerful Jewish minority of Jamaica controlled "many of the larger economic enterprises."^[11] Before the socialist policies of the Manley administration were implemented (1972–1980), Jews "controlled the country's only cement factory, the radio sector, the telephone company, and the largest rum company."^[12]

For all intents and purposes, the *Empire Windrush* was passed into Jewish ownership by a Jewish Secretary for War, given the green light to boost profits and start bringing non-Whites to Britain by a Jewish Minister for Transport, and provided with armies of eager passengers by a Jewish-owned media. Despite these facts, a very different

narrative emerged in the aftermath of the ship's arrival. Pollard writes that "in the years since the arrival of the *Empire Windrush* ... a myth has taken hold that *the British government* was responsible for bringing the passengers over as part of a concerted plan to help overcome a labour shortage. ...But this is wrong. It is clear from the reaction of ministers that they were as surprised as the public when they first learned, via a telegram from the Acting Governor of Jamaica on May 11, what was about to happen."[\[13\]](#) The myth was a helpful one because it acknowledged the undemocratic nature of the event while deflecting blame away from the most obvious source of the scourge — the Jews of the shipping industry and the Ministry of Transport. It's an interesting fact that, with the relevant contracts assigned and the process underway, Harry Nathan quietly vacated his position on May 31. Astonishingly, since that date Nathan has eluded all scholarly and journalistic attention until my own investigation.

The Labour government fumbled in the aftermath of the arrival of the *Empire Windrush*, clinging to the fantasy that upholding the 'tradition' that members of the colonies should be "freely admissible to the United Kingdom" could act as a means of holding the crumbling Empire together.[\[14\]](#) Part of the Cabinet's strict adherence to this established, but previously superfluous, protocol, may also have been influenced by the interpretation of existing immigration law presented to them. The responsibility for interpreting existing law for the Crown and the Cabinet lies with the Solicitor General — a role that had been occupied since 1945 by yet another Jew, Frank Soskice. As I noted in a [previous essay](#), Soskice would later introduce Britain's first legislation containing a provision prohibiting 'group libel.' Soskice, was the son of a Russian-Jewish revolutionary exile. It was Soskice who "drew up the legislation" and "piloted the first Race Relations Act, 1965, through Parliament." The Act "aimed to outlaw racial discrimination in public places."

Crucially, the 1965 Act created the 'Race Relations Board' and equipped it with the power to sponsor research for the purposes of monitoring race relations in Britain and, if necessary, extending legislation on the basis of the 'findings' of such research. Clearly Soskice would have been at pains to admonish, with legal jargon, any 'racist' reactions among Ministers to the arrival of *Empire Windrush* and subsequent streams of Black immigrants sailing on Jewish vessels. It was Soskice who informed Arthur Creech Jones, the anti-immigration Minister for Labor, that neither the Jamaican nor the British government had any legal power in peacetime to prevent the landing at Tilbury of the

Empire Windrush. And so the former *Monte Rosa*, once a triumphant symbol of ‘Strength through Joy,’ disgorged its passengers on the Thames as part of a new initiative: ‘Destruction through Diversity.’ It was soon followed by numerous other troopships, like the *SS Orbita*, laden with dusky immigrants and stinking of “vomit and urine.”[\[15\]](#)

It was only during the next Churchill government that some reflection took place on the longer-term implications of what had begun, with Churchill recorded by Sir Norman Brook as remarking:

Problems will arise if many colored people settle here. Are we to saddle ourselves with colour problems in the UK? Attracted by Welfare State. Public Opinion in UK won't tolerate it once it gets beyond certain limits.[\[16\]](#)

But by then it was too late. Over the course of the following decade, Black immigration to Britain increased dramatically. Between 1948 and 1952 between around 2,000 Blacks entered Britain each year. By 1957 the figure had climbed to 42,000. Government investigations into this new population revealed that the idea that Blacks were helping fill a labor shortage was grossly ill-founded. In one report, completed in December 1953, civil servants stated that the new population found it difficult to secure employment not because of prejudice among Whites, but because the newcomers had “low output” and their working life was marked by “irresponsibility, quarrelsomeness, and lack of discipline.” Black women were “slow mentally,” and Black men were “more volatile in temperament than white workers ... more easily provoked to violence ... lacking in stamina,” and generally “not up to the standards required by British employers.”[\[17\]](#)

Worse, future social and criminal patterns were already being established. In 1954 Home Secretary David Maxwell Fyfe issued a secret memorandum to the cabinet on blacks pimping White women, stating that: “Figures I have obtained from the Metropolitan police do show that the number of colored men convicted for this offense is out of all proportion to the number of colored men in London.”[\[18\]](#) Three months later he again wrote to the cabinet stressing that “large numbers of colored people are living on national assistance or the immoral earnings of white women.”[\[19\]](#) While the famed [Notting Hill Race Riots](#) of 1958 are often pointed to as an example of Black victimhood and the need for a Black reaction against White ‘oppression,’ the riots were instead the culmination of White reactions against Black crime and miscegenation. Earlier in 1958 the Eugenics Society, now the [Galton Institute](#), issued warnings that the mingling of races that had started in Britain “ran counter to the great

developing pattern of human evolution” and attacked the United Nations for minimizing the “quite obvious dissimilarities between people and individuals.”^[20] The Notting Hill riots, occurring a decade after the arrival of *Empire Windrush*, were seeded one August evening when White youths intervened in an argument between a Swedish prostitute and her Black ‘husband’ Raymond Morrison. A brawl broke out between the youths and Morrison’s friends. The following day some of the White youths verbally assaulted the Swede for being a “Black man’s trollop.” The White youths then assembled between three and four hundred fellows to begin a violent demonstration against Black criminality, resulting in six days and nights of almost uninterrupted inter-ethnic warfare.

This period represented one of the clearest opportunities for Britain to turn back the tide. But, as I have previously documented, it was also the period in which the efforts of a large number of [unelected Jewish lawyers](#) began the British ‘race relations’ sham, choking out free speech, and with it any opportunity for effective White resistance.

After catching fire during a voyage, *Empire Windrush* sank to a watery grave off the coast of Algeria in 1954. Its legacy was to last much longer. Liberals and the Cultural Marxist elite named a public space in Brixton, London, “Windrush Square” to commemorate the 50th anniversary of its landing. It also featured during the opening ceremony of the 2012 Olympic Games, and the salvaged wheel of the vessel sits relic-like for veneration at the offices of the Open University in Milton Keynes.

I see a more tangible legacy however. Last year Jamaican [Lloyd Byfield](#) smashed his way into the apartment of Londoner Leighann Duffy after she spurned his advances. Armed with a claw hammer and knife he stabbed her 14 times in front of her six year old daughter. What made the brutal crime even more disgusting was the fact that Byfield was an illegal immigrant who had previously been jailed for 30 weeks after attacking a White woman with a chisel. A deportation order was made during that sentencing, but was never carried out because Britain remains as catatonic on matters of race and immigration as it was in May 1948. The motherless, raped, and murdered White children of Britain are the truest legacy and reflection of that fateful voyage. But, it is hoped, the mechanics behind that voyage are now a little better known.

Notes:

[1] D. Gutwein, *The Divided Elite: Politics and Anglo-Jewry, 1882-1917* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992), p.5.

[2] T. Endelmann, “Communal Solidarity and Family Loyalty Among the Jewish Elite of Victorian London,” *Victorian Studies*, 28 (3), pp.491-526, p.491 & 495.

[3] *Ibid*, p.496.

[4] Ibid, p.519.

[5] Ibid.

[6] W. Rubinstein, "The Jewish Economic Elite in Britain, 1808-1909," *Jewish Historical Society of England*. Available at: <http://www.jhse.org/book/export/article/21930>.

[7] D. Feldman, "Jews and the British Empire c1900" *History Workshop Journal*, 63 (1), pp.70-89. Available at: <http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/655/2/655.pdf>.

[8] Ibid.

[9] S. Pollard, *Ten Days That Changed the Nation: The Making of Modern Britain* (Simon & Schuster, 1999), p.4

[10] D. Lawrence, *Black Migrants, White Natives: A Study of Race Relations in Nottingham* (Cambridge University Press, 1974), p.19

[11] A. Waters, *Race, Class and Symbols: Rastafari and Reggae in Jamaican Politics* (Transaction, 1999), p.41.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Pollard, p.5.

[14] Pollard, p.8.

[15] I. Thomson, *The Dead Yard: Tales of Modern Jamaica* (Faber & Faber, 2009), p.53.

[16] Pollard, p.13.

[17] K. Paul, *Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era* (Cornell University Press, 1997), p.134.

[18] J. Procter, *Writing Black Britain, 1948-1998: An Interdisciplinary Anthology* (Manchester University Press, 2000), p.71.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

Feminism and the Assault on European Civilization

Morgoth's Review, 2015

Original title: *Taylor Swift and How Feminism is a PsyOp Against White People*

Taylor Swift is being lambasted for her new music video, *Wildest Dreams*, commentators and journalists accusing her of racism.

Taylor Swift is dressed as a colonial-era woman on African soil. With just a few exceptions, the cast in the video — the actors playing her boyfriend and a movie director and his staff — all appear to be white.

We are shocked to think that in 2015, Taylor Swift, her record label and her video production group would think it was OK to film a video that presents a glamorous version of the white colonial fantasy of Africa. But it still stings.

It goes on:

Here are some facts for Swift and her team: Colonialism was neither romantic nor beautiful. It was exploitative and brutal. The legacy of colonialism still lives quite loudly to this day. Scholars have argued that poor economic performance, weak property rights and tribal tensions across the continent can be traced to colonial strategies. So can other woes. In a place full of devastation and lawlessness, diseases spread like wildfire, conflict breaks out and dictators grab power.

Excuses, excuses. Meanwhile in Singapore and Hong Kong, which were also colonised, things look rather more like this and the same scholars presumably have rather less to say.

Taylor Swift has been the target of scorn for several years with feminists taking offence, apparently, at her positioning as a "good girl" who writes simple,

heterosexual love songs that have mentioned virginity in a positive way.

It's been printed on T-shirts and postcards and throw pillows: "Well-behaved women seldom make history." Taylor Swift's Grammy threatens to refute this. I don't care about her personal choices, but her image of being good and pure plays right into how much the patriarchy fetishizes virginity, loves purity, and celebrates women who know their place as delicate flowers.[\[1\]](#)

Today though Swift cuts a different image having officially "quit" country music last year and now with Jew/new best friends, arch-feminists Lena Dunham and Lorde, in tow she is saying things like "Misogyny is ingrained in people from the time they are born" and "So to me, feminism is probably the most important movement that you could embrace, because it's just basically another word for equality."

So all must surely be well for Swift now that she joined the feminist club, right? Right? Well, no. The attacks have only been getting worse and more vicious because the world of feminism has moved on from its goal of demonising White men and encouraging women to sleep around and never settle down to have children - fourth-wave feminism has arrived and it's here to broadcast the message that Whites are evil and that White women should "Shut the fuck up" because they are "oppressors". Unfortunately as time and history has shown, women are much more easily manipulated than men and this brainwashing has taken on a particularly brutal nature.

"People of colour" otherwise known as the Coalition of Aggressive Non-Whites Against White People, coming out with more and more of this stuff as they grow in number and confidence is unsurprising but what is so damaging is that third-wave feminism, already a subversive force that's bad for White women - turning them against White men via poisonous ideas like "rape culture", and putting them off having families - is quickly being superseded by fourth-wave, the goal of which seems to be entirely to teach White women that they are evil, their entire history and culture is evil and that they must now to be a "proper feminist" spend their entire lives apologising and grovelling to "people of colour" and campaigning against themselves and White men.

Women as "Defenders of the Status Quo"

It's easy to say "Ha, well feminists have been hating on men for ages, it's great to see them get a taste of their own medicine," but the whole point of feminism from the beginning seems to be separation of White women from White men. It's not just

women who are hating their fellow Whites - look at MGTOW, most of the "Manosphere". These sites acknowledge biological differences and that women are more easily led but also incite hatred towards White women, despite the fact they have been so Jewed up they have no idea what they are doing. Right up until the 1990s women were the essential part of the Conservative Party's electorate - they voted Conservative in far larger numbers than men and were far more socially conservative. They were protectors of the family unit under the fickle and easily controlled system of "democracy" until the Frankfurt School and their followers decided that family life was "hate".

Third-Wave Feminism and the Demonisation of White Men

After CIA-funded and Bilderberg-backed second-wave feminism transformed women into good little worker bees for the elite, third-wave feminism was extremely useful to White genocide in a number of key ways. This wave of feminism is the one that has muddied the concept of consent to the degree that it puts any White male having sex with women in danger. While White men are obviously the main victims of this state of affairs, impressionable White women are also negatively affected as many obviously have come to genuinely believe, via vile brainwashing, that consensual sex can have been a terrible "rape". This is why university students are now having "consent classes" where they are told that engaging in sexual activities after one glass of wine can be "rape".

Why is all this happening? Is it because, as many men-oriented websites say, women are just evil and vindictive? Or is it because Whites need to be picked off as Whites, not as men? It also implanted the key idea that the only reason there are more men in certain jobs than women is down to "sexism" and "male privilege". This meme that humans are just programmable bipeds and any difference is down to "culture" will prove useful later.

A Case Study

Firstly I am going to show what "rape" typically is in the media, and that its third-wave form is often largely in feminists' minds, having been transplanted there by... oh, whichever kind souls just have our women's welfare in their minds, obviously. Then I am going to show the ramifications of what happens to a White man after he acquiesces to the request of a woman to "lick her out" - after that I will look at the British feminist response to a genuine attempted rape.

First, the "rape". The woman in question was "couchsurfing" in his house, and the man was depressed after losing his job, his girlfriend etc. But then... [rape](#):

His attempt at seducing me in his bedroom worked. I did feel that I wanted to have sex with him. He told me we should go to my room because his room was opposite his parents. He suggested a cup of tea. I agreed.

He brought tea to my bedroom. I sat on the bed and he sat on the chair. I let him close the door. I let him undress me. I didn't want to kiss him, but eventually I let him. I liked the feeling of being touched at the beginning. He examined every inch of my body, studying me like some kind of specimen. He touched me but I didn't touch him back. He told me to, to show him some kind of love. Anything. I felt sorry for him. I told him I couldn't love him and he said that he didn't want my love anymore, or to have a relationship with me. He just wanted me. Maybe just my body. He told me to close me eyes, and he continued to touch me. I said it didn't feel right anymore, and I tried to push him away. Not too forcefully though because I was afraid. I was completely dependant (sic) on him. I was in his family's home. I didn't know how to get to the nearest town. His family spoke only Spanish. He touched me. Then he turned me around onto me knees and stomach. I told him to stop, repeatedly. He didn't.

It sounded like he was crying. I lay very still afterwards. I asked him why he didn't stop and he said that it was too late. I said that was bullshit. He laughed. He said that was the first time he heard me swear. He tried to touch me again and I pulled away from him. I got up and had a shower. When I came back into the room he was dressed and remaking the bed meticulously. I had never seen a bed being made so perfectly, despite the stain on the sheets. I watched him as I put fresh clothes on. He had folded the clothes he removed from me and placed them in a neat pile on the table. He was a perfectionist. After he made the bed he went to have a shower. I turned the light off and got into bed. I didn't know what had just happened. I felt physically disgusted, like I was a piece of meat.

This was an article from a feminist magazine in the UK and exemplifies what is considered an "acceptable" rape story in today's narrative. This sort of story fills up magazines, blogs and newspapers as an example of a typical rape, convincing millions of girls and women who have had sex and then changed their mind/not been sure about it that they have been raped. This builds distrust between White men and White women as obviously Pakistani communities etc pay no attention to this sort of thing.

A high profile instance was the constant media coverage of Emma "Mattress Girl" Sulkowicz' "rape", by a German man. Half Chinese, half Jewish Emma has been featured in glossy magazines, the New York Times and been celebrated for her "brave" performance art piece of carrying a mattress round campus to express her disgust at her university having failed to expel the German. The wheels came off the outrage bus as it was exposed as a likely hoax given that Sulkowicz had repeatedly contacted her "attacker" in friendly and flirty terms for months and months after the alleged attack yet because the story fit the narrative of Evil White Rapist, the media is still running with it even after the wheels have fallen off the bus, as VDare [reports](#).

A footballer, Ched Evans, was pretty much scared and threatened off ever playing football again. What he had done was extremely degenerate, but then the prevailing culture is extremely degenerate. A White woman had been "picked up", in a kebab shop, by other footballers and proceeded to have sex with them. There were also black footballers involved (who got off, despite the fact she accused them of rape, too). Anyway, she requested that this Ched Evans character perform oral sex on her and he did, she asked him to have sex with her and he did.

Now obviously all of this is a less than ideal situation and before White culture was subverted by, again, people who have our best interest at heart :^) especially the interests of women, it would have been unthinkable but anyway, in the world where it happened, people campaigned long and hard to ensure Ched Evans never played football again. Celebrities lined up to lambaste the team he'd previously played for, teams which tried to sign him after he'd served his prison sentence were bombarded with calls and emails and protests until no one would dare touch him.

At the same time we have Ione Wells, who was nearly raped outside her home by a dindu. Ione bravely spoke out about her ordeal. I say "bravely" not because speaking out against rape is a brave thing in this day and age, as "rape" when it comes to campaigning nowadays seems to refer to white, working class men so much as wolf-whistling at a girl, but because hers was definitively the wrong sort of rapist.

Her attacker was a 17-year-old Somalian and the attack [went like this](#):

When you were caught on CCTV following me through my own neighbourhood from the Tube, when you waited until I was on my own street to approach me, when you clapped your hand around my face until I could not breathe, when you pushed me to my knees until my face bled, when I wrestled with your hand just enough so that I could scream. When you dragged me by my hair, and when you smashed my head against the pavement and told me to stop screaming for help, when my neighbour saw you from her window and shouted at you and you looked her in the eye and carried on kicking me in the back and neck. When you tore my bra in half from the sheer force you grabbed my breast, when you didn't reach once for my belongings because you wanted my body, when you failed to have my body because all my neighbours and family came out, and you saw them face-to-face. When CCTV caught you running from your attempted assault on me... and then following another woman twenty minutes later from the same tube station before you were arrested on suspicion. When I was in the police station until 5am while you were four floors below me in custody, when I had to hand over my clothes and photographs of the marks and cuts on my naked body to forensic teams - did you ever think of the people in your life?

This is from an open letter to her attempted rapist which "went viral", as they say. What is most tragic about the letter is its naivety and that it exposes in full the fact that here in the West people genuinely believe everyone is born equal and that everyone is the same. As is put pretty well [here](#), Black people do not have the same feelings as White people and whatever our moral educators and betters (:^)) in the West have led White people to believe, ethnocentrism is completely normal outside of the West while Whites are the only people who came to develop much of a conscience for those not in any traditional "in-group".

She continues:

I don't know who the people in your life are. I don't know anything about you. But I do know this: you did not just attack me that night. I am a daughter, I am a friend, I am a girlfriend, I am a pupil, I am a cousin, I am a niece, I am a neighbour, I am the employee who served everyone down the road coffee in the café under the railway. All the people

who form those relations to me make up my community, and you assaulted every single one of them. You violated the truth that I will never cease to fight for, and which all of those people represent – that there are infinitely more good people in the world than bad.

Because of the lies of Boas, Gould et al about human biodiversity, and due to naive White universalism Wells spouts tragic paragraphs like the above, thinking Black people are the same as her and that they see everyone as an equal.

Jane Kelly wrote about Wells' attack [in the Spectator](#), pointing out that in the 1980s she had had a Black try to strangle her before attempting rape and that she had been "saved by locals" (read: White people). She said she'd made the mistake, when writing an article about her attack, of mentioning the assailant's race and said that the left, at the time, had blamed her for her assault and accused her of "racist body language". Thus she said she understood why Wells wrote a letter which avoided any allusion to her attacker's background, and also pointed out that the BBC and none of the national papers had done this either. For all anyone knew, Ione's rapist was another Ched Evans - one of the evil Whites the press never tires of highlighting and warning about. Anyway her campaign which was "hashtagged" #NotGuilty didn't really gain anywhere near the attention of any of the campaigns against Evans. No one criticised the Somali youth, talked about "cultural" problems like they do with White men nor anything else.

One problem when trying to get through to White women who have been infected by feminism, and men (though they are fewer), is that they have been weaned on "privilege theory", by the likes of Jew Noel Ignatiev, which is that it that those supposedly with more power should defer for people supposedly with less power. It is also why when a Black person says "Whites are evil", someone calling him a racist doesn't work for the brainwashed. Because racism is prejudice + power and therefore can only be done by Whites. And merely mentioning Jews means you're a Nazi, so that's a non-starter.

A brainwashed White woman went to Haiti and was, predictably, raped by a Black man and [proceeded to blame his actions on](#) "White patriarchy".

"Rape" is obsessed about in feminism not for the sake of women but entirely to demonise White men. Monstrous, violent stranger rapes, which are far more characteristic of some types of non-White men, are airbrushed out of the narrative by the media, their actors and victims inconvenient. Meanwhile "rape culture" is shouted about from the rooftops of every university, magazine, blog and newspaper as a huge

threat to women, women who have had drunk sex and regretful sex encouraged to feel as much resentment as possible, feminists convincing them that they are victims of a terrible crime they must feel angry and upset about. If they cared about women at all then the spotlight would be on keeping safe from violent stranger rapists, but it's not about women it's about White people.

Fourth-Wave Feminism and the Outright Assault on White People

What we are seeing now is that feminism has moved from the Jew-controlled sphere of stopping White people from breeding with White people (although this is very much in place with the transgender lobby which pumps White children with sterilising hormones) and is now controlled by a coalition of hostile anti-Whites drunk on Jew-juice that Whites are evil and to blame for everything. That Jews have lost control is evident from that Jew feminists are being criticised as if they were the evil Whites (these goys never heard of the Holocaust??!?!), shown in the massive criticism of the likes of Lena Dunham, for not packing her TV show Girls with negroes, but the result is certainly no better, though.

"Privilege theory", or that the only reason there are more men in certain plum jobs than women is down to discrimination, has worked its wonders so that White feminists are easily tricked into thinking that the reason they earn more than men "who could be brothers of Trayvon" is because of evil White racism. much as with White men it was supposedly down to sexism.

Rowan Blanchard, some sort of tween actress aged 13 with "Middle Eastern and Northern European ancestry", ["spoke out"](#) on Instagram about "White feminism" and talked about how White women are oppressing Black women and trans "women". A website typical of this sort of feminism, which is the prevalent sort to be found now among under 20s and the ever-growing non-White component within this age group, is Everyday Feminism.

One [particularly heinous article](#) says that White women in relationships with non-White men are "oppressing" them. While this is great in that the fewer White women who are consorting with non-White men, the better, it all adds to the creeping narrative that Whites are worthless whilst non-Whites are blameless victims. What must warm the cockles of the hearts of girls gang-raped and threatened with death by married Pakistanis is paragraphs like

It's important to remember that as a white person being sexual with a person of color, you're in a position of power.

The fact that you're intimate with one another doesn't erase that. And it can be difficult for a marginalized person to feel comfortable expressing their needs without a safe space being intentionally created by the person of privilege. I've written (okay, tweeted) before about how this plays out even in sexual encounters where only a power imbalance exists on the axis of gender. The issue is this: The power dynamics bestowed upon us by our fucked up, oppressive society don't disappear just because you're intimate with someone.

See, the real problem with the girls who were victims of Pakistani rape gangs in Telford, Rochdale, Rotherham, Oxford and everywhere else where Pakis are allowed to congregate near White women, is that our society is not a safe space in which they can express their needs. In fact, if these diverse and enriching gentlemen were to tell the truth about their much-deserved sexual needs, there are people in the disgusting and unbearable Whiteness of our society who might question, with hate speech reminiscent of Hitler himself probably, these men's right to freely access White girls' vaginas against their will.

The website is also packed with the sort of Social Justice Warrior who makes me particularly angry - East Asian women. There is a ridiculous piece by one of these women [about](#) "6 Reasons We Need to Dismantle the Model Minority Myth of 'Those Hard-Working Asians.'" The piece, of course, does nothing to dismantle anything but instead says that this stereotype is a "tool of White supremacy" and that Asians and Blacks need to work together to defeat Whites. I can't work out whether these Asian women are stupid or just evil to write these pieces in terms of whether or not they realise that if "White supremacy" is earning more than another group and being arrested yet then "Asian supremacy" is clearly more than a thing. But they think that because some weeaboos fancy them that this is "oppression."

To bring this back to Taylor Swift, this website also has [an article](#) entitled "5 Ways Taylor Swift Exemplifies White Feminism – And Why That's a Problem." The problem, of course, is that Taylor Swift is White and this fact makes her "problematic". White women need to be led away from feminism, and fast, because feminism is an anti-White movement that is destroying us from inside and out and they are not even trying to hide it anymore. And they should be reminded that, when Whites are gone, so is the altruism so many White women are driven by and love so much.

Why Democracy Sucks

Clark (<https://status451.com>), 2016

Original title: *What is Neoreaction?*

Neoreaction defines itself more in terms of what it is opposed to than in terms of what it is in favor of.

Fine. So what is neoreaction against?

Democracy.

Neoreaction is the political philosophy that says that democracy is not merely the well-meaning god that happened to fail, but that our current wreckage was predetermined, because democracy fatally intertwined with progressivism since its birth, that it is a *tool* of progressivism, and that therefore, for a society to accept democracy is for a society to accept its inevitable doom at the hands of progressivism.

What is democracy?

To modern American ears, the phrase “democracy sucks” is an insane statement. To be against democracy is to be against motherhood, apple pie, puppies, and breathing oxygen.

The fact that our reaction (heh) to hearing democracy spoken ill of is visceral, deep, and immediate, is, I suggest, cause to examine that reaction. We humans only react viscerally to things that are coded into our DNA (dangerous heights, smells of rotting — and therefore disease-causing — meat, and so forth) and to triggers that are beaten into us by culture (the idea of stepping into traffic, the bad dream of showing up at the office without pants, etc.).

We in the West have been told that Democracy is wonderful. But what is this democracy that we love?

It’s a little tricky to answer, because “democracy” is a [motte-and-bailey](#) term. The motte (the core defensible meaning of the term) is that democracy is a system of selecting leaders by casting ballots.

The bailey (the much larger extension of the term that is switched in invisibly by its

proponents to win arguments) is that democracy is a late 20th century “mixed economy” phenomenon where, yes, leaders are selected by ballots, but also where the State has no well-defined limits to its authority, where there are vast bureaucracies that decide everything from how much water a toilet can use per flush to what factories should get built, and where one-third of the economy is under state control.

A typical conservative thinks that the problem with democracy is merely its excrescences, and wants to push democracy from the overly expansive bailey back to the “reasonable” motte.

A typical neoreactionary disagrees, and thinks that the problem with democracy is not in its excesses, but in its core nature. A neoreactionary does not want to reform democracy, but instead wants to rip it out wholesale.

Wait, what? Who could possibly be against democracy — especially the core of it, the voting part? And why?

Well, we’ve defined democracy, but now let us attempt to understand it — which is to say, let us attempt to understand the hold it has over the modern mind.

Those on the right, with their smaller conception of democracy, have a fairly pragmatic regard for the system — they think that it’s a better technology for selecting legislators than other contenders: “Democracy is the worst form of government except all the others,” in the famous and pithy words of Winston Churchill.

Those on the left not only have a different understanding of democracy, they have a different relationship with the idea. Leftists see it as simultaneously an expressive act, a ritual of community membership, and, like conservatives, as a tool to generate good outcomes.

They are wrong on all counts.

The “expressive act” argument is easy enough to dispatch. Well, not dispatch. The idea is correct, at some level. Voting *is* an expressive act; but then again, so is punching a stranger in the face. Anyone with a conception of human rights and individual autonomy would suggest that if you want to express yourself, it would be better to take up dance, or keep a journal, or throw clay pots on the wheel — any hobby that does not require that other citizens put their life, liberty, or property at risk merely because you want to bring the legislature into session to express your special snowflake nature.

Likewise, the idea that democracy is valid as a ritual of community membership: it’s true, obviously. We know this because progressives never shut up about it. But if you want to be part of a community, join a church — or failing that, a group of Unitarians

— or form a chess club, or find new friends at meetup.com. Fellowship with one’s fellow human beings existed long before Athens and will exist long after Washington, and every instantiation of it in a non-governmental context is less destructive to the liberty of bystanders.

The remaining argument, the one that both liberals and conservatives endorse, is that democracy may be a flawed tool, but it is still the best available one for letting people coexist and pick public policy that affects everyone.

Why?

Let us formalize the very best argument in favor of democracy’s effectiveness ([“steel manning”](#) it), so that when we defeat it in the field of battle, none can say that it was not a fair fight.

Democracy is, properly understood — and properly cheerleaded for — a tool of social coordination that harnesses local knowledge and feedback loops to generate policy decisions. By harnessing local knowledge, it avoids the problems of top-down autocracies that issue orders saying “the people of province X must plant 1,000 acres and generate 100,000 bushels of corn,” ignorant of the fact that province X is experiencing a drought. By harnessing feedback loops (elections), it ensures that a defective leader is removed from power.

Why democracy works

Democracy works ... at least better than some other solutions.

What does it get right?

Leftists, from the somewhat-reputable communist punk hanging out in front of local 7-11 and begging, all the way down to FDR, often spin schemes to control the prices of goods. There are multiple flaws in their schemes, but perhaps the least well understood one is that they are attempting to destroy information. Imagine a home heated by a furnace where the electrical line from the thermostat to the furnace is cut. How can the furnace possibly know what to do? It will heat the house either too much or too little. And so in the Soviet Union, where there were no prices to gather distributed information and direct it to those people who needed it, there was always too much or too little. Too many potatoes, or, if you prefer, too little labor to bring in the potato harvest.

Once you know to look for it, the phenomenon of muddied control appears in all sorts of places, and under various names. It’s the principal-agent problem when the taxpayer hires police, who then refuse to provide useful statistics to their theoretical

masters, or when investors hire a CEO, who then spins the news to his advantage.

And thus we can see the salient benefit of democracy: it provides some feedback, no matter how meager and how infrequently, that tells the leaders what the populace thinks of their policies.

Some feedback is better than no feedback, and democracy is the only system yet invented that gives regular feedback to the government, thus correcting some of its errors.

Why democracy doesn't work

In what ways does democracy fail?

First, as noted above, many people **vote as an expressive act**. The typical Obama voter knew nothing of his policies, but wanted to be “part” of “something”. There are all sorts of cultural and emotional connotations associated with Team Pepsi, and people want to affiliate themselves with those signals. Team Coke is no better: many Republican voters are in favor of a culture of God, Flag, and Apple Pie, and cast a vote for the GOP as an expressive act, without knowing or caring the actual positions of the candidates they vote for.

Second, we are **rationally ignorant**: even if every voter chose to vote based on policy, not emotions, our individual contribution to the outcome of an election is insanely close to zero, and — at some level — we all know this. Thus, almost none of us bothers to educate ourselves about the candidates and their positions. This is, individually, a smart choice.

Third, democracy has the **principal-agent problem**: we voters send politicians to Washington DC for — well, for whatever purposes we have. We hope that, once there, they will do our bidding...and we expect to motivate them to do that bidding by using the threat of our future votes and future campaign donations. But a lot is hidden in that “voters hope to motivate them”. Because voters don't have time or inclination to monitor politicians, and because they tend to vote for expressive purposes rather than policy purposes (think of all the anti-war Democrats who support Obama and his various undeclared overseas wars), politicians need only do just enough to appear to serve the voters, while actually pursuing their own policies.

Fourth, we humans are **hyperbolic discounters**. Given the promise of one marshmallow now over two in five minutes, we choose the one now. Is it any surprise that we, en masse, repeatedly vote for the politicians who promise us bread and circuses today, and a bill that won't come due for ... a while?

Fifth, democracy has the **public choice** problem. There are many issues which affect each of us very little — ten cents per person in extra taxes for program X, or three dollars per person more in the price of a commodity because of trade barrier Y, or a slight bit of extra hassle in doing thing Z. These hassles, collectively, destroy a lot of value in our lives, but individually, harm us very little. However, these small barnacles did not randomly accrete on the body politic — each is placed there by the dedicated lobbying of some group that benefits *quite a lot* from the tax, regulation, or trade barrier. Ethanol in our gasoline harms all of us a little, but helps a small influential group quite a lot. The outrageous salaries of some tenured public school teachers harms all of us a little, but helps a small influential group quite a lot. As long as one small group benefits from a regulation, they will be motivated to secure an outsized influence on politicians. And they will succeed.

Sixth, democracy results in **negative externalities** and the **tragedy of the commons**. In a world with robust property rights, if I see that I can make a profit by mining gold and dumping the tailings on your property, my plan can only go forward if you and I come to an agreement on how much I'll pay you for that right. The better tier of environmentalists are fond of noting that the market is a wonderful tool, but there are some unowned things (they'll cite the carbon content of the atmosphere, or ocean fisheries) that are not owned, and therefore which do not factor into economic calculations. The result of something having a cost, but not actually showing up on the ledgers, is that it is over-consumed, or over-polluted. This is a coherent argument, but it applies to more than just the atmosphere and the oceans — it also applies to untitled, undocumented, unowned things like cultural capital, an educated populace, and low-crime neighborhoods. When politicians can create “profit” for themselves and for their campaign donors by taking from some other group, they face some minor resistance. When politicians can create “profit” for themselves and for their campaign donors by taking from an off-books account like “cultural capital”, they have no effective resistance at all.

Seventh, “democracies” (in the broad sense of the modern western state) are **run less by the politicians than by the permanent mandarin class**. Despite the US Constitution enumerating the powers of the legislature, declaring that anything that wasn't enumerated was forbidden, and failing to enumerate “may delegate powers to a bureaucracy,” the US legislature continually delegates its powers to unelected, unionized, unfireable civil servants. This is a bargain that delivers benefits for every important class of a modern democracy (i.e. the political class and the government employee class): politicians generate permanent voting blocs that know what side their bread is buttered on, and can use the bureaucracies to deliver policies to important constituencies (e.g. the Sierra Club, corn farmers, etc.) while also [having](#)

[plausible deniability when it comes to the ire of the voters](#) (“there’s nothing I can do; the EPA did it!”).

Eighth, the **government controls the schools** (Head Start, kindergarten, elementary, high school, and — via funding with strings attached — colleges, graduate schools, and medical schools, including private ones), and so it controls what is taught. Which is to say, it controls both what students think and what the the [Overton Window](#) describing the limits of acceptable thought is.

Ninth, the **government is just one party in an informal, emergent web of like-minded institutions (known in Nrx circles as ‘The Cathedral’)**. Citizens are educated by unionized ideologically monolithic teachers, watch movies produced by ideologically monolithic Hollywood, watch TV news and comedy-news produced by the same, use search engines that prune, derank, and purge unacceptable content, purchase books and games from e-tailers that do the same, are forced to obey regulations that are written by lifetime government bureaucrats and enforced by lifetime government [praetorians](#), and have their disagreements with the government ruled on by yet more government employees. At no point during the day — from searching the web to buying a shirt to reading the news — does a citizen have an experience that is unmediated by the web of campaign donors, NGOs, bureaucrats, teachers, and culturally approved entertainers. Thus, even if democracy (in the sense of voting) worked, the choices, knowledge, and opinions that give rise to political choices are all so constrained by the operation of the government, that no real dissent or fresh thinking is possible. We will always vote for either Coke or Pepsi; the very idea of Sprite is dangerous to consider (and the suggestion “tomato juice,” being so far outside the consensus, elicits nothing but blank stares or nervous laughter as the silent alarm under the desk is pushed).

Why democracy is unreformable

Democracy pulls a very clever trick that previous authoritarian regimes were not smart enough to invent: it subverts dissent by channeling it into the democratic process. Every time a libertarian votes for Ron Paul or a conservative for Pat Buchanan, not only does God kill a kitten, but some actual anger and disgust that could have worked against the system is instead channeled into upholding the system.

Further, even if in some electoral spasm we did elect a government that a libertarian or conservative could abide, and/or one that Thomas Jefferson would recognize as being remotely American in character, we already know how it would end.

Computer Science and operations research use the concept of a “state machine”: a

mathematical abstraction that shows how one state of a system can flow into another. The transitions are crisply delineated. Red lights turn green, green lights turn yellow, and yellow lights turn red ... but yellow lights never, ever turn green.

We have two hundred years of data on how democracies (American and otherwise) transition over time. They start out with limited powers and limited budgets. They soon extend the franchise, then extend it again. Then they grow their budgets, grow their power, and grow more socialist...but they never go into reverse. Sometimes they are replaced by dictatorships (e.g. Weimar Germany, Chile), and those dictatorships are in turn replaced by lean democracies, but democracies themselves never shrink themselves.

Green lights turn yellow. Yellow lights turn red. Red lights turn green.

And yellow lights never, ever turn green.

What can replace democracy

Perhaps democracy is the best system that can be designed for our purposes, and we have to live with its flaws.

But perhaps not.

Because the origin of neoreaction (blog essays by Silicon Valley entrepreneur Curtis Yarvin and former University of Warwick philosopher Nick Land) focuses more on the problem of democracy than solutions, there are several schools of neoreactionary thought, ranging from the juvenile to the disreputable to the interesting.

Let's imagine the characteristics of an ideal system that does not suffer democracy's flaws:

- achieves good ends (better than democracy) with regard to respect for human rights, rational foreign policy, rational domestic policy, limited budgets, and/or limited power
- does not depend on the rationality of the citizens
- does not depend on the self-education of the citizens on esoteric political topics
- does not, in short, depend on the citizens at all
- does not suffer from the "state machine problem": will not quickly degenerate into something worse (e.g. democracy)

Anarcho-capitalists such as myself suggest that a David Friedman-esque polycentric

legal order, where there is no true government and all services — including legal services — are provided by free market competitors, achieves most of these goals.

The core problem with anarcho-capitalism is the state machine: there's no reason to believe that even if the US Government disappeared today and were replaced by competing service providers tomorrow, that it would stay gone.

The forces that subverted the absolutely minimal US government organized under the Articles of Confederation and replaced it with a larger government under the Constitution in 1789 (wealthy bondholders looking to get paid) would still exist.

The forces that subverted the pre-Civil War US government and turned it into a centralized ruler of states, not merely a collection of them (evangelical Massachusetts progressives) would still exist.

The forces that subverted the early 20th century US government and turned it into a regulatory state (again, evangelical New England progressives) would still exist.

No, as much as it pains me to say it, my dream of an anarcho-capitalist order in America is unrealistic.

Nature abhors a vacuum, and a United States without a government is a power vacuum.

Something will fill it; the trick is to engineer a system that occupies the space, fills the ecological niche, refuses the high ground to the enemy ... and yet does minimal harm, and does not grow.

The proposals are many, and center around, variously, Singaporean or Chilean style light-touch autocracy, a dissolution of the US into a "patchwork" of small countries covering the map (each just strong enough to defend itself from its neighbors), corporate ownership of the state apparatus (which incentivizes the owners to reduce waste and maximize utility), and others.

In line with Bastiat's "seen and the unseen," or Robin Hanson's "near mode and far mode," it's much easier for us to see both the benefits and the flaws in democracy than it is to see the flaws in systems that don't yet exist.

Neoreaction may be an intellectual circle-jerk, or it may be the early rumblings of something new and exciting.

... or perhaps it's both.

Regardless, in an era where neither right nor left have anything useful or serious to contribute to the debate and merely argue about what epicycles and what flavor of


soda syrup should be mixed with water, I find it a refreshing political ferment.

If it's sometimes too raucous and way too distasteful, forgive it; it's young.

Ideological and Geopolitical Origins of the EU – Part I

Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa

Clare Ellis, 2015



Das Pan-Europäische Manifest by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi

In order to understand the current crisis in Europe created by the cultural Marxist practices and policies of immigration and multiculturalism there is a need to understand the ideological roots of parallel yet intersecting movements. One such movement has been a geopolitical effort, undertaken by various leading statesmen, aimed at creating a pan-European economic order that essentially suppresses ethnic European bonds in favour of cosmopolitan ideals.

Pan-Europa and Eurafrica

Pan-Europa began as an early twentieth century socialist European integration model that was developed by Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi and based on the ideologies

of Cosmopolitanism, Perpetual Peace, and World Federation. Kalergi sought to unite Europe in perpetual peace by replacing ethno-national European identities with a common European cultural identity. This non-ethnic based European Union was envisioned as the first step toward the eventual unification of humanity under a World Federation in perpetual peace.

Kalergi claimed that for the full materialisation of a united and prosperous Europe the joint colonization and exploitation of the resources and land of the African colonies would be required, which would lead to the creation of Eurafrika, a large geopolitical bloc that had the Mediterranean Sea as its central axis and would encompass (and Europeanise) nations in the African and Muslim world south of the Mediterranean. Kalergi's Pan-European project was funded and supported by wealthy bankers, politicians, and cultural forces on both sides of the Atlantic, yet it also met with opposition from authoritarian nationalism in the 1930s and 40s.

The Ideological and Historical Context before World War I

In the 18th and 19th centuries, after constant conflict between European nations, notions of European confederation became increasingly popular among the cultural and political elites on both sides of the Atlantic. The first president of the United States, George Washington (1732-1799), supported the idea of a United States of Europe in a letter to Marquis de LaFayette: "One day, taking its pattern from the United States, there will be founded the United States of Europe". In 1849, at the third International Peace Conference in Paris, a notable French Romantic — the poet, novelist, and dramatist Victor Hugo (1802-1885) — echoed these sentiments, saying that

A day will come when all nations on our continent will form a European brotherhood....A day will come when we shall see...the United States of America and the United States of Europe face to face, reaching out for each other across the seas [i].

In mid-18th century a European integration plan based on disarmament and peace titled *A Project for Perpetual Peace* had been outlined by French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), who wrote that "[i]t is not possible, therefore, that the confederacy being once established, that any seeds of hostility can remain amongst the confederates"[ii]. His work was based on Abbe de Saint Pierre's Project for a Perpetual Peace (1713), who greatly desired European federation in the context of

international peace.

Less than thirty years after the publication of Rousseau's essay, Kant published his essay *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (1784), a pretext to his famous essay *Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795). He explained that the conflict of interests, or Hobbesian state of nature, between individuals and nations was what drove human progress and would, through cooperation, mutual recognition, and self-discipline, lead to a future cosmopolitan ideal, a federation of states in [perpetual peace](#). The basis for this peace included the following principles:

- The civil constitution of every state should be republican.
- The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states.
- The law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality [iii].

He also proposed in his Preliminary Articles that disarmament, international arbitration, and the renunciation of colonies would produce perpetual peace.

In the 19th and early 20th centuries peace movements and cosmopolitanism became prevalent in Britain and America. Anti-war organizations sprang up in 1815-1816 and evolved into the London and American Peace Societies, which aimed at gradual disarmament. Cosmopolitanism in early 20th century America went further, focusing on racial equality, liberal immigration, and a universal national identity. Organizations based on anti-discrimination, pro-immigration, and anti-nationalism were established, such as the American Liberal Progressive Movement (1905) and the Immigrant Protective Association (1908).

Several organisations in early 20th century openly supported the notion of a United States of Europe, such as the British Quaker pacifists (1910), the National Peace League (1911), and the European Unity League (1913). Cosmopolitanism drove academic pressure groups to attack "the nationalist canon", such as the British Union of Democratic Control (UDC, 1914). During the interwar period, cosmopolitan books written by the UDC were "derisive of nationalist shibboleths" and could be found in both English and American universities [iv].

Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-European Movement

These anti-national, cosmopolitan, and liberal progressive notions of a peaceful and united Europe soon coalesced into a political project in the interwar era (post WWI) called the Pan-European movement, founded by Count Richard Nikolaus Eijiro von Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1922. Kalergi (1894-1972) was an Austro-Hungarian

geopolitician and philosopher. His mother, Mitsuko Aoyama, was a wealthy Japanese woman, and his father, Heinrich, was a Bohemian noble from a family of mixed European heritage (Flemish, Czech, Austrian, Hungarian, and Greek) and a long line of nobility (800 year old oligarchical family).

Kalergi wrote numerous books and articles about European integration over his lifetime. His first book was titled *Adel*, translated as *Nobility*; this work, along with *Pazifismus* (1924), was the basis for his *Praktischer Idealismus: Adel–Technik–Pazifismus* or *Practical Idealism: Nobility–Technique–Pacifism* (1925). His 1922 article *Pan-Europa — A Proposal* and his book *Pan-Europa* (1923) mark the beginning of the Pan European movement, and his monthly journal *Paneuropa* (1924-1938) and books, *The Fight for Paneuropa* (1925-1928, three volumes) and *Europa Erwacht (Europe Awakened, 1934)* among other works, further elaborated his exposition on European integration.

Kalergi established the Pan-European Union (PEU) in 1946 and is often considered the founding father of the European Union. He was the recipient of the first Charlemagne prize in 1950 and today the European Prize Coudenhove-Kalergi is [awarded](#) every two years to "leading personalities for their extraordinary commitment in the European unification process". In addition to the Coudenhove-Kalergi Prize, the [Europe Square](#) in Austria, a [gold Euro coin](#), an Austrian [peace monument](#) and [stamp](#), the [European anthem](#), and a [Viennese Park](#), testify to Kalergi's legacy as a major figurehead in the integration process of Europe. The Pan European Union continues to influence European unity to this [day](#).

The Pan European movement was a political project rooted in notions of peace and international alliance and arose in the interwar era as a response to World War I. At the end of WWI the allied victors set the terms of peace for the defeated powers at the Paris Peace Conference (1919). This conference led to the development of an intergovernmental organisation, the League of Nations (10th January 1920), which was informed by Atlantic world federalism and peace movements. The League aimed at, among other things, peace by disarmament and international arbitration.

However, during the early 1920s and 1930s Europe split into three divisive political ideologies: Liberal Democracy (France and Britain), Communism (Russia, which split from Europe in 1917 signified by the Bolshevik revolution), and authoritarian nationalism (Italy and Germany, fascism).

In this European climate of war, fascism, "nationalistic pretensions", and hostility between Germany and France, Kalergi wrote:

Europe as a political concept does not exist. The part of the world with that name covers peoples and States in chaos, a powder keg of international conflicts, the breeding ground of future conflicts. This is the European Question: the mutual hatred of Europeans for each other poisons the international atmosphere and is a perpetual worry to even the most peace-loving countries of the world... The European Question will be resolved only by the union of the peoples of Europe. This will come about either voluntarily, by the construction of a pan-European federation or coercively by Russian conquest... The greatest obstacle to the realisation of the United States of Europe is the thousand year rivalry between the two most populous nations of Pan-Europe: Germany and France...[v]

Interwar hostilities between France and Germany had a long history (late 1700s) but were greatly inflamed after the defeat of Germany in World War I. France sent colonial troops numbering between 20,000 and 45,000 from Madagascar, West Africa, Morocco, and Algeria to occupy the German Rhineland, a position that was considered by the Germans (and other Europeans) as the "Black horror on the Rhine" as Blacks were considered as "unreliable savages who posed great danger, especially for the German female and juvenile population". The German president, Friedrich Ebert stated that "the deployment of coloured troops of the most inferior culture as overseers of a population of such high spiritual and economic importance as the Rhinelanders is an intolerable violation of the law of European civilization"[vi]. Yet this was just one of the first among many assaults that were to come that targeted German ethnic identity in the Twentieth century.

The Pan-European Union

Kalergi perceived the interwar period as a vital time to prevent another Great War and the destruction of European and Western civilization. He felt that Europe was endangered by European ethnonationalism, particularly Nazism, as well as the "Bolshevik danger", and an American "economic and cultural threat". He thought it was a time of choice between "[integration or collapse](#)" and warned against a "future war" that could see American and Soviet powers taking over Europe. He seriously considered that Europe could only become either "the stage of perpetual war or perpetual peace". His remedy for these ills and forebodings was a Pan-European Union (PEU) aimed toward peace.

Pan-Europa would protect and strengthen European economic and political powers at

the geopolitical level and enable Europe to once again become a dominant power on par with the others. Europe as a world power related to Kalergi's vision, shared by many of his contemporaries and having roots in the distant past, of a future world federation of humanity. He clarifies the essential aim of the Pan European movement in his *Pan-Europa* (1923):

if world organisation is to take the place of world anarchy
then the first step must be for the states to form
themselves into super-states...so the unification of Europe
will be a necessary state on the road to a united humanity.
[vii]

Writing in 1931, he further elaborated this goal: "The great aim...is to make European boundaries invisible" which will lead to European peace and prosperity, conditions that are necessary for the defence of Western civilization and the creation of "the real universal State", a future where "nationalism on a narrow basis" has been replaced by a "patriotism for large areas of the world" and where the "Atlantic brotherhood" has paved the way to "the future federation of humanity"[viii].

In order to realise a Pan-European Union and a world federation, Kalergi suggested that the League of Nations be modeled as a "federation of federations" and that the European Union be modeled after the original League of Nations, a "federation of states". This 'federation of federations' was based on the division of the world into five federated geopolitical blocs, or what Kalergi terms "the five great parts of the world – the British Commonwealth, Pan-America, Pan-Europe, Eastern Asia, and the Soviet Union". These five blocs would enable a "balance of power in the world", a necessary arrangement that aimed to "prevent any one part of the world from obtaining hegemony over another".

So the first step towards creating World Federation was the integration of European states into a Pan-European Union (PEU), a federation of states that would represent a third collaborative Atlantic power (on par with Pan-America and the British Commonwealth) acting in concert to "save Western civilization from the great dangers now threatening it"[ix].

The Erasure of European Ethno-nationalist Identities

Although European federation was to be based on the collective economic, cultural, militaristic, and political defense of Europe, Kalergi wanted Europe to disarm, to replace militaristic forces with peace forces so it could progress culturally in concord

and equality. By "creating a new public opinion, by showing the European a new ideal and common interests" he thought he could create a socially conservative European democracy that united the European peoples and nations. In this vein, he argued that Europe had a shared historical identity that could be renewed:

Historically, culturally and ethically, the unity of Europe was a real unity, temporarily obliterated in later centuries by religious divisions and the conception of linguistic patriotisms. If these narrow patriotisms could be weakened by a common European patriotism, the underlying central conditions of unity would reappear.[x]

This new European patriotism required the cleansing of language-based and ethnic elements of national patriotism that were perceived as not conducive to Kalergi's European peace. For him, "Europe as a cultural unity was...not so much a matter of political, historical, or racial identification, but a matter of morals and of style". Pan-Europeanism would overcome 'egocentric nationalism' based on race and culture[xi]. Indeed, Kalergi envisioned a future of race mixing:

The man of the future will be of mixed race. Today's races and castes will gradually disappear owing to the vanishing of space, time, and prejudice. The Eurasian-Negroid race of the future, similar in its appearance to the Ancient Egyptians, will replace the diversity of peoples with a diversity of individuals.[xii]

Kalergi sought to replace individual national ideals of ethnic communities with an ethnically mixed European patriotism, a "common European nationalism" based on a common European culture, "a kind of 'supra-national' nationalism" that is European rather than a balance of powers between the European nations. He wrote that "Europe is one big nation that is divided into branches; racist nationalities see only the branches and think they are trees because, semi-cultured as they are, they are unable to see the trunk". He thought nationalism "is the product of bourgeois semi-culture" and wrote:

Just as aristocrats nourished their self-esteem through the disdain of the bourgeois, so the bourgeois began using the newly discovered nationalism in order to thoroughly despise all other nations. In some way, every nation sees itself as the chosen people, as Grande Nation, as the salt of the earth.[xiii]

Kalergi rejected "national 'egocentricity'" as "a kind of chauvinist universalism attempting to dominate the others"[xiv] and thought that ethno-nationalists were "the principal obstacle to his ideas" and "a primary cause of war and human misery"[xv]. To solve cultural-historical national rivalries (particularly those of France and Germany) and attain European integration "existing patriotisms" had to be "sterilised for mischief" while retaining those elements that are "for good". In response to Kalergi's plan, Chairman Mr. Amery suggested that Pan-Europe could help the League of Nations by "separating out purely European causes of friction, thus making the League more truly universal and easier for the United States to join"[xvi].

This creation of a new Europe, a Pan-Europe, based on new ideals of social democracy rather than feudal aristocracy and a new European identity deprived of its ethnic characteristics, would be overseen, according to Kalergi, by a "social aristocracy of the spirit"[xvii]. He claims that the traits — "[s]trength of character combined with sharpness of spirit" — that are required for the spiritual aristocratic leadership of Europe can be found in the Jewish people alone. These traits, peculiar to the Jewish as a people, "predestine" them "to be leaders of urban humanity, the protagonists of capitalism as well as the revolution." But it is "the Jewish Socialist leaders" who "want to redeem us with the highest self-denial from the original sin of capitalism, free people from injustice, violence and serfdom and change the liberated world into an earthly paradise"[xviii]. Further, he wrote:

[t]he influence of the nobility of blood decreases, the influence of the nobility of spirit is growing. Such a development, and with it the chaos of modern politics, will find its end only when an aristocracy of spirit will seize the reins of society's power: by seizing powder, gold, and printing ink to devote to the welfare of the community.[xix]

Eurafrica

Kalergi believed that European federation required using "common resources" so that Europe could develop its "great African territories", which, in turn, would enable Pan-Europe to become "capable of living for itself"[xx]. It was only through a joint colonization of Africa, rather than national colonial projects, that Europe could fully develop its economic and political potential and prosperity and sustainability 'for all' could be realised.

In 1929, Kalergi coined the term 'Eurafrica'. According to the German philosopher Thorsten Botz-Bornstein, Eurafrica was "an extended version of Europe supposed to include also the European colonies" except for the British colonies, such that "Europe

stretches from Angola to Spitzbergen" and the Mediterranean would be "Europe's axis and not its border". In this scheme, Eurafrika was "the multilateral relationship between six European states and their dependencies overseas". It was "purely imperialistic" as it suggested that "millions of Europeans" should settle in the African colonies because "the fatherland had become too narrow", too over-populated, and land and resources were needed. It also proposed that "the colonies would become the main providers of raw materials for the empire", resources that would include hydroelectric power and agricultural produce.

The African colonies would also be 'Europeanized' along with other "regions should they enter the Pan-European Community (like Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan)" as this would be necessary "for the coherence of Europe as a geopolitical and cultural body". In *Europa Erwacht* (1934) Kalergi thought that "the Arab population of Africa" will eventually "adopt the European way of life"[xxi]. Although Kalergi thought it necessary for Europe to exploit Africa, he did not intend large-scale immigration and settlement in Europe by African peoples: "Europe must at all costs prevent 'that great numbers of black workers and soldiers immigrate to Europe'"[xxii].

The supranational Pan-Europe and Eurafrika project represented the birth of a third geopolitical power that would create a balance of powers in the world. In 1931 all colonial powers except for Britain were invited to the Colonial Exposition in Paris to display their colonial possessions. This was to be followed by European cooperation in the African colonies themselves.

Funding, Support, Leadership, and Opposition

The Pan-European movement and Union were directly funded by powerful financiers and aristocrats. In 1924 Kalergi's friend Baron Louis Nathaniel de Rothschild introduced him to Hamburg banker Max Warburg who offered 60,000 gold marks to fund the first three years of the movement; Warburg and Kalergi remained in "constant intellectual dialogue" thereon [xxiii]. Max introduced him to his brothers Felix and Paul Warburg and the American financier, Bernard Baruch in 1925. Robert Bosch, a German industrialist, "[w]as so impressed by Coudenhove that he set up the Pan-Europe Development Fund"[xxiv]. And according to American author David J. Peterson the movement was also "provided financial support and promoted" by the "Thurn und Taxis, Wittlesbachs, Hapsburgs and Kalergi families"[xxv].

Kalergi had the support of many important statesmen, political figureheads, and cultural elites in Britain and Europe. Three years after he founded the Pan European movement he brought thousands of leading European elites together at the First Pan-European Congress (Vienna, 1926). By the mid-Twentieth century, Winston Churchill,

Paul-Henri Spaak, Konrad Adenauer, Leon Blum, and Alcide de Gasperi were perceived as the Pan European Union's "five Presidents of Honour"[xxvi].

Austrian Chancellor Ignaz Seipel provided the Pan-Europa movement with headquarters in Hofburg Palace and was President of the PEU Austrian branch, support followed from Chancellors Engelbert Dollfuß and Kurt Schuschnigg, President of Austria, Karl Renner, and Otto von Habsburg, Archduke Otto of Austria. In France endorsement came from Louis Loucheur, who became president of the movement in France in 1927, and from Prime Ministers Leon Blum (Socialist), Eduard Herriot (Radical), Charles de Gaulle, and Aristide Briand, the latter of which spoke in favour of a federal Europe in his speech at the League of Nations (September 1929), and in his *Memorandum on the Organisation of a Regime of European Federal Union* (1930).

In Germany, foreign minister and Noble Prize laureate Gustav Stresemann, German socialist and President of the Reichstag, Paul Lobe, and numerous pacifists, novelists, and socialists, such as Kurt Hiller, and Heinrich and Thomas Mann, agreed to the Union. The PEU was also endorsed by many other prominent authors, playwrights, poets, and novelists, such as Paul Valery, Gerhart Hauptmann, Rainer Maria Rilke, Stefan Zweig, Franz Werfel, and Arthur Schnitzler, and scientists, such as Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud.

Opposition to Pan-Europa was prevalent among the fascist nationalists of Italy and the National Socialists of Germany in the 1920s and 30s. Kalergi approached Benito Mussolini twice, in May 1933 and 1936, in an attempt to sway him to the movement, but Mussolini was more interested in discussing fascism in Europe. In Germany, Adolf Hitler called Kalergi a "cosmopolitan bastard"[xxvii] and a right wing 1930s university professor, Ewald Geißler, complained that the idea of a Pan-Europe was not new but "always shows its face when France is very near to its highest political goal: Rule over Europe"[xxviii]. In return, Kalergi showed his disdain for Hitler by saying "I do not believe anything good or noble can come from such a vulgar physiognomy"[xxix].

Meanwhile, other anti-fascists before and during the Second World War saw Germany as a [problem](#) and published works calling for the "[sterilisation](#)" and "[outbreeding](#)" of the German race so to rid Europe of the German ethno-national identity manifested in National Socialism, which was perceived as an obstacle to the cosmopolitan plan for European integration. This was a conflict between the political ideologies of cosmopolitanism and political nationalism; between liberal democracy and European ethnonationalism.

Conclusion of Part I

Kalergi's socialist, cosmopolitan, and anti-nationalist European integration model of Pan-Europa, which centered on the Mediterranean as a central axis for geographical unification with African and Arab countries, laid down the groundwork for the development of another, yet similar, integration model in the second half of the Twentieth century. Such a model, known infamously as "Eurabia" and associated with the Euro-Arab Dialogue of the early 1970s, effectively opened European borders to large-scale immigration from the Third World, especially from Muslim lands (Africa, the Middle East, and Asia) and has promoted the culture, language, and religion of Islam as being foundational and on par with European civilization. This European integration model of Eurabia will be examined in Part II.

Notes:

- [i] Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, "A Parliament for Europe: A Third Solid Pillar for the United Nations," *Vital Speeches of the Day* 13, no. 13 (4/15/47) : 401.
- [ii] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *A Project for Perpetual Peace*. By J.J. Rousseau, Citizen of Geneva, translated from the French, with a preface by the Translator, 2nd ed. (London: MDCCLXVII, 1767), 26.
- [iii] Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, trans. by Ted Humphrey, (Hackett Publishing Company, 1983).
- [iv] Eric Kaufmann, "A Comparative-Historical Perspective on the United States and European Union," *Global Society* 17, no.4 (2010) : 377.
- [v] Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, "'Pan-Europe', 1923," in *Building European Union: A Documentary History and Analysis*, edited by Trevor C. Salmon and Sir William Nicoll, (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 7-8.
- [vi] Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson. "Bringing Africa as a 'Dowry to Europe'." *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 13, no.3 (2011) : 444-446
- [vii] Kalergi cited by Quincy Wright in "Pan-Europe, Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi", *Political Science Quarterly* 42, no.4 (1927) : 634.
- [viii] Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, "The Pan-European Outlook," *International Affairs* (Royal Institute for International Affairs 1931-1939) 10, no.5 (1931) : 644.
- [ix] *Ibid*, 640-643, 642.
- [x] *Ibid*, 639, 651.
- [xi] Thorsten Botz-Bornstein, "European Transfigurations — Eurafrika and Eurasia: Coudenhove and Trubetzkoy Revisited," *The European Legacy* 12, no.5, (2007) : 569, 573.
- [xii] Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Practical Idealism*, 22-23, my translation. To note this citation is taken from Chapter 4, titled 'Inzucht – Kreuzung' or 'Inbreeding-Crossing'.
- [xiii] Botz-Bornstein, "European Transfigurations," 570-571.
- [xiv] *Ibid*, 571.
- [xv] Kaufmann, "A Comparative-Historical Perspective," 378, 380.
- [xvi] Kalergi, "The Pan-European Outlook," 645.
- [xvii] Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 21-22.
- [xviii] Kalergi, *Practical Idealism*, 27-28, my translation. To note, this citation is taken from Chapter 5, titled 'Heidnische und Christliche Mentalität' or 'Pagan and Christian mentality'.
- [xix] *Ibid*, 32-33, my translation. To note, this citation is taken from Chapter 6, titled 'Geistesherrschaft statt Schwertherrschaft' or 'Mental Domination instead of Sword Domination'.
- [xx] Kalergi, "The Pan-European Outlook," 651.
- [xxi] Botz-Bornstein, "European Transfigurations," 565-570.
- [xxii] Kalergi cited by Peo Hansen in "Bringing Africa," 450.

[xxiii] Geoff Eley and James N. Retallack, eds., "Wilhelminism and Its Legacies: German Modernities, Imperialism, and the Meanings of Reform, 1890-1930," *Essays for Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann*, (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 220, 232.

[xxiv] Anita Pretenthaler-Ziegerhofer, "Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Birth of a 'New' Europe," in *Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917-1957*, edited by Mark Hewitson and Matthew D'Auria, (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012), 98.

[xxv] David J. Peterson, "Revoking the Moral Order: The Ideology of Positivism and the Vienna Circle," (Lexington Books, 1999), 122.

[xxvi] Richard J. Aldrich, "OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe, 1948-60," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 8, no.1 (1997) : 184.

[xxvii] Hans-Åke Persson and Bo Stråth, eds., "Reflections on Europe: Defining a Political Order in Time and Space," (Berlin; New York; Oxford: Peter Lang, 2007), 114.

[xxviii] Geißler cited by Daniel C. Villanueva, "Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa as the Elusive 'Object of Longing'," *Rocky Mountain Review of Language and Literature* 59, no.2 (2005) : 69.

[xxix] Kalergi cited in "Reflections on Europe," 114.

Ideological and Geopolitical Origins of the EU – Part II

Islamization, Mass Immigration, and Destruction of European Ethnicity

By Clare Ellis, 2015

The Continuation of Eurafrika after WWII

Along with Pan-Europa, the notion of Eurafrika continued to be advocated and institutionalized after WWII. The Congress of Europe (Hague, 1948) considered the development of African colonies an “imperative necessity” and a “collective benefit” for a war-devastated Europe to emerge as “a third force in world politics”[i]. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, 1948) was established to administer the [Marshall Plan](#)/European Recovery Program, the [American initiative](#) to financially aid post-war Europe (\$13 billion). This move effectively institutionalised Eurafrika. The OEEC established an Overseas Territories Working Group “to promote European cooperation in colonial affairs, particularly towards Africa” and involved long term plans in water works, heavy construction, infrastructure, and agriculture[ii].

In 1952 the Council of Europe (1949), which developed out of the Pan-European Union and the Hague Congress, adopted the [Strasbourg Plan](#). This Plan aimed at profiting Europe by the joint development of the raw materials of African colonies and the settlement of these overseas territories to curb overpopulation in Europe[iii]. The Council also adopted the [Schuman Plan](#) (1950), which was vital for European integration and the development and exploitation of African resources, giving rise to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) established by the [Treaty of Paris](#) (1951) involving France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries.

The ‘chief architect’ and president of the ECSC was Jean Monnet, who thought that “France could give Africa as a 'dowry to Europe’”, a strategy that would also “seduce the Germans”[iv]. Several years later, the same countries that signed the Treaty of Paris were involved in the [Rome Treaty](#) negotiations of 1956-1957. These discussions involved the promotion of the “economic and social development of the [colonial] countries and territories” and the establishment of “close economic relations between them and the Community as a whole”. The signing of the Rome Treaties signaled the

birth of the European Economic Community (EEC, 1957), a customs union that aimed to incorporate all the colonial possessions of the member countries: “French West and Equatorial Africa, Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, Italian Somaliland and Netherlands New Guinea”[v].

During these developments, Guy Mollet, socialist premier of France, claimed that Europe’s “economic development will bring about a better standard of living to the Europeans as well as to the African peoples freely associated here. This is not a hazy dream, I am firmly convinced that EURAFRICA will be the reality of tomorrow”[vi]. Many African states agreed. In 1963, under the Yaoundé Convention, a total of eighteen independent African states approved of multilateral EEC partnerships and by the mid-1970s, under the Lomé Convention, most African states had chosen EEC association.

Economic Revival, Foreign Cheap Labor, and Cultural Marxism

Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s notion of Eurafrika lacked any explicit mention of the African peoples or the Arabs of Africa and the Middle East and their cultures becoming embedded in Europe via mass-immigration. It merely envisioned the eventual Europeanization of Africans through modernization[vii]. Kalergi thought that “Europe is bound together by the Christian religion, European science, art and culture, which rest on a Christian-Hellenic basis.” There was also no indication that Islam was integral to the foundation of European culture and societies, or that Europe required cultural enrichment from the Third World, or that Europe required massive immigration in order to survive, things that are claimed today by leading European elites. Kalergi made it quite clear that Europe had a distinct identity in contrast to other cultures:

European culture is said to be proudly ‘distinct from the Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu and Confucian cultures of Asia’[viii].

But this all began to change very noticeably in the 1960s and 70s.

Pre-1950s immigration in Europe was intra-European and European nations were overwhelmingly White in population. With the founding of the Atlantic Charter (1941) and the UDHR (1948), however, a new global order was set in place that would influence the opening of Western nations to non-European immigration from the Third-World (decolonisation, emphasis on equality, independence, universal rights, anti-discrimination laws and non-race based immigration selection criteria).

The Marshall Plan (1948-1952) ushered in an "economic miracle" and about ten years after the war, after rebuilding was almost finished, immigration was officially initiated from the Third World. At this time, the economy was booming and more workers were sought from high unemployment countries in Europe, such as Greece, Italy, and Spain.

On 30 October 1961, the bilateral labour recruitment treaty between Turkey and Germany was signed, which initiated temporary work permits and the arrival of large numbers of Turks as "guest workers" (cheap labourers), who, instead of leaving after their set time of employment (at first it was two years, then in 1964 this was extended and family migration began too), stayed and established Turkish diasporic communities in Germany. Germany also signed recruitment treaties with Morocco (1963) and Tunisia (1965).

Large numbers of Algerians had migrated to France in the interwar and post WWII era. The French had settled the Algerian coastal plain and aimed at integrating Algeria into the French nation as a province. Algerian soldiers who had fought alongside the French during World War I were given French citizenship and many sought work (as cheap labourers). As for Britain, with the dismantling of the British Commonwealth, many Commonwealth citizens of the West Indies, Pakistan, and India were granted British citizenship and travelled to Britain to work as cheap labourers in the factories and mills of the North. In these cases, the opening of the borders to non-Europeans was justified on both economic and cosmopolitan grounds (France and Britain are nations of citizens regardless of ethnicity).

Simultaneous to these economic developments was the entrenchment of [Fabian \(Britain\)](#) and [Frankfurt School \(Germany\) socialism](#) into mainstream society on both sides of the Atlantic. These two very influential cosmopolitan movements, particularly the 'permeation' strategies of Fabian socialism and the 'long march' of cultural Marxism, were factors, along with the efforts of pan-European cosmopolitanism, peace movements, and expanded education, that gave rise, in the 1950s and 60s, to a 'New Class', a "sector of post-industrial societies [that] tends to be liberal on cultural issues, university educated, and drawn from relatively younger age cohorts" and who identified with Europe/world rather than nation or locale[ix].

This 'New Class' were the 'organic intellectuals'[x] of cosmopolitan national networks who had, by the early 1970s, entered the mainstream media and educational institutions and were promoting the destruction and remaking of Western culture via anti-nationalism, anti-traditionalism, liberal progressivism, and non-European immigration.

Meanwhile, other issues were developing in the Middle East which would essentially

affect the ethnic character of Europe for decades to come.

Middle-East Conflict and UN Resolution 242

In the Arab world, movements towards a Pan-Arabism and a re-politicization of Islam, a Pan-Islamism, had been brewing for decades, grounded in Muslim Brotherhood ideology and its offshoots, as well as the shared oppositional stance of Arabs towards the creation of Israel (1948). In May 1967, while the New Class was rising and convulsing in the West, President Nasser of Egypt was mobilizing army units in the Sinai and closing Israel's connection, the Gulf of Aqaba, to the Indian Ocean. This initiated what came to be known as the Six Day War.

As a response to the Western support of Israel in this war, particularly by the United States and Britain, and knowing their reliance on Arab oil, the Arab states imposed an oil embargo against them (June–September, 1967). At the Oil Ministers Conference in Baghdad (June 9-18), a Resolution was passed by several Arab countries that held that Arab oil shall be denied to and shall not be allowed to reach directly or indirectly countries committing aggression or participating in aggression on sovereignty of any Arab state or its territories or its territorial waters, particularly the Gulf of Aqaba [xi].

However, this embargo had limited effect on the US or Europe as it was disorganised and ended with the [Khartoum Resolution](#).

In the aftermath of the Six Day War, the UN adopted [Security Council Resolution 242](#) (November 1967), which states that “a just and lasting peace in the Middle East” should include the “[w]ithdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” and the “[t]ermination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force”.

In January 1968, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) was established by Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia and aimed at separating politics from the production and sale of oil. Then, in 1973, another war broke out in the Middle East, which was a crucial moment for Europe: the Yom Kippur War. The Arab world had become increasingly incensed by what they saw as the occupation of Arab territories by Israel and the pro-Israeli stance of the United States. On October 6th Egypt (under President Anwar Sadat), Iraq, and Syria, with the help of Jordan, Libya, and other Arab states, launched an attack on Israel. Israel mobilised and pushed back, taking part of the west bank of the Suez Canal. In an effort to effect Western policies on the Middle-East conflict, a second oil embargo was imposed on pro-Israel

countries, particularly the U.S., by OAPEC (decided on Oct. 17th) and this time it was effective.

1973 Oil Embargo and the Euro-Arab Dialogue

America, due to their emergency aid (\$2.2 billion), as well as the supply of weapons and other provisions to Israel during the Yom Kippur War, was the main target for the oil embargo, but, in comparison to Europe, they were largely unaffected as they had their own oil supplies. Out of the members of the EEC at that time (Nine) only Holland was completely embargoed; Britain and France were not directly targeted (they had prevented the US from using their airspace to resupply Israel), and the other six, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Ireland were subject to “phased production of 5 per cent a month”[xii].

As Rotterdam[xiii] was the biggest port in Europe and was completely cut-off, the embargo “created economic turmoil in Europe including Britain”. Britain was reliant on Arab oil – it had imported 624 million pounds of oil from the Middle East in 1970 – and it was affected by the “overall cut” in Arab oil production, which amounted to 25% by November 1973, and was also affected by the rise in oil prices, which had increased by 470% in 1973 to over \$11 a barrel[xiv].

On 28 November 1973 Arab heads of state issued the [Arab Declaration of Algiers](#), which defined their parameters for cooperating with the EEC including the “demand that the countries of Western Europe cease their military and economic support of Israel”. This Declaration prompted French President of the European Commission, Georges Pompidou, to call for an EEC Summit meeting in Copenhagen (15 December 1973) to discuss the Middle-East crisis. Pompidou and West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt[xv], sponsored this meeting. Four Arab Foreign Ministers attended, laid out their political objectives and suggested various strategies, including the offer of a relationship between the two regions based on “mutually beneficial cooperation”[xvi].

In Brussels, 4 March 1974, eight of the Nine Foreign Ministers (excluding Britain) decided to begin a Dialogue, known as the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD), with the Arab League states in an effort to protect industrial interests that relied on energy resources coming from the Middle East. The EAD established “a multilateral economic forum whose aim was to strengthen economic links and co-operation between the two regions” (the Nine of the EEC and the twenty Arab League states) and this cooperation included “a wide number of economic, financial, technical, and cultural fields”[xvii]. The EEC perceived that such cooperation would bring about economic benefits for Europe from “expanded oil, commercial, and industrial markets”, which included the “massive sales of arms, as well as of industrial and nuclear

equipment”[xviii]. It was also a way for Europeans to reinforce their collective links so to protect against Arab discrimination and future embargoes.

Britain initially had reservations about joining the EAD as they were concerned what impact it would have on British interests, on Israeli and Arab relations, and on American attitudes and its peace brokering in the Middle East. The Americans were also initially adamant that Britain not join the EAD and were extremely upset (threatening) with the EEC for their self-assertion and decision to enter into dialogue with the Arabs. However, on March 28, after the oil embargo had ended (17 March 1974), and after several conversations and meetings, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger informed the British that the Americans understood the need for good relations between the Europeans, British, and Arabs and finally approved British involvement with the EAD. At the European Ministerial Summit in Luxembourg, April 2nd, 1974, Britain joined the EAD.

The European Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Cooperation (PAEAC)

The European Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Cooperation (PAEAC) was founded by the Nine with the aim of improving European integration by initiating a common foreign policy between the member states and “improv[ing] political, cultural, and economic cooperation between Europe and the Arab world”, and it met biannually. On 7-8 June 1975 PAEAC met at Strasbourg. At this meeting recognition of the “historical contribution of Arab culture to European development” and “the contribution that the European countries can still expect from Arab culture, notably in the area of human values” were discussed. Also deliberated was the provision of the “means,” created by the Arab countries, to enable Arab immigrants in Europe “to participate in Arab cultural and religious life” in their respective host countries, and included the propagation of Islam and the Arab culture throughout Europe, which was a priority of the EEC[xix].

To a large extent these discussions were stimulated by a study on the conditions of Euro-Arab cooperation submitted to the economic commission of the PAEAC by Belgian member, Tilj DeClercq. He wrote that:

A medium and long term policy must henceforth be formulated in order to bring about economic cooperation through a combination of Arab manpower reserves and raw materials, and European technology and ‘management’.

This promoted Arab-Muslim immigration into Europe. He also suggested that

economic integration was not possible until political support for Arabs in the Middle East was clarified:

genuine political will must be at the base of the concrete plans for cooperation and must be demonstrated on three levels: the national level; the level of the continent; and at world level [xx].

DeClerq's proposals were accepted by PAEAC and integrated into their resolutions, which included calls "for news coverage more favourable to Arab causes, as well as special conditions for Arab immigrants" such as the equal rights of Arab immigrant workers in Europe to that of national citizens. The resolutions were published in July 1975 in [Eurabia](#), a journal first published in 1970 by the European Committee for Coordination of Friendship Associations with the Arab World. This journal outlined an essential aim of the Euro-Arab Dialogue: a "continent-wide foreign policy unity, so as to become a global alternative to American power". The EAD, according to [Eurabia](#), had to express "a joint political will" and European authorities had to create "a climate of opinion" that was "favourable to the Arabs". If Europe was to cooperate with the Arab world then it was necessary for Europe to

reaffirm their confidence in the Euro-Arab friendship and their respect for the millennial contribution of the Arabs to world civilization [xxi].

Euro-Arab Cultural Cooperation: Islamization of Europe

Two days after the PAEAC meeting in Strasbourg, the Arabs and Europeans of the EAD met in Cairo (June 10-14, 1975). A Joint Memorandum was issued that outlined their principles and aims:

The Euro-Arab Dialogue is the fruit of a common political desire [and] is inspired by neighboring ties and a common cultural heritage, as well as by their complementary and convergent interests.

It listed several areas of cultural cooperation that "should embrace education, the arts, science, and information" and also cooperation with the Arab workforce in Europe, involving the equal treatment of immigrants "in three areas: employment; working and living conditions; and social security benefits"[xxii].

The Communiqué of the EAD [General Committee](#) (GC, the central body of EAD)

meeting in Tunis, February 1977, involved the “transfer of technology, commercial cooperation (specifically an Arab request for the establishment of a ‘Euro-Arab Trade Cooperation Center’), the protection and encouragement of investment, a number of industrial contracts, cultural cooperation, and finally, the living and working conditions of migrant workers”[xxiii].

In other words, "cultural cooperation" involved the Arabization and Islamization of European culture and the encouragement, initiated by the Arab League and abided by the Europeans, of these immigrants to retain their cultural traditions in their new countries of residence. Included in this was discussion on the establishment of a program for strengthening Euro-Arab cooperation in the media and information spheres.

Such cultural inroads were advocated by a Euro-Arab Seminar on “Means and Forms of Cooperation for the Diffusion in Europe of the Knowledge of Arabic Language and Literary Civilization” that was held at the University of Venice from March 28 to 30, 1977. This Seminar proposed a common culture for the “north and south shores of the Mediterranean” and offered nineteen recommendations [xxiv] for the formation of Euro-Arab Cultural Centers in European capitals for the diffusion of Arab culture and language within Europe. Both the cultural and migratory inroads into Europe from the Arab world were further confirmed at the fourth meeting of the GC in Damascus, 9-11 December 1978, which produced the Damascus Declaration. This Declaration effectively provided Arab countries the right to transfer their culture, customs, and people into Europe[xxv].

Venice Declaration, Maastricht Treaty, and the European Union

In Italy, on 30 September 1979, a symposium brought together the United Nations, the European Communities, the League of Arab States, and OPEC. The Chairman of OPEC, Mana Ben Saeed Al-Otaiba, declared threateningly that

Our cooperation should...be based on moral educational principles so that Europe should play its part in putting an end to injustice and restoring the people of Palestine to their rights. Unless these aims are adhered to, it will be difficult for Europe to have her petroleum supplies guaranteed [xxvi].

In June 1980, the EEC issued the [Declaration of Venice](#), which repeated that Israel must withdraw to 1949 lines and that the Israeli occupation of territories was

preventing the Middle East peace process.

In the mid to late 1980s, and into the 1990s, European integration and a common European foreign policy developed further. In 1986 the [Single European Act](#) (SEA, 1986) was adopted, and in 1991 the Maastricht Treaty was signed and introduced [Citizenship of the European Union](#), which has been enforced since December 1st, 2009 via an amended (2007) [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union](#) (see Part II, article 20). The Maastricht Treaty also emphasised the collective definition and application of a “common policy covering all areas of foreign relations and security” for the EU and its members states.

The establishment of the European Union (EU) came about with the enforcement of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. In 1995, the European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Co-operation ([MEDEA](#)) was established in Brussels with the aim of enhancing cooperation and development in the Mediterranean basin and improving Euro-Arab relations. At the first conference in Barcelona, 27-28 November 1995, which was attended by 15 EU members and 12 non-members, MEDEA developed a comprehensive [Euro-Mediterranean Partnership](#) (EUROMED/Barcelona Process) that brought together Israel, EU member states, and nine Arab states.

The [Barcelona Declaration](#) sought to transform the Mediterranean basin into a zone of cooperation, dialogue, and exchange, and has aimed at guaranteeing “[peace, stability and growth in the Mediterranean Partner Countries](#),” a plan that has been further implemented by the Final Declaration of the EUROMED Forum, 27-28 October 1998. In fact, the [advisory group](#) to Romano Prodi has stated that within the next half century the two parts of the Euro-Mediterranean (European and African/Arab) area would have integrated their day-to-day life.

Funding of the Euro-Arab Partnerships

The MEDA program — Mediterranean Development Assistance — which developed out of the Barcelona Declaration, has been the main financial instrument of the European Union for the enactment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED). Between 1995 and 1999 MEDA allocated €4.685 billion of tax-payers monies for “financial cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners” and this was increased to €5.35 billion between 2000 and 2006. In 2003 the European Commission signed Financing Agreements for three MEDA-funded cooperation programs, which totalled €32 million (\$40 million). In April 2003, the European Investment Bank (EIB) approved €1.5 billion for investment in Arab countries. A few months later, in November 2003, EIB had given out more than €1.8 billion of new

loans and also approved €1.8 billion of new investment operations in the Muslim world[xxvii].

About 90 percent of these MEDA resources have benefitted the Mediterranean partners of Europe, which include Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority.

Twenty-First Century Euro-Arab Relations and European Integration

In Brussels, June 2002, the [Euro-Arab Parliamentary Dialogue](#) aimed to create a foundation to develop joint Euro-Arab cultural and educational programs. In October 2003 Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission, [said](#) that the foundation would “give concrete form to the principle of co-ownership, of the feeling of belonging”. This “feeling of belonging” was explained in the same month by a High-Level Advisory Meeting in Brussels, which issued a report titled [Dialogue Between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area](#) and stated that “feelings of belonging now work as intersecting circles, and no longer as concentric or juxtaposed circles” – it is no longer about people defining “themselves by opposition to others”. According to this report, individuals do not first and foremost belong to an ethnicity, country, or region, but individuals act as individuals — “each person for themselves” — and, next, act as world citizens.

In Naples, on 2-3 December 2003, the Sixth Meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs met as part of the Barcelona Process and recommended the formation of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, a Euro-Mediterranean Bank for Euro-Mediterranean Investment, and a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures. In addition, this meeting also stressed the importance of Ministers accepting the following ongoing programs: Euromed Heritage, Euromed Audio-Visual, Euromed Youth, and Euromed Platform Youth.

In Dublin in 2004, May 5-6, EUROMED founded the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures, which has since established HQ in Alexandria, Egypt. It was named after the Social Democratic Party member Anna Lindh, who was murdered in 2002. In 2008 the same original partners of EUROMED established the [Union for the Mediterranean](#), which is based on the Barcelona Process (1995) and encourages “economic integration and democratic reform across 16 neighbours to the EU’s south in North Africa and the Middle East”. At the international level, it seeks to “advance in the wider world” the following principles that define its “own creation”:

democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law (see [here](#) and [here](#)).

Euro-Mediterranean Union, Eurafrica, and Eurabia

The European push for a Union of the Mediterranean continues to work towards the early Twentieth century notion of Eurafrica. In 2007, French President Nicolas Sarkozy [spoke](#) in Dakar and suggested that Eurafrica still remained the destiny of the two continents:

What France wants to do with Africa is co-development...shared development...a joint strategy within the globalisation process...a jointly negotiated policy on immigration...What France wants to do with Africa is to prepare the advent of Eurafrique, this great common destiny which awaits Europe and Africa.

On 17 December 2008, Sarkozy gave an impassioned speech on diversity at the École Polytechnique de Palaiseau, suggesting that “diversity should be set in the stone of the constitution” and advocated métissage, which denotes “the mixing of racial or ethnic groups[xxviii]. He said that he wanted more ethnic diversity in the media, in politics, and in the elite schools and aimed to “[end the stranglehold of France's white, monocultural elite](#)”.

In a 2011 [speech](#) on Europe in Toulon (1st December) he stated his goals:

a capitalism of production, regulated globalization, regulated finance, sustainable development, a new role for the state in the economy and a new European and global governance.

Just recently, in August 2014, the European Commission issued a [press release](#) stating the launch of a Pan-African Programme that will fund activities totalling €415 million and “offer new possibilities for the EU and Africa to work together”. This [Programme](#) will continue until 2017 and “will contribute to increased mobility within the continent as well as between Europe and Africa”, movements that involve student exchange programmes as well as “labour mobility”.

British Labour member David Miliband gave a [speech](#) in 2007 to the College of Europe, Bruges in Amsterdam, and spoke of the enlargement of Europe which entailed a “version of the European Free Trade Association that could gradually bring the countries of the Maghreb, the Middle East and Eastern Europe in line with the single market, not as an alternative to membership, but potentially as a step towards it”. Meanwhile, in 2009, David Cameron, who has been advised by [Tariq Ramadan](#), said to Muslims in Britain that there are [too many White Christians in Britain](#):

It's not enough, as I've said many times, for a party like the Conservatives to open the door, and say 'come on in,' if all you see is a sea of white Christian faces. You need to see people from your own communities getting to the top of the army, getting to the top of the legal profession, getting to the top of business and, yes, getting to the top of the Conservative party and politics too.

Cameron has also declared his vision for the capital of Britain, London: [a world capital of Islamic finance](#).

Euro-Mediterranean Integration Schemes are Anti-European

While Europe expanded its markets and transferred its technology to the Arab world and received a guarantee of oil supplies, it received Arab manpower through large-scale immigration from Muslim countries, immigrants who were perceived as builders of the future Eurabia. With the support of the European elites and the legal system millions of these immigrants have come to Europe with no intention of integrating; bringing their cultural norms and habits with them they have rejected the secular liberal culture of Europe in favour of their own and have utilised the legal system to protect their interests, all of which has created a volatile situation of social fragmentation and separatism within Europe.

Although all EU heads of state have endorsed the Euro-Arab policies, most of the European masses have remained unaware that such agreements and procedures have been made. Not only have indigenous Europeans been deceived by their own leaders, the ideologies of cultural relativism and political correctness have also been imposed upon them through the political, educational, and media systems as well as through cultural activities.

Educational and media institutions have also distorted the history of European civilization in line with the social and political goals of the EAD; it is claimed that the

Greek scientific heritage of Europe was transmitted to Europeans from the Arab-Muslim world. This view of history ignores the fact that Greek civilization was taught in the Byzantine Empire and in Italy and when Jihad arrived in the 11th century these European scholars fled to Western Europe where they then transmitted their knowledge in Latin. The false portrayal of European history is prevalent in European textbooks.

What began as an elite Pan-European socialist movement initiated by Kalergi, a movement that focused on the economic and political union of Europe, the creation of a hybridized common European culture, the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean geopolitical bloc united with both the African continent and parts of the Muslim Middle East, and the construction of a cosmopolitan patriotism, today has become a multicultural and multiracial Eurocrat project, a Euro-Mediterranean Union that is anti-European and based on multicultural immigrant ideologies and a Neoconservative-style global monoculture.

Multiculturalism is cast by Leftist socialists as the exemplary model for all the world's nations to conform to, whether they like it or not (forced to be "free"), and assimilation is portrayed by neoconservatives as the model to enforce upon the indigenous and immigrant populations. Both models are utilised by capitalists to transform cultures into neoliberal societies devoid of racial, ethnic, or ancestral identifications and to integrate them into a world economic market run by wealthy elites. They are bourgeois "humanists" and economic individualists that masquerade as the supreme moral force of Western Civilization.

This social engineering based on a political ideology, demographic transformation, and a universalising philosophical and economic idealism, and which seeks to overcome human nature, nationalities, and ethnic identities, is for the sake of an abstract conception of a future utopia. By the end of the 20th century, utopia was a mainstream political ideology and sought to bring an "American-style democratic capitalism – the final form of human government" to all the world[xxix].

The imposition of global corporate capitalism and all it entails under the guise of humanitarian development and universal progress, requires the violent intervention of the American-led West into other countries that are considered "backward" and "unfree", including Europe. This intervention and the destruction of existing traditional cultures — a global democratic revolution — is considered justified for it makes possible the room for the construction of modern, democratic, capitalist, and standardised systems of American-style Western living based on an idealised notion of a future federation of humanity in perpetual peace.

“Creative destruction is our middle name” says neoconservative foreign policy analyst, Michael Ledeen. He further writes:

We tear down the old order every day, from business to science, literature, art, architecture, and cinema to politics and the law. Our enemies have always hated this whirlwind of energy and creativity, which menaces their traditions (whatever they may be) and shames them for their inability to keep pace. Seeing America undo traditional societies, they fear us, for they do not wish to be undone. They cannot feel secure so long as we are there, for our very existence — our existence, not our politics — threatens their legitimacy. They must attack us in order to survive, just as we must destroy them to advance our historic mission[xxx].

In the context of an ideal future world government and single race, to deny and dilute White European identity is considered necessary, progressive, and humanistic. Meanwhile Eurosceptic, ethnonationalist, and anti-cosmopolitan opposition continues, albeit alongside non-European immigrant nationalisms demanding self-determination in Europe (e.g. Turkish Muslims in Germany).

Mass-immigration and multiculturalism are the most recent strategies of the elite that link socialist and progressive ideas towards Euro-Mediterranean integration and the future aim of a World Federation in perpetual peace. Euro-Mediterranean aspirations, especially the strategy of massive immigration from the Third World into Western Europe and its accompanying multicultural dogma, is plainly and simply an unethical practice that amounts to the cultural death and eventual genocide of European peoples.

Notes:

[i] Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, “Bringing Africa as a ‘Dowry to Europe’,” *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 13, no.3 (2011) : 452.

[ii] *Ibid.*, 451.

[iii] There were widespread concerns about massive population growth stimulated by such works as *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798-1825, six editions) by Thomas Malthus, *Our Plundered Planet* (1948) by Fairfield Osborn, and *Road to Survival* (1948) by William Vogt, which influenced the seminal book, *The Population Bomb* (1968) by Paul Ehrlich. There was also a feverish embrace of planned parenthood, the creation of Zero Population Growth Inc., and the rise of environmental movements that had merged with feminism.

[iv] Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism*, (London; New York: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2014), 123

[v] Hansen, “Bringing Africa,” 454-455.

[vi] Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), (1956-58) EN-Emile Noël, EN.01-Activitiés européennes avant 1958; EN.01-04.01, Discours de Guy Mollet 1956-58, Florence, European University

- Institute, <<http://archives.eui.eu/en/fonds/110738?item=EN.01-04.01>> (November 2014).
- [vii] However, as mentioned in Part I, Kalergi did envision a mixed race of the future.
- [viii] Cited by Daniel C. Villanueva, "Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa as the Elusive 'Object of Longing'," *Rocky Mountain Review of Language and Literature* 59, no.2 (2005) : 74, 75.
- [ix] Kaufmann, "A Comparative-Historical Perspective," 381-382.
- [x] Coined by Gramsci; they were the American New Left and the European 68ers
- [xi] U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XXXIV: American Republics*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986), Doc. 232.
- [xii] David Allen, "The Euro-Arab Dialogue," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 16, no.4 (1977) : 323; see also Ye'or, *Eurabia*, 326.
- [xiii] Rotterdam is the largest port in Europe and one of the largest ports in the world and also happens to be considered the Islamic capital of Europe. See [here](#).
- [xiv] Muhamad Hasrul Zakariah, "The Euro-Arab Dialogue 1973-1978: Britain Reinsurance Policy in the Middle-East Conflict," *European Review of History* 20, no.1 (5 March 2013) : 107-108.
- [xv] Willy Brandt became the head of the Socialist International in 1979, at a time when this organisation had become not just anti-colonialist and anti-nationalist, but also anti-Israeli and anti-American.
- [xvi] Zakariah, "The Euro-Arab Dialogue," 96
- [xvii] *Ibid*, 95, 97.
- [xviii] Bat Ye'or, *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis*, (Maryland/Plymouth: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005/2011), 70
- [xix] *Ibid*, 54, 66.
- [xx] Cited in *ibid*, 64.
- [xxi] *Ibid*, 63-65.
- [xxii] *Ibid*, 67-68.
- [xxiii] Allen, "The Euro-Arab Dialogue," 336.
- [xxiv] See Derek Hopwood, ed., *Euro-Arab Dialogue: The Relations Between the Two Cultures. Acts of the Hamburg Symposium April 11th to 15th 1983*. (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 317-23.
- [xxv] Ye'or, *Eurabia*, 91-95.
- [xxvi] Cited in *Ibid*, 81-82.
- [xxvii] *Ibid*, 108, 246, 201-202.
- [xxviii] Yvan Gastaut, "The 'Immigration Question': Mainspring of Sarkozy's Presidency," *Contemporary French & Francophone Studies* 16, no. 3 (June 2012): 341.
- [xxix] John Gray, *Black Mass: How Religion Led the World into Crisis* (Anchor Canada, 2008), 29
- [xxx] Michael A. Leeden, *The War Against the Terror Masters: Why It Happened. Where We Are Now. How'II We Win*, (New York: Macmillan, 2003/2007), 212-213.