

TRADITION & REVOLUTION

Collected Writings of Troy Southgate



ARKTOS 

Tradition & Revolution

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of
Troy Southgate

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PUBLISHER'S FOREWORD

Troy Southgate is a long-term activist and a man who lives according to his ideals. He has the experience and the standing to write about the matters presented in this book, including topics such as 'revolution', which so many people on both ends of the political spectrum write about without having done anything to bring it about, or possessing any practical knowledge of what it entails.

Troy Southgate's understanding of the topics presented is, in our opinion, also mature. He does not, for example, write about revolution in the mundane, Marxist sense, but in a way that goes beyond the old Left-Right dichotomy and incorporates spirituality, tradition, and a critique of modern society. Troy Southgate's ideas of revolution are, as such, more metapolitical than political.

For these reasons we thought the book would be of interest to our readers. Given the tremendous response we received to the first edition of this book, we thought it necessary to bring out a new, and we hope improved, edition.

The first edition of this book was published by Integral Tradition Publishing in 2007. This second edition, now published by Arktos Media, includes a number of essays that were not included in the first. One essay ('Sussex Swan') was also removed for this edition at Mr. Southgate's request.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank Troy Southgate for making this publication possible and for patiently working with us through the process of making it ready – twice.

ARKTOS MEDIA,

May 2010

'The new man is still evolving. Indeed, he is not yet visible to everyone, for he does not come from the noisy centre which constantly attracts the attention of the crowd, but from the quiet periphery. Every new force that is designed to topple an age which has run its course comes from the periphery of that age with all its dominant values and pseudo-values. It is in the moments of great crisis in the emergence of the new that the 'outsiders' take on their special function of forming the nucleus of a new centre around which the coming world will henceforth order itself.'

– **E. Günther Gründel**, *The Mission of the Young Generation*

DEDICATION & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work is dedicated to my family, friends and all those who have provided me with sound advice, constructive criticism and good comradeship across three decades of political and literary activity. This anthology is especially dedicated to Mariella Shearer.

I would also like to dedicate this second edition to:

Dániel Ágoston (Hungary), David Aldridge, Archonis (America), Gonzalo Baez (Chile), Letty Baldacchino (Malta), Josh Barnhill (America), Alexander Baron, Rupert Bell, Clive Bignell, Kerry Bolton (New Zealand), Steve Bolton, Maxim Borozenec (Denmark), Christian Bouchet (France), Jonothon Boulter, Jonathan Bowden, Richard Paul Brass, Brecht (Belgium), Hans Cany (France), Danae Caradja (Greece), Kristian Carter, Kelly Cavey, Alisdair Clarke R.I.P., Dave Copping, Justin Cowgill (America), Greg Cumming (Ulster), Darksphere (Denmark), Adrian Davies, Greg Dejaeger (Belgium), Detrimony (Australia), Jesse Deutsch (America), Chris Donnellan (America), Steven Dotson (America), Alexander Dugin (Russia), Xavier Everaert (Belgium), Ean Frick (America), Flávio Gonçalves (Portugal), Peter Georgacarakos (America), Luke Goaman-Dodson, Matthew Gordon, Professor Roger Griffin, Marco Grosso (Italy), Anthony Hancock, Chris Haywood, Hamasson, Jeff Harrison, Scott Harrison (Australia), Welf Herfurth (Australia), Thomas Herriot, Ian Holloway, Brian Hoostal (America), Richard Hunt, Ian Huyett (America), Wulf Ingessunu, Sean Jobst (America), Greg Johnson (America), M. Raphael Johnson (America), Jemma Anne Kee (Australia), Joseph Kerrick (America), Josef Klumb (Germany), Maury Knutson (America), Mikulas Kolya (America), Alex Kurtagic, Dawn Kurtagic, Richard Levy, Norman Lowell (Malta), Kate Lujan (America), Michael Lujan (America), Butow Maler (Germany), Richard Miller, Justin Mitchell, Davide Moiso, Vadge Moore (America), Kai Murros (Finland), Peter Myers (Australia), Adam Nardell, Nicolas Nowak (France), Steve Nuttall, James O'Meara (America), Marcel P. (Germany), Chris Pankhurst, Sasha Papovic (Serbia), Phlegethon (Germany), Dennis R. Plummer (Germany), James Pond, Keith Preston (America), J.D. Pryce (America), Michele Renouf, Steve Rohan, Marcel Rüter (Holland), Dr.

James Saleam (Australia), Karissa Shaw (America), Robert Sheffield, Paul Shepherd, Grzegorz Siedlecki (Poland), Adel Souto (America), Dean Speakman, Jon St. Francis, Robert Steuckers (Belgium), Brett Stevens (America), Andrea Strasser (Germany), Wayne John Sturgeon, Ksenia Sunic (Croatia), Tomislav Sunic (Croatia), Matthew Tait, Robert N. Taylor (America), Jaroslaw Tomasiewicz (Poland), Peter Töpfer (Germany), Gwendolyn Toynton (New Zealand), Tom Tremayne, Dan Trepanier (Canada), Jasper Umbongo (America), Neil Vince, Allan W., Cornelius M. Waldner (Germany), Michael Walker (Germany), Matthew Ward (America), Wes Wayne (Canada), Nils Wegner (Germany), Adrian White, Snowwy, Jason Wilcock, Jeremy Wilcox (America), David E. Williams (America), Thomas Wiloch (America), Michael Woodbridge, David Yates, Andrew Yeoman (America), Damon Zacharias (Greece) and last but certainly not least, my close friend Dino Zakarya.

I am also greatly indebted to my friend and comrade, Tord Morsund (Norway), for conducting the Autonom interview, to Miron Fyodorov (Russia), Dan Ghetu (Romania), Tomasz Lewicki (Poland) and Milan Spinka (Czech Republic) for their interviews, and finally to Patrick Boch, Jacob Christiansen and John Morgan for working so very hard on the manuscript and for kindly agreeing to assemble this collection for both present and future generations.

May you all live long, healthy and fulfilling lives.

Troy Southgate,

January 2010

TROY SOUTHGATE & THE EVOLVING FACE OF THE TRUE RIGHT

BY JOHN B. MORGAN

IT'S difficult for me to remember when I first learned about Troy Southgate, since it was long ago and his name is so pervasive in the circles in which I've traveled. With the evolution of previously ghettoised subcultures into international phenomena during the 1990s and 2000s with the aid of the Internet, and Troy's skillful use of it from its earliest days to spread his message, I doubt that there is anyone who has been engaged with radical politics, the true Right (as Evola defined it) or traditionalism in the West during the past twenty-five years who isn't familiar with his name, whether it be to praise or curse him. As such, to study the evolution of Troy's ideas is to witness the evolution of the true Right over the past three decades.

Although I can't recall our first exchange, I'm certain it was on the (still active as of this writing but seldom used these days) Yahoo-based Evola group during the late 1990s. At the time, I was trying to learn more about nationalist movements, which I had studied as historical movements but about which I knew little in the present day. I learned two things very quickly. As one finds on such forums, the vast majority of postings come from either the enthusiastic but ill-informed, or else those who simply try to provoke a negative reaction from the others. Troy was a welcome exception, and it often seemed that I could just read his posts and ignore most of the others. Here was someone who clearly knew what he was talking about, not just intellectually but also in terms of experience. His practical knowledge kept him firmly rooted in reality, rather than simply dreaming up imaginary armies, empires and imperiums, as some are wont to do. And in a rare phenomenon for radical politics, Troy does not have a hint of pretension about him, not posturing himself as some kind of *übermensch*, but as an ordinary – if talented – man, and always willing to admit his own limitations.

The second thing I realized was that Troy was everywhere – it seemed to me, as I came to know the 'scene', that there was hardly a group or Web site on which he wasn't either a participant or someone

who was frequently referenced. Clearly, a lot of people were interested in what Troy had to say.

At first, I must admit, I remained somewhat skeptical about Troy's ideas. Having been weaned on traditional European nationalism, at first I didn't care for his references to various Leftist and non-European figures. I wanted to be a European revolutionary, and I wanted nothing to do with Che Guevara or Farrakhan or Arab nationalism. And as for Troy's interest in traditional spirituality – sure, I was willing to admit that thinkers such as Evola had given us useful myths which could be adapted to serve the nationalist cause, but we shouldn't take them too seriously.

What I didn't know at first was that Troy wasn't just a lone figure ranting on the Internet. Rather, he is a man who has been in the trenches for a long time. He began as a youth in 1984 in the British National Front, becoming part of a genuinely revolutionary subcurrent in the organisation which is difficult to imagine in today's more traditionally nationalist NF. After doing his apprenticeship there for several years, he moved on in 1989 to the NF offshoot, the International Third Position, which marks the beginning of Troy's effort to find a transcending synthesis of traditional Left/Right politics. During the 1990s, he moved on to more activist groups such as the English Nationalist Movement, which he led, and the National Revolutionary Faction, which fashioned itself in a cell-based structure with its aim being the protection of neighborhoods from violent immigrant gangs. In 2000, Troy and collaborator Michael Lujan founded the *SYNTHESIS*^[1] Web site, which has become the primary mouthpiece for Troy's National-Anarchist views. Even more recently, in 2005, Troy founded the English New Right,^[2] by which he has been seeking to establish a branch of the metapolitical school of thought particular to the British situation, inspired by the ideas which have been expounded by the French philosopher Alain de Benoist and his colleagues in the GRECE organisation, which I firmly believe to be the last, best hope for a rebirth of the true Right in our time. The ENR continues to hold periodic conferences in London. Additionally, Troy has been a member of the heathenist Woden's Folk group, and has been a writer, editor,

publisher and musician (such as in the groups H.E.R.R., Seelenlicht, Von Thronstahl and Horologium) in far too many capacities to list here. On top of all of this, Troy has four children, all of whom he has home-schooled in accordance with his beliefs (see his essay on this topic in this volume). So when Troy writes on a topic, it is coming out of a sustained and wide-ranging hands-on engagement with the subject at hand, and not from idle speculation.

Therefore, it comes as no surprise to me now that my views ended up developing in ways that are similar to Troy's. As anyone observes the endless parade of Rightist movements and wannabe leaders continually running their heads up against the wall and smashing themselves to pieces, many of these conclusions are unavoidable. I realised that the world had changed so much since the time of the great nationalist movements of the past that the concepts of Left and Right retained little meaning. We could still learn from both of them, but as concepts they needed to be transcended – as the European New Right has been trying to achieve. And even as I began to appreciate the value of non-European allies in the struggle against multiculturalism and international capitalism, I also started to learn, in part through some of the subjects that I examined as a result of Troy's writings, that non-Westerners also had noble thoughts and actions which were worthy of being studied. This freed me from the bonds which shackle many would-be nationalists who remain fixated on past, failed attempts to halt the march of 'progress'. Read Troy's essays in this volume on Muammar al-Qadhafi or the Islamic Revolution in Iran for examples of this.

I likewise came to recognise that political action without the element of the sacred is always doomed to failure. Not the sacred as a symbol to be manipulated by mere mortals, but as something that we acknowledge as superior to ourselves, and which we must always strive to serve and incorporate into our lives even if we don't completely comprehend it. Such understanding leads not only to a broader *weltanschauung*, but also teaches one how to live humbly and simply, preventing many of the errors to which our egos make us prone and which have proved so damaging to the revolutionary spirit. Troy has

also come to this conclusion, as you can see in his essays on Julius Evola, particularly his examination of Evola's *Men Among the Ruins*, which was originally published in the Russian *Pravda Online*, which is the electronic heir to the famous Soviet newspaper of the same name.

Lastly, the fascination with totalitarianism and absolute leadership that one finds both on the Left and the Right is nowhere to be found in Troy's writings. As he informs us in his essays on National-Anarchism, the time of great, all-encompassing systems seizing the reins of power are a thing of the past...and rightfully so. Those of Troy's detractors who accuse him of sympathising with Fascism know not from whence they speak, as a reading of this volume will make plainly obvious. Troy's ideals are the decentralisation of power, of power returned to local communities and their chosen leaders, firmly rooted in time-tested (yet largely forgotten) principles of honour, labour and responsibility. From this vantage point, it is clear that it is the forces of international capitalism which are the true heirs of the totalitarian movements, and not those such as Troy who are merely seeking a secure island upon which to ride out the coming deluge when it all falls apart.

Although I'm not sure I would describe myself as a National-Anarchist, I can certainly say that I find much common ground between my own viewpoint and the ideas of Troy Southgate. He's already arrived at a place, through hard work and the resulting process of maturation, that many newbies to the 'scene' have yet to attain. Therefore, one who wants to become active in the arena of radical politics owes it to himself to become familiar with Troy's writings. In doing so, he will avoid many of the problems and pitfalls that plague all would-be radical movements.

This book, although subtitled *Collected Writings*, should still be considered a work-in-progress, since we can be certain that Troy is far from finished with either his writing or his political activism. Only time will tell what new topics will be added to the next edition of this volume.

JOHN B. MORGAN, MUMBAI

1 May 2010

^[1] Located at www.rosenoire.org.

^[2] Located at www.new-right.org.

PART I:

CHAPTER ONE

KING ALFRED THE GREAT: THE INTELLECTUAL & MILITARY ACHIEVEMENTS OF ENGLAND'S FIRST POLITICAL SOLDIER

KING ALFRED [c.849-99] was a Ninth-century equivalent of the warrior-philosopher and is undoubtedly one of the greatest figures to have ever graced the historic shores of England. But whilst he is usually remembered for uniting the various regional strands of an often divided country against its persistent Viking adversaries, his many cultural triumphs remain either forgotten or overlooked. In this article I intend to examine Alfred's military and intellectual achievements to explain precisely why both strategies were fundamentally interdependent in the struggle to save England from certain oblivion.

One distinctive organisational feature which lay at the very root of Alfred's militaristic success was the division of the *fyrd*. According to C. Warren Hollister, before the late Ninth century a *fyrd* was simply 'a rude assemblage of all able-bodied freemen whose service was based on the old Germanic concept of a nation in arms'^[1]. On the other hand, although historians are uncertain whether the *fyrd* constituted a distinct class in itself or was basically a mixture of *thegns*, peasants and mercenaries, Sir Frank Stenton is of the opinion that before the Danish wars the composition of the *fyrd* was taken very seriously indeed, with kings 'attempting to raise its quality by limiting its numbers.'^[2] So the process of creating an elite force of Anglo-Saxon warriors was already well advanced by the time Alfred came to the throne in 871. In a strategic sense, however, the *fyrd* only became a real threat to the Viking invaders once Alfred had divided it into two groups 'which served alternately so as to provide a continuously existing military force.'^[3] In the past, the *fyrd* had symbolised little more than a territorial entity in which men were expected to provide a voluntary service over a specific period of time. But in 893, when Alfred had 'divided his levies into two sections, so that there was always half at home and half on active service',^[4] England received her first standing army. Indeed, as a direct result of Alfred's far-sighted innovations the West Saxons went on to defeat their Danish adversaries in two key

areas of the country, and his ‘system of rotating the two groups was still in effect as late as 920, and long afterwards English monarchs seem to have expected almost unlimited service from the select *fyrð* in times of grave emergency.’^[5]

But Alfred did not simply apply his militaristic resourcefulness in order to improve the performance of his forces on dry land, however, he was also aware that if he was to bring an end to the great mobility of the Viking armies it was necessary to engage them at sea. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle notes that, in 875 and again in 882, Alfred attempted to fight the Danes on their own terms. On the first occasion, he ‘sailed out to sea with a fleet, and fought against seven ships’ companies’,^[6] capturing one of them in the process and putting the remainder to flight. On the second, ‘King Alfred went out to sea with ships and fought against four ships’ companies of Danes’,^[7] with two of them being destroyed and the remaining two ‘badly cut about and severely wounded before they surrendered.’^[8] But in 896, the Wessex ships were generally regarded as being rather inadequate and ‘Alfred ordered warships to be built to meet the Danish ships’,^[9] inadvertently creating the first English navy. Although Alfred’s new fleet was said to have been unique in terms of its design, its establishment was fundamentally a reaction to the superior quality of the Viking longships rather than something particularly original in itself. Like so many of Alfred’s ideas, however, the revitalised fleet was ‘only part of a remodelling of the national defences carried through in Alfred’s later years’^[10] and was basically tied in with his overall strategy. But this fact does not diminish the great competence with which the Anglo-Saxons were able to engage the Vikings at sea. Indeed, after England had suffered a devastating attack on the Devon coast, Alfred employed nine of his new ships to form a blockade and prevented the escape of most of those responsible, despite the loss of sixty-two men. But Alfred’s watery triumphs were also partly due to his own direct participation. There seems little doubt that the average Anglo-Saxon oarsman would have been significantly impressed by the sight of Alfred himself at the helm and ‘neither Henry VII or Henry VIII went himself to sea as Alfred did in the ships he built, taking command of them against an Enemy.’^[11]

Among the more important features of Alfred's military renaissance were his fortifications which, once again, were primarily initiated in order to bring an end to Danish mischief. The main source for the West Saxon defences is the Burghal Hidage, a document compiled at the end of Alfred's reign and which takes the form of a detailed list indicating precisely where the Anglo-Saxons created a string of burhs. Each *burh*, or defensive town, is attributed a specific number of hides, denoting the size of each military district. In all, the Burghal Hidage mentions a total of 31 fortified defences stretching across most of southern England, although many *burhs* – among them Canterbury, Dover and Rochester to the east – were not mentioned in the document. What is certain, however, is that Alfred's fortifications were based on similar networks elsewhere in Europe and that 'the Franks and migratory Danes made greater use of fortifications in warfare than the English of the ninth century.'^[12] In addition, although the distribution of burhs was extremely well-planned, 'it had been partly evolved during the stress of war.'^[13] Indeed, the fact that the defences were constructed over a number of years is reflected in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle of 892, which reveals how the Vikings attacked a 'half-built'^[14] fort on the Weald. But regardless of where Alfred received his inspiration for the burhs and how long it took for them to be constructed, it remains that the decision to implement such a system conveys the great urgency of the times. The fourth important military achievement of the late-ninth century, was the conversion of Guthrum at Eddington in 878. According to the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, after his crushing defeat Guthrum and thirty of his men went to meet Alfred at Allure, 'where the king stood sponsor to him at baptism'.^[15] On the face of it, that Alfred had managed to suppress the pagan inclinations of a leading Viking representative may only seem important to those of a decidedly Christian outlook, but this development had far more significance than that. More importantly, perhaps, it symbolised England's growing ascendancy over its heathen adversaries and, in 886, Alfred and Guthrum prepared to agree the terms of a treaty concerning a rather complex and artificial north-south divide running 'up the Thames, and then up the Lea, and along the Lea to its source, and then in a straight line to Bedford, then up the Ouse to Watling Street.'^[16] The objectives

of such a treaty were fairly honourable, in that the two leaders seemed poised to consolidate a plan based on mutual respect and equality in the eyes of the law. The fact that the treaty was never implemented, however, does not undermine or detract from the great statesmanship and diplomacy of the West Saxon king himself. Indeed, for Alfred to have reached such a unique position whereby he had the upper hand in a conference between England's indigenous home guard on the one hand and a colonial force of hostile immigrants on the other, is significant in itself. I have now examined Alfred's military achievements, but what of his intellectual triumphs?

According to Alfred's semi-residential biographer, a Welsh bishop by the name of Asser, we learn how the king developed a keen interest in literature from a very young age.^[17] It seems fairly certain that his desire to revive the art of learning amongst his contemporaries was due to the decline of English education and scholarship in general.^[18] Prior to the second half of the ninth century, education had been reserved for the privileged intellectuals of the Christian monasteries, but due in part to the continuing activities of the Danish marauders, it soon began to decline to the point where monastic life in general had completely disappeared from western Mercia and southern England.^[19] By the time Alfred came to the throne in 871, learning in general had deteriorated so thoroughly that few people were able to converse in Latin as their predecessors had done before them.^[20] This state of affairs eventually caused Alfred to take matters into his own hands.

One of Alfred's earliest attempts to initiate a literary replenishment was the translation of Gregory's *Regula Pastoralis* into English, although Stenton has suggested that 'it is not mentioned by Asser and therefore most scholars are inclined to attribute it to the year 894.'^[21] In his prose Preface to Gregory's work, Alfred explains why he decided to circulate the text in the first place. He refers to happier times when England enjoyed a golden age in her intellectual heritage. This reference is indicative of the admiration Alfred had for the culture of the seventh century, something he would have read about in Bede's *Historia Ecclesiastica*. Alfred notes that if one wanted to find literature and learning in the ninth century, one had to seek them elsewhere.

Indeed, in his own words, ‘learning had declined so thoroughly in England that there were very few men on this side of the Humber who could ... even translate a single letter from Latin into English’.^[22] Alfred goes on to warn of the spiritual chastisement which he felt had been forced upon his people, whilst historians like Simon Keynes and Michael Lapidge maintain that ‘in common with many Christian authors before him and after him, Alfred regarded the invasion of hostile peoples as a form of divine punishment for decadence and decay’.^[23] Meanwhile, in the *English Historical Review*, T.A. Shippey has suggested that Alfred is contrasting the happiness of old with the misery of his own age, but whilst this is obviously the result of the constant battles which he himself was forced to wage against the Danes, Alfred is careful to note that even ‘before everything was ransacked and burned – the churches throughout England stood filled with treasures and books’ which were never used. Alfred’s intellectual revival was also designed to be permanent and the *Regula Pastoralis* was simply the first stage in a more detailed and long-sighted plan of action. According to Shippey, Alfred’s prose Preface was written by ‘a man who knew his own mind and the extent of probable opposition to it, and a man who knew how to wheedle and when to command, like a brilliant public speaker’.^[24] Indeed, the success of Alfred’s plan has since been vindicated by the fact that no less than six manuscripts of the book still survive today.

Another of his intellectual achievements was the prose Preface to Boethius’s *Consolation of Philosophy*, which later became one of the most widely read books of the Middle Ages. The text relates to a conversation between Boethius – the central character – and Lady Philosophy. Alfred’s Preface describes how he was able to translate the book in the midst of ‘various and multifarious worldly distractions which frequently occupied him in either mind or body’^[25], an obvious reference to his ongoing struggle against the Danish menace. The reader can also detect a slight tinge of sadness in Alfred’s words, which can be attributed to the fact that his lifelong pursuit of learning was constantly interrupted by the call to arms.

As for Alfred’s own romantic conception of the defence and

propagation of the intellectual arts was concerned, his translation of Augustine's *Soliloquies* is probably the best source available to us. Alfred's own Preface employs a key metaphor with which to describe the crucial role that he has undertaken personally, and the part of the woodcutter is superbly likened to that of the cultural renovator. Just as a forest provides man with the essential materials for construction, so too the works of great thinkers such as Augustine served to 'illuminate the eyes of my mind'^[26] and bring forth a brighter future.

Another of Alfred's literary triumphs was the translation of the first fifty psalms of the Psalter, and there were also several other examples of the manner in which the king inspired others to translate Latin texts into English; among them the *Leechbook* of Bald, Werferth of Worcester's translation of Gregory's *Dialogi* and, possibly, even Orosius's *Histories Against the Pagans*. So even when Alfred was not directly involved in the propagation of learning himself, he was still inspiring others to do likewise. Indeed, Alfred's determination to create an intellectual revival even extended to the judicial sphere. As a firm believer in social justice, Alfred took it upon himself to investigate those court proceedings which had taken place in his absence, in order to ensure that the ruling officials in any given case had arrived at a just decision in the sentencing of an individual. Whenever Alfred found a discrepancy, however, he attacked his noble contemporaries for what Asser describes as having 'assumed the duties and rank of wise men [whilst having] neglected the study and exercise of wisdom'.^[27] In fact Alfred even ordered the West Saxon judiciary to 'either lay down here that exercise of earthly power which you enjoy, or to take care to apply yourselves with much greater zeal to the study of wisdom'.^[28] At this time, nearly all of the presiding ealdormen, reeves and thegns had been illiterate since childhood, but to please Alfred and his growing concern for intellectual competence, they were forced to learn 'an unwonted discipline'^[29] if they truly sought to retain their respective offices of power and influence. Asser tells us that if any man was unable to learn due to the 'great slowness of an unaccustomed mind',^[30] his son would be expected to read aloud to him both day and night. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Alfred's men suddenly acquired a mysterious

penchant for books and thus regretted being unable to have pursued a similar form of education in their own youth.^[31]

But Alfred was not alone in his attempts to encourage learning and literacy in England and he was ably assisted by several leading scholastic figures of the period, including Plegmund, Werferth, Asser and Grimbald. Alfred drew his inspiration from the European mainland, where Charlemagne – despite being unable to read – had also commissioned people to translate certain works for him; among them Alcuin of Northumbria.^[32] In addition, D.A. Bullough has pointed out that ‘the use of Latin commentaries is evidence that the extant manuscripts understate the extent to which recent Continental scholarship was available in England in the late ninth century’.^[33] In other words, Alfred’s educational regeneration programme must, at least to some degree, have been influenced by the literary works which found their way across the English Channel. The availability of such works would have indicated to him that his foreign contemporaries had reached a superior level of ability. So whilst Alfred was genuinely concerned about the educational deprivation of his own people, he was also aware that England was lagging behind somewhat.

Thus far I have attempted to identify the main military and intellectual achievements of Alfred the Great, but which of these were most significant? Firstly, it has to be said that Alfred was deeply concerned with the propagation and maintenance of English culture and, indeed, English life in general. During his reign the Vikings were causing a tremendous amount of damage to Anglo-Saxon settlements and, by fortifying such sites against potential attack, Alfred sought to create a long-term strategy which would finally deter the Danes once and for all. This strategy is best illustrated by Nicholas Brooks, who regards such a development as being in the interests of everyone. In short, if England was to remain secure against Viking attacks in the future, the whole of Anglo-Saxon society ‘had every reason to assist Alfred as best they could in creating effective burghal defences’.^[34] Similarly, an existing or prospective form of culture cannot flourish or, indeed, develop if it is constantly impeded by invading armies with little or no respect for its spiritual or temporal achievements. It was

therefore necessary to halt the process of cultural destruction, before attempting to concentrate on the nation's educational infrastructure.

But whilst Alfred's military achievements were simply a prerequisite to a more permanent intellectual revival, neither sphere must take precedence over the other. Both aspects of King Alfred's two-pronged attack upon crass ignorance and foreign barbarism were part of an overall strategy; a strategy which, due to the shortcomings of his closest advisors, meant that the destiny of England 'must therefore be initiated by the king and the king alone'.^[35] Alfred was undoubtedly the right man for the job and managed to strike an important balance between the revival of the old and the defence of the new. It remains a fortunate paradox, therefore, that King Alfred was 'one of the men of genius who discovered the obvious, and so changed the fate of mankind'.^[36]

As far as the cultural guardians and renovators of today are concerned, this statement makes clear the contemporary significance of King Alfred the Great and puts his incredible contribution towards English culture into its full perspective. In short, he understood the relationship between intelligent thought and constructive action and was, without any doubt, a true Political Soldier.

^[1] C. Warren Hollister, *Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions* (Oxford University Press, 1962), p.2.

^[2] Sir Frank Stenton, *Anglo-Saxon England* (Oxford University Press, 1971), p.291.

^[3] Hollister, op.cit., p.85.

^[4] G.N. Garmonsway (Ed.), *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* (Everyman, 1994), p.84.

^[5] Hollister, op.cit., p.86.

^[6] Garmonsway, op.cit, p.74.

^[7] Ibid., pp.77-8.

^[8] Ibid., p.78.

^[9] Ibid., p.90.

^[10] Stenton, op.cit., p.264.

^[11] R.H. Hodgkin, *A History of the Anglo-Saxons: Volume II* (Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 585.

^[12] Alfred P. Smyth, *King Alfred the Great* (Oxford University Press, 1995), p.138.

^[13] Hodgkin, op.cit., p.586.

^[14] Garmonsway, op.cit., p.85.

^[15] Ibid., p.76.

^[16] Simon Keynes & Michael Lapidge (Ed.), *Alfred the Great* (Penguin, 1985), p.171.

^[17] L.C. Jane (Ed.), *Asser's Life of King Alfred* (Chatto & Windus, 1908), p.20.

^[18] Ibid.

^[19] Peter Hunter Blair, *An Introduction to Anglo-Saxon England* (Cambridge University Press, 1962), p.172.

^[20] Ibid., p.173.

^[21] Stenton, op.cit., p.273.

^[22] Keynes & Lapidge, op.cit., p.125.

^[23] Ibid., p.275.

^[24] T.A. Shippey, *English Historical Review* (1979), Volume 94, pp.346-55.

^[25] Shippey, op.cit.

^[26] Ibid., p.139.

^[27] L.C. Jane, op.cit., p.89.

^[28] Keynes & Lapidge, op.cit., p.131.

^[29] Ibid., p.90.

^[30] Ibid.

^[31] Ibid., pp.90-1.

^[32] Douglas Woodruff, *The Life and Times of Alfred the Great* (Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1974), p.140.

^[33] D.A. Bullough, *Carolingian Renewal: Sources and Heritage* (Manchester University Press, 1991), p.301.

^[34] Nicholas Brooks, *The Early History of the Church of Canterbury* (Leicester University Press, 1984), p.154.

^[35] Hodgkin, op.cit., p.6.

^[36] Ibid., p.673.

CHAPTER TWO

ROBERT OWEN: WELSH RADICAL & CO-OPERATIVE POWER

IT is no secret that the term ‘Socialism’ has been hijacked by the Left. Indeed, once we transcend the contemporary Marxist blur of ideological dogma, minority rights and concomitant gender-bending, one soon discovers that the true definition of the term relates to ‘a political and economic theory of social organisation which advocates [that] the community as a whole should own and control the means of production, distribution and exchange.’^[1] Writing as a National-Anarchist, or someone who believes in a fusion of Anarchist principles and racial separatism, I am always eager to distance myself from those ‘Socialists’ who advocate a property-less form of nationalisation (i.e. State-owned Capitalism) and instead, declare my support for the redistribution of wealth in a more decentralist context. But let’s examine what was meant by ‘Socialism’ in the very beginning.

The first individual to use the term ‘Socialism’, was none other than Robert Owen, in 1817, although he certainly had no sympathy with ‘attempts to foster class hatred’^[2] and promoted the notion of a moral rebirth; a concept which most Left-wing historians – among them the late E.P. Thompson^[3] – have found rather difficult to account for in their deceitful attempts to equate early Socialism with Marxism.

Owen was born in Montgomeryshire in 1771 and, by the time he was ten years old, was apprenticed to a draper at Stamford. After working in London, he raised enough money to establish a mill in Manchester and, by 1800, had become a partner in a Scottish mill at New Lanark.

By this time, Owen was emerging as a great industrialist, but he was far different to the prevailing Capitalists and economists of his age. According to G.D.H. Cole:

‘In Owen’s view Man was ever the creature of his environment. But, so far from drawing the moral that men should leave these forces of nature to operate free and uncontrolled, Owen demanded that their emergence demanded conscious and deliberate regulation in the common interest. The new forces, he

insisted, were not individual but social forces; they were replacing the individual producer, making a thing with the work of his own hands, by a collaborating group of producers, who must work together in designed harmony in order to achieve a good result. Competition was of the essence of the old order, and not of the new. The vital principle of this new industrialism must be Co-operation.’^[4]

During the Nineteenth century, England was gradually becoming influenced by the destructive effects of the 1789 French Revolution, a Masonic conspiracy chiefly propagated by the Jacobins and the London Corresponding Society’s mass dissemination of Thomas Paine’s *Rights of Man*. However, this left Owen:

‘... utterly unmoved because he conceived of the world of politics as no more than an emanation from the real world of economic relationships. In this, though he proclaimed no Materialist Conception of History, he essentially anticipated Marx.’^[5]

At New Lanark, Owen – despite making his fortune – was only really interested in helping the poor and put his profits into a series of radical experiments. He was appalled by the inhuman working and living conditions of his century and, in 1813, published *A New View of Society*, which became the blueprint of the Co-operative Movement.

In order to combat rising unemployment and the awful poverty suffered by the working classes, Owen proposed that the State, local authorities or groups of private philanthropists set up ‘Villages of Co-operation’ based upon his own experiments at New Lanark, in order to find work for the poor and provide for their moral and material regeneration. Owen believed that such communities would serve as centres of social life, rational education and productive activity. He also maintained that they should be agricultural as well as industrial and, whilst being entirely self-supportive, should seek to trade with one another by exchanging surplus goods. This idea was known as ‘the Plan’ and is the fundamental component of genuine Socialism and Co-operation.

New Lanark was the springboard from which Owen’s Socialism was

launched, and sweeping changes began to take place in and around the local community. For many years the poor had been living in filthy, cramped conditions and Owen set about enlarging the houses of his workforce. Up until this time, local residents frequently dumped their waste in the streets, but Owen organised refuse collection and even built new streets. To ensure health, he urged his workers to appoint a visiting committee, which maintained the standards of cleanliness and domestic economy.

Owen then directed his attention to the factory itself and, by seeking out those who had influence among the workers, slowly transformed their lives. It was said that ‘the childlike simplicity of Owen’s own character’⁶ made him increasingly popular. He refused to employ young children, limited working hours for adults and gave people better wages, even establishing a Co-operative store. In addition, Owen began to erect schools, playgrounds and lecture halls where both children and adults could receive the finest education he could provide for them.

In 1824, Owen had become so disillusioned with Capitalism and the English ruling class and its refusal to accept his new economic proposals, that he left for America. For five years, Owen attempted to establish a Socialist community at New Harmony in Indiana, but his efforts were in vain. Owen had contended that, for the first three years, the community should remain under his control and a Constitution was drawn up for this very purpose. However, such a Constitution involved elections and representative government, which many community members felt were opposed to the free-spirited principles of New Harmony itself. Eventually, there was a split in the community – albeit very amicable – which resulted in two separate groups of settlers.

The community also became divided as a result of religious, social and racial differences and, whilst Owen had mistakenly been led to believe that America represented a new world of universal brotherhood, he soon realised that natural developments were responsible for the fact that New Harmony gradually changed from a communal to an individualistic community. This trend towards individual free-spiritedness is clear evidence of the basic flaws in the universalist vision and Owen’s community therefore split into a number of separate

societies rather similar to the old Guild System of the Middle Ages. Owen was later forced to admit that:

‘... experience proved that the attempt was premature to unite a number of strangers not previously educated for the purpose, who should carry on extensive operations for their common interest, and live together as a common family.’^[7]

When he returned to England in 1829, Owen was surprised to discover that a movement had sprung up in his name and ‘Owenites’ were engaged in laying the foundations for the Co-operative Movement. ‘The New Society is to be based’, explained the pioneers, ‘on the free association of producers in guilds and manufacturing societies strong enough to dispense with employers and with the exploitation of labour for private profit.’^[8]

Owen soon became the leader of this growing support for Co-operation and, in 1834, founded the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union (GNCTU) in order to continue the struggle for better wages and conditions within the prevailing Capitalist system of his day. Despite acquiring half a million workers, the GNCTU lasted just nine months, due to a series of fierce differences between Owen himself and two of the Union’s most prominent members, Smith and Morrison. Apart from the sectarianism, Owen was also angered by their promotion of class hatred within the pages of the GNCTU’s main publication, *The Pioneer*, and the Owenite Co-operative Movement’s *Crisis* journal: ‘All the individuals now living are the suffering victims of this accursed system, and all are objects of pity...’^[9]

Robert Owen subsequently ceased publication of *Crisis* and with the death of the GNCTU came the temporary demise of Co-operation itself. The anti-Capitalist agitation that Owen had helped to build up during the first half of the nineteenth century was soon conveniently (for the industrialists) diverted towards the proto-Marxian Chartist movement.

Charles Kingsley and the Christian Socialists managed to keep the Co-operative ideal alive to some extent and retail trading along producer Co-operative lines was still being practiced in certain areas – like Carlisle, for example – but Co-operation was to slowly fizzle out

until 1844, when the Rochdale Equitable Pioneers (REP) set up the first Co-operative store in Toad Lane.

Sadly, although the REP began life as orthodox Owenites, the basic economic principles of Robert Owen himself were soon swept under the carpet. Indeed, according to G.D.H. Cole:

‘... though Co-operators pay tribute to Owen as the founder of their system, it is more than doubtful whether Owen, if he could revisit the earth, would recognise his progeny, or take more than a passing interest in its growth. Owenism led on to consumers’ Co-operation as we know it almost by accident; the interesting question is how far consumers’ Co-operation in its further development will be led on to the reassertion of the Socialist principles from which it has sprung.’^[10]

Since these words were written in 1965, what most people regard as the chief exponent of ‘Co-operation’ in the United Kingdom today – i.e., the Co-op supermarket – is in fact just another Capitalist conglomerate. In 1988, its total retail sales matched those of Sainsbury and Tesco, and today, the Co-op makes around £10 billion a year in profits^[11] and recently swallowed up the Somerfield chain, too.

Although the REP began as genuine practitioners of Co-operation, they only concentrated on those principles which did not come into conflict with the existing Capitalist system. Today, the old Toad Street shop is a museum, attracting more than 7,000 visitors every year. Unfortunately, however, the museum represents little more than a smokescreen for the Capitalist businessmen of the modern Co-op industry, who frequently point to their ‘Socialist’ roots.

Meanwhile, if anyone doubts the role that the Left has played in the attempt to nullify the Co-operative Movement, we need only refer to Colin Ward’s comments in the 17th June 1994 issue of *New Statesman* magazine:

‘Sidney and Beatrice Webb used their influence in the Labour Party to turn British Socialists against them [Co-operatives], the demand for workers’ control of production was slowly squeezed out of the Co-operative Movement. Consequently it had to be re-

invented with the Industrial Common Ownership Act of 1976, and there are people around who insist that experiments in that decade by the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in promoting Workers' Co-operatives to take over dying industries, were introduced by the Labour Government of those years simply in order to discredit the Co-operative ideal.'^[12]

In 1858, Robert Owen passed away and, shortly afterwards in 1864, the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) was formed in Manchester. The fact that Capitalist subsequently tolerated – and even encouraged – the existence of the CWS is proof of its fraudulent nature: 'Victorian Co-operation, aimed at making its peace with the Capitalist order even while it protected the workers against its worst abuses.'^[13]

May 1994 marked the 150th Anniversary of the CWS and the managing director of the Co-operative Bank (a CWS subsidiary), Terry Thomas, unveiled a statue of Robert Owen in central Manchester, declaring that 'Owen should be seen as a guru of the 1990s at a time when Adam Smith of the Right and Karl Marx of the Left have both lost much of their esteem.'^[14]

These words were certainly very accurate and Owen does have much to offer us today, but he would hardly have approved of the Co-operative Bank and its usurious practices which, by 1993, the previous year, had earned its directors a cool £17.8 million in pre-tax profits. Today, modern Co-op supermarkets are just as exploitative and greedy as their rivals and far from 'protecting the workers', make great use of cheap labour.

Owen was obviously far more of a reformist than a revolutionary political agitator – there is no question about that – but his pioneering ideas can still teach us a great deal today. Although Owen made some mistakes and was commonly dismissed as a 'Utopian', the main economic principles of 'the Plan' still exist as part of an all-embracing economic programme today. Indeed, a similar form of the programme is practised by the Mondragon project in the Basque country, an initiative which involves the manufacturing of products as diverse as machine tools and cookers, furniture and car spares. In the European

Union (EU), meanwhile, around one million people are employed in over 50,000 Co-operatives, many of them based in northern Italy, where they are encouraged with government funding. There are over 1,500 in the British Isles, too, where over 10,000 people work in Co-operatives.

To conclude, Co-operation is a crucial means by which all right-thinking opponents of Capitalist exploitation and injustice will help to give ordinary people a real stake in the fruits of their labour. It seems only right to end this biographical account with the words of Robert Owen himself:

‘Can those who profess a sincere desire to improve the condition of the poor and working classes longer refuse to examine a proposal which, on the most rational grounds, promises them ample relief, accompanied with unmixed good to every other part of society?’^[15]

^[1] J.B. Sykes (Ed.), *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* (Guild Publishing, 1982), p.1006.

^[2] A.W. Palmer, *The Penguin Dictionary of Modern History* (Penguin, 1978), p.244.

^[3] E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (Penguin, 1991), pp.864-5.

^[4] G.D.H. Cole, *The Life of Robert Owen* (Frank Cass & Co., 1965), pp.4-5.

^[5] *Ibid.*, p.11.

^[6] *Ibid.*, p.105.

^[7] Robert Owen (Ed.), *New Harmony Gazette*, Vol. iii, p.204.

^[8] G.D.H. Cole, *op. cit.*, p.29.

^[9] James Morrison (Ed.), ‘The Legacy of Robert Owen’ in *The Pioneer*, 29th March 1834.

^[10] G.D.H. Cole, *op.cit.*, p.304.

^[11] Clive Woodcock, ‘High Street’s Sleeping Giant Stirs’ in *The Guardian*, 28th May 1994, p.37.

^[12] Colin Ward, *New Statesman*, 17th June 1994.

^[13] Martin Halsall, ‘Commercial Miracle Was Inspired By “Guru for the 90s”’ in *The Guardian*, 28th May 1994, p.37.

^[14] Norman Smith, *Peace Dividend in New Statesman & Society*, 17th June 1994, p.xiv.

^[15] Robert Owen, *A New View of Society* (Everyman’s Library, 1963), p.298.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FISCHER CONTROVERSY: EXAMINING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

ANY truly effective study of the so-called ‘Fischer Controversy’ must begin with a thorough examination of the various factors which actually preceded the start of the First World War. Secondly, it must examine the German and Marxist interpretations of the conflict before going on to study Fritz Fischer’s own controversial thesis. Finally, this essay will conclude by either rejecting or validating the claim that Germany was deliberately planning the First World War prior to the eventual outbreak of hostilities in 1914.

The origins of the First World War have been an object of fascination for generations of historians, many of whom have portrayed the War as an inevitable development whereby an old imperialistic empire finally clashed with the emerging force of the new democracies. Others have been susceptible to the myth that pre-war Europe represented the last real age of political, social and economic stability. This latter view is far from realistic and, despite what many monarchists think of the wholesale destruction of the Austro-Hungarian dynasty, there can be no doubt that by employing an effective system of historical analysis we soon find that daily life in Germany can be shown to have been woefully inadequate and literally crying out for change.

But unfortunately, whilst attempts to apportion blame for the First World War are part of the inevitable process of coming to terms with what was arguably the most horrific and destructive war in recent history, such efforts do seem to avoid recognising that there were a great many factors involved. However, despite her long-term desire for glory upon the European stage, Germany was certainly not unique in terms of being imperialistic and the First World War was – inevitably – a penultimate clash between several aspiring empires and alliances. Apart from the might of the Austro-Hungarian dynasty, the early part of the Twentieth century saw the full emergence of the Ottoman Empire and Russia was also evolving into a strong European power. In

addition, Britain and France represented a rising liberal-democratic alliance. So whilst war does seem to have been inevitable, in recent years historians have tried to account for its actual origins by seeking to blame one nation in particular. Indeed, in the direct aftermath of the conflict Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles was specifically designed to shift the blame for the war onto German shoulders, although the German nation refused to accept its own complicity and 'signed the Treaty only under duress'.^[1] In addition, long after the Kaiser's abdication in 1918, textbooks published in German secondary schools during the 1920's continued to reject the terms of the Treaty, claiming that 'every informed person inside and outside Germany knows that Germany is absolutely innocent with regard to the outbreak of war. Russia, France and England wanted war and unleashed it'.^[2]

Even Marxists have refused to denounce the German nation for what many perceive as her characteristic warmongering attitude, preferring instead to blame the squabbling participants of a wider Capitalist charade. Indeed, when Lenin published a pamphlet in 1916 entitled *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, he pointed out that the war in 1914 had been caused by 'economic rivalries generated by cliques of highly-organised financial monopolies and cartels putting pressure on their respective governments'.^[3] Whatever one may think of Communism, in the circumstances the main thrust of Lenin's frank analysis does appear to be reasonably viable.

With regard to the Treaty of Versailles and the implication that Germany alone was responsible for the cataclysmic events of 1914, A.J.P. Taylor was rather less sympathetic towards England's wartime opponents. Taylor believed that a warmongering bloodlust fed by traditional Prussianism was something especially particular to the German psyche. On the other hand, the study of the First World War was not an area in which Taylor excelled and, perhaps due to his reputation as 'a sentimental populist',^[4] he had no access to the German archives and based his wild assertions on character assassination rather than upon the consequences of German decision-making. But as the 'war guilt' controversy continued to rage, it was not until the early 1960s that a concise argument supporting the theory of German

culpability finally emerged.

In 1961 a certain Fritz Fischer published his *Griff Nach der Weltmacht (Germany's Aims in the First World War)*, in which he sought to provide strong documentary evidence illustrating Germany's secret plans for military confrontation. The fact that a native German had attempted to blame his own Fatherland for starting the First World War led to a huge storm of controversy. Fischer's book created an outcry and he was vigorously attacked for being unpatriotic. Fischer's first claim alluded to the fact that Germany had hoped that a conflict in Europe would arise from her decision to back Austria against the Serbians. Prior to 1914, the Serbians harboured their own imperialistic dreams and, as Slavs, looked to their co-racialist Russian allies for support. As the conflict in the Balkans began to escalate with Serbia asserting her supremacy over the whole region, the situation finally erupted with the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. However, Fischer did not believe that this incident was the actual cause of the Great War itself, but simply the trigger. The cataclysmic events which took place in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, led – in Fischer's opinion – to a precalculated chain of events. His unique thesis hinted at a programme which had been drafted in anticipation of an eventual German victory. This is where Fischer's vital documentary evidence comes in.

By clearly unearthing and then subsequently publishing Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg's infamous 'September Programme', Fischer was able to demonstrate that Germany was indeed not only preparing to mobilise for war, but also had a desire for all-out war itself. On 9 September 1914, Bethmann Hollweg, the German Chancellor, had stated that the general aim of the War was the stability of the German Reich and that 'for this purpose France must be so weakened as to make her revival as a great power impossible for all time. Russia must be thrust back as far as possible from Germany's eastern frontier and her domination of the non-Russian vassal peoples broken.'^[5] The 'September Programme' went on to suggest that parts of France were to be annexed and, more importantly, that Belgium must 'be reduced to a vassal state'.^[6] The significance of Bethmann Hollweg's reference to

Belgium soon becomes very clear if one considers her invaluable role in the Schlieffen Plan.

The Schlieffen Plan was the basis of the German attack in the West during 1914. At this time, France and Russia had a pact in which both nations agreed to fight on the same side. The Schlieffen Plan was specifically designed to counteract the potential for a war on two fronts and this is precisely why Bethmann Hollweg had suggested that France be dealt with first. However, in order to attack France and fulfil its Parisian objectives, the Plan required the German Army to advance through neutral Belgian territory. When Belgium refused to permit German troops onto her soil, the Germans used force and promised to release the country after Germany's strategic objectives had been carried out. This, however, was a rather transparent promise given that the German Chancellor wanted to make Belgium entirely subservient to the expanding German Empire. Needless to say, the initial Belgian refusal had deprived Germany of her diplomatic strength and therefore Britain and France each declared war.

Despite the fact that Germany's original Schlieffen Plan had actually fallen short of its objectives, Fischer's controversial allegations – made public almost fifty years later – led to a storm of protest from his academic contemporaries. An attempt was made to ban him from the archives, and his funding was withdrawn by the angry German establishment. Fischer's opponents claimed that his work was based on 'allegedly suspect theories and concepts'^[2] and that the 'September Programme' was not as important as Fischer would have the world believe. It was argued that Germany was forced into making preparations for war in order to defend herself against the alliance of France, Russia and Britain. But, as Rohl correctly states, Fischer's opponents 'seemed only dimly aware that this position implied the admission that Germany had begun war deliberately against France and Russia'.^[8]

In order to further strengthen the argument against his critics, in 1969 Fischer published a second book entitled *War of Illusions*. This book was even more controversial, in that it concentrated specifically upon the earlier period of 1911-14. In this book, Fischer argued that

Germany had planned to expand its military capabilities at a War Council meeting held as early as 1912. By examining an entry in Admiral von Müller's diary for 8 December 1912, Fischer was able to show that Admiral Tirpitz – Kaiser Wilhelm II's naval secretary – had suggested that work on the Kiel Canal be completed as soon as possible and that Germany's fleet of U-boats be increased immediately. Furthermore, the Chief of the General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, stated that in his opinion 'war is unavoidable. But we must do more through the press to prepare the popularity of a war against Russia'.¹⁹¹ However, it was Tirpitz himself who uttered what was to become the most damning indictment of German war guilt, demanding in no uncertain terms that there be a brief 'postponement of the great fight for one-and-a-half years',¹⁹¹ with the Kaiser only agreeing to such a postponement very reluctantly. During Muller's account of the 1912 War Council, there is no mention of any military representative verbally opposing such suggestions and those present seemed pretty confirmed in their respective warlike aspirations. On the contrary, the German military leadership – for no politicians were allowed to attend – was more concerned with temporarily delaying hostilities in order to 'justify' any subsequent call to arms and thus portray Germany as an innocent victim of external forces beyond her control. Fischer's intelligent use of Muller's diary, however, is validated by the writings of Hopman, Leuckart, Wenninger and Claparede; all of which correspond to an incredible degree.

Fischer certainly made one thing clear in his re-evaluation of the origins of the First World War. From that moment on German mobilisation increased at an alarming rate, giving even further credence to Fischer's confirmed belief that Archduke Ferdinand's symbolic assassination in Sarajevo – precisely twenty-one months later (and only three months after Tirpitz's suggested postponement) – was merely the final pretext for all-out war. It is also interesting to note that the widening of the Kiel Canal was completed just a few days before the assassination took place.

To conclude, it certainly seems as though Fritz Fischer's controversial thesis is correct and that Kaiser Wilhelm II did indeed

embark upon ‘a long-term bid to secure world power status by using Tirpitz’s battlefleet plan as a lever to effect a revolutionary shift in the global balance of power in Germany’s favour’.^[11] Most notably, the 1914 Schlieffen Plan was masterminded by a man who had earlier attended the 1912 War Council which, in light of Fischer’s penetrating analysis, may be regarded as the forerunner of the Schlieffen Plan itself. The man was Helmuth von Moltke who, almost certainly, shared the militaristic aims of his fellow war councillors. In addition, as if further proof of Fischer’s claims were really needed, it is worth mentioning two final sources which validate his thesis beyond any doubt. Firstly, on 31 December 1911, the Crown Prince wrote to his father – the Kaiser – that ‘as a result of quiet and careful reflection’,^[12] he was hoping that the New Year would bring war. Secondly, when Rudolf von Valentini – head of the Kaiser’s Civil Cabinet – was invited to dine at the New Palace in Potsdam on July 30th, 1914, he consequently noted in his diary that ‘all were full of *kriegslust*’.^[13]

As Fritz Fischer wrote himself: ‘There is no doubt that the war which the German politicians started in July 1914 was not a preventive war fought out of fear and despair. It was an attempt to defeat the enemy powers before they became too strong, and to realise Germany’s political ambitions which may be summed up as German hegemony over Europe.’^[14] If Fischer’s definitive analysis is combined with Lenin’s own assertion that the First World War was really a battle between the grasping forces of Capitalism, it becomes certain that future generations of historians now have a strong framework of truth in which to use their continuing efforts to try and understand the dark forces which unleashed the Twentieth century’s most terrible example of orchestrated destruction.

^[1] Ruth Henig; ‘The Origins of the First World War: The Historical Debate’ in *History Review* (Issue 18, 1994), p. 36.

^[2] William Simpson; *Hitler and Germany* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 26.

^[3] William Simpson; *Hitler and Germany* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 26.

^[4] Ruth Henig, op. cit., pp. 37-8.

^[5] Norman Stone; ‘Warts and All: A Rude Historian of Genius’ in *The Sunday Times*, April 2nd, 1995.

^[6] John C. G. Rohl; ‘Imperial Germany Part One: The Riddle of 1914’ in *Modern History Review* (No. 1, Vol. 2, 1990), p. 9.

[\[7\]](#) Ibid.

[\[8\]](#) Ibid.

[\[9\]](#) Ibid., p. 10.

[\[10\]](#) John C. G. Rohl; 'Imperial Germany Part Two: The Riddle of 1914' in *Modern History Review* (No. 2, Vol. 2, 1990), p. 10.

[\[11\]](#) Ibid., p. 11.

[\[12\]](#) Ibid., p. 12.

[\[13\]](#) Ibid.

[\[14\]](#) Fritz Fischer; *War of Illusions: German Policies From 1911 to 1914* (Chatto & Windus, 1975), p. 470.

CHAPTER FOUR

WHAT WAS SO DISTINCTIVE ABOUT THE RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIK PARTY?

IN order to address the nature of the Russian Bolshevik Party as fully as possible it is necessary to examine the political, social and economic situation in Russia prior to the actual emergence of the Bolshevik Party itself. I will then look at the failure of liberalism in Russia before going on to study the most distinctive features of Bolshevism.

It has been said that throughout the age of Western Capitalism, Russia was little more than ‘an economic backwater’.^[1] However, after the turbulent upheavals of the 1905 Revolution and the determination of rich landowners to ‘reject peasant demands, crush rural disorder, and drastically reduce popular representation in the Duma’,^[2] tsarist Russia began to progress towards a bourgeois-capitalist State similar to that of her Western neighbours. Indeed, in April 1906 a mainly French banking syndicate granted Nicholas II’s government a loan of 2,250 million francs,^[3] although even this huge sum was unable to prevent Russia’s imminent slide into all-out war and, ultimately, further debt.

As usual it was the working classes and the peasantry which suffered most under the old regime, and poverty and hardship were commonplace. Only severe repression on the part of the police, the Cossacks and the army could keep the lid on the boiling pot of human misery and dissatisfaction. The reactionary nature of Russia’s monarchist autocracy and its political and economic mismanagement of the Russian State, was to culminate in the 1917 Revolution and the rise of the dictatorial Bolshevik regime. Quite simply, the Tsar – raised and sustained upon a bed of comparative luxury – was out of touch with the basic needs of the common people. First and foremost the Revolution was a fierce protest against social injustice, regardless of the seemingly innocent beast that was poised to evolve into a far worse nightmare for the Russian people. According to Dietrich Geyer, ‘when the old regime finally collapsed, few people in Russia could have remembered a time when there had been a feeling of security, of

unbroken confidence and faith'.^[4]

Ever since the 1789 French Revolution, or so it would seem, any truly successful deployment of revolutionary activity has served as an epigraph to the failure of liberalism. The fact that Russia did not manage to climb aboard the liberal bandwagon driven by her progressive European neighbours, is mostly due to the vast unrest which I have described above. Edward Acton wrote that, in light of such devastating conditions, 'there was little chance of evolving liberal institutions and a legal order through which social conflict could be peacefully resolved'.^[5] Although liberalism found support among the Russian middle-classes at the turn of the century, its adherents were deeply divided along ethnic and cultural lines, being unable to win support for their reforms 'either from the economically powerful upper classes or from the numerically powerful masses'.^[6] Another reason is that penitent aristocrats were 'right out of touch with and rather afraid of the real peasants.'^[7] Such weaknesses proved invaluable to the opportunistic designs of the incoming Bolshevik Party and the thugs of the NKVD and CHEKA which characterised its ruthless, one-party dictatorship.

In 1903, the Marxist Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party (formed in 1898) split into two distinct factions: the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. At first it seemed as though the dispute was due to conflicting opinions on the definition of party membership. Lenin believed that Party members should be activists, whilst his opponents wanted to assume an essentially passive role. Eventually, Lenin managed to persuade most Social-Democrats to join him in the forming of a new party – the Bolsheviks (Majoritarians) – whilst those remaining were to become known as the Mensheviks (Minoritarians). In 1912, the Bolsheviks established a separate Central Committee at the Prague Congress.

However, despite the official view, the resulting factionalism was due to a series of far deeper and significantly more ideological reasons. Whilst the Mensheviks represented the more moderate wing of the Communist movement and believed in a transitory process of

‘scientific evolutionary Marxism, according to which society would evolve through certain stages, the penultimate one being advanced capitalism, before the emergence first of socialism, then of Communism’,^[8] Lenin and his Bolsheviks propagated the view that revolutionary change could only spring from a move away from the mass movement. In other words, the Bolsheviks had a different approach in that they were advocating the supremacy of quality over quantity, calling ‘for a small group of hard men, dedicated revolutionaries, who would lead the masses’.^[9] The ideological and strategic awareness of Bolshevism that its adherents had a totally different perception of the time-scale needed to implement Communist revolution to that of their Menshevik rivals. It was Trotsky who came to develop the theory of permanent, or uninterrupted revolution. By complete contrast the Mensheviks found such an idea wholly repugnant, comparing Lenin to the murderers of the French Revolution. Lenin himself, however, with his ‘ruthless maximalism and his dismissal of the wishy-washy and the sentimental’,^[10] saw the Mensheviks as being nothing more than a coterie of weak intellectuals. Indeed, such anti-intellectualism was to become the very basis for a whole catalogue of State-sanctioned murders which took place during the course of a subsequent chapter of Bolshevik misrule, now known as the Red Terror.

The beginnings of Bolshevism date from around 1903, soon after the publication of Lenin’s inflammatory pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* In it, Lenin established the concept that ‘the idea of class consciousness’^[11] came from outside the working class. Lenin believed in the formation of a new type of political party, one which incorporated his view that ‘the bourgeoisie has “ideology” whereas the working class has “consciousness”’.^[12] In other words, by taking into account the European liberals of the Nineteenth century, Lenin perceived that ‘the liberal intelligentsia could never be more than half-hearted revolutionaries, that they would sell out to tsarism as soon as they had attained their minimum objectives.’^[13] Furthermore, Lenin believed that socialism was something which had to be introduced into the proletariat’s class struggle by ideologists.^[14] Indeed, given that many Leftist commentators

see the French Revolution as a bourgeois phenomenon, it is not difficult to see why the Bolshevik Party was so distinctive when compared to the administrative shortcomings of its liberal predecessors. However, by its very definition the Bolshevik Party was a multifarious entity.

One of Bolshevism's key features was the marked ethnicity of its chief protagonists. In 1918, the Bolshevik Party was controlled almost entirely by revolutionary cadres of Jewish (Khazar) extraction. According to Robert Wilton, the Russian correspondent for the *Times* newspaper, 'out of 556 important functionaries of the Bolshevik State, there were in 1918-1919, 17 Russians, 2 Ukrainians, 11 Armenians, 35 Letts, 15 Germans, 1 Hungarian, 10 Georgians, 3 Poles, 3 Finns, 1 Czech, 1 Karaim, 457 Jews. If the reader is astonished to find the Jewish hand everywhere in the affair of the assassination of the Russian Imperial Family, he must bear in mind the formidable numerical preponderance of Jews in the Soviet administration.'^[15] Wilton's remarks are validated by Hilaire Belloc, who, in 1937, wrote that, 'As for anyone that does not know that the present revolutionary Bolshevist movement is Jewish in Russia, I can only say that he must be a man who is taken in by the suppressions of our deplorable press.'^[16] Sir Winston Churchill also noted the decidedly Jewish character of Bolshevism in the *Illustrated Sunday Herald* of February 8th, 1920, when he said, 'There is no need to exaggerate the part played in the creation of Bolshevism and in the actual bringing about of the Russian Revolution by these international and for the most part atheistical Jews. It is certainly a very great one; it probably outweighs all others.'^[17]

Another distinguishing aspect of the Bolshevik Party was its tendency towards violence and the elimination of political opponents. Even without the 19,000,000 labour camp deaths between 1921 and 1960^[18], the 1,500,000 Stalinist purges,^[19] the 7,000,000 deaths caused by the disaster of the first Five Year Plan^[20] or the 3,000,000 murders of 'class enemies' and minorities,^[21] there were still around 1,500,000 fatalities as a result of the 1917 Revolution and the ensuing Civil War.^[22] Without doubt, the price that was paid by the Russian people in

pursuit of Communist ‘liberation’ was absolutely devastating. In Communist terminology, the end justifies the means and Lenin himself wrote frequently of the need for violent struggle. In 1908 he praised ‘real nation-wide terror, which reinvigorates the country and through which the great French Revolution achieved glory’.^[23] On the eve of the October 1917 seizure of power, Lenin demanded the extermination of his enemies: ‘Not a single revolutionary government can dispense with the death penalty for the exploiters.’^[24] And again, on January 27th, 1918: ‘Speculators will be shot: we can achieve nothing unless we use terror.’^[25] Furthermore, Lenin urged his followers to ‘apply mass terror immediately, to execute and exterminate hundreds of prostitutes, drunken soldiers, former officers, etc.’^[26] In the wake of the Bolshevik victory, Mayakovsky had likened the defeat of tsarism to a ‘chewed stump of a fag; we spat their dynasty out’.^[27] But the violence did not end with the Bolshevik Party’s control of the State. Indeed, its new powers were to become a springboard from which even greater atrocities were to be orchestrated in the years to come.

The Bolsheviks were also distinctive in that it claimed to have developed a unique economic response to the social catastrophe which had been the hallmark of the outgoing tsarist regime. According to Lionel Kochan, both during and after the Bolshevik victory of 1917 the Russian countryside began to experience ‘a genuine and immense agrarian revolution’.^[28] Peasants had started to expropriate the large rural estates and, by March 1919, ‘virtually all the usable land was in peasant hands. The peasants were not socialists, of course; but it was this elemental movement that was indispensable to the victory of Bolshevism’.^[29] At the 10th Party Congress in 1921, the prospects for international revolution looked very bleak indeed and Lenin turned instead to a modification of the domestic sphere, unveiling his New Economic Policy (NEP). The NEP represented ‘an attempt to dismantle the economic structures and policies that had brought Soviet citizens to the brink of despair’,^[30] and was Lenin’s way of making peace with the Russian peasantry. On the other hand, by asking peasants to pay a tax in kind (in this case with grain) the NEP represented a complete *volte-face* and was quite detached from the former Bolshevik policy of grain

requisition. Lenin's NEP now allowed peasants to sell their surplus on the open market, something completely alien to the Bolshevik Party's alleged commitment to anti-capitalist 'egalitarianism'. In the words of one historian, the NEP soon 'provoked fresh political disagreements and social tensions, paving the way for Stalinist collectivisation and terror'.^[31]

The Communists of the early Bolshevik Party, who, like their Capitalist counterparts had their roots in ideological materialism, were also noted for initiating a sustained and vigorous assault upon religion and spirituality. At the turn of the century, Lunacharskii had founded a movement known as 'God-building'. This new concept 'sought to replace traditional religion with human solidarity, with mankind itself as the object of worship'.^[32] When Lunacharskii became the Bolshevik regime's so-called Commissar of Enlightenment a decade later, he set about raising Science above Religion and developing 'a Communist surrogate cult with its own divinities, saints and rituals'.^[33] Lenin, however, saw religion as a pillar of class society and preferred to undermine it through the promotion of atheism rather than by crude imitation. The Bolsheviks particularly abhorred organised religion and the Russian Orthodox Church came in for special attention, with Communists believing that it was 'the last fragment of the political organisation of the defeated classes still surviving'.^[34] Eventually, the powers of the Church were curtailed by the abolition of State subsidies and the confiscation of its property. Monasteries were also destroyed or converted into purely secular administrative centres, and atheistic propaganda replaced traditional Christian teaching in Russian schools. However, these deliberate attacks were counter-productive and totally unable to prevent Russian Christianity and its Nationalist and Monarchic followers from organising themselves into an effective anti-Communist underground. In fact the Bolsheviks were never able to deter the faith of the peasantry and those in rural areas remained loyally devoted to Christianity, a fact which – coupled with the brutal agenda of the Party – seemingly justified their eventual slaughter. Similarly, by 1926 one observer concluded that the Church had emerged victorious from her conflict with the Communists: 'The only

thing the Bolsheviks had achieved was to loosen the hierarchy and split the Church.’^[35]

To conclude, it has been found that the Bolshevik Party was distinctive for its belief in vanguardism, a matter which inevitably split the Social-Democratic movement in two. Lenin and his followers were unwilling to engage in transitory political reform and chose to take up arms and attempt to change Russian society with force and determination, rather than with patience or diplomacy. Bolshevism was also opposed to intellectualism, or at least to the separation of political thought and political action. The cadres of the Bolshevik Party were mostly Jewish (Khazar), although its leadership purported to defend the interests of the Russian proletariat. The Party itself was noted for its violence and expressed a great deal of atheistic hostility towards organised Christianity. In addition, the Bolshevik Party has been lauded for the implementation of Lenin’s NEP, despite the programme’s subsequent failure and gradual dismemberment as Bolshevism evolved into Stalinism. But despite the agitation and brutality which followed closely on the heels of the Russian Revolution, the true insurrectionary nature of the Bolshevik Party remains debatable. Whilst Lenin certainly espoused a great deal of inflammatory rhetoric, one academic has written that far from actually seizing power in Russia, the Bolsheviks ‘had found it lying in the street and picked it up. The greater task, that of establishing a new order in the country, still lay ahead of them’.^[36] On the other hand, the Bolshevik Party had its own plans for Russia which, according to Pope Pius XI, meant the propagation of ‘a doctrine destructive of the foundations of civil society and subversive of social order; a doctrine which refuses to acknowledge the true origin of the State, its nature and purpose; which repudiates and denies the rights, the dignity, and the freedom of the human person’.^[37]

^[1] Christopher Hill; *Lenin and the Russian Revolution* (English Universities Press, 1967), p. 4.

^[2] Edward Acton; *From Tsarism to Communism in History Review #17* (December, 1993), p. 35.

^[3] Christopher Hill, op. cit., p. 13.

^[4] Dietrich Geyer; *The Russian Revolution* (Berg, 1987), p. 15.

^[5] Edward Acton, op. cit., p. 35.

^[6] Ibid.

- [7] Christopher Hill, op. cit., p. 6.
- [8] Alex de Jonge; *Stalin and the Shaping of the Soviet Union* (Collins, 1986), p. 53.
- [9] Ibid., p. 54.
- [10] Ibid.
- [11] Richard Sakwa; *Soviet Communists in Power* (Macmillan, 1988), p. 8.
- [12] Ibid.
- [13] Christopher Hill, op. cit., p. 55.
- [14] Robert Conquest; *The Politics of Ideas in the USSR* (The Bodley Head, 1967), p. 15.
- [15] Robert Wilton; *Les Derniers Jours des Romanof* (Thornton Butterworth, 1920), p. 29.
- [16] Hilaire Belloc; *G. K. 's Weekly* (February 4th, 1937).
- [17] Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill; *Illustrated Sunday Herald* (February 8th, 1920).
- [18] Figures given at the Inter-Denominational Service to Commemorate the Victims of Communism at the Royal Albert Hall, London, on October 31st, 1967; quoted in *The Committee for Truth in History's The Six Million Reconsidered* (Historical Review Press, 1979), p. 98.
- [19] Ibid.
- [20] Ibid.
- [21] Ibid.
- [22] Ibid.
- [23] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin; *Collected Works*, 4th Russian Edition, v. 13, p. 435; quoted in Robert Conquest's *The Cost of Soviet Communism* (U. S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1970), p. 7.
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- [25] Ibid.
- [26] Ibid., p. 286.
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- [29] Ibid.
- [30] Peter Gatrell; *Lenin's New Economic Policy in Modern History Review* (September, 1993), Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 12.
- [31] Ibid.
- [32] Richard Pipes; *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime 1919-1924* (Harvill, 1994), p. 338.
- [33] Ibid.
- [34] Ibid., p. 339.
- [35] Ibid., p. 368.
- [36] Christopher Read; *Interpreting the Russian Revolution in History Sixth #5* (October, 1989), p. 48.
- [37] Pope Pius XI; *Atheistic Communism* (Catholic Truth Society, 1937), p. 16.

CHAPTER FIVE

FOR OR AGAINST? ATTITUDES TOWARDS CAPITALISM IN GERMAN & ITALIAN FASCISM

IN order to evaluate the main features of Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany, one must examine each regime in terms of its original principles. Capitalism is essentially concerned with the economic sphere, and for this reason the Hitlerian and Mussolinian systems must be studied in accordance with their theoretical and practical approaches towards industry, agriculture and business. If, however, there is no evidence to support the existence of a uniquely independent 'fascist' system in either Germany or Italy, it will be necessary to determine exactly which form of economics was adopted by each regime.

In the case of the NSDAP, Gottfried Feder's Twenty-Five Points were already in existence when Hitler first joined the Party in 1919, and the same programme was declared official in Munich on 25 February 1920.^[1] These principles do contain a strong element of Socialism, or at the very least the NSDAP's own interpretation of it. However, despite the early rhetoric these socialistic elements were never put into practice, something which will be examined in due course.

In Italy, Mussolini's Fascist Party also attempted to formulate a synthesis of Nationalist and socialist ideas which, given Mussolini's past, is hardly surprising. At the turn of the century, many Italian intellectuals had been won over to Syndicalism, which at that time was an economic doctrine principally developed by Georges Sorel in order to transcend the boundaries of Marxian Socialism and 'determine whether there exists a mechanism capable of guaranteeing the development of morality'.^[2] In fact Syndicalism sought to combine Marxism and populism by transferring the means of production from private industrialists to workers' unions. After a decade of decline, however, Syndicalism was revived by the emerging Fascist Party to help defeat the growing menace of Communism and was consequently promoted as a distinct economic policy in its own right. Indeed, David

D. Roberts has suggested that Syndicalism embodied the ‘anti-political, totalitarian corporativism which was in many ways the major thrust of Fascism’.^[3] If Germany and Italy adhered to specific theoretical programmes, therefore, we must examine them in terms of whether such concepts were applied in the fields of industry, agriculture and business.

Firstly, the Twenty-Five Points promised to involve German workers in a form of ‘profit-sharing for all’,^[4] with Feder particularly keen to stress that the ‘sharing of profits from a man’s own work is a demand so natural and socially so just, that nothing can be advanced against it as a principle’.^[5] This may well be so, but whilst his Party claimed to support the nationalisation of the great industries^[6] which it considered ‘ripe for socialisation’^[7] in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the German electorate, economic decentralisation was ‘soon abandoned, and Hitler adopted more empirical policies’.^[8] Noted for its great opportunism, the NSDAP had tried to take advantage of the public’s support for autarkic economics, something which had its roots in Germany’s characteristic opposition to foreign control. The Wall Street Crash had led to the withdrawal of American investment, and many Germans had become rather suspicious of the hidden forces which could dictate German financial policy from overseas. Furthermore, once the German proletariat had been conveniently persuaded to mobilise itself in ‘the general interest as a member of the national community’,^[9] the main concern for their industrial masters was the accumulation of vast profit at their expense. The financial role of Big Business will be examined in due course but, needless to say, once the NSDAP had risen to power in 1933 nationalisation did not replace those companies and trusts which, according to Feder, had served ‘the greed of Capitalism’.^[10] Hitler’s own disregard for economics and the State’s lack of initiative when faced with a dictator unwilling to make economic decisions, led inevitably to the growth of large private companies. By September 1936, Hermann Göring had replaced Hjalmar Schacht as German Economic Minister and set up a ‘total war’ economy. His new Four-Year Plan was designed ‘to make Germany self-sufficient in four years, so that a wartime blockade

would not stifle it'.^[11] As a result, huge factories like the Hermann Göring Works began to make synthetic rubber, textiles, fuels and other products extracted from raw materials. Nationalisation and the economic self-determination of German workers had been sacrificed in the interests of a form of competitive divisiveness not entirely unrelated to British or American Capitalism. But whilst the theoretical tenets of NSDAP ideology seemed to possess a rather unique economic stance, the industrial practicalities of what passed for National Socialism certainly did not accord with a distinctive or sui generis economic system of its own.

Mussolini's brand of Syndicalism also claimed to advance the economic liberation of industrial workers, and, in an article by Agostino Lanzillo in the pages of *Il popolo d'Italia* in May 1919, it was suggested that Syndicalism's commitment to a form of representation based upon economic groups would lead to 'the authentic representation of the legitimate interests and the organic forces of the country'.^[12] Indeed, Syndicalism was allegedly designed to 'minimise industrial strife and mobilise productive potential in the interests of the whole community'.^[13] By 1925 Mussolini had embarked upon his quest to create the Corporate State, abolishing trade unions and employers' organisations and establishing twenty-two corporations, each containing delegates from the ranks of the workers and their employers. By 1929 Mussolini had announced to the world that 'the former antagonism between capital and labour was at an end: both sides of industry were working together with complete parity of rights and duties'.^[14] At best, this was an exaggeration, for Mussolini had made certain that his own Fascist Party members kept a firm eye on factory workers whilst delegates did not really have any say in matters relating to wages and price levels. In addition, many Party officials got the best jobs and used their position 'to line their own pockets',^[15] although employers, 'whilst grateful for the forcible submission of labour, were always strong enough to avoid being centrally organised by official appointees'.^[16] So whilst claiming to be anti-Capitalist due to its superficial alteration of the relationship between employers and employees, Italian Fascism was basically very similar to existing

economic doctrines found elsewhere on the Right of the political spectrum.

Turning to the agricultural sphere, despite their alleged commitment to land-reform and its concomitant ‘confiscation without compensation of land for communal purposes; abolition of interest on land loans, and prevention of all speculation in land’,^[17] the NSDAP’s Twenty-Five Points were fairly vague with regard to agricultural issues. But on January 25th, 1930, Gottfried Feder published an extensive report concerning the Party’s opposition to the taxing of the peasantry, foreign imports, Jewish intervention between the producer and the consumer, and high prices. In place of the prevailing system, the NSDAP proposed that inheritance be abolished and that land be controlled by the peasantry and held in trust for future generations, involving fixed social classes which would be firmly rooted to the soil. By 1933 the position of the German peasantry had become extremely precarious, but thus far the Party’s Minister of Agriculture – Walther Darré – had not made any real attempt to bring an end to their suffering. Agricultural labourers had been unfairly divided into three rival classes: ‘peasants whose holdings are so small as to be unviable; middle and great peasants who are tenant-farmers; and great land-owners who run their estates on purely Capitalist lines’.^[18] In addition, the creation of the Labour Front was seen by outsiders as ‘the fullest possible exploitation of the working capacities of the German population on behalf of the business enterprise’.^[19] Similarly, in March 1935 Robert Ley cynically announced that ‘we could not offer the working masses any material benefits, for Germany was poor and in a state of confusion and misery. New rates of wages and similar things were out of the question’.^[20] Hence it was necessary to ‘suppress the materialism’^[21] which gave rise to demands for improved standards of living, and ‘instead divert the gaze of the workers to the ideal values of the nation’.^[22] So it seems fairly certain that National Socialists did not attempt to implement a unique economic system of their own, but simply ignored the pledges contained in Feder’s Twenty-Five Points in order to combine the doctrinal features of Nationalism and Capitalism for their own ends.

By 1925, Mussolini had become concerned at the amount of public

expenditure directed towards the importation of agricultural produce from abroad. As a result he launched the 'battle for wheat', ceremoniously bestowing upon those farmers producing the most wheat a series of patronising awards. But whilst wheat production doubled by 1939, the extra land that had been set aside for this purpose led inevitably to a reduction in other crops. In 1926 the so-called 'battle for land' had seen Italian swamps and marshland converted into farmland, although such measures were more designed to boost the Italian economy than provide decent employment for agricultural labourers. Many argue that the Fascist Party's efforts to reclaim land was nothing more than a publicity stunt, with Mussolini himself 'stripping to the waist'^[23] in an attempt to appear semi-human. If studied in a purely statistical context, it is rather difficult to ascertain just how efficient Fascist agriculture really was. However, due to the fact that Mussolini went to great lengths to hide the true effects of his policies,^[24] it seems fairly safe to assume that if Fascism had really created a formidable climate of rural development Il Duce would inevitably have used this as a convenient propaganda tool. In Fascist Italy, blowing one's own trumpet was part of everyday life. Silence, therefore, indicates a degree of failure.

But the real reason why Italian and German Fascists did not significantly implement their original economic principles has much to do with vested interests. Mussolini had been funded by bankers, industrialists and landowners and it is hardly surprising, therefore, that so few of his economic policies were actually put into practice. In fact Mussolini himself declared that it was necessary to 'create exceptionally favourable conditions for the Capitalist economy',^[25] and, according to Denis Mack Smith, although Mussolini claimed to detest the wealthy classes he never forced them to conform with his regime and such elements offered little more than 'a purely formal adherence'^[26] to his Fascist government. Thus, far from representing a distinctly unique form of economics, by tolerating the preferences of its financial backers and serving only their interests the Fascist Party was merely perpetuating Capitalism from behind a nationalistic facade.

Similarly, Hitler had been financed by a group of wealthy German

industrialists and large business conglomerates like I.G. Farben. By 1919 ‘Krupp was already giving financial aid to one of the reactionary political groups which sowed the seed of the present Nazi ideology’^[27] and, by 1924, ‘other prominent industrialists and financiers, among them Fritz Thysson, Albert Vogler, Adolf Kirdorf, and Kurt von Schröder, were secretly giving substantial sums to the Nazis’.^[28] Indeed, in his autobiography Thysson himself readily admits that ‘Hitler’s monarchistic attitude of those days brought to his Party a large following among industrial circles’.^[29] There is also some evidence relating to the fact that Hitler was secretly funded by a clique of New York businessmen, including representatives of the Ford Motor Company and the Rockefeller Chase Bank^[30] which, in light of the more recent ‘arms for Iraq’ scandal, does not seem totally implausible. Indeed, whilst the Twenty-Five Points made it perfectly clear that ‘self-enrichment at the expense of the nation, shall be punished with death’^[31], the subsequent German Rearmament Programme and the Nazi regime’s sudden desire to restore the ‘primacy of politics’ and establish ‘a politically independent and energetic State leadership which was no longer forced to take into account the selfish, short-sighted wishes of special interests’^[32] when it came to economic decision-making, led to what many political analysts regard as an incredible paradox. Tim Mason believes that whilst large industrial entities had supported National Socialism due to their inherent self-interest, they eventually found themselves bound ‘to a government on whose aims, inasmuch as they were subject to control at all, they had virtually no influence’.^[33] It is certainly a fact that once Hjalmar Schacht had retired in 1939 the freedom to make independent decisions was severely curbed by the inauguration of Albert Speer as chief mediator between Nazi Führer and Nazi State, but I tend to disagree with Mason’s assertion; which, incidentally, is compatible with Nazi apologists who mistakenly claim that Hitler merely used German Capitalists for his own ends. Why would such powerful and wealthy individuals finance a man who, on paper at least, intended to dismantle large industrial concerns? As for the assertion that Hitler suddenly rendered his Capitalistic allies powerless in an effort to redress the German economy in the face of a

huge labour shortage, Richard Grunberger's simile which likens German business during the Third Reich to 'the conductor of a runaway bus who has no control over the actions of the driver but keeps collecting the passengers' fares right up until the final crash',^[34] seems very apt indeed. Equally so, David Schönbaum is wrong to suggest that German industry was somehow subordinate to the NSDAP and 'if it recovered, it recovered on Nazi terms'.^[35] Unfortunately, wealth has always been a determining factor behind political power and Hitler was undoubtedly a willing tool of Capitalism.

It is also worth noting that Otto Strasser, a leading member of the NSDAP who dared to criticise Hitler's betrayal of the Party's original economic principles, was eventually forced to flee for his life after resigning in 1930. In order to understand the very nature of the NSDAP's economic system, it is perhaps well worth remembering that in answer to Strasser's defence of genuine National Socialism, Hitler replied, 'your kind of socialism is nothing but Marxism. The mass of the working class want nothing but bread and games. They will never understand the meaning of an ideal, and we cannot hope to win them over to one'.^[36] In Hitler's own words, an economic system must 'select from a new master-class men who will not allow themselves to be guided ... by the morality of pity. Those who rule must know that they have the right to rule because they belong to a superior race. They must maintain that right and ruthlessly consolidate it'.^[37] Indeed, Hitler's assertion that the weaker members of society must inevitably go to the wall is a fundamental mainstay of orthodox Capitalism.

Finally, whilst the original programmes of both the German NSDAP and Italian Fascist Party had been openly anti-Capitalist in nature – endorsing a form of industrial and agricultural Socialism – when Hitler and Mussolini realised that huge financial contributions could greatly assist them in the fulfilment of their true aims and objectives, both eagerly betrayed the socialistic tenets of their respective manifestos and capitulated to their purported Big Business adversaries. Despite the intellectual clarity and foresight reflected in their original principles, Fascism and National Socialism never created a distinct economic system in a truly practical sense. Furthermore, whilst such regimes

were never *laissez-faire* in accordance with orthodox Capitalism, the overall objectives of their respective economies were definitely capital-intensive. Fascism and National Socialism, then, may have adopted anti-Capitalist phraseology but were classic examples of how Capitalism can regenerate itself in the face of an acute economic crisis and the constant threat of genuine revolutionary upheaval.

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^[1] Gottfried Feder, *The Programme of the NSDAP and its General Conceptions*, B P Publications, 1980, p 18.

^[2] Georges Sorel, 'Avenir socialiste des syndicats' in *Materiaux d'une theorie du proletariat*, Marcel Riviere, 1919, p 127.

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^[4] Feder, op cit, p 47.

^[5] Ibid.

^[6] Ibid, p 19.

^[7] Ibid, p 41.

^[8] Eugen Weber, *Varieties of Fascism*, Van Nostrand, 1975, p 84.

^[9] Feder, op cit, p 25.

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- [12] Roberts, op cit, p 173.
- [13] Denis Mack Smith, *Mussolini*, Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1982, p 118.
- [14] Ibid, p 119.
- [15] Josh Brooman, *Italy and Mussolini*, Longman Group, 1985, p 25.
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- [24] Mack Smith, op cit, p 123.
- [25] Benito Mussolini, *Vita di Sandro e di Arnaldo*, Milan, 1934, p 178.
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- [30] Anthony Sutton, *Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler*, Bloomfield Books, 1976, pp 149-161.
- [31] Feder, op cit, p 42.
- [32] T. W. Mason, 'The Primacy of Politics – Politics and Economics in National Socialist Germany' in S J Woolf (ed.), *The Nature of Fascism*, Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1968, p 168.
- [33] Ibid, p 189.
- [34] Richard Grunberger, *A Social History of the Third Reich*, Penguin, 1974, p 238.
- [35] David Schönbaum, *Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and status in Nazi Germany 1933-39*, Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1967, p 158.
- [36] Otto Strasser, *Hitler and I*, Jonathan Cape, 1940, p 117.
- [37] Ibid, p 118.

CHAPTER SIX

REVOLUTION VS. REACTION: SOCIAL NATIONALISM & THE STRASSER BROTHERS

MANY people associate the term 'Socialism' with Left-Wing intellectuals, Communists or members of the Labour Party. The sad reality is that the internationalist Left has completely hijacked this word and used it to hide their more sinister motives. 'Socialism', for the average Marxist-Leninist, is the description given to the promotion of minorities above the larger community as a whole. Left-Wing organizations are fond of trying to appeal to the working class, or what they patronisingly refer to as 'the Proletariat'. The ulterior objective behind such ideology is based upon a desire to divide and rule. In other words, whilst these organisations are offering support to so-called 'oppressed minorities', such as homosexuals, Black Power groups and rebellious middle class students, they are in fact creating disunity amongst the ordinary members of society by ensuring that they possess the only banner behind which degeneracy and abnormality can find a safe haven from the seemingly encroaching rigors of normality. That society is becoming more degenerate, is merely testimony to the fact that Communists are regularly able to rally between two and three thousand protestors at the drop of a hat, as happened recently on a wet Monday evening at an Anti-Nazi League demonstration in London. By adding up all the minorities, social inadequates and anyone else with a chip on their shoulder, these activists can appear to comprise a majority. But this is minority rule in its most pure and distorted guise.

There is simply no disputing the fact that Socialism is an integral part of the Nationalist creed. To separate the very essence of the social sphere from the concept of the nation, is to ignore the basic fact that it is the People who actually comprise the nation itself.

Without people there can be no nation, and without a nation there can be no people. On the other hand, it is quite certain that we have absolutely nothing in common with the intellectually-bankrupt legions of the modern Left, but then, neither do we owe any allegiance to those on the Right. Many so-called Nationalists are content to describe

themselves as being 'right of centre', or even on the 'Far Right', but it must be stated quite categorically that true Nationalism has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with Right-wing politics. To simplify, a Right-winger is no more 'Nationalist' than his counterpart on the Left. Both Communism and Capitalism are two heads of the same beast.

But rather than take a leaf out of the existing books and attempt to form some kind of a ridiculous halfway ideology, Revolutionary Nationalists remain unconcerned with philosophical materialism altogether and reject the middle and both ends of the system in its entirety. We Revolutionary Nationalists oppose the Reactionaries and the Reds alike, because we are genuine Social Nationalists.

The doctrine of Social Nationalism was chiefly propagated by Otto and Gregor Strasser, two brothers who joined the National Socialist German Worker's Party (NSDAP) during the 1920s. This organization eventually came to be led by Adolf Hitler, who, in his selfish lust for ultimate power came to betray the very ideals of Social Nationalism that had been promoted by the NSDAP from the very beginning. To many so-called Nationalists, criticism of Hitler is viewed as heresy. But nobody can ignore the plain and simple fact that Hitler totally refused to condemn German Capitalists and the Right-wing Establishment, even allowing the Party to receive funding from wealthy Jewish financiers in Wall Street. The evidence for this claim can be found in Anthony Sutton's excellent *Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler*.

The Strasser Brothers, however, who were both extremely active in the NSDAP before the party came to power in 1933, were regularly engaged in a war of ideology with Hitler himself, a man who refused to advocate the decentralization of State power or offer the normal working people of Germany a stake in both agriculture and industry. Hitler had actually rejected Otto Strasser's *The Structure of German Socialism* in 1925, preferring instead to stick with Gottfried Feder's Twenty-Five Points, considered by many Party members to be outdated. Even without Strasser's radical ideas for a new direction beyond both the Left and Right of the political spectrum, the Twenty-Five Points were still incompatible with Hitler's reactionary allegiance to his Capitalist financiers and many of these basic tenets of National

Socialist policy were betrayed. Anyone taking the trouble to examine Point 11 of this manifesto, for example, will discover a forthright condemnation of unearned income. However, after Hitler's ascension to power, usury continued to infect the German banking system and no effort was made to prevent wealthy bankers from charging the German people huge interest on their loans. Indeed, Hitler placed all financial power in the hands of Hjalmar Schacht, a freemason with connections in Wall Street. Gregor Strasser, however, had this to say about Capitalism: 'The Capitalist system with its exploitation of those who are economically weak, with its robbery of the workers' labour power, with its unethical way of appraising human beings by the number of things and the amount of money they possess, instead of by their internal value and their achievements, must be replaced by a new and just economic system, in a word by German Socialism.'

Moving on to Points 13 and 14, the statement of Party principles called for the destruction of the Capitalist system and its replacement by family businesses and workers' co-operatives. Once again, Hitler had no time for such economic justice and these two articles of policy were soon forgotten. Otto Strasser, on the other hand, explained that: 'The alternative to the bankrupt alien "solutions" of Communism and Capitalism, the idea which we present is the political representation of parties, trades and professions based on our ancient Guild system.'

Otto Strasser, who was once described as 'a dauntless man of compelling sincerity and charm' by the English anti-Capitalist A.K. Chesterton, then went on to propose a three-point programme for industry and the workers:

There will come into being, in contradistinction to the extant 'class' of Capitalists, an 'estate' of managers, which, regardless of wealth or origin, will constitute a functional aristocracy that, thanks to the very methods of its selection, may be said to be made up of 'captains of industry' or 'commissioned officers of economic life'.

The dispossessed 'class of proletarians' will vanish, its place being taken by an 'estate' of fully privileged workers, directly

and indirectly participating in and therefore interested in their 'workshop'. They will no longer be objects of the economy, but its subjects. The relations between State and economic life will be radically altered.

The State will not be the 'night-watchman and policeman' of Capitalism, nor will it be a dictator whose bureaucracy cracks the whip that drives the workers to the bench and spurs them to their tasks; but it will be a trustee of the consumers, and as such it will have much influence, but only within and beside the self-determination of the working producers, namely of the management and the staff of workers (consisting in appropriate proportions of clerical and other intellectual workers, on the one hand, and manual operatives, on the other).

But in spite of the commonsense ideas of Strasserism the list of contradictions continues, as a result of the fact that Hitler meekly refused to condemn the Right, gaining control of the NSDAP and eventually leading Germany into an imperialist onslaught against the rest of Europe, suppressing non-German culture and tradition in his fanatical drive towards a 'Greater Germany'. Point 16 promised the destruction of chain stores and supermarkets, and claimed to support small businesses. The reality, on the other hand, was far different as Hitler once again defended the monopolists. Whilst Strasserite stormtroopers picketed the large stores and urged people to support the small traders, Hitler put an instant stop to all such anti-Capitalist activity. Indeed, one large chain store was funding the Southern Branch of the NSDAP itself and Hitler did not want to alienate his financial backers.

In Point 17, it was explained that there would be an end to the rule of the big landowners, and that there would be a resettlement of the expanded peasantry. During the 1920s, over 20% of Germany was owned by fewer than 19,000 people and the peasants were looking to the NSDAP to provide a brighter future in the face of their ever-worsening predicament. Unfortunately, they were to receive little assistance from Hitler. Although Agricultural Minister Walter Darré appeared to do much to safeguard the role of the peasantry, there was

no attempt to redistribute the land. Even when Darré passed the Hereditary Peasant Holdings Act, the draft itself was provided by his deputy, Ferdinand Fried – the secret leader of Otto Strasser’s Black Front. So what answer did Strasserism provide to combat the unholy alliance of Capitalists, landowners and Hitlerites? Otto Strasser provided a truly just argument to the complexities of agriculture in his *Structure for German Socialism*:

The object of agriculture is to make sure that the community will be fed. The land available for the use of the community is owned exclusively by the nation, for it was not by any individual but by the community at large that the land was acquired, by battle or by colonization on the part of the community, and by the community it has been defended against enemies. The community as owner puts the land at the disposal of the nation in the form of ‘entails’ to those able and willing to use them for husbandry and stock-raising. This will be undertaken by self-governing corporations of local peasant-councils. The size of the farms will be limited in accordance with the local qualities of the land: the maximum being determined by the principle that no one may hold in ‘entail’ more land than he is able to farm unaided; and the minimum being determined by the principle that the landowner must have enough land to provide, not only food for self and family, but a superfluity by the disposal of which he will be able to obtain clothing and shelter for his family.

The maximum limitation will result in freeing large quantities of land for settlement by peasants, particularly in Eastern Germany. This peasant settlement is all the more necessary because the existence of an abundance of peasants thus settled on their own farms furnishes the best guarantee for the maintenance of public health and public energy. The landholder who thus receives a farm for ‘entail’ will pledge himself to manage this farm for the best advantage of the community and to use his utmost endeavors to make sure that the land shall be farmed to supply the food of the community. He will therefore have to pay a land tax, a tithe rent, to the community. This will be payable in kind, the amount

being fixed in accordance with the area and quality of the land. No other taxes will be payable by the peasant. Should the holder of an 'entail' die, the farm will pass to a son able and willing to carry it on. If there are no male children available, the 'entail' will revert to the community, and will be allotted by the local peasant-council.

In the event of bad farming, an 'entail' will also revert to the community, the decision upon this matter resting with the local self-governing body (peasant-council) in agreement with the state (represented by the circle president). The introduction of 'entail' into German agriculture will be in such manifest conformity with German tradition and with the right and necessary ideas of peasant possessor-ship, that neither psychological nor material difficulties are likely to ensue.

The sad motive behind Hitler's blatant refusal to listen to Otto and Gregor Strasser, was power. Whilst Hitler saw power as the objective, the group of people who were gathered around these visionary brothers – commonly known as the Strasser-Circle – saw power merely as the means to implement their Social Nationalist programme. Once again, the common people paid the price for the selfishness of a reactionary. In 1930, things finally came to a head and Otto Strasser began to clash with Hitler on a regular basis. His newspaper, the *Arbeitsblatt*, which was based in Berlin and which served as the Party's official northern publication, became a constant irritant to Hitler. Finally, in April of the same year, trade unions in Saxony declared a general strike and Otto Strasser announced his total support for the German workers. Meanwhile, the powerful industrialists themselves put pressure on Hitler to condemn the views of Strasser and bring the strike to a halt. Hitler called Otto Strasser to a private meeting at his hotel the following day, where he attempted to bring him into line by ordering him to submit to his authority. During a heated debate, Hitler accused him of promoting 'bombastic nonsense' by placing emphasis on the Ideal rather than the Leader. Strasser was right, of course, but Hitler was only interested in personal power and chose to put himself before the economic freedom of the German people. Otto Strasser went on to

rightly accuse Hitler of trying to: ‘...strangle the social revolution for the sake of legality and your new collaboration with the bourgeois parties of the Right.’

Hitler angrily denied this and tried to condone what modern Capitalists today like to call ‘free enterprise’. He also went on to endorse the Capitalist philosophy that ‘might is right’ and only ‘the strong survive’, whilst the weakest must inevitably ‘go to the wall’: ‘The Capitalists have worked their way to the top through their capacity, and on the basis of this selection, which again only proves their right race, they have a right to lead.’

This statement alone is testimony to Hitler’s allegiance to Capitalism and Big Business, and reveals the unbridgeable gulf that exists between reaction and revolution. Hitler, after failing to come up with any real argument against the genuinely Socialist principles of Otto Strasser, eventually wrote to Göbbels and instructed him to drive Strasser and his supporters from the Party. Otto Strasser remained true to his beliefs and, as a result, was expelled from the NSDAP soon afterwards, setting up a group known as the Union of Revolutionary National Socialists – the forerunner of the Black Front. Otto Strasser was finally interned by the SIS-OSS and became a broken-hearted exile in Canada, where he was forced to live as a non-person until 1955. He eventually managed to return to his beloved Germany, but only after some very determined campaigning by the English journalist Douglas Reed. Meanwhile, despite the fact that Gregor Strasser had bowed to Hitler’s authority and remained in the party in the hope that the Fuhrer would realize the error of his ways, he was brutally murdered in the Prinz Albrechtstrasse prison during a Hitlerite purge in June 1934, now known as the infamous Night of the Long Knives. Even Hitler was forced to admit some years later, that Gregor Strasser’s murder had been ‘a mistake’.

Before this essay is brought to a conclusion, it must be pointed out that Strasserism is totally incompatible with Marxism and the alleged ‘Socialism’ of the Left. Here are a few excerpts from Otto Strasser’s polemic comparison of the two ideologies:

How German Socialism differs from Marxism:

The personal initiative of the responsible managers is preserved, but it is incorporated into the needs of the community.

Within the systematically planned management of the whole national economy by the State (organically safeguarded by the equal third of influence which the State has in every industrial enterprise) the wholesome rivalry of the individual enterprises is maintained.

The treatment of State and economic enterprise, that is to say of official and industrial manager, on an equal footing is avoided; so is the arbitrary power of the State which deprives the worker of his rights.

Everyone engaged in an enterprise is, by virtue of his being part-possessor as a citizen, one of the immediate and influential possessors of his enterprise, his 'workshop', and can exert this possessive right in full measure on the supervisory council of the concern. The form of the factory fellowship, founded upon the legal idea of the fief, and given life by the great self-governing body of the workers' and employees' councils, on the one hand, the industrial and trades' councils, on the other, constitutes the new economic system of German Socialism, which is equally remote from Western Capitalism and Eastern Bolshevism, and nevertheless complies with the requirements of large scale industry.

On a final note, I hope that this short essay on Strasserism has persuaded some of the more misguided supporters of the Hitler regime that genuine Socialism has yet to achieve a practical breakthrough and progress from the purely theoretical stage. It is futile for any Nationalist to look back to Nazi Germany as a worthy example of what is best for our English nation, or even for Europe as a whole. Without completely rejecting the Right-wing Capitalists, revolutionaries will continue to be betrayed over and over again. Indeed, with Nazism on the rise once again in the wake of German reunification, it is hoped that the German people will remember the mistakes of the past. One thing

must be made clear. We in the National Revolutionary Faction have the determination to stick to our guns and will never be under the control of the Capitalist Right. Likewise, neither will we betray our revolutionary principles.

Recommended Reading:

Otto Strasser:

Hitler and I (translated by Douglas Reed)

A History in My Time (translated by Douglas Reed)

Germany Tomorrow (translated by Douglas Reed)

Gregor Strasser (written under the pseudonym of 'Micheal Geismeyer')

We Seek Germany (written under the pseudonym of 'D.G.')

Whither Hitler? (written under the pseudonym of 'D.G.')

Europe Tomorrow (written under the pseudonym of 'D.G.')

Structure of German Socialism

The German St Bartholomew's Night

European Federation

The Gangsters Around Hitler

Gregor Strasser:

Struggle for Germany

Douglas Reed:

Nemesis: The Story of Otto Strasser

The Prisoner of Ottawa: Otto Strasser

CHAPTER SEVEN

BLOOD & SOIL: REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM AS THE VANGUARD OF ECOLOGICAL SANITY

WHILST the modern world appears to be in a state of great disarray, the perpetual relevance of Nature both as a guide and a source of inspiration continues to invite our utmost respect and admiration. Sadly, however, the vast majority of people have become alienated from their origins, detached from their racial and cultural heritage, and cut off from their roots.

Even as far back as 1833, William Cobbett had rightly announced to the world that English folk had become ‘deserters from the plough’.^[1] As if by magic, the smoking chimneys and windowless factories of the Industrial Revolution had arrived to force people away from the fields and into the expanding towns. Meanwhile, however, as Howard Newby suggests, even today the countryside offers its stubborn resistance to ‘reassure us that everything these days is superficial and transitory; that some things remain stable, permanent and enduring’.^[2] Indeed, the glory of rural life sanctions the status quo. Not the status quo of the Establishment or the bland sterility of modernism; on the contrary, the great tenacity of our forests, clifftops and dales are a lasting reminder that man can return to his ancestral sanctuary whenever the futile quest for scientific infallibility has run its inevitable course and he has finally begun to withdraw from the hedonistic negativity of the burgeoning metropolis. So what is meant by blood and soil, and why is it so vital in the shift towards a decentralised proliferation of small village communities?

The term originated in Germany during the early-1920s and was first coined by August Winnig, an ex-Social Democrat who had resigned from the centre-left SPD due to its obsession with internationalism. In 1927, the Transylvanian exile, Georg Kenstler, launched his *Blood and Soil* magazine as a means of safeguarding the ‘integral link between the tribe and the land, to be defended by blood, if necessary’.^[3] For rural Germans, therefore, blood and soil became ‘a code word implying the

protection of a real personality. It stressed the kinship element, and the peasant's demographic role. City-dwellers did not breed – peasants did. They were the life-blood of the nation in a literal sense as well as its spiritual and cultural basis'.^[4] But the very notion that a race is somehow rooted to a territory which has been drenched in the pioneering blood of its ancestors, is something that goes far beyond the terminological inventiveness of Weimar Germany. In a similar vein, it would be extremely unwise to dismiss blood and soil as a phenomenon which simply accompanied the emergence of National Socialism, or even to suggest that twentieth-century romantics like the German Youth Movement and various nudist colonies had merely revived the medieval spirit of Aryan yeomanry for their own amusement. Not so! In fact the image of the heroic farmer and his devoted spouse extends far beyond the trappings of Teutonic legend, and blood and soil each represent inextricable components of the natural order and should not be estimated in historical terms alone. To those who aspired to such an ideal, it became a living testimony to the Nordic soul, an 'unwritten history of Europe, a history unconnected with trade, the banditry of the aristocracy, and the infinite duplicity of church and monarchy'.^[5] Indeed, throughout the centuries the growth of materialism has become enshrined within a capitalist-marxian axis, leading to an inexhaustible plethora of ideological variants which come and go like empires founded upon sand. Meanwhile, of course, the self-appointed lords of the manor have forcibly extracted their financial dues from the sweating brow of many a broken and bitter serf.

Revolutionary Nationalism, on the other hand, or what in some circles is described as National-Anarchism, is more than a political ideology. It is able to recognise and understand that the relationship between a community and the land is something both immeasurable and spiritual. But, as Dr. Anna Bramwell has explained, blood and soil 'is implicit rather than explicit'^[6] and, in practical terms, can often be seen today in 'European nations such as Greece and France, and several states in the United States of America, [where] farm purchase by non-nationals is either forbidden or tangled up with so many booby-traps as to be made extremely difficult. The position in the Third World is much more

exclusivist and racist'.^[7] In short, to fully appreciate blood and soil one must come to terms with the fact that it is far more than just a political concept. As long as future attempts to initiate a blood and soil renaissance take this fact into account, however, the process will remain as natural and organic as possible.

Few people would doubt that Hitler's Reichsbauernführer, R. Walther Darré, was primarily a political animal, but he was also intelligent enough to realise that if Germany was to retain her fine rural tradition the incoming National Socialist government had to ensure that the existence of the peasantry was not in any way undermined. Indeed, Darré did not wish to see the vocational heritage of the country's agricultural backbone reduced to a fleeting plaything of the urban escapist or become the profitable sideline of exploitative fatcats. But Darré was an idealist, and never likely to be taken seriously by an opportunist and politician like Hitler.

On 6 March 1930, the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) published its 'Official Party Manifesto on the Position of the NSDAP with Regard to the Farming Population and Agriculture'. This document claimed that the 'Maintenance of an efficient agricultural class, increasing in numbers as the general population increases, is a central plank in the National-Socialist platform'.^[8] Furthermore, the Party rightly acknowledged that the German peasantry was under attack from several quarters, namely 'the Jewish world money market – which really controls parliamentary democracy in Germany ... the competition of foreign agriculturalists, who work under more favourable conditions ... the extravagant profits made by the large wholesale middlemen, who thrust themselves in between producer and consumer ... [and] ... the oppressive rates the farmer has to pay for electric power and artificial manures to concerns mainly run by Jews'.^[9] In place of this exploitation the NSDAP proposed that, amongst other things, land ownership be exclusively available to German citizens, that such land be made inheritable property (enabling peasants to become rooted to the soil), and that large areas be set aside for colonisation by an expanding German population. But whilst such policies were understandably attractive to ordinary peasants and back-to-the-land enthusiasts alike,

when the Hitler government finally came to power in 1933 they were never put into practice. In 1940 Otto Strasser attacked the regime's Patrimonial Farm Law for the simple reason that it extended only to a portion of the peasantry and 'created three kinds of agricultural entrepreneur: peasants whose holdings were so small as to be unviable; middle and great peasants who are tenant-farmers; and great landowners who run their estates on purely capitalist lines'.^[10]

Meanwhile, Walther Darré (who did not actually join the Party until 1930) had acquired a reputation as a man of great principle after resigning from his post in the East Prussian Trakhener Stud (Warm Blood Society), an animal breeding centre where he had come into direct conflict with his superiors. In 1926, Darré had written an article condemning those who were seeking to revive plans for a colonial German empire, regarding the idea as 'inimical and destructive to the concept of a German homeland'.^[11] Darré, therefore, seemed an unlikely figure for a Party which unashamedly advocated the forcible colonisation of occupied land for German settlement. Several years later, when Hitler ordered the seizure of Moravia and Bohemia from the Czechs, Darré recorded an entry in his diary claiming that, by creating an empire at the expense of her own national interests, Germany was repeating the errors made by England. Nevertheless, when Hitler had realised that Darré's immense popularity could provide him with the rural vote the NSDAP needed in order to obtain power, the latter rose to the challenge and vowed to use his new position in the government to defend the interests of his beloved peasants.

Modern ecologists would do well to emulate the honesty and integrity of men like Walther Darré. Sadly, however, unlike their National Socialist predecessor most of them are too frightened to accept that Race has a great part to play in the restoration of the natural order. As far as Darré was concerned, the peasantry constituted a 'homogenous racial group of Nordic antecedents, who formed the racial and cultural core of the German nation'.^[12] In 1929 Darré published *The Peasantry as the Key to Understanding the Nordic Race*, in which he concluded that 'kind providence laid a gift in the cradle of the Nordic race out of

which grew perhaps its most significant characteristic. It is to the innermost need of the Nordic to place his life at the service of a cause and to develop inner moral principles for himself out of the necessities which determine this work'.^[13]

Initially, Darré did little more than reduce peasant interest rates to a maximum of 2% on farm loans and ensure that rural families retained their ancient right of hereditary ownership. However, once Hitler had made it perfectly clear that he had no real intention of honouring the original agricultural principles outlined in the *Twenty-Five Points of the NSDAP*, Darré realised that he had to use his time as constructively as possible in order to stave off the rising challenge of his closest rival, arch-technocrat and Hitlerian sycophant Herbert Backe. At Goslar, an ancient medieval town in the Harz Mountains, Darré established a 'peasants' capital' and launched a series of measures designed to regenerate German agriculture by encouraging organic farming and replanting techniques. His 'dream was to make Goslar the centre of a new peasants' international; a green union of the northern European peoples. Here he made speeches condemning the Führer Principle and attacking imperial expansion. Visitors flocked to him. Organic farming enthusiasts from England welcomed Darré's plans and admired the hereditary tenure legislation. Representatives from Norwegian and Danish peasant movements joined the conferences on blood and soil.^[14] But Darré's overall strategy was even more radical, and he intended to abolish industrial society altogether and replace it with a series of purely peasant-based communities. In his view, 'capitalism and industry would soon wither away' – a view held by many people in the Depression era – 'and with it the age of mass urbanisation and mechanisation. An urbanised society was incapable of survival. As it collapsed – helped by farmers blockading the cities – it would be replaced by a new society formed from a core of healthy, sound peasants'.^[15] Darré realised, therefore, the extent to which cities have to rely upon extracting their sustenance from the rural periphery. He knew, in other words, that by encouraging German peasants to deprive the country's blood-sucking industrial regions of their agrarian lifeforce, it was possible to hasten the self-destructive process of

capitalism itself.

Needless to say, the leaders of the NSDAP were eager to claim these magnificent achievements for themselves and, by August 1937, Darré became completely disgusted with a statement made by Hermann Göring at the International Dairy Conference, during which the overweight usurper had declared that: ‘No country can withdraw today from the world economic system. No country can ever say again, we decline the world economy and are going to live and produce for ourselves alone.’^[16] By April 1939, Göring’s Four-Year Plan for the industrialisation of Germany in accordance with a total war economy had taken young people away from the land and into cramped munitions factories in the cities. This led to Darré attacking the Nazi regime for its ‘economic imperialism, which makes one anxious for blood and soil ideals’.^[17] In 1942, Darré was demoted from his ministerial position and inevitably replaced by the odious and far less dangerous Herbert Backe. From that moment on he had no doubt whatsoever that Hitler had cruelly betrayed the German peasantry. In the words of the aforementioned Dr. Bramwell: ‘Hitler found Darré a useful theorist and organiser for a period of crisis, but when he kept faith with his vision he was, like many other revolutionary ideologues, discarded’.^[18] More importantly, however, whilst Darré was far too modest to concede the fact, the Führer had deprived Germany of her finest ecological pioneer; a man who is truly the patriarch of the modern Greens.

But Darré was not the only radical in the NSDAP. On the contrary, he was just one of many disaffected anti-Capitalists who attempted to make the Party more radical by working from within. In this sense, at least, Darré surpassed most of them because the likes of ‘Feder and Strasser did not see their ideas carried into effect’.^[19] But, despite his agrarian radicalism, Darré never fully realised the futility of his association with the NSDAP until it was too late. On the other hand, if Darré had not been appointed Agricultural Minister in the first place he would not have been able to implement his blood and soil policies at all. This does not validate the gradualist strategy of those who continue to put their trust in the System, however; it merely demonstrates that –

despite of the legacy passed down to us by Darré and his closest followers – it is only possible to achieve a certain amount within the context of the existing governmental framework. Indeed, by 1942 Darré would have said the same thing himself, believing, as he did, that only a Green Revolution can sweep away the old Establishment and pave the way for a New Agrarian Order.

Darré's concern for the environment was also shared by Corneliu Codreanu and the Rumanian Legionary Movement (Iron Guard), mainly due to the fact that prior to the Second World War the Rumanian peasantry made up some 90% of the total population. The defiant streak of anti-urbanism which characterised the green-shirted fighters of Europe's most spiritual bastion of National Revolutionary struggle to date, is epitomised by the slogan 'up above, we will defend the life of the trees and the mountains from further devastation. Down below [in the towns], we will spread death and mercy'.^[20] This view obviously concords with those in contemporary National-Anarchist circles and their commitment to destroy capitalism from within whilst creating a brand new order from without. Codreanu was a man who often sought release from the tortures of self-doubt by wandering into the wilderness, eagerly savouring the comfort and solace offered by the beautiful Rumanian mountains. In his moving and emotional autobiography, *For My Legionaries*, Codreanu describes his self-imposed experience of solitude thus: 'It was getting dark. Not one living soul around. Only trees with vultures shrieking around the barren cliffs. I only had with me my heavy coat and a loaf of bread. I ate some bread and drank some water springing from among the rocks.'^[21] Codreanu undoubtedly appreciated the spiritual realities of his ancestral homeland. Another example of the vast importance the Iron Guard attributed to the notion of blood and soil can be found in the Legion's symbolic commitment to Rumania in terms of the country's physical and spiritual immortality. In 1927, twenty-seven legionaries made a solemn vow to defend their fatherland by distributing between themselves small leather sacks containing Rumanian earth. But whilst some may view this ceremony as a purely theatrical affair, as Codreanu himself rightly notes, such earth was representative of the very soul of the nation, which, in turn, means 'not only all Rumanians living in the

same territory, sharing the same past and the same future, the same dress, but all Rumanians, alive and dead who have lived on this land from the beginning of history and will live here in the future'.^[22]

In Spain, however, the concept of blood and soil was not at all shared by José Antonio Primo de Rivera's Falange. In fact the Nationalist leader 'stringently attacked the blood and soil gut patriotism typical of Romanian and German National Socialism, together with Romantic Nationalism and its emphasis on the pull of the land'.^[23] According to Hugh Thomas, 'patriotism had to be anchored, not in the heart, but in the mind'.^[24] But despite the worthy idealism of the Falange prior to its involvement with self-important reactionaries like General Franco in the 1936 Civil War, the Movement's attitude towards agrarian issues was woefully inadequate. José Antonio wanted his country to dominate the world stage and, therefore, failed to appreciate the fact that a naturally-rooted peasantry is far from 'backward' or 'anachronistic'. Unfortunately, many of his 'economic and social policies followed the modernising path of Mussolini and the aims of Mosley'.^[25] On the other hand, the Spanish leader was extremely critical of those who wallowed in the contaminating decadence of city life: 'Our place is in the fresh air, under the cloudless heavens, weapons in our hands, with the stars above us. Let the others go on with their merrymaking. We outside, in tense, fervent, and certain vigilance, already feel the dawn breaking in the joy of our hearts.'^[26]

But whilst capitalism is chiefly responsible for the destruction of the natural world, Marxism does not even take it into consideration. As one of the great modern pioneers of organic farming and self-sufficiency, John Seymour, has explained: 'Karl Marx, who spent most of his life in the reading room of the British Museum Library, probably came as little into contact with nature as it was possible to do and still stay alive. The result was that his philosophy ignored everything not human completely. He was aware (just) that food came from the country. He was aware that there must be some people out there somewhere who grew it. It was his object to rescue these imaginary people from what he called "the idiocy of rural life". What is that to the idiocy of spending all your life in the British Museum Library?'.^[27] Since then, of course,

the practical implementation of this individual's philosophy in Eastern Europe has proved beyond any doubt that Marxism is opposed to ecological order. One ridiculous consequence of Soviet agrarianism led to Russia – the greatest continuous wheat-growing area in the world – being forced to import its grain from abroad. If this is an example of Marxist state-planning in action it is hardly surprising to learn that Stalin eventually condemned millions of peasants to misery, squalor and mass starvation. The Red dictator's agricultural incompetence was soon hurriedly obscured by diverting the world's attention towards the steady industrialisation of Russia. Marxism, it seems, relies far more upon blood than soil.

Returning to the present, until those involved in ecological struggle can learn to appreciate the spiritual reality which binds man to his environment, reactionaries, liberals and leftists alike will continue to delay the replenishment of the natural order. We revolutionaries can only revitalise and reclaim the natural world from the clutches of capitalism once we have discovered that which lies within ourselves. It is vital for us to come to terms with the fact that, by springing from the very soil of which we have always been a part, we are inevitably destined to return to it at the end of our brief sojourn upon this earth. This is summed up very beautifully by Knut Hamsun, the great Norwegian storyteller who, in a poem entitled 'My Grave', wrote the following emotive words:

*Oh Lord, I pray thee do not let me die
In a bed with sheets and blankets piled upon
And with dripping noses about me.
Nay, smite me someday without warning,
That headlong I fall into the forest some place
Where no one will come around nosing.
I well know the forest, I am its son,
It will not deny my humble request
To die on its cranberry bog.*

*Thus will I give back without word of complaint
My mighty cadaver to its creatures all,
To the crows, the rats and the flies.*^[28]

So without a recognition of our inherent racial qualities and the ancestral territory that determines our nationhood, we will remain as much a threatened species as the white rhino, the giant panda and the large blue butterfly. As Europe and North America struggle to cope with the catastrophic results of inner-city habitation and suicidal race-mixing, National Revolutionaries must never forget that we humans are the natural guardians of the soil and our extinction would be possibly the greatest ecological disaster of all. This is why we must seek to re-establish ourselves in the heart of the rural countryside, so that one day we can proudly declare that, in the words of Walther Darré: ‘Here is anchored the eternalness of a racial stock of unique character.’^[29]

^[1] William Cobbett, quoted in Alun Hawkins’ ‘Deserters From The Plough’ in *History Today*, Vol. 43 (February 1993), p.32.

^[2] Howard Newby, quoted in David Lowenthal’s ‘Heritage and the English Landscape’ in *History Today*, Vol. 41 (September 1991), p. 10.

^[3] Anna Bramwell, *Blood And Soil: Walther Darre And Hitler’s Green Party*, The Kensal Press, 1985, p 55.

^[4] Anna Bramwell, *Ecology In The 20th Century: A History*, Yale University Press, 1989, p 191.

^[5] *Blood And Soil*, op cit, p 54.

^[6] Ibid, p 6.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] Gottfried Feder, *The Programme Of The NSDAP And Its General Conceptions*, BP Publications, 1980, p 10.

^[9] Ibid, p 11.

^[10] Otto Strasser, *Germany Tomorrow*, Jonathan Cape, 1940, p 156.

^[11] *Blood And Soil*, op cit, p 24.

^[12] Ibid, p 55.

^[13] R. W. Darré, *The Peasantry as the Key to Understanding the Nordic Race* in Barbara Miller Lane & Leila J Rupp (Ed.), *Nazi Ideology Before 1933: A Documentation*, Manchester University Press, 1978, p 105.

^[14] *Blood And Soil*, op cit, p 105.

^[15] Anna Bramwell, *Was This Man Father Of The Greens?* in *History Today* magazine, September 1984, Vol. 34, p 8.

^[16] *Blood And Soil*, op cit, p 115.

^[17] Ibid, p 119.

^[18] Ibid.

^[19] Ibid, p 5.

^[20] Corneliu Z Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, Liberty Bell, 1990, p 225.

^[21] Ibid, p 146.

^[22] Ibid, p 313.

^[23] *Ecology In The 20th Century: A History*, op cit, pp 163-4.

^[24] Hugh Thomas (Ed.), *Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera: Selected Writings*, London, 1972, p 30.

^[25] *Ecology In The 20th Century: A History*, op cit, pp 164.

^[26] Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, in a speech to mark the foundation of his Movement on October 29th, 1933, quoted in Stanley Payne, *Falange*, Stanford, 1961, p 41.

^[27] John Seymour, *The Ultimate Heresy*, Green Books, 1989, pp 87-8.

^[28] Knut Hamsun, quoted in Pdraig Cullen, 'Voice From The Forests', *The Scorpion*, Issue 11, p 25.

^[29] R W Darre, *The German Peasant Formed German History* in George L Mosse (Ed.), *Nazi Culture*, Grosset & Dunlap, 1966, p 150.

CHAPTER EIGHT

OSWALD MOSLEY: THE RISE & FALL OF ENGLISH FASCISM BETWEEN 1918-1945

WHILST evaluations of the Hitlerian and Mussolinian regimes run into many thousands, Fascism in England is a subject which has received far less coverage in the political and historical mainstream. But in order to analyse the mixed fortunes of its adherents between 1918 and 1945, one should never overlook the seemingly irrelevant – albeit crucial – ingredients which contribute to the overall flavour of this rather unlikely phenomenon. The story of English Fascism concerns far more than the deeds of the Blackshirts themselves. Throughout the brief period of comparative military quietude between the British Establishment and its apparently ‘traditional’ German adversaries, Fascism in England did not splutter erratically like a dilapidated exhaust-pipe; on the contrary, its uncomplicated development can be traced from its humble origins right through to its short-lived climax, and from there to its penultimate and ignoble demise. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that this article inevitably adheres to a somewhat bell-curved format.

According to Eugen Weber, Fascism in England ‘seems almost a contradiction because Great Britain – and especially England – is known as a law-abiding and constitution minded country, where violence is out of place, existing institutions are respected, and gradual reform is the rule’.^[1] In the wake of the First World War, however, Fascism was poised to find much in the way of support from the English people. During the formulative years of the twentieth century the British Brothers’ League appeared, and, slightly later in 1919, Henry Hamilton Beamish founded The Britons, a London society committed to the exposure of the Jewish ‘secret conspiracy’.^[2] The group republished and distributed copies of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, a document which, although still unproven, accords with the main events in modern world history. Many of the group’s leaders were

associated with similar organisations like the Eugenics Society, Loyalty League, Navy League and Vigilantes Society. But the first truly organised appearance of Fascism in England came in the shape of the British Fascisti, which, partly because it had been modelled on the Italian system, found very little support. Ironically, perhaps, the group owed its emergence to a woman. In 1923, Miss Rotha Lintorn-Orman, a Field-Marshal's daughter, had become 'gravely alarmed at the rise of Socialism and Communism and decided to insert a series of six advertisements in the Duke of Northumberland's paper, The Patriot. The advertisements asked for recruits for a 'British Fascisti' to act as an 'organised force to combat [the] Red Revolution'.^[3] Lintorn-Orman had served in the Women's Reserve Ambulance during the First World War and pledged her support for the Monarchy, the Constitution and the imperialist British Empire. One prominent member of the group was William Joyce (see below), a man later known as 'Lord Haw-Haw' and hanged for collaborating with Hitler's Government during the Second World War. This capricious launching-pad soon split into various warring factions – 'extremist little groups, dissatisfied with the Movement's staid activities'^[4] – such as the British Empire Fascists, the Fascist League and the Fascist Movement, all of whom were joined in 1925 by the black-shirted National Fascisti. Other, smaller groups came into existence, like the British National Fascists and the United Empire Fascists, each of them imitating their Italian contemporaries and 'enjoying brief lives under pocket Mussolinis'.^[5]

In 1924, Arnold Spencer Leese became a member of the British Fascisti and soon rose through the ranks to become the main organiser of its Stamford branch. Leese, born in 1877, was a veterinary surgeon and specialist in camel diseases; unlikely credentials, perhaps, for an emerging Fascist leader. However, Leese had a genuine fondness for animals and many attributed his 'anti-Semitism' to an inherent 'distaste for the Kosher method of slaughtering animals'.^[6] Due to an uncompromising attitude towards those around him, Leese eventually

made the Stamford branch of the British Fascisti a totally independent organisation after he and Henry Simpson had deliberately broken the rules of the group's constitution by standing in a 1927 municipal election. By 1929 Leese had formed the Imperial Fascist League (IFL), a group which attracted a 'working class and youth element'^[2] and for its emblem combined the Union Flag with the Swastika. The IFL soon began to publish its own newspaper, *The Fascist*, which declared itself an 'organ of racial fascism'.^[9] But apart from the various factional disputes which took place in and around the Far Right during this early period, their importance was only apparent to those involved and groups like the IFL remained fairly small. Indeed, by 1933, just four years after its inception, the IFL was only able to assemble sixteen uniformed members at a major meeting of Leslie H Sherrard's 'Fascist Legions'. The numerical weakness of the IFL did not seem to worry Leese, however, and despite the fact that nine out of ten recruits lapsed soon after joining, 'his aim, he said, was quality rather than quantity'.^[9] But whilst he and his most loyal followers were subsequently accused of languishing 'in obscurity for nearly half a century without any increase in the handful of members with which they began',^[10] a new player emerged from the wings. Sir Oswald Mosley, who had trained at the Sandhurst military academy, was set to become the most well known Fascist leader this country has ever seen. When an influential figure decides to embrace an existing political ideology, it is often the case that he or she acts as a catalyst. Just as George Bernard Shaw had misguidedly returned from his beloved Russia and pointed his true colours to the Bolshevik mast for all to see, thus increasingly the credibility of his new-found comrades overseas, so Mosley's decision to embrace Fascism provided the denizens of the English Far Right with a fresh air of respectability.

After being wounded during the First World War, Mosley came to appreciate what he regarded as the efficiency of the interventionist State. In 1918 Mosley became the Conservative Party MP for Harrow, although he was first and foremost a staunch Unionist and 'rarely, if ever, described himself as a Conservative'.^[11] Indeed, by 1920 he had left the Party with many people speculating that he was gravitating

towards Labour. Even Beatrice Webb described him as ‘the perfect politician who is also the perfect gentleman’.^[12] High praise indeed! But whilst Mosley’s ‘defection’ across the floor of the Commons seemed imminent, he initially stood at Harrow in 1922 as an independent, only joining the Labour Party two years later after declining an offer to join forces with Stanley Baldwin. As he was later to reflect, after a war in which so many people from these isles perished during a struggle for what they hoped would be a brighter future, between 1924 and 1929 Baldwin’s government had plunged the country into a sterile climate of comparative ‘normality’. Meanwhile, Mosley’s campaign in the 1924 election proved disastrous and he failed to get himself elected. By 1926, however, Mosley had been elected in Birmingham. As a specialist on unemployment, Mosley advocated a ‘homes for heroes’ policy and sympathised with John Maynard Keynes prior to the *General Theory* of 1936. In 1925 Mosley produced an allegedly contentious pamphlet, entitled *Revolution by Reason*, and, by 1929, had been made an advisor on unemployment for the incoming Labour government led by J Ramsey Macdonald. He was also regarded as being next in line for the Prime Minister’s job. But Mosley’s increasing unhappiness with the centre parties saw him establish a group within the Parliamentary Labour Party, and, in a January 1930 memorandum – known as the *Mosley Manifesto* – he declared that his main aims were expanded credit, the exclusion of foreign goods, the raising of the school leaving age and the accentuation of the British Empire. For those who were misguided enough to place their faith in the corrupt Zionist system, this programme was regarded as both simple and pragmatic. But, predictably, it was rejected by the Cabinet because of its supposedly ‘radical’ nature. In May 1930, Mosley resigned from his government post and tried to promote his objectives at the Party’s October conference instead. But although it has been stated that by this time he had ‘reached his highest point in conventional English politics’^[13] and ‘become a major political personality in his own right, with a wide, and unique, range of support and goodwill across the political spectrum’,^[14] as a result of his continued and persistent dissidence and the fact that he had inadvertently portrayed the Labour Party as ‘quasi-fascist’ in a press interview, by March 1931 Mosley had

been expelled and forced to search for an alternative outlet for his political energies.

Whereas Mosley's political acrobatics may seem a far cry from the relatively marginalised fringes of English Fascism, there is little doubt that his Statist credentials became the spark which ignited the deluded hearts and minds of the masses and, despite the fact that it had basically burnt itself out in less than a decade, the Fascist prototype was taken out of storage, dusted off, revitalised and hurriedly shoved out into the stagnant arena of party politics. In March 1931 Mosley formed the New Party and was joined in this new venture by six from seventeen of those Labour Party officials who had signed the Mosley Manifesto. In October 1931 the New Party put up twenty-four candidates and all were defeated. The true significance of this defeat soon became apparent in 1935, when no candidates were put up whatsoever. But the New Party was never a truly Fascist entity in its own right and, according to Colin Cross, it was only when Mosley realised the extent to which his policies were opposed by angry mobs of Labour supporters baying for his blood that he decided to embrace Fascism as a means of protecting both himself and his supporters from physical attack.^[15] But whilst Cross carefully attributes this belief to John Strachey, there remains little truth in the assertion. Although Mosley was renowned for his flirtation with several of the existing Establishment parties, when he initially entered the domain of Fascist politics he was in possession of one or two very strong ideological principles (although policy-making decisions were gradually left to others as time wore on). Despite the opportunistic nature of the man himself, it is quite ridiculous to assume that Mosley adopted Fascism simply for its ability to provide its leading figures with a ready-made army of street-fighters. After all, what good are bodyguards if you have to change or water-down your original principles in order to be accepted by a few hardened combatants? Whilst Mosley was often an indecisive man, he was never a careerist and his willingness to make a stand for what he considered to be right was, to some extent, emulated by Enoch Powell some years later. This does not, however, mean that reactionaries like Mosley and Powell should be worthy of our respect. We revolutionaries have our own ideological mentors. But why did

Mosley embrace Fascism? Well, despite the fact that the New Party itself was not Fascist, it certainly served as a kind of Fascist ante-chamber. Towards the end of 1931, Mosley was beginning to study the Fascist and National-Socialist regimes in Italy and Germany respectively and, as a result, by January 1932 he had visited both Hitler and Mussolini personally, events which undoubtedly ‘strengthened his faith in Fascist politics’.^[16] Several years on, Mosley even married his second wife in Berlin and held the reception in Hitler’s very own house. From that moment on, the full title of his new movement became the British Union of Fascists and National Socialists. But if Mosley had found his ideological niche, then Fascism in England had gained a temporary reprieve from political obscurity.

On October 1st, 1932, the New Party had been dissolved and the British Union of Fascists (BUF) formerly launched. Among the BUF’s leading members were Arthur Kenneth Chesterton, second cousin to G. K. Chesterton and later to become the first Chairman of the National Front; Alexander Raven Thomson, an expert on Corporatist economics who ‘possessed a mind of appreciable intellectual power’;^[17] Neil Francis-Hawkins; and the aforementioned William Joyce. Whilst the leadership of the BUF was overwhelmingly middle-class, the movement also managed to attract a mixture of university graduates, ex-soldiers and the unemployed. The early success of the BUF was partly due to Mosley’s ability to court the English aristocracy, a strategy which, by 1934, had secured the financial support of Lord Rothermere, a wealthy accountant who viewed the BUF as being little more than something with which to scare the Conservative Party into more decisive economic action. Whilst the link with Rothermere opened up a fringe dialogue with the more reactionary members of the Conservative Party, the BUF found itself inundated with enquiries for membership after *Daily Mail* headlines had announced ‘The Blackshirts Have Arrived!’ and ‘Hurrah For The Blackshirts!’, plunging Fascism into the political mainstream. At the now famous indoor meeting held at London’s Olympia in June 1934, the BUF entertained an audience of over 30,000 people. For many of those who had been cruelly demoralised by the Great Depression, the attraction of Fascism could be found in its ability to infuse its members with pride

and self-respect. Unemployed men and women felt part of an emerging historical phenomenon, rather than part of the scrapheap created by the economic disaster sweeping the country at the time. In addition, despite the fact that BUF membership was originally open to those of Jewish (Khazar) extraction, when Mosley suddenly realised that the thorny issue surrounding Jewish control of shops and businesses in the East End of London could increase his support, he used it to ‘boost membership’.^[18] Consequently, at a meeting in the Albert Hall during October 1934 Mosley used the opportunity of a mass gathering to denounce ‘the power of organised Jewry, which is today mobilised against Fascism’^[19]. Whilst the escalation of violence will be discussed in due course, 1934 was a year in which the fortunes of Fascism reached an all-time high. In the same year, Lintorn-Orman’s British Fascisti was facing imminent bankruptcy and the IFL was attracting the attention of the Home Office after a complaint that two of its speakers had declared that ‘they would clear all the Jews out of the country’.^[20] But whilst the BUF and IFL’s fiery denunciations of Jewish power differed only in terms of rhetoric, Leese accused Mosley of being a ‘Kosher Fascist’ due to the latter’s defence of Freemasonry and an allegation that William Joyce had employed the services of a lawyer ‘whose daughter recently married a Rothschild’.^[21] Indeed, according to Leese – who seemed by far the most genuine and honest character amongst those of the early Fascist generation – ‘Mosley was muscling in to the Fascist field of politics’.^[22] Furthermore, it seems, ‘He had the money and we had not, and he was a well-known figure in democratic politics and did not attempt to face the Jewish issue (how could he with his first with the grand-daughter of Levi Leiter, the flour-cornerer of Chicago?) he took what little wind there was out of our sails for a time’.^[23] By September 1933 many people thought Mosley was following some kind of secret agenda, especially when the President of the Oxford Union’s Jewish Society correctly stated that ‘Our greatest supporters in the fight against the Imperial Fascists are the Mosley Fascists themselves’.^[24]

But as far as the warring components of English Fascism were concerned, from that point on it was downhill all the way and we must

now turn our attention to their gradual demise. After Rothermere had withdrawn his short-lived financial support for the BUF after the violent events at Olympia in 1934, it inevitably ‘became more alienated from the British political culture’.^[25] Internal problems also took their toll, and whilst the BUF was portrayed as ‘a thriving, organised movement, united behind an infallible leader’,^[26] the reality was quite different. Mosley had always been a very poor judge of character and when BUF funds fell victim to widespread petty theft inspired by the worsening Depression, the blame lay with the fact that his ‘delegation of administrative and organisational functions tended to leave mediocrities and incompetents in charge’.^[27] It has since been noted that Mosley was too honest for his own good, and that he lacked cynicism. Similarly, the BUF was also challenged internally by those who continually encouraged the movement to take a more paramilitary stance, and an opposing clique which sought to repackage Fascism and make it somewhat more palatable to the average man and woman in the street. When Mosley saw that the BUF could not realistically tolerate both factions within the same camp he was eventually forced to concede that direct action was far more effective in the battle for recruits than the piecemeal efforts of his more ideological associates. Needless to say, the more astute members of the BUF – among them Chesterton, Joyce and Beckett – resigned in order to pursue their own objectives. But Mosley’s fascination with paramilitary organisation was something of a contradiction for a man who had developed his policies within the existing parties of the political Establishment. Further, Mosley was never an anti-parliamentarian anyway.

The failure of the BUF has much to do with the strong parliamentary system which, this far, has always been very characteristic of politics in the British Isles. John Weiss has noted that ‘Conservatives in England remained true to their own grand tradition in the end, as a wave of revulsion against Mosley’s street toughs and storm troopers swept through all groups’^[28]. In addition, the lower middle-class was thought to be ‘too well off and too liberal’^[29] to support Fascism and whilst similar movements in Germany and Italy were able to thrive in their respective atmospheres of socio-economic despair, disillusionment and

the threat of Bolshevik insurrection, English folk were far too reserved to take such claims seriously. In short, although the parliamentary system appeared to be immersed within a puddle of economic stagnation, the situation was seemingly not so desperate as to require the measures being advocated in Central Europe. Predictably, from 1931 onwards the Conservative-dominated National Government ‘provided a safe haven for the propertied classes and thus denied the BUF political space on the Right in which to develop as a credible alternative’.^[30] In addition, the fact that the BUF was simply unable to capitalise upon the prevailing air of economic discontent suggests that the likes of Mosley and Leese ‘are unable to succeed in societies where there are too many vestiges of the feudal past’.^[31] But more importantly, Mosley always remained part of the existing System and never attempted to transcend or undermine the Establishment by creating any visible socio-economic structures on the periphery. In 1931 the government abandoned the Gold Standard, a move which was closely followed by low interest rates, falling unemployment and increasing prosperity. Mosley – that self-professed economic ‘radical’ – had squandered his only chance.

According to many historians, one of the main reasons why the BUF was unable to make a breakthrough can be directly attributed to its tendency to adopt ‘foreign’ methods of promulgation. The flag-waving pageantry of the East End street party has been compared by the more ridiculous and hysterical academics to the torchlight rallies at Nuremberg, and the BUF was shown in an equally ‘foreign’ light by a hostile media completely opposed to such concepts as nationhood and patriotism. Despite his lack of imagination, Mosley was hardly the first man to stage a procession of Union flags on English soil, but his stage-managed adoption of the black-shirted uniform, neo-runic insignia and organisational authoritarianism replete with Roman salute, inextricably connected him with significant events happening elsewhere in Europe. On the other hand, it could be argued that England had far more in common with her cousins in Germany and Italy than with the seeping liberalism which emanated from Westminster, but the controlled media was having none of it. The British Establishment had already chosen to side against the future Axis powers, and Mosley was fast becoming an

irritant who had to be dealt with once and for all. The Fascist leader suddenly found himself in a dilemma; on the one hand he was keen to appear patriotic and pro-Empire, but, on the other, he was incessantly portrayed as ‘the enemy within’.

The most important factor relating to the failure of English Fascism was violence, or at least its inference. Marxist and Jewish historians alike, delight in vilifying the BUF as being solely responsible for the various street battles which took place during the 1930s. Similarly, so-called ‘anti-fascists’ are ordinarily depicted as honest opponents of totalitarianism, men and women who mobilised themselves to defeat a growing menace which had been imported from the Continent. But whilst the BUF undoubtedly attracted many violent young men who wished to find an outlet for their pathological frustrations, Mosley often managed to channel this aggression by imbuing such elements with a strong sense of loyalty and devotion towards the Fascist cause itself. Whenever Fascists used violence against their opponents it was in self-defence. Indeed, BUF meetings were frequently broken up and the organisation’s sympathisers were constantly attacked and beaten by those who claimed to represent the best interests of the nation at large. The reality is that Fascism often managed to unite the various sections of society and leftists knew only too well that their outdated theories of class struggle cannot in any way be reconciled with the reawakened spirit of national unity. The involvement of the British Communist Party was part of a Marxist revival which had been inspired by events between Nationalist and Republican insurgents in Spain. As these so-called ‘extremists’ of the Right and Left of the political spectrum fought out their differences on the streets, the average voter began to feel alienated and strongly abhorred the new orgy of violence which was beginning to spread to many of the cities and towns of England. Many such people began to return to the pro-Establishment fold as the centre ground regained its composure in the face of a minor civil war. As Andrew Mitchell concedes: ‘Militant Communist, Jewish and Labour opponents successfully saddled the BUF with the public blame for violence and disorder’.^[32] Whilst the press tried to insinuate that violence directed at the BUF was merely the result of spontaneous uprisings by ‘English anti-fascists’, William Joyce compiled an

extensive list of Jews who had been arrested and charged for such acts. In his view: 'These little sub-men are a nuisance to be eliminated, but their wealthy instigators and controllers, well known to us, are, in sum, a criminal monstrosity, for which not all the gold of Jewry can pay the just compensation which we will demand and obtain'.^[33] From November 1933 onwards, the State launched a campaign of intimidation and surveillance against the BUF, and the press managed to impose a mass boycott in the same way that the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) is still able to do with regard to groups like the National Front (NF) and British National Party (BNP) today. So whilst 'Newspaper editors and the BBC were advised not to report Fascist activities or publicise pro-Mosley views',^[34] the sole image of the BUF which was projected to the general public was one of extremism and negativity.

With the approach of the Second World War, the final blow for the BUF came with the adoption of a further campaign of systematic State repression. By December 1936, the BUF found it increasingly difficult to hire council-owned venues for its meetings and the new Public Order Act had outlawed the wearing of paramilitary uniform. This measure severely affected the ability of the BUF to operate effectively and, in his memoirs, Mosley asks: 'Has any other political party in Britain experienced, let alone survived, two special measures passed by Parliament for its suppression? If not, we must bear alone the burden for this dubious honour'.^[35] By December 1938 BUF membership was estimated at 16,500, and this figure increased slightly as Mosley took full advantage of widespread hostility to the approaching conflict with Germany and organised a 'Stop The War' campaign. In July 1939, 20,000 supporters attended a peace rally at London's Earl's Court and, by September of the same year, the BUF had 22,500 members. It was inevitable, however, that as the allies began to close ranks against Hitler the British Establishment launched its own programme of 'patriotic' opposition to Fascism. As a result, this artificially-induced fervour saw the BUF once again portrayed as an internal threat to the country's national interests and, once the masses had accepted this fabricated view, from May 1940 onwards the internment of 747 BUF

supporters under Defence Regulation 18(b) became something of a formality. Two months later the BUF was officially banned and 26,000 German, Austrian and Italian immigrants also rounded up and brutally incarcerated by the British State.

Thus, I have attempted to demonstrate how Fascism was retrieved from the fringes of English politics between the wars and revitalised by its greatest asset: Sir Oswald Mosley. But despite Mosley's charismatic leadership and his ability to win recruits for the BUF by capitalising upon the issue of Jewish power and securing the short-term financial support of Lord Rothermere, English Fascism was eventually destroyed by its own ideological and strategic contradictions. Moreover, it was brought down by those external factors – strong government, Zionist and Leftist violence, media hostility and State repression – over which it had little or no control. The BUF, despite leaving Arnold Leese and the IFL floundering at the starting-post like the proverbial tortoise, eventually found itself consigned to the very same tomb of political failure. Put simply, in the words of F. L. Carsten: 'The national climate and the political structure did not favour its growth, and Sir Oswald Mosley was neither a Hitler nor a Mussolini'.^[36] But for those who seriously think that a policy of Nationalism can be achieved by pursuing an electoral or constitutionalist policy, the fortunes of English Fascism prior to 1945 prove just how futile it is to tread such a path. The likes of the BNP today, just like Mosley and the BUF before it, will continue to fail miserably because those who willingly engage in the absurdities of the existing parliamentary system are destined to be controlled and manipulated by the very system itself. The BUF was forced to learn the hard way, but the fact that contemporary organisations like the BNP still refuse to recognise or acknowledge the mistakes of the past more than fifty years on, can only be viewed with deep suspicion.

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^[11] Cross, op cit, p 11.

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^[14] Ibid.

^[15] Cross, op cit, p 47.

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^[17] Thurlow, op cit, p 131.

^[18] Mitchell, op cit, p 19.

^[19] W F Mandle, *Anti-Semitism and the British Union of Fascists*, Longman, Green & Co., 1968, p 11.

^[20] Thurlow, op cit, p 74.

^[21] Imperial Fascist League, op cit, p 4.

^[22] Arnold S Leese, *Out of Step: Events in the Two Lives of An Anti-Jewish Camel Doctor*, Imperial Fascist League, 1947, p 52.

^[23] Ibid.

^[24] Ibid.

^[25] Richard C Thurlow, 'The Return of Jeremiah' in Kenneth Lunn & Richard C. Thurlow (ed.), *British Fascism: Essays on the Radical Right in Inter-War Britain*, Croom Helm, 1980, p 108.

^[26] Mitchell, op cit, p 20.

^[27] Ibid.

^[28] John Weiss, *The Fascist Tradition*, Harper & Row, 1966, p 81.

^[29] Ibid.

^[30] Mitchell, op cit, p 20.

^[31] Weiss, op cit, p 82.

^[32] Mitchell, op cit, p 31.

^[33] William Joyce, *Fascism and Jewry*, Sons of Liberty, 1976, p 8.

^[34] Mitchell, op cit, p 21.

^[35] Mosley, op cit, p 312.

^[36] F. L. Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism*, Methuen, 1970, p 223.

CHAPTER NINE

WAS 'FASCISM' OUTSIDE GERMANY & ITALY ANYTHING MORE THAN AN IMITATION?

ON previous occasions I have examined whether Hitler or Mussolini actually developed a distinctive brand of Fascist economics in its own right, concluding that Fascism itself was and remains a bastardised form of Capitalism which has frequently hijacked genuine Nationalist sentiment for its own ends. But what of the other organisations in Europe around this period, many of which were considered to be very similar?

During the latter part of the Twentieth century, political, social and historical analysts have frequently employed the Fascist epithet in order to describe the nature of those individuals and groups considered to resemble the German and Italian regimes. Indeed, many politically motivated individuals in the intellectual Establishment have used this sweeping term to conveniently disregard the philosophical trappings of Nationalism elsewhere. The fact that the objectives of an organisation happen to accord with the aspirations of Fascism on one or two ideological points, does not make it Fascist per se. Despite portraying themselves as opponents of Fascism, Right-wing conservatives have often been known to steal Nationalistic imagery and fool the more radical elements within a nation which is subject to political instability.

In this article, I intend to examine three expressions of European Nationalism: the Spanish Falange, the Belgian Rexists and the Rumanian Iron Guard. I have chosen to reject the various other examples across Europe, simply because the aforementioned groups reflect the different approaches to liberal-democracy during the time when Fascism was rather fashionable in Italy and Germany. Furthermore, each group will be studied in accordance with what I consider to be five fundamental characteristics of Fascism: strong leadership, anti-Liberalism, imperialism, anti-Marxism and a maintenance (or tolerance) of Capitalism. In addition, it is worth noting how such groups viewed their German and Italian counterparts. However, before going any further, here is a brief synopsis of how each

organisation arose in the first place.

The Spanish Falange was formed in Madrid on 29th October 1933, although the organisation and its charismatic leader, José Antonio Primo de Rivera (1903-36), did not become a force to be reckoned with until it had merged with the J.O.N.S. (National-Syndicalist Councils of Action) on 13th February 1934. José Antonio's father had led the military dictatorship which ruled Spain from 1923 to 1930 and, despite his many faults, the General's loyal and devoted son expressed a bitter contempt towards those he felt to have let his father down: namely the aristocracy and the property-owning classes. In the early days of the Falange, José Antonio won the support of many Right-wing conservative elements, although his poetic romanticism also inspired many students to join his political crusade. Like so many other Nationalistic entities, the Falange was a reaction towards what it perceived to be weak government; in this case, the moderate conservatives which had triumphed at the 1933 elections.

But whilst Spain has always had a tense political atmosphere, in Belgium people seemed less prone to Nationalism. According to Eugen Weber, Belgium was 'a country whose problems were in no way dramatic and whose people, solid and often stolid, inclined neither to excesses nor to histrionics'.^[4] Indeed, in the 1930s Belgium had merely been torn between two distinct forms of popular expression. On the one hand, Flemish activists were campaigning vigorously to preserve their own independence from the French-speaking Walloons, and on the other, reactionaries and imperialists were perpetuating the rule of the privileged aristocracy. In the wake of this sterility came Rex, a Movement which had its roots in the Association of Belgian Youth (A.C.J.B.). Its founder, Léon Degrelle (1906-94), began his political adventure by contributing to Léon Daudet's *Action Française* newspaper, before emerging as the leader of the Rexist Movement in 1935.

Elsewhere, Corneliu Codreanu's Iron Guard was established after many people became alarmed at the disproportionate number of Jews in positions of power and influence. Indeed, many of them saw the need for an alternative to the twin evils of Capitalism and Marxism:

materialist philosophies controlled by a Judaeo-Masonic conspiracy. Codreanu (1899-1938) had formed his group after a split with the more conservative League of Christian National Defence in 1927. The Iron Guard, also known as the Legion of the Archangel Michael, became a bastion of spiritual warriors, their ranks an antithesis to the decadence of Rumanian Liberalism. But how do these three manifestations of Nationalism compare with the fundamental traits of Fascism?

Strong leadership is certainly one of the main characteristics of Fascism and the Falange undoubtedly embraced such a concept. But whilst more orthodox Fascism is dependant upon a form of uncompromising dictatorship, José Antonio believed that the 'leader should obey the public; he should serve it, which is a different thing'.^[2] On the other hand, he was of the opinion that leadership should be administered in the interests of the people 'even though the people itself be unaware what good is'.^[3] Elsewhere, José Antonio noted that German totalitarianism was peculiar to the German people, and that for Spain a different form of leadership was required; one which, in accordance with the Spanish tradition of confederation, blocks and alliances, would allow leaders to emerge from 'the union of several dwarves'.^[4] In Belgium leadership was essential to the whole Rexist philosophy. According to George L. Mosse, 'The language and style of Rex was Degrelle. This was its most Fascistic characteristic'.^[5] But Degrelle was careful to point out that 'The Leader in Rex, is the one who sees in the nation at all levels, not slaves or robots, but collaborators in a common task'.^[6] In Rumania, Codreanu believed that strong leadership must be founded upon personal morality. In truth, whilst Codreanu was undoubtedly its leader, the Iron Guard was far more decentralised than its Spanish or Belgian counterparts and encouraged initiative from below, rather than authority from above. In fact the Iron Guard was based upon the concept of the Nest, a series of highly-disciplined and locally organised branches. In his *Nest Leader's Manual*, Codreanu clearly states that a 'Leader must be wise: he must consider carefully before taking a decision so that it may be the right one. He must decide quickly and carry out the decision'.^[7] In addition, unlike the blind obedience shown to the Führer and the Duce, he was of

the opinion that such a role was there to be earned and that, despite his authority, the Nest Leader ‘must be benign and care for the men under his command’.^[8] He must also be good-humoured ‘in the eyes of his subordinates; not bitter, gloomy, nervy’.^[9] Codreanu also believed that leadership should not entitle an individual to any specific privileges, and that a such a figure ‘must put himself in the hardest place. A Legionary must not push to fill the best seat at the table or the softest bed to sleep in’.^[10]

Our second characteristic, anti-Liberalism, was present in all three examples. José Antonio described Liberalism as ‘the mockery of the unfortunate’,^[11] believing that ‘Under the Liberal System the cruel irony could be seen of men and women working themselves to skeletons, twelve hours a day, for a miserable wage, and yet being assured by the law that they were “free” men and women’.^[12] In Belgium, Degrelle’s right-hand man, Jean Denis, proposed that

The concept of the individual which forms the erroneous philosophical foundation of the present regime, and which was born of the catastrophic ideologies of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries, must be replaced by the concept of the human being, which corresponds exactly to the reality of man; a social being endowed with a fundamental dignity, which society can help develop, and with which it has no right to interfere.^[13]

Meanwhile, Codreanu opposed Liberalism due to the fact that it did not accord with his Christianity and came into conflict with Objective Truth and the Natural Law. In other words, Codreanu rejected the majoritarianism of liberal-democracy because in his view a State ‘cannot be based only on theoretical conceptions of constitutional law’.^[14] But there is no doubt that the Falange, Rex and the Iron Guard each relied upon paramilitary or extra-parliamentary means, which greatly distinguished them from their liberal-democratic adversaries. By openly rejecting Liberalism, Nationalists were advocating not only the destruction of the existing system from within, but the creation of a viable alternative from without.

Turning now to imperialism, the Falange was not particularly

concerned with the extension of Spanish power abroad, at least not in a physical sense. In terms of setting an example to others, however, José Antonio did intend 'to bring it about that the head of the world shall once again be our Spain'.^[15] But depending upon how one views imperialism within Spain itself, the Falange may be considered imperialist in the sense that it opposed an independent Catalanian nation. Catalanian separatism, however, at least during the early 1930s, was also rejected due to the fact that many of its adherents were Moscow-backed Communists. But the seemingly unbridgeable gulf between imperialism and parochialism has always presented something of a dilemma for some Nationalists and for Degrelle it was no different. In the war he raised a battalion of SS volunteers and joined Hitler's forces on the Eastern Front, but as Weber rightly points out, 'though he may have been a 'European', Degrelle remained a Belgian Nationalist'.^[16]

Codreanu, on the other hand, was certainly not an imperialist. Rumania had only won its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1879, and Codreanu himself had fought for his country against the encroaching imperialism of Austria-Hungary in 1916. In terms of propaganda, the Iron Guard only ever referred to the need for a rebirth within the confines of its own borders. This may have been due to the fact that, by emerging victorious from the First World War, Rumania had been one of the few nations to have retained her territorial independence. In terms of ethnicity, however, Eastern Europe has always been a hotbed of racial conflict due to its highly potent and proximate concentration of Latinos, Germans, Magyars, Slavs, Jews and Gypsies.

But one important factor shared by all three groups, was their fierce opposition to Marxism. José Antonio described Communism as 'an appalling absorption of man into a vast amorphous mass, in which all individuality is lost and the corporeal vestige of each individual soul is weakened and dissolved'.^[17] But the Falange was still perceived by many to be a Socialist organisation, although the Movement was wrongly accused of 'Bolshevism' by its conservative enemies on the Right. The implications of such a smear have an important parallel in

that, elsewhere, German Hitlerites attacked the likes of Gregor and Otto Strasser for taking a rather similar stance. By leaving for the Eastern Front, Léon Degrelle obviously intended to engage his Communist enemies head on, but even before Rex had encouraged its supporters to join Hitler's SS, the Movement was inevitably perceived as anti-Marxist due to its adherence to Catholicism. But the Rexists were also keen to stress that 'We are not the sort to exploit the funk of frightened bourgeoisie by telling them that Communism and revolution are one and the same. We are those who, having nothing to lose and everything to win, have decided to replace the decaying liberal regime with a new regime and to create a world in which man can truly live'.^[18] So Rexist opposition to Communism 'was based on the belief that Marxism was a left-over of decaying liberalism'.^[19] Codreanu, of course, battled against Rumania's Communists during his time as a university student, and even before he had anticipated the formation of the Iron Guard, had little hesitation in climbing to the top of the Nicolina Railway Works in 1920, and hoisting aloft the Rumanian Tricolour in defiance of the '5,000 armed Communists'^[20] gathered below. As far as the Iron Guard was concerned, the realisation of a Marxist system would not in any way have liberated the ordinary Rumanian worker from the clutches of Capitalism: 'If these had been victorious, would we have had at least a Rumania led by a Rumanian workers' regime? Would the Rumanian workers have become masters of the country? No! The next day we would have become the slaves of the dirtiest tyranny: the Talmudic, Jewish tyranny'.^[21]

Marxism was also greatly feared due to the fact that, as far as Rumanians were concerned, Russia was itself an unpredictable and intimidating entity which, potentially at least, could have launched an attack upon its smaller neighbour at any time.

Fascists in Germany and Italy were renowned for their tolerance of Capitalism, with Mussolini and Hitler being financed both overtly and covertly by wealthy bankers and industrialists. In Spain, however, the Falange was rather different from other Right-wing organisations in that it refused to form an alliance with General Franco and his rich conservative sympathisers. Indeed, José Antonio described capital as

‘an economic instrument which must serve the entire economy, and hence may not be an instrument for the advantage and privilege of the few who have had the good luck to get in first’.^[22] If set in a rather more conspiratorial context, despite the fact that such an act was carried out at the behest of the ruling Marxist regime, José Antonio’s anti-Capitalist attitude may have had a great deal to do with his eventual murder in the Alicante Prison immediately prior to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936.

Indeed, what better way for Franco to fuse together his Falangist and Carlist (Monarchist) opponents and unite the remaining patriotic elements beneath one banner? In fact, the Spanish leader remained opposed to the forces of conservatism right up until his execution, declaring, that ‘Our triumph will not be that of a reactionary group, nor will it mean the people’s loss of any advantage. On the contrary: our work will be a national work, which will be capable of raising the people’s standard of living – truly appalling in some regions – and of making them share the pride of a great destiny recovered.’^[23] Here lies the very crux which separates genuine Nationalism from conservative imposture. Rexists, meanwhile, opposed Capitalism just as strongly as they opposed Marxism and, according to George L. Mosse, ‘Degrelle exploited a mounting distaste for both State Socialism and super-Capitalism, arguing that the lesser bourgeoisie was being sacrificed to the whims and wishes of Capital and Labour: large scale industrial plant owners and large financier-speculator groups in collusion with liberal and Marxist politicians had become the power elite.’^[24] But, more importantly, Rexists sought to replace the prevailing atmosphere of selfishness and individualism with something involving the whole nation, believing that ‘In a century where people only live for themselves, hundreds, thousands of men must no longer live for themselves, but for a collective ideal, and be prepared in advance to endure for its sake every sacrifice, every humiliation, every heroic act.’^[25] In Rumania the Iron Guard represented the very antithesis of the existing Capitalist System, with its whole ideology espousing the virtues of self-sacrifice, trust and humility. As far as Codreanu was concerned, ‘we were striking a blow at a mentality which placed the

golden calf in the centre and as the main purpose in life'.^[26] Furthermore, 'Through our daring gesture we turned our backs on a mentality that dominated everything. We killed in ourselves a world in order to raise another, high as the sky... The absolute rule of matter was overthrown so it could be replaced by the rule of the spirit, of moral values?'^[27]

To sum up, in order to establish whether or not these three organisations actually were imitations of German and Italian Fascism, it is necessary to examine how each group viewed the whole concept of Fascism itself. In 1933, José Antonio is said to have embarked upon his political voyage after becoming 'profoundly impressed'^[28] by Mussolini. He even wrote an article for a prospective periodical known as *Il Fascio*, although it never appeared. In addition, he announced that 'If there is anything which deserves to be called a State of Workers, it is the Fascist State.'^[29] However, by 1934 it had become clear that 'No true Spaniard will knowingly follow a foreign model'^[30] and when he was asked to attend an international Fascist Congress at Montreux, José Antonio announced that 'the truly national character of the movement he leads is inconsistent with even the semblance of international government'.^[31] He added that the Falange was not a Fascist Movement, declaring that 'It has certain coincidences with Fascism in essential points which are of universal validity: but it is daily acquiring a clearer outline of its own.'^[32] Indeed, according to Hugh Thomas, after visiting Germany in the Spring of 1934 José Antonio 'returned to Spain depressed by the Nazis'.^[33] And whilst the Falange was originally inspired by Italian Fascism, he soon became 'almost as ill-impressed with Mussolini'^[34] and developed a distinct form of Nationalism in its own right. From that moment on, the Falange leader 'had no other meetings with foreign Fascist groups, and made a conscious effort in succeeding months to distinguish his movement from Fascism'.^[35] In Belgium, however, the exact opposite happened and Degrelle's Catholic heritage became gradually incorporated within Hitler's vision of a Germanic Empire. Whilst Degrelle was prepared to trade his Belgian Nationalism for an active role in the Nazi crusade against

Bolshevism, he also admired the political aspects of Fascism. Indeed, according to Roger Griffin, ‘After the Nazi invasion of Belgium in May 1940, Degrelle threw his effort into transforming Rex into an openly pro-Nazi party’.^[36] But whilst José Antonio had rejected Fascism, and Degrelle had come to embrace it, Codreanu was never part of the Fascist tradition in Europe. The Iron Guard certainly shared many of its ideas with Hitler and Mussolini, but it was essentially a product of an age in which the full effects of Liberalism were beginning to be rejected throughout the Continent as a whole. Although Codreanu sent Hitler his personal greetings on 12th March 1938,^[37] he had developed his brand of National Christian Socialism as early as 1919.^[38] In fact Codreanu’s emphasis upon the supremacy of spirit over matter clearly distinguished the Legionaries of the Iron Guard from their Fascist contemporaries.

According to C. Papanace, ‘By way of a metaphor, let us say that Fascism will assail the branches of the tree of evil that must be cut down, National Socialism the trunk, Legionaryism the very root feeding the evil, by depriving them of the source of nourishment’.^[39] It is also worth noting that when the legitimate Legionary Government was toppled in 1941 by the incoming military dictatorship of General Antonescu, the coup d’etat was directly backed by the Hitler regime.^[40]

According to F L Carsten, ‘Hitler was preoccupied with his plans of domination and conquest in Eastern Europe and for this reason needed an orderly regime in Rumania capable of aiding him’.^[41] The Iron Guard’s vision of an independent Rumanian nation obviously did not accord with the concept of a European Fascist Empire.

On a final note, the Falange, Rex and the Iron Guard were all different in their attitudes to the liberal-democratic sterility which had plunged Europe into chaos in the wake of the First World War. But whilst Degrelle sacrificed his own originality in order to imitate Adolf Hitler, José Antonio soon realised that he did not wish to be connected with a foreign phenomenon and rejected Benito Mussolini almost as quickly as he had adopted him. On the other hand, Codreanu was able to rely upon his own characteristic resourcefulness in order to address a

series of very similar problems. It is, then, perhaps significant that the Iron Guard was ‘the only “fascist” movement outside Germany and Italy to come to power without foreign aid’.^[42]

Given the mysterious forces behind the funding of the Hitlerian and Mussolinian regimes, it seems hardly surprising that Codreanu and his followers were dealt with in such a repressive manner. Capitalism, it seems, will only tolerate Nationalism if it is used to clothe the reactionary charlatans of Fascism.

^[1] Eugen Weber, *Varieties of Fascism*, Von Nostrand Co, 1964, p 122.

^[2] José Antonio Primo de Rivera, *The Spanish Contribution to Contemporary Political Thought*, Ediciones Almena, 1947, p 92.

^[3] *Ibid*, p 93.

^[4] *Ibid*, p 149.

^[5] George L. Mosse, *International Fascism*, Sage Publications, 1979, p 309.

^[6] Eugen Weber, *op cit*, p 181.

^[7] Corneliu Codreanu, *Legion: The Nest Leader’s Manual*, The Rising Press, 1984, p 4 I.

^[8] *Ibid*.

^[9] *Ibid*.

^[10] *Ibid*.

^[11] José Antonio Primo de Rivera, *op cit*, p 99.

^[12] *Ibid*.

^[13] Eugen Weber, *op cit*, p 179.

^[14] Corneliu Codreanu, *op cit*, p 62.

^[15] José Antonio Primo de Rivera, *op cit*, p 270.

^[16] Eugen Weber, *op cit*, p 129.

^[17] José Antonio Primo de Rivera, *op cit*, p 136.

^[18] Eugen Weber, *op cit*, p 125.

^[19] *Ibid*.

^[20] Corneliu Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, Liberty Bell Publications, 1990, p 13.

^[21] *Ibid*., p. 9.

^[22] José Antonio Primo de Rivera, *op cit*, p 112.

^[23] *Ibid*, p 275.

^[24] George L. Mosse, *op cit*, p 298.

^[25] Léon Degrelle, *Revolution des Ames*, Editions de la France, 1938, p 162.

- [26] Corneliu Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, op cit, p 214.
- [27] Ibid, pp 213-4.
- [28] José Antonio Primo de Rivera, op cit, p 19.
- [29] Ibid, p 151.
- [30] Ibid, p 19.
- [31] Ibid, p 150.
- [32] Ibid.
- [33] Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War*, Pelican, 1974, p 101.
- [34] Ibid.
- [35] Ibid.
- [36] Roger Griffin, *Fascism*, Oxford University Press, 1995, p 204.
- [37] Corneliu Codreanu, *Circulars and Manifestos*, Editorial 'Libertatea', 1987, p 229.
- [38] Corneliu Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, op cit, pp 329-30.
- [39] Corneliu Codreanu, Legion, *The Nest Leader's Manual*, op cit, p 7.
- [40] Eugen Weber, op cit, p 105.
- [41] F. L. Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism*, Methuen, 1970, p 192.
- [42] George L. Mosse, op cit, p 319.

CHAPTER TEN

THE GUILD OF ST. JOSEPH & ST. DOMINIC

IN previous articles I have looked at the devastating effects of Capitalist industry and examined the direct and theoretical tactics of agrarian revolutionaries like the mysterious ‘Captain Swing’ and nationalist ecologist Walther Darré. Another very worthy attempt to initiate a rural revolution came in the shape of the Guild of St. Joseph and St. Dominic, which established itself at Ditchling in Sussex. Indeed, after a recent visit to Ditchling Common, where I had a chance to meet up with one of the community’s ex-members, I decided to explore the story in more depth.

In 1907, Eric Gill, a twenty-five year-old stone-carver, left Hammersmith in West London and moved to Ditchling, a small village in the heart of the Sussex countryside. This self-imposed exodus was a direct result of Gill’s increasing belief that country life was far preferable to that in the sprawling metropolis. Six years later, Gill decided to go one step further and move from the High Street to Ditchling Common in order to try his hand at self-sufficiency. He bought a house and two acres of land, and eventually both he and his family began producing their own milk, butter, eggs and bread, as well as making their own clothes. The family also kept pigs and hens.

Shortly afterwards, a calligrapher named Edward Johnston – who was born in 1872 and had previously shared lodgings with Eric Gill – moved to Ditchling with his family. Meanwhile, Hilary Peplar, a hand printer, also joined the growing number of those who sought to escape the pestilence of urban England. These three men became the founding members of the Guild of St. Joseph and St. Dominic, which became a colony based upon craft and agriculture and the principles of ‘a religious fraternity for those who make things with their hands’.

The Guild thrived for some seventy years, exercising a dominant and positive influence over Catholic art both in the British Isles and abroad. As well as being firmly based upon religious values, the Guild also became important in a political sense, too. Hilary Peplar’s written work of the time spoke of the days when ‘work shall be once more of the

nature of a sacrament, a pledge given by Man and a token received by God'. He also called upon workmen to be the masters of their own production, and not the slaves of other men's profits.

The Guild grew steadily larger during the early-1920s, with many comings and goings amongst the membership. By this time, a whole rural community had come into being, consisting of countless workshops, a library, laundry, orchard, independent bank, allotment garden and chapel.

All seemed well until 1924, when Eric Gill decided to leave the Guild altogether. This came about soon after Gill had been to visit another guild in Wales, at Capel y Ffin, and tried to persuade the two communities to merge together. This would have actually required one of the communities to relocate to the area inhabited by the other which, at the time, was a huge and daunting task. The Guild at Ditchling refused to accept Gill's ambitious proposals, and he eventually left Ditchling altogether. Gill's departure had a terrible effect on some of the original founding members on the Common, who were extremely sorry to see him leave.

After 1924, all the original members of the Guild were Tertiaries of the Order of St. Dominic (the third level of monasticism); although there were other Tertiaries in the community. Therefore, in 1928, the Guild's strict regulations were finally relaxed and it was agreed that not all members had to be Tertiaries. At this time, the Guild was being maintained by Joseph Cribb, Hilary Peplar, George Maxwell and Valentine Kilbride, who were joined in 1927 by Bernard Brocklehurst.

In the early thirties, many new ideas were incorporated into the general scheme of things: group criticism sessions to discuss and regulate the standards of work and a new marketing exercise, during which a pamphlet – entitled 'Things For Devotional and Liturgical Use' – was published. Publication and photography costs were shared and the pamphlet was sent to potential clients, becoming an early method of direct mailing.

Socially, the Guild was thriving. The climax of the year was the Fourth of August, St. Dominic's Day, when a whole programme of

events took place. Sports activities for children, tea in the orchard, drama or mimes for amusement, and supper at a local pub in the evening.

Then, in 1937, a telephone box was even considered, but as a result of the fact that electricity and power tools were frowned upon in the workshops, it was eventually decided that a call-box would be sited in a nearby lane.

During the war years, both Maxwell and Kilbride lost a son. Meanwhile, Joseph Cribb, a talented sculptor, served as a community air-raid warden for the British Home Guard. Towards the close of another decade, in 1949, it seemed that a younger generation was now at hand to continue the tradition, as Edgar Holloway and wife Daisy Monica moved to Ditchling. Sadly, it was not to be. Meetings of the Guild began to last minutes instead of hours and new recruits were put off by the resistance of some of the existing members.

As time went by, several more women moved to the area, but things still continued to deteriorate because those who desired almost total seclusion became difficult to bargain with. Finally, in 1988, the decision was taken to wind up the affairs of the Guild. The example set by Gill, Peplar and Johnson is more than relevant to our own National-Anarchist stance today. These men attempted to create something spiritual and organic in place of man's fast-deteriorating 'existence' in the modern soul-destroying cities of England. Their downfall, however, came as a direct result of the fact that some community members opposed the actual spread and propagation of the rural ideal beyond the confines of Ditchling Common itself. Denying the simple pleasures of country living to others on the basis of introverted pride, sadly resulted in the whole experiment falling apart at the seams. But whilst some may not have wanted the city to follow them to the countryside, it seems likely that several core members had gravitated away from the original principles of agrarian communalism and off into the more unsociable realms of the hermit.

But whatever the reasons for the eventual disbanding of the Guild of St. Joseph and St. Dominic, we can all learn from their noble attempts

to instigate a dream shared by many of us who continue to feel sickened and repulsed by the filthy and materialistic streets of our large towns and cities.

PART II:

CHAPTER ELEVEN

TRANSCENDING THE BEYOND: FROM THIRD POSITION TO NATIONAL-ANARCHISM

MAN'S obsession with trinitarian concepts has lasted for thousands of years. Indeed, when presented with two distinct choices – both of which are considered inadequate – we often look for a third alternative. In the late Sixth century BC, the famous Buddhist sage, Prince Gautama, rejected a life of opulent complacency and experimented with self-discipline and denial. Consequently, after driving himself to the very brink of starvation the Prince realised that there was 'a middle way' beyond both luxury and asceticism. In this case it was the path of meditation and detachment, a process in which both lifestyles were transcended and overcome.

An interesting parallel can be drawn between the example of Gautama's rejection of hereditary privilege and the search for an alternative to Capitalism during the late Nineteenth and early-Twentieth centuries. The 'solution', as we know only too well, was Communism. In fact the last century may be rightly perceived as having been a furious historical battleground for two highly adversarial and bitterly-opposed ideologies. But as Hilaire Belloc observed in *The Restoration of Property* over sixty years ago, the differences between the two are not as distinct or clear-cut as their supporters often like to contend:

The only economic difference between a herd of subservient Russians and a mob of free Englishmen pouring into a factory in the morning is that the latter are exploited by private profit, the former by the State in communal fashion. The motive of the Russian masters is to establish a comfortable bureaucracy for themselves and their friends out of the proletariat labour. The motive of the English masters is to increase their private fortunes out of proletariat labour. But we want something different from either.

Thus Communism is considered, not as the antidote, but as a symptom

and a product of Capitalism. Belloc's own quest for a genuine alternative to both Capitalism and Communism was represented by The Distributist League, which he founded in 1936 with G. K. Chesterton. Both were famous converts to Catholicism and were inspired by *Rerum Novarum*, a timely encyclical in which Pope Leo XIII replied to the challenge of atheistic Communism by proposing that property be distributed more fairly and workers treated with more dignity. As we shall see below, Belloc and Chesterton were to become two of the chief ideologues of the new Third Position.

By the late-1970s Britain's largest Far Right organisation, the National Front (NF), had experienced an unprecedented growth spurt. Virtually indistinguishable from the more mainstream Conservative Party in that it defended family values, law and order, capital punishment and several other Right-wing policies, the NF became a household name due to its opposition to multi-racialism and support for the compulsory repatriation of all non-white immigrants. By 1979, however, the Party was heavily defeated at the ballot box after Margaret Thatcher had herself expressed one or two outspoken comments about the growing immigration problem. As a result, most NF supporters left for the comparatively less extreme realms of the Centre Right, although, predictably, Mrs. Thatcher's pledge to tighten up on immigration was never practicably consolidated. From that point onwards the NF went through a period of factionalism, as the complicated mish-mash of ideologies which for so long had marched beneath the same banner now resulted in a bitter struggle between reactionary conservatives, blatant neo-Nazis and revolutionaries. NF luminaries like Martin Webster and John Tyndall were ousted from the Party in the early-1980s, clearing the way for a new up-and-coming generation of young activists, men like Derek Holland, Nick Griffin, Patrick Harrington and Graham Williamson. These individuals had been motivated by 'third way' organisations abroad, not least by Italy's Terza Posizione (Third Position) and the exiled Roberto Fiore. The strategy of tension – *Anno di Piombo* – which had characterised Italian politics during the 1970s had led to the development of the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (Armed Revolutionary Nuclei), and demonstrators had been seen on the streets bearing placards in simultaneous praise of both Hitler and Mao. Many

NF members had also been inspired by Otto Strasser, a former member of the German National Socialist Workers' Party who had fought with Hitler over the latter's betrayal of the NSDAP's more socialistic tenets. So, for the NF, this was to be a new era for revolutionary politics. One in which the boundaries of 'Left' and 'Right' were to be totally rejected and redefined.

In 1983 the British NF began to publish a series of revolutionary magazines entitled *Rising: Booklet For The Political Soldier*, in which detailed articles were given over to the twin concepts of political sacrifice and struggle. Meanwhile, Derek Holland's pamphlet, *The Political Soldier*, inspired yet another generation of new activists and was heavily influenced by the Italian philosopher Julius Evola. By 1986 the NF claimed to have finally purged its ranks of 'Tories' and 'reactionaries' and, much to the chagrin of the traditional Left, was soon forging alliances with Black separatist organisations like Louis Farrakhan's Nation of Islam and commending the 'third way' stance of Khomeini's Iran. Indeed, whilst the works of Belloc and Chesterton were used to provide the NF with a unique economic platform, the organisation was also advocating Popular Rule, an interesting socio-political theory in which the structure of British society would become so decentralised that it would come to resemble that of Colonel Qadhafi's Libya. Not culturally, but in terms of establishing street, area and regional committees through which power could be decisively channelled up from the grass roots. This, of course, was in stark contrast to the NF's former dependence upon the electoral voting system. The NF, in awe of its Libyan counterparts, was now distributing copies of Qadhafi's *Green Book* and happily chanting the mantra 'no representation without participation'. As a consequence, therefore, the NF's rejection of the ballot box confirmed its inevitable admittance into the revolutionary domain of extra-parliamentary politics. The movement went on to express its support for regional independence, European solidarity, positive anti-racism and co-operation with Black and Asian communities residing in England.

These were exciting times for supporters of Revolutionary Nationalism, but the personality clashes which tend to prevail in all political circles

eventually tore the organisation apart during the Autumn of 1989. On one side were gathered the supporters of Derek Holland, Colin Todd, Nick Griffin and Roberto Fiore, all of whom were involved in the establishment of a new rural project in northern France. On the other were Patrick Harrington, Graham Williamson and David Kerr, who believed that the administrative core of the organisation should remain in the British Isles. Holland, Todd, Griffin and Fiore all left to form the International Third Position (ITP), whilst Harrington and the remaining supporters of the NF disbanded the movement in March 1990 and formed Third Way. But for those who believed that the revolutionary dynamism of the late-1980s could somehow be recreated, it was to end in disappointment and dejection. Third Way became far more conservative by supporting anti-federalist and 'save the pound' campaigns, now portraying itself as 'the radical centre'. The ITP, on the other hand, tried to influence traditional Catholics grouped around The Society of St. Pius X, and – to the horror of the overwhelming majority of its membership – took the disastrous road towards reactionary fascism. So whilst one segment of the old NF had become 'respectable' and centrist, the leaders of the other were espousing the principles of Mussolini, Pétain and Franco. For the ITP, the inevitable split came in September 1992.

By this time I had been personally involved with the NF – and, consequently, the ITP – since joining as a teenager in 1984. Throughout those years I had served as Regional Organiser with both Sussex NF and the Tunbridge Wells branch of the ITP, publishing magazines such as *The Kent Crusader*, *Surrey Action*, *Eastern Legion* and *Catholic Action*. Combined with Northern Rising (published by the ITP's Yorkshire and Lancashire branches), these publications comprised five-fifths of the organisation's literary output. When the ITP virtually disintegrated in 1992, these magazines all withdrew their support. The ITP, meanwhile, was left with *Final Conflict*, comprising a mixture of skinhead youth culture and Christian bigotry.

The split occurred for a variety of reasons, most notably the fact that the ITP had rejected the internal cadre structure which had been used to such great effect during the NF period. Coupled with the fact that Derek

Holland and several others had left the country and were now completely disinterested in the Third Positionist struggle in England, Roberto Fiore was attacked by myself and many others for his involvement in a ruthlessly Capitalist enterprise which operated from Central London. Several outgoing ITP activists also accused Holland and Fiore of stealing many thousands of pounds they had invested in property based within the group's rural enclave in northern France. But the most decisive factor of all, however, was the ITP leadership's increasing obsession with Catholicism and its gradual descent into the reactionary waters of neo-fascism.

From the tattered remains of the ITP came a new independence organisation, the English Nationalist Movement (ENM). New attempts were made to restate the principles of the Third Position, and ENM publications like *The Crusader* and *Catalyst* attacked both Hitler and Mussolini and preferred to emulate home-grown English socialists like Robert Owen, William Cobbett, Robert Blatchford and William Morris. This was combined with a call to arms. The ENM also campaigned against Unionism, advocating the break-up of the British Isles into seven distinct nations: England, Scotland, Wales, Ulster, Ireland, Mannin (Isle of Man) and Kernow (Cornwall). Meanwhile, its publishing service, The Rising Press, distributed booklets and pamphlets covering a whole range of topics, including works by Otto and Gregor Strasser, Corneliu Codreanu and Colonel Qadhafi.

In 1998 the ENM changed its name to the National Revolutionary Faction and began to call for armed insurrection against the British State in even stronger terms. A series of detailed pamphlets and internal bulletins were disseminated amongst Nationalists across the length and breadth of the country, seeking to end the British National Party's (BNP) obsession with marches and elections. The revamped organisation also forged contacts with like-minded Third Positionist groups abroad, such as Nouvelle Resistance (France), the American Front, Spartacus (Canada), the Canadian Front, Alternativa Europea (Spain), National Destiny (New Zealand), Devenir (Belgium), Rivolta (Italy), Free Nationalists (Germany) and the National Bolshevik Party (Russia). National Bolshevism is a concept which seeks to establish an

alliance between East and West, and has been around for many years. Its earliest supporters were men like Arthur Moeller van den Bruck and Ernst Jünger, both of whom tried desperately to unite Germany with Russia. National Bolshevism today is mainly associated with the contemporary Russian thinker, Alexander Dugin, and has become one of the NRF's main interests. Not least because the NRF supports the creation of a decentralised Eurasian bloc in defiance of American hegemony.

In recent years the NRF has rejected Third Positionism and now describes itself as a National-Anarchist movement. In other words, whilst Third Positionists are committed to going beyond Capitalism and Communism, National-Anarchists have taken things one step further by actually transcending the very notion of beyond. According to the well-known Anarchist thinker, Hakim Bey, writing in *Millennium* (1996): 'Five years ago it still remained possible to occupy a third position in the world, a neither/nor of refusal or slyness, a realm outside the dialectic'. He goes on to suggest that 'Where there is no second, no opposition, there can be no third, no neither/nor. So the choice remains: either we accept ourselves as the 'last humans', or else we accept ourselves as the opposition'. This has led the NRF to praise Anarchist thinkers like Bakunin and Proudhon, as well as to reject the concept of the State and call for independent enclaves 'in which National-Anarchists can live according to their own principles and ideals'. National-Anarchists also declare that even after the demise of Capitalism they neither hope nor desire to establish a national infrastructure, believing that like-minded and pragmatic individuals must set up and maintain organic communities of their own choosing. This, of course, means that whilst the NRF retains its vision of Natural Order and racial separatism it no longer wishes to impose its beliefs on others. The group has also been involved in ecological campaigns, anti-Capitalist demonstrations and animal liberation circles.

The NRF has also been heavily influenced by Alternative Green, a group set up in the wake of Richard Hunt's resignation as Editor from the Leftist newspaper, *Green Anarchist*. Hunt's unique economic analysis of the Western core's exploitation of the Third World

periphery, as well as his wholesale rejection of the division of labour, has led to an open-minded alliance between Alternative Green, the NRF, Nationale-Anarchie (German National-Anarchists), the Wessex Regionalists, Oriflamme (medievalists), Albion Awake (a Christian-Anarchist organisation), the Anarchic Movement (influenced by both Jünger and Evola) and various other political groupuscles which all firmly believe that opponents of Capitalism from across the board must come together in order to exchange ideas and strategies. In May 2000 these elements staged the first Anarchist Heretics' Fair in Brighton, launching a new political initiative called Beyond Left-Right. This has since been attacked by a variety of 'anarcho-dogmatists' on the Left, including the International Workers of the World (IWW) and Anti-Fascist Action (AFA). To date, however, neither of these organisations has attempted to explain precisely why the NRF or its allies deserve the 'fascist' epithet or deserve their threats of violence and intimidation. Furthermore, fewer still have tried to define the actual meaning of 'fascism' itself.

Given that ideologies such as National Socialism, National Communism and National Bolshevism have each attempted to combine two seemingly diverse and contradictory opposites, the arrival of National-Anarchism always seemed inevitable. But what distinguishes the NRF from its counterparts within the prevailing Left-Right spectrum, however, is the fact that it is seeking to create a synthesis. Indeed, *Synthesis* is the name of a new online magazine established by the Cercle de la Rose Noire, through which NRF thinkers, Evolians and prominent ex-members of the now defunct White Order of Thule (WOT) are promoting the three-fold strategy of 'Anarchy', 'Occulture' and 'Metapolitics'. The Circle's website, www.rosenoire.org, has presented National-Anarchists with an esoteric perspective, becoming a huge counter-cultural resource from which articles, essays, poetry, interviews and reviews can be easily obtained.

The similarities between the strategy of National-Anarchism and the triadic analysis of the famous German philosopher, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, are tremendous. Hegel believed that when confronted with the ineffectiveness of a thought or affirmation (thesis) and its

subsequent negation (antithesis), the result is a yet further negation as the two original precepts are united and thus resolved at a much higher level (synthesis). Once this process takes place, the synthesis itself can then be negated by another antithesis, until the arrival of a second synthesis starts the whole process over again. This brings us back to our long and repeated flirtations with trinitarianism. When considered from this perspective, National-Anarchism appears to be the next logical step towards the raising of mankind's spiritual and intellectual consciousness.

CHAPTER TWELVE

MANIFESTO OF THE EUROPEAN LIBERATION FRONT, 1999

I. THE NEED FOR PAN-EUROPEAN COLLABORATION

NO-ONE in their right mind would question the fact that – particularly at this key stage in history – each European nation requires a movement committed to the struggle for National Freedom and Social Justice. However, given that many Revolutionary Nationalist organisations can be rather parochial in their attitudes towards forming healthy working relationships with those groups outside of their own borders, the spirit of pan-European unity has often proved difficult to foment. This issue has certainly not been helped by the narrow-minded pettiness of the Zionist media, which, whilst being fully aware of the immense contribution that international co-operation has made to its own agenda, has constantly sought to encourage hostility and division between the various tribes and cultures of our European Motherland. The English have been attacked for being ‘arrogant’, the French denigrated as ‘Frogs’, and the Germans labelled as potential dictators who harbour a secret desire to ‘take over the world’.

Unfortunately, these ridiculous stereotypical images are often embraced by those who claim to support the cause of Nationalism. But this variety of Nationalism, however, is not based upon a love of our own peoples and a respect for others, but is reliant upon a mindless hatred of anything even remotely perceived to be ‘foreign’. Such negativity has always proven to be the arch-enemy of all those who truly care about the plight of Europe, and by encouraging those who revel in such trivial behaviour our adversaries are ensuring that the final curtain quickly begins to descend upon the stage of our traditional heritage and culture. In the words of Francis Parker Yockey (whose vision for Europe will be discussed in due course):

English, German, French, Italian, Spanish – these are now mere place-names and linguistic variations. Like all of the other rich products of our great Culture, they will continue, but they are no

longer political terms. Local cultures in Europe may be as diversified as they wish, and they will enjoy a perfect autonomy in the European imperium, now that the oppression of vertical nationalism is dead. Anyone who seeks to perpetuate petty-statism or old-fashioned nationalism is the inner enemy of Europe. He is playing the game of the extra-European forces; he is dividing Europe and committing treason. Treason now has only one meaning to Europe: it means serving any other force than Europe. There is only one treason now, treason to Europe. The nations are dead, for Europe is born.

Earlier we mentioned that the Zionists have benefited from international collaboration. In fact the Zionists are well known for their cosmopolitan perspective upon life, not least because those who rally to this nefarious cause have no organic roots of their own. But perhaps we in the vanguard of European salvation can learn from these people? 'But these people are internationalists', I hear you cry, 'they are prepared to sacrifice all in the name of globalisation.' Of course, but think how successful we National Revolutionaries could be if we learnt to work together and unite beneath an international banner of our own? That banner is the European Liberation Front (ELF), and if you too are concerned about Europe then you must become part of it.

II. THE ELF:

PART OF A LIVING TRADITION

The very suggestion that the various National Revolutionary groups of the East and West should come together to form a pan-European front against Zionism, Capitalism and the New World Order is certainly not a new concept. On the contrary, the European Liberation Front (ELF) is not the result of an idle fantasy but part of an organic, living tradition. In the past, this tradition has been chiefly propagated by men such as Francis Parker Yockey, Otto Strasser and Jean Thariat.

In 1949 Yockey published a document entitled *The Proclamation of London of the European Liberation Front*, a brief summary of the most crucial ideas which had already been presented in his 600-page volume *Imperium*. These ideas dealt with key historical issues such as The

Unity of Western Culture, The Age of Materialism, Class War, Social Degeneration, and The Destruction of the Political Unity of Europe. Yockey's vision of a unified Continent was brimming with sheer energy and perception, and he often made reference to the sinister role of the outsider; symbolised by those mysterious extra-European forces which had long conspired to decimate and undermine the solidarity once enjoyed by the various branches of Western Man. Amidst the disillusioned aftermath of the Second World War, men like Yockey were hurriedly waking up to the fact that Europe was now dominated by a secret cabal of materialist gangsters who sought to plunder our historic land mass for its own ends. In Yockey's own words, these conspirators saw Europe

...as a source of booty for extra-European forces; Europe as a reservoir of man-power for the disposition of the American generalate; Europe as a loan-market for the New York financier; Europe as a beggar-colony watching for crumbs from the table of rich America; Europe as an historical sight for visiting colonials, a place where once there were great happenings; Europe as a museum, a mausoleum; Europe as a moribund collection of petty-states and squabbling peoples; Europe as an economic mad-house where every tiny unit is against each other; Europe as a backward population waiting for re-education by the American world-clown and the sadistic Jew; Europe, as a laboratory for gigantic social experiments by Moscow and for the genocide experimentation of New York and Tel Aviv; Europe as a Black Mass of scaffold-trials, backward-looking persecution, treason, terror, despair and suicide.

Contrast this bleak and desolate image with the Europe of former times, a Europe blessed by the spiritual and cultural achievements of the Celts, Vikings, Suevi, Goths, Romans, Greeks, Anglo-Saxons, Vandals, Bretons and others. The only way to preserve the organic identity of Europe was – and still is – to promulgate an atmosphere of unity and co-operation. These essentially civilised and necessary measures must undoubtedly be taken if we are to repel our liberal-democratic adversaries and drive them back beyond our frontiers. Thus,

when Yockey created the very first European Liberation Front he made it absolutely clear that The Proclamation of London was designed to act as a fully-fledged 'Declaration of War'.

Another great figure who shared Yockey's dream of pan-European collaboration was Otto Strasser. In the aftermath of a war in which he had become the supreme enemy of the Gestapo after resigning from the NSDAP in 1930 in protest at Adolf Hitler's capitulation to Big Business, the exiled Strasser was finally granted permission to leave Canada and return to his beloved German homeland in 1955. Consequently, just one year later he established the Deutsche Soziale Union [German Social Union] and unveiled an innovative pan-European programme not dissimilar to that published by Yockey just seven years earlier. The new Party declared itself 'independent of Wall Street and the Kremlin' and produced a journal entitled *Deutsche Freiheit*. In typical fashion, however, Strasser was cruelly derided in the liberal-democratic press for being Hitler's former comrade-in-arms and his obituary in the London Times of August 29, 1974 suggests that as far as the DSU was concerned, Strasser's 'Nazi past hindered its progress. His claim of a return to political respectability was somewhat suspect'. Given the nature of this literary pillar of the Zionist Establishment, it would appear that Strasser was a worthy opponent of these notorious extra-European forces.

The third personality in the development of Continental unity was Jean Thiriart, a Belgian who became a committed opponent of the American Way of Life and the threat it has increasingly posed to European civilisation. He had this to say about the encroaching struggle between Europe and the USA: 'We shall be our own rulers in our home. Friendly or serious relations are possible, as long as we take our destiny in our own hands. For the United States, the real unification of Europe would be a disaster, because an enormous competitor would appear.'

It is clear that Yockey, Strasser and Thiriart shared one vision and one aim: that of European liberation.

III. OUR AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The affiliates of the European Liberation Front each have their own

specific agenda, but we are agreed on the following minimalist programme:

A. EUROPEAN UNITY

Whilst we fully accept that countries such as Italy, Spain, France etc. each have their own unique heritage and tradition, we also believe that Europe has a common destiny and that her peoples are strengthened and complimented by the historical and cultural ties which exist between our respective nations. In this respect we support a policy of European unity.

B. RACE AND CULTURE

Multi-racial societies are destroying the race, culture and traditions of all European peoples and we call for the re-establishment of mono-racial homelands in Europe.

C. ZIONISM

We support the struggle to liberate Palestine from the shackles of International Zionism and oppose the political and economic imperialism of Zionism throughout the world.

D. PROPERTY AND ECONOMY

The ownership of home, farms and factories should be as widely distributed as possible by means of economic autonomy and self-determination.

E. THE ENVIRONMENT

We believe that man and nature must live in harmony, not conflict. Therefore the materialist forces responsible for the destruction of the environment – namely Capitalism and Marxism – must be eradicated. Ruralism must also take precedence over the current trend towards urbanism.

F. REVOLUTION

These changes can only spring from a National Revolution. This must begin in the hearts of individuals and spread by their example to involve whole communities in revolutionary structures such as

alternative councils and schools, neighbourhood patrols and self-help groups. Once we cease to depend on the institutions of the Old Order it will be swept aside.

IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ELF

At its official inauguration in Paris on September 19th, 1998, the European Liberation Front decided to meet in various parts of the Continent on a six-monthly basis. Each group agreed to exchange ideas and resources, as well as to publish regular reports on the developments within the ELF itself and both encourage and develop relations with those groups outside Europe. Such contacts are categorised within the Liaison Committee for Revolutionary Nationalism (LCRN). ELF or LCRN affiliates can either send delegates to the meetings in person or, at the very least, make a contribution by sending a prepared statement or list of recommendations.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE WAY OF THE FANATIC: AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI & THE LEADERSHIP OF THE

FOR some it may come as a surprise to learn that the immense success of Islam in the contemporary world has never had to rely on the characteristically divisive issues of race and ethnicity, and furthermore that Muslims are just as fiercely internationalist as their Capitalist and Marxist adversaries. The rapid growth and expansion of revolutionary Mohammedanism is due to both a widespread sense of intense religiosity and, more importantly, the kind of unique political action which is born of a fanatical heart. National Revolutionaries can learn a great deal from the way Muslims have perfected this rare quality and then used it to their own devastating advantage. What follows is an examination of the greatest Islamic uprising in history, and although religion undoubtedly played a major role throughout this whole process it is worth remembering that a similar faith can stem from an undying belief in a purely political *ethos*. Indeed, whilst the Islamic *ulema* is a religious entity, the role of such a body may be compared to that of the National Revolutionary cadre.

The term '*ulema*' has Arabic and Persian origins and, collectively, is used to describe a group of scholars or religious men of learning. Religious leadership in Muslim society falls into three distinct categories, each of which are fundamentally interdependent and inseparable. Firstly, there are the *ulema* themselves, epitomised by the *mufti*, *qazi*, *maulana* and *maulvi*; secondly, the neo-esoteric Sufis and, thirdly, the sayyed – who claim to be descended from the Prophet Mohammed. According to Akbar Ahmed, the *ulema* are the most significant because they 'represent the orthodox, bureaucratic, formal and legalistic tradition in Islam. They interact with the State even at the highest level and advise the kings, captains and commanders of Islam'.^[1] Indeed, unlike both their Sufi and *sayyed* counterparts the *ulema* have often become willingly embroiled in the political, social and economic affairs of their respective nation-states. But the interference of the *ulema* in secular government has not always been

popular amongst Muslims. In 1514, Fazullah ibn Ruzbihan Khunji strongly attacked his scholastic contemporaries and condemned 'the addiction of the *ulema* of his time to philosophy and the rational sciences at the expense of religious jurisprudence'.^[2] Elsewhere in Sixteenth century Iran, there was a gradual ascendancy of the *ulema* which resulted in its members 'quickly becoming part of the State apparatus. They presided over the Islamic law-courts while State functionaries were appointed to civil customary-law courts'.^[3] Several centuries later, between 1918 and 1924, the Indian *ulema* were at the forefront of governmental affairs when they participated heavily in the Khilafat movement. In fact the *ulema* fully supported this movement and deliberately 'entered the political arena to defend the last hope of Islam'.^[4] M.N. Qureshi quotes one member of the *ulema* as insisting that 'until the *ulema* take the reins of politics in their own hands and cross their voices with those in authority, it will be difficult for them to establish their religious supremacy'.^[5] Sunni and Shi'ah Muslims, however, differ in their approach to the role of the *ulema*. Indeed, whilst the former have had very little influence upon governmental affairs, the latter have become actively involved in what may accurately be described as manifestations of theocratic subversion. David Waines points out that 'Sunni *mujtahids*, as individual scholars of different schools, lacked the degree of cohesion of the Shi'ah *mujtahids*, who could act collectively as a counterweight to weak political government, which they regarded as essentially illegitimate. Sunni *ulema* tended to serve as mediators between the people and government rather than as a countervailing force to the latter'.^[6] But this had not always been the case. Many Shi'ah have refused to participate in political activity due to the fact that the absence of the Imam totally invalidates all earthly forms of authority. At this point one may be forgiven for wondering just how Khomeini managed to be both administratively successful and remain within the accepted theological guidelines at the same time, but the process of *ulema* involvement in Iranian politics had stemmed from the events surrounding the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. According to Kalim Siddiqui, 'Once this theological barrier had been passed, it was a short

step to the Iranian Revolution'.^[7] Very often, however, it has become necessary to reform the *ulema* and scholars such as Rifa'ah al-Tahtawi and Khayr al-Din have argued that prospective members of the *ulema* should familiarise themselves with the affairs of the contemporary world. Whereas formerly the *ulema* had been viewed as a class of scholars who were to be consulted on strictly religious matters, many believed that the most knowledgeable members of Islamic society should continually seek to expand their intellectual capabilities. At the very root of these reforms lay a determination to create a just society by encouraging 'the active participation of a politically educated citizenry conscious of its freedoms and responsibilities'.^[8] But there is little doubt that the traditional role of the *ulema* in Iran – with which I am primarily concerned – was greatly enhanced by the fact that it began 'appropriating some of the Imam's prerogatives without, of course, claiming his essential quality of infallibility'.^[9] Such were the prerequisite conditions of Khomeini's valiant uprising against a monarchical puppet of International Zionism and the West, but what of the Ayatollah's own attempts to rule Iran by relying directly upon the leadership of the *ulema*?

In the late 1950s Khomeini gradually began to emerge from within a growing national atmosphere of disillusionment with the oppressive Pahlavi Dynasty. Consequently, the *ulema* began to assume a growing confidence in its own abilities. Reza Shah had established a multitude of schools and colleges which had ended the monopoly of religious education in Iran. After the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, however, Khomeini set about portraying him as 'a usurper, the parliaments of the period as lacking in legitimacy, the laws they had approved as harmful, the ministries as corrupt, the police cruel, and officials as lacking in concern for the poor and downtrodden'.^[10] Consequently, although he initially rejected an increased political role for the *ulema*, once Mohammed Reza Shah had begun to imitate the disastrous economic policies of his father Khomeini started to listen to the more revolutionary opinions of hard-line scholars like Mohammed Beheshti, who, from the 1960s onwards began to develop a strategy 'designed to shake the *ulema* awake from ten centuries of slumber to resume their

responsibility for leading the Shi'ite community in the real world'.^[11] In 1963, the Shah launched a highly unpopular programme of reform (the White Revolution) and Khomeini stepped forward to demand that the *ulema* be allowed to participate more fully in Iranian politics. According to Shaul Bakhash, Khomeini's 'request for a "modest" share for the *ulema* in administration was rooted in his belief that the clerical class would set such an exemplary model in their limited sphere that all would recognise the superiority of religious administration'.^[12] Indeed, Khomeini even tried to influence the Shah in a personal capacity by appealing to the Pahlavi monarch to 'Listen to my advice, listen to the *ulema* of Islam. They desire the welfare of the nation, the welfare of the country. Don't listen to Israel; Israel can't do anything for you'.^[13] Khomeini always believed that the *ulema* had been chosen to follow upon the sacred heels of the Twelfth Imam, and 'have been appointed by the Imam (upon whom be peace) to the positions of ruler and judge, and these positions belong to them in perpetuity'.^[14] Elsewhere in his writings Khomeini lamented the fact that the *ulema* had been deprived of its 'true degree and rank',^[15] and his portrayal of the *ulema* themselves as representing the natural earthly successors to the Imam became something of a contentious issue in the wider Islamic community as a whole. Traditionally, however, the fact that Shi'ites regard the descendants of Ali and his followers as the true heirs of the Imam allowed Khomeini to justify his sudden emergence as the chief spokesman of his fellow Iranian Muslims. By 1964, Khomeini had been exiled to Turkey and the Shah was able to attack religious institutions. Consequently the battle-lines began to take shape and the 'Shah was cast as the evil Yazid, slayer of Imam Husayn, and in the popular imagination, Khomeini became the awaited last Imam'.^[16] In 1966 Khomeini moved to Iraq and, one year later, continued to inspire the *ulema* from without by attacking Mohammed Reza Shah for his 'blind service to the lords of the dollar'.^[17] In 1968, as the Iranian *ulema* became even more politicised, Ni'matollah Salihi Najaf-adabi – a follower of Khomeini – attempted to separate the political tenets of Shi'ism from its purely theological basis by publishing *Shahid-e Javid* ('The Immortal Martyr'). This development suggested that some of the

ulema were attempting to play down the religious significance of events like the Karbala uprising, and to some extent becoming rather alarmed at the militant fervour which had been unleashed in the name of Islam. Ali Shari'ati, however, was a figure who simply refused to ignore the increasing influence of the *ulema* and his own interpretation of Shi'ism 'naturally championed the cause of the people, doubly oppressed by the internal forces of domination, and by the external force of imperialism'.^[18] But the real issue which divided Iran was the question of legitimate authority. In 1970, Khomeini published his *Wilayat al-faqih (Islamic Government)* and exposed the basic incompatibility between Islamic rule and that of constitutional monarchy. Roy Mottahedeh quotes Khomeini as saying that 'whereas the representatives of the people or the monarch in such regimes engage in legislation, in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty'.^[19] It was Khomeini's primary intention to portray the *ulema* 'as the authoritative interpreters of the sacred law in the absence of the Hidden Imam, to assume the right to rule'.^[20] In many ways, this development began to resemble the earlier power struggles between Church and State in Medieval Europe, particularly those involving Henry II and Thomas Beckett, and Henry VIII and Thomas More. In short, the new, increasingly secular Iran began to clash with the old world of the Mullahs. The *ulema* now began to look overwhelmingly towards their exiled comrade as being an unflinching opponent of the hated Pahlavi Dynasty, and Khomeini naturally assumed the leadership of the *ulema* itself. In 1978, on the very eve of the Islamic Revolution, the Ayatollah published his *Namih-e Imam Musawi Kashif al-Ghita* ('A Letter From The Imam Musawi, The Dispeller of Obscurity') in which he sought to redefine the *ulema* and its relationship towards the whole concept of political leadership, or what he described as the 'Guardianship of the Jurisconsult'. But whilst Khomeini was making the case for the authoritative superiority of the *ulema*, he was also careful to ensure that comparisons between himself and the Imam were, at least initially, kept to a minimum: 'This is a heavy and important duty, [but] not something which would create a supernatural status for its holder, elevating him to a position higher than that of an ordinary human

being. In other words, the *wilaya*, of which we are talking, means government and implementation. Contrary to what people might think, it is not a privilege, but a great responsibility'.^[21] As far as his admirers in the *ulema* were concerned such words merely served to demonstrate the great humility of this long-awaited warrior of the Islamic creed. But how did Khomeini manage to exert such a profound influence upon the *ulema* from his forced state of exile?

After he had left Iran in 1964, Khomeini had instructed his clerics – among them Motahhari, Beheshti, Musavi-Ardabili and Bahonar – in Teheran, Qom and various other cities to establish a powerful *ulema* 'network' by agitating amongst the nation's rural elements out in the countryside. These close-knit cells were poised to become the revolutionary bedrock upon which the Ayatollah would forge his new anti-Zionist *weltanschauung*. Charities (*sahm-e imam*) were also established in Khomeini's name and soon 'constituted a source of considerable influence and were used not only to support clerics, mosques, seminary students, and Islamic cultural activities, but also to fund opposition political movements'.^[22] But although many clerics were still partly favourable to the existing Pahlavi regime, before long Khomeini's network became the most powerful force in Iran. Whilst the *ulema* were able to generate the necessary funds and resources from within, the outspoken Ayatollah was able to avoid the sinister advances of the SAVAK (secret police) by attacking the Shah from the relatively safe confines of his Iraqi nerve centre. There was little doubt, however, that armed struggle was the only effective method of Islamic resistance and, in 1975, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani visited the PLO in Lebanon and organised the training of Iranian militants. Whilst the cause against Western imperialism and Zionist manipulation was undoubtedly just (as, indeed, it remains to this very day), Rafsanjani and many of his comrades were imprisoned for several years. Nevertheless, the *ulema* 'exploited the weaknesses of an increasingly vulnerable, wavering, and disorientated administration; and it found in Khomeini a leader who could give the movement leadership, direction and concrete goals'.^[23] Needless to say, the *ulema* played a vital role in Khomeini's overall vision of an Islamic society free of monarchical

control and, on 31st January 1979, the Ayatollah returned to Teheran in triumph. But what was to be the position of the *ulema* in post-revolutionary Iran?

In order to secure his revolution and endow it with a sense of longevity, Khomeini made certain that members of the *ulema* received constant protection from the Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps) which, in March 1979, had been formed ‘as a powerful arm of the Revolutionary Tribunals, in addition to being responsible for maintaining peace and counteracting anti-Revolutionary forces’.^[24] Consequently, the *ulema* began to supersede the outgoing Pahlavi regime, although a more cynical Shaul Bakhash only grudgingly credits them with having replaced the Shah’s men with their own and ensuring that ‘the bureaucratic apparatus remained in place’.^[25] But what the critics of the Iranian Revolution simply cannot dispute is the massive vote of confidence the Iranian people (both Shi’ite and Sunni) expressed for Khomeini and the *ulema* in 1983: ‘Thus, all the affairs of the Islamic State are run in accordance with the teachings of Islam under direct supervision of Islamic experts. It was for the election of these experts that the Muslim masses voted on December 10th’.^[26] At a unity conference in Sri Lanka from 28th December 1982 to 2nd January 1983, the *ulema* unveiled its desire to export the Iranian Revolution further afield by encouraging Islamic subversion around the world. According to one statement, the *ulema* deplored ‘the destructive activities of some scholars who spread disunity between Muslims and try to split the Islamic *Ummah*’.^[27] Several years earlier, Khomeini himself had even hinted at an internationalist strategy in his own writings: ‘I extend the hand of brotherhood to all committed Muslims in the world and ask them to regard the Shi’is as cherished brothers and thereby frustrate the sinister plans of foreigners’.^[28] Elsewhere in post-Revolutionary Iran, we discover that the *ulema* had helped to deepen the spiritual life of the people by regaining ‘the religious-political importance they enjoyed in the early years of Islam’.^[29]

To conclude, perhaps it is worth reflecting upon the actual legacy of Khomeini’s leadership of the *ulema*. Some critics have suggested that the Ayatollah broke with Islamic tradition, and that ‘By allowing

himself to be described as Imam he has initiated what could prove to be a major schism in Shi'ism after he has gone'.^[30] These words, written by notorious liberal Amir Taheri, have thus far proved totally unfounded. On the other hand, Shaykh Ansari – one of Khomeini's predecessors – would have agreed with Taheri's claims. For him, a leaderless *ulema* must not become embroiled in political matters because 'no individual, except the Prophet and the Imam, has the authority to exert *wiliya* over others'^[31]. It remains a fact, however, that to the great frustration of liberals everywhere Khomeini's Revolution did not wither and die and in fact still persists until this very day. Under Khomeini's leadership the *ulema* was intelligently transformed 'from one of the two organs of pre-modern government into publicists, ideologues, and finally revolutionaries'.^[32] But even more important, perhaps, is the actual nature of the Revolution itself: 'Rather than creating a new substitute for religion, as did the Communists and the Nazis, the Islamic militants have fortified an already vigorous religion with the ideological armour necessary for battle in the arena of mass politics. In doing so they have made their distinct contribution to world history'.^[33] Indeed, whereas the old *ulema* had often sided with those regimes firmly under the control of the Zionist heel, by 1962 the revitalised *ulema* was in a position to agitate in the cities, streets and mosques of Iran. Inevitably, therefore, Ayatollah Khomeini's highly inspirational leadership soon consolidated the position of the *ulema* at the very forefront of Iranian politics by embracing both the language and pageantry of Revolution. Theirs was a victory not only of the Word, but also of the Deed. Furthermore, in this case Islamic insurrection became the very 'Tradition' so often alluded to by philosophers like Julius Evola, with the black-clad militants of the Revolutionary Guard assuming the role of *ksatriya*: the true Warrior-Caste.

[1] Akbar Ahmed, 'Emergent Trends In Moslem Tribal Society' in Said Amir Arjoman (ed.), *From Nationalism To Revolutionary Islam*, Macmillan, 1984, p 83.

[2] Said Amir Arjoman, 'Traditionalism in Twentieth-Century Iran', *ibid*, pp 195-6.

[3] Juan R. Cole, 'Imami Jurisprudence' in Nikkie R. Keddie (ed.), *Religion and Politics In Iran: Shi'ism From Quietism To Revolution*, Yale University Press, 1983, p 38.

[4] Said Amir Arjoman, *op. cit.*, p 198.

[5] M. N. Qureshi, 'The Indian Khilafat Movement: 1918-1924' in *The Journal of Asian History*, 1978, Vol. 2, p 152.

- [6] David Waines, *An Introduction To Islam*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp 206-7.
- [7] Kalim Siddiqui, *Issues On the Islamic Movement: 1982-3*, The Open Press, 1984, p 12.
- [8] David Waines, op. cit., p 219.
- [9] Ibid, p 248.
- [10] Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution*, Counterpoint, 1986, p 23.
- [11] Said Amir Arjomand, op. cit., p 211.
- [12] Shaul Bakhash, op. cit., pp 32-3.
- [13] Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations*, KPI, 1985, p 179.
- [14] Ibid, p 98.
- [15] Ibid, p 111.
- [16] David Waines, op. cit., p 251.
- [17] Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, op. cit., p 192.
- [18] Said Amir Arjomand, op. cit., p 212.
- [19] Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, quoted in Roy Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet: Learning and Power In Modern Iran*, Chatto & Windus, 1986, p 381.
- [20] David Waines, op. cit., p 251.
- [21] Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, quoted in Hamid Enayat, 'Iran: Khomeini's Concept of the "Guardianship of the Jurisconsult"' in James P. Piscatori (ed.), *Islam In the Political Process*, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p 163.
- [22] Shaul Bakhash, op. cit., p 40.
- [23] Ibid, p 44.
- [24] M Ghayasuddin, 'The Ideological Training of the Sepah' in Kalim Siddiqui (ed.), op. cit., p 177.
- [25] Shaul Bakhash, op. cit., p 243.
- [26] Abdorreza Rafiee, 'Massive Vote of Confidence In Islamic Iran' in Kalim Siddiqui (ed.), op. cit., p 177.
- [27] 'Muslimedia', February 1983, quoted in Kalim Siddiqui (ed.), op. cit., p 226.
- [28] Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, op. cit., p 302.
- [29] Zafarul-Islam Khan, 'Humility and Gratitude to Allah on the Fourth Anniversary' in Kalim Siddiqui (ed.), op. cit., p 233.
- [30] Amir Taheri, *The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution*, Hutchinson, 1985, p 172.
- [31] Hamid Enayat, op. cit., p 162.
- [32] Said Amir Arjomand, op. cit., p 228.
- [33] Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban For the Crown: The Islamic Revolution In Iran*, Oxford University Press, 1988, p 210.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

REVOLT AGAINST THE FEMINISTS: THE TRADITIONAL WOMAN ACCORDING TO JULIUS EVOLA

IT seems pretty ironic that, in these times at least, women are more likely to be attracted to balding men with bad breath and blossoming beer-guts than the woefully neglected works of Traditionalist thinkers like René Guénon, Miguel Serrano or Mircea Eliade. Indeed, ever since the rise of the Feminist movement and the concomitant enticement of women into the workplace, the average European female has looked with increasing scorn upon the allegedly restrictive and oppressive nature of home and hearth. According to the Germaine Greer and Andrea Dworkin schools of thought, discarding your bra amid the phallic pyres of pseudo-rebellion or relinquishing control and responsibility of one's children are seen as positive and necessary steps for the advancement of womankind. For most women, however, the so-called 'liberation' of their gender has led to little more than a pseudo-egalitarian wage-slavery beneath which they are expected to toil equally alongside their male counterparts.

The well-known Greek author, Arianna Stassinopoulos, who has an advantage over this writer in that she is a woman and therefore perhaps more qualified to write on such matters, explains thus:

The Female Woman parts company with Women's Liberation because of the fundamental qualitative difference between liberation and emancipation. Liberation is not an extension of emancipation: it is not merely a furthering of women's legal, social and political rights in society. Emancipation insists on equal status for distinctly female roles. Liberation demands the abolition of any such distinctive roles: the achievement of equality through identical patterns of behaviour. Emancipation means the removal of all barriers to female opportunities – it does not mean compelling women into male roles by devaluing female ones. [From *The Female Woman*, Davis-Poynter, 1973, pp. 14-15]

Perhaps even Baron Julius Evola (1898-1974), that decidedly male scholar and long-presumed misogynist, would agree with the conclusions of Ms. Stassinopoulos? Furthermore, by examining Evola's thoughts on the frenetic and often-contentious relationship between men and women, many soon discover to their immense surprise that this erudite Sicilian of noble birth was far from being a misogynist of any kind. Indeed, let us now turn to the Baron's highly-regarded opus, *Revolt Against The Modern World* [published by Inner Traditions International, 1995], which contains a whole chapter on the relationship between 'Man and Woman'.

Evola begins by addressing humanity's sexual characteristics, pointing out that whilst the supernatural principle is decidedly masculine, nature itself is distinctly feminine. This is represented by the Far Eastern concepts of Yin (male) and Yang (female), a true synthesis of opposites. Women are perceived as a danger for those seeking the path of the supernatural, acting as both a generative and centrifugal force in contrast to the male's cold and immobile opposite. In the Hindu tradition this is represented graphically by the divine couple, Shiva and Shakti, whose act of sexual intercourse (*viparita-maithuna*) symbolises the male wick upon which dances the highly animated and energetic flame of womanhood: 'This norm obeys the principle of the caste system and it also emphasises the two cardinal tenets of *dharma* and of *bhakti*, or *fides*: self-subsistent nature and active dedication.' [Ibid., p. 158] Indeed, according to John Mumford, 'personifying as female that which is manifest power and energy is not an idea exclusive to Eastern thought. Buried deep in the racial consciousness of Western man is also the concept of feminine power' [From *Sexual Occultism: The Sorcery of Love In Theory and Practice*, Compendium, 1977, p. 19].

But whilst male and female are complimentary to one another, they each have their own distinct paths to follow. The path of the male is one of an active and contemplative asceticism, whilst the female path is rather similar in that it seeks expression by way of the mother and lover. Indeed, whilst his is a form of 'active heroism' hers becomes a 'passive heroism' whereby the woman gives of herself for another (a

loved one or a son, perhaps) and through this finds herself: 'To realise oneself in an increasingly resolute way according to these two distinct and unmistakable directions; to reduce in a woman all that is masculine and in a man everything that is feminine; and to strive to implement the archetypes of the 'absolute man' and of the 'absolute woman' – this was the traditional law concerning the sexes according to their different planes of existence.' [p. 159] Therefore women participated in the hierarchical order through man, something Evola regards as being 'proper to the pure feminine nature' [Evola, op. cit., p. 160]. He further demonstrates this point by alluding to the fact that within Aztec civilisation those women who perished in childbirth were equated with the warriors who had died in battle.

Man himself is vital to the fulfilment of the female and, even in death, acts as a mystical doorway for his counterpart. This key traditional component is vigorously expressed by committed Hindu women who leap into the flames of their late husband's funeral pyre in order to secure immortality for themselves. The Incas also believed that women should follow their husbands into the afterlife by committing deliberate and well-intentioned acts of suicide. The devotion and self-sacrifice of the traditional woman in relation to her loved one clearly knows no bounds. In life, however, this spiritual *ethos* is reflected within the Islamic harem: 'It seemed natural for a woman to concentrate all her life on one man only, who was loved in such a vast and unselfish way as to allow other women to share in the same feeling and be united to him through the same bond and the same dedication . . . A love that sets conditions and requires the reciprocated love and the dedication of a man was reputed to be of an inferior kind' [Ibid., pp. 161-2]. This may sound rather harsh and patronising to the modern reader, but this form of unconditional loyalty and devotion on the part of a woman is perceived as a means to higher ends. Indeed, viewed in its most basic and instinctual form – such as within the sexually promiscuous community led by Charles Manson in the late-1960's, for example – the concept of the polygamous male surrounded by adoring and consenting female partners is perhaps difficult to accept. However, Evola tells us that in Ancient Greece 'concubinage enjoyed a sort of regular character and was legally acknowledged as a

way to compliment the monogamic marriage and in which sexual exclusivism was overcome' [Ibid., p. 163]. Despite having conflicting reasons for doing so, several leading figures in psychology from the last century would undoubtedly have agreed. The controversial support for polygamy expressed by the likes of C.G. Jung and Otto Gross is here shown to have concrete roots in the traditional sphere.

To suggest that Evola's views on the role of the traditional woman would meet with the vitriol and hysteria of our contemporaries in the liberal establishment is an understatement. But, regardless of whether the 'liberated' purveyors of sexual egalitarianism like it or not, male impotence and the concomitant growth of Feminism during the course of the last few decades has led to a sexually-divisive individualism:

In a society that no longer understands the figure of the ascetic and the warrior; in which the hands of the latest aristocrats seem better fit to hold tennis rackets or shakers for cocktail mixes than swords or sceptres; in which the archetype of the virile man is represented by a boxer or by a movie star if not by the dull wimp represented by the intellectual, the college professor, the narcissistic puppet of the artist, or the busy and dirty money-making banker and the politician – in such a society it was only a matter of time before women rose up and claimed for themselves a 'personality' and a 'freedom' according to the anarchist and individualist meaning usually associated with these words. [Ibid., p. 163]

Evola rightly describes this process as a form of irresponsible abdication on the part of man:

What truly amounts to an abdication was thus claimed as a 'step forward'. After centuries of 'slavery' women wanted to be themselves and do whatever they pleased. But so-called feminism has not been able to devise a personality for women other than by imitating the male personality, so that the woman's 'claims' conceal a fundamental lack of trust in herself as well as her inability to be and to function as a real woman and not as a man. Due to such a misunderstanding, modern woman has considered

her traditional role to be demeaning and has taken offence at being treated 'only as a woman'. This was the beginning of a wrong vocation; because of this she wanted to take her revenge, reclaim her 'dignity', prove her 'true value' and compete with men in a man's world. But the man she set out to defeat is not at all a real man, only the puppet of a standardised, rationalised society that no longer knows anything that is truly differentiated and qualitative. In such a civilisation there obviously cannot be any room for legitimate privileges and thus women who are unable and unwilling to recognise their natural traditional vocation and to defend it (even on the lowest possible plane, since no woman who is sexually fulfilled ever feels the need to imitate and to envy man) could easily demonstrate that they too virtually possess the same faculties and talents – both material and intellectual – that are found in the other sex and that, generally speaking, are required and cherished in a society of the modern type. Man for his part has irresponsibly let this happen and has even helped and 'pushed' women into the streets, offices, schools, and factories, into all the 'polluted' crossroads of modern culture and society. Thus the last levelling push has been imparted. [Ibid., p. 164]

The more astute reader will recognise that, far from condemning women or seeking to relegate or limit their role to one of irrelevant servitude, Evola is actually differentiating between natural femininity on the one hand and feministic artificiality on the other. He understands that woman can only find self-satisfaction and personal fulfilment when she perceives of herself in relation to man. Just as tribal peoples from Namibia will never find peace and acceptance within a sprawling Western metropolis which is alien to their traditional values and way of life, so then must women achieve their true destinies by seeking to resolve – rather than resign – themselves to the fact that they each represent a complimentary aspect of our wider humanity. More essentially, perhaps, it is man who must be blamed for the current plight of the modern world. Evola rightly points out that even in former times this very process contributed to the general decline of ancient civilisation, a cycle of decadence and decay to which man himself must

be made fully accountable. Even feminism, says Evola, is the result of male weakness: 'It should not be expected of women that they return to what they really are and thus re-establish the necessary inner and outer conditions for a reintegration of a superior race, when men themselves retain only the semblance of true virility' [Ibid., p. 169] So Evola is not the transparent bigot or misogynist that he is often made out to be. On the contrary, his work is aimed at both sexes and genuinely seeks to reconcile the relationship between men and women so that we can all discover our true function. Not only in life, of course, but also in death.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

MILITANT IMPERIUM: A CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY OF JULIUS EVOLA'S

1. REVOLUTION – COUNTERREVOLUTION – TRADITION

In the opening chapter of his work, Evola can be forgiven for appearing to sound like a typical Catholic fundamentalist. According to the Baron, socio-political subversion (*eversio*) was introduced into Europe for the first time with the 1789 and 1848 revolutions. Catholic writers like Chesterton, Belloc and a whole array of popes and cardinals would agree with him. Indeed, Evola even suggests that the term 'reactionary' should be adopted by those who realise the true extent to which the forces of liberalism, Marxism and democracy are advancing their secret agenda. We are informed that if this term had not been so furiously rejected by the conservative opponents of revolution, our European nations would have been relatively more salvageable. But now that several decades have passed since the book was first published, had the author still been alive he may well have been surprised to learn that his ideas have found significant expression within the ranks of those who have become known as 'conservative revolutionaries'. For Evola, therefore, perhaps the apparently conflicting terminology in this phrase would have been a misnomer. On the contrary, it was used throughout the Twentieth century by men such as Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Michael Walker, Armin Mohler and Otto Strasser. In fact Evola tells us himself that 'conservative revolution' should not be connected with the term 'reaction' because the former has distinctly positive and energetic connotations. Revolution in this sense, he admits, simply means restoring order and thus avoiding entirely its chaotic antithesis. He even defines revolution (*revolutio*) – not as a departure from prevailing trends – but as a return to origins. Thus revolution, in his evaluation of the term, indicates a replenishment of that which has gone before.

But the word 'conservative' can also be very misleading. Evola argues that 'it is necessary to first establish as exactly as possible what needs to be "preserved".' He is also under no illusion that capitalists have long used this term with which to advance the interests of their

own class, rather than ‘committing themselves to a stout defence of a higher right, dignity, and impersonal legacy of values, ideas and principles’. This suggests a kind of aristocratic benevolence, a chivalric sense of duty and sacrifice. Evola also believes that the State must not concern itself with economic matters, rather assuming a transcendent role in opposition to the class-oriented obsessions of both the bourgeoisie and Marxists alike. Furthermore, he tells us, ‘What really counts is to be faithful not to past forms and institutions, but rather to principles of which such forms and institutions have been particular expressions’. So therefore the success of Tradition lies in our ability to create new forms from the etymological drawing-board which inspired those of the past, a process which works its way down through the generations as though divinely inspired. In other words it is not the transitory or – in the case of historical personality cults – even the idolatrous facets which are of value, but those which are everlasting and permanent. Indeed, Evola pours scorn upon the very term ‘historical’ because such matters rise above and beyond the whole notion of history altogether. Mircea Eliade has discussed this idea at length in *The Myth of The Eternal Return*,¹¹ echoed here by Evola: ‘These principles are not compromised by the fact that in various instances an individual, out of weakness or due to other reasons, was able to actualise them or to even implement them partially at one point in his life rather than another.’ The designers and schemers of the modern age, of course, dismiss these aspects as having been a consequence of the period in which they were apparently expressed. So therefore Tradition and historicism are totally irreconcilable. The author’s own homeland also comes in for some criticism, with Evola firmly believing that Italy has no material or ideological connection with Tradition and that her only hope lies in a spiritual renewal.

Returning to the dangers of revolution – at least in the purely negative sense as defined above – we are reminded of the more positive, Hegelian analysis: ‘the negation of the negation’. In other words, eradicating that which in itself has been the great eradicator is a worthwhile objective. On the other hand, Evola is being slightly pedantic when he criticises the adoption of the ‘revolutionary spirit’, lest it sound too progressive or wild. His denunciation of the

unfulfilling legend of technological advancement, however, is very accurate indeed: 'Those who are not subject to the predominant materialism of our times, upon recognising the only context in which it is legitimate to speak of progress, will be on guard against any orientation in which the modern "myth of progress" is reflected.' Indeed, there are many such examples, all of which contend either blindly or knowingly that the past must be eradicated for the good of the present. This, says Evola, is 'history's demolition squad'. It is rather surprising, therefore, to consider that in his youth Evola offered his support to Italian Futurism. Not, of course, that Marinetti's pledge to raze libraries and museums to the ground was ever designed to be an attempt to destroy the perennial essence which always transcends the purely anachronistic. The contentious issue of Fascism is also tackled by Evola and is here regarded as being valid only when it concords with Tradition. To stand vigorously in favour of Fascism simply for its own sake, is akin to the fulminating negativity inherent within many of its anti-fascist opponents.

2. SOVEREIGNTY – AUTHORITY – IMPERIUM

According to Evola, 'every true political unity appears as the embodiment of an idea and a power, thus distinguishing itself from every form of naturalistic association or "natural right", and also from every societal aggregation determined by mere social, economic, biological, utilitarian, or eudemonistic factors'. He goes on to point out that, for the Romans at least, the very idea of an imperium of sovereign power was something perceived to be highly sacred. This functioned by way of a mystical trinity comprised of the Leader (*auctoritas*), the Nobility (*gens*) and the State (*res publica*). Evola's interpretation of the imperium is certainly supported by those historians who – like Edward Gibbon and Oswald Spengler – have allowed the Holy Roman Empire its own unique and symbolic niche in both time and space. That it prevailed until its disastrous collapse at Constantinople in 1453, of course, is demonstrative of the way in which the very idea of imperium survived the various cycles of history in which it found itself. Evola also reminds us of de Maistre's assertion that 'power and authority that are not absolute, are not real authority or real power' at all.

The author then turns his mind to judicial matters, stating that whenever the State rises above the merely temporal laws of the nation it assumes the role of an independently organic entity. In other words, Evola is basically suggesting that in cases of national emergency, for example, the State can flex its muscles and prove just how transcendent it really is by overriding the laws of the judiciary. This notion will fill the average supporter of democracy and egalitarianism with some horror, but Evola is referring to a central principle of authoritative order rather than advocating that a fascist dictatorship rule over the masses with an iron fist (although he does suggest that a temporary dictatorship can often get things back on track). Indeed, this is rather similar to the way Cicero analyses Natural Law and the fact that it only applies to those who seek to transgress its permanently entrenched codes.

Evola also refutes the idea that power should rise up to the State from the grass roots, for example in the way that Muammar al-Qadhafi explains the concept in *The Green Book*. As far as he is concerned, the State is not the expression or embodiment of the people at all. This 'political domain is defined through hierarchical, heroic, ideal, anti-hedonistic, and, to a degree, even anti-eudemonistic values that set it apart from the order of naturalistic and vegetative life'. But this is almost like a paradox. If the State completely transcends the ordinary functions of what most people consider to be the role of a State, then surely Evola's vision is one of anarchic authority? Evola may have disagreed with the use of the term 'anarchy', but surely the State for him is more mystical than fully tangible in the purely ordinary sense? By this I am implying that the State is present as a guiding authority at the helm of a nation or empire, but absent in terms of the way it is perceived by most people. Anarchy, of course, does not mean that authority is non-existent, it simply refers to the absence of rule. Therefore Evola's concept of the mystical State may well be altogether detached from the socio-economic version which writers like Peter Kropotkin (*The State: Its Historic Role*), Michael Bakunin (*Marxism, Freedom & The State*) or Herbert Spencer (*The Man Versus The State*) have gone to such great lengths in order to analyse and dissect. Evola makes a profound distinction between the political and social aspects of

the State, arguing that it emanates from a specific family (*gens*) and thus rejecting the idea that states can arise from the naturalistic plane. At first this appears to be a contradiction in terms, because surely the family is a naturalistic phenomenon? On the contrary, Evola is referring to an altogether different interpretation of the term ‘family’, that of the Männerbunde (or all-male fraternity). Given the nature of the Mafia, of course, Italians should find it that much easier to appreciate the subtle differences in terminology. Evola also wrote extensively on the Mithraic sun-cult, both prime examples of the Männerbunde and possessing deep initiatic qualities which – by way of a series of trials and degrees – take the male apprentice way beyond his maternalistic upbringing on the exoteric plane. Thus a significant change takes place both within the man himself and the way he is then perceived by others. But this interpretation is not designed to leave women out of the equation; it simply states that whilst men are the natural frequenters of the mystical, or political, domain, women are the pivotal masters of society. It lies completely ‘under the feminine aegis’. Those readers who are familiar with Evola’s *Revolt Against the Modern World* ^[2] will grasp the higher significance of what Evola is trying to say. Indeed, in the present work he summarises these metaphysical concepts thus: ‘The common mythological background is that of the duality of the luminous and heavenly deities, who are the gods of the political and heroic world on the one hand, and of the feminine and maternal deities of naturalistic existence, who were loved by the plebeian strata of society on the other hand. Thus, even in the ancient Roman world, the idea of State and of imperium (i.e., of the sacred authority) was strictly connected to the symbolic cult of the virile deities of heaven, of light and of the super-world in opposition to the dark region of the Mothers and the chthonic deities.’ If we follow Evola’s line of thinking, we soon arrive at the medieval idea of the divine right of kings. This, he tells us, was a development which – contrary to the earlier imperium – was not consolidated ‘by the power of a rite’. Traditional Catholics would disagree wholeheartedly with this conclusion, at least right up until the Reformation and Henry VIII’s well-documented break with Rome. And if the divine right of kings is one step removed from the imperium, the next logical stage of decline

is that of Socialism and the demos, which Evola describes as ‘the degradation and contamination of the political principle’. Furthermore, he argues, ‘Both democracy and socialism ratify the shift from the masculine to the feminine and from the spiritual to the material and the promiscuous.’

Evola is often portrayed by his opponents as a ‘fascist’, but it may surprise many of them to learn that he relegates ‘romantic and idealistic’ concepts such as the nation, the homeland and the people to the purely naturalistic and biological level. These issues, he contends, have replaced a political principle which is representative of a far higher and more penetrating Tradition. By refusing to accept the legitimacy of feudalism or the authority of the Holy Roman Empire, he argues, nation-states tried to create their own pockets of authority. Thus, the struggle between popes and princes, kings and noblemen, led to a vast centralisation of power which was epitomised by the Third Estate. This is where Evola returns to what he perceives as the crucial – and destructive – role played by the 1789 French Revolution, whereby the final vestiges of Tradition were erased from the face of Europe. The process was aided by the 1848 Revolution and the onslaught of the First World War, pitting nation against nation in the name of ‘patriotism’. Furthermore, he says, elevating a national identity or geographical territory to a kind of mystical status completely erodes both authority and sovereignty. Nations are associated with female terminology – Motherland, for example – and therefore ‘attributed to the Great Mother in ancient plebeian gynecocracies and in societies that ignored the virile and political principle of the imperium’. Evola goes on to compare the political unit of the nation with the position of the soul in comparison to the body. In other words, it assumes an ‘inner form’ which totally goes beyond the popular understanding of the way a nation is defined. It is true, after all, that nations do not arise purely by themselves and so the hidden – spiritual – component is the true guiding force. The nation is only perceived as an independent entity with a life of its own once the political aspect has been significantly weakened: ‘From the political class understood as an Order and a Männerbund a shift occurs to demagogues and to the so-called “servants of the nation,” to the democratic ruling classes who presume

to “represent” the people and who acquire for themselves the various offices or positions of power by flattering and manipulating the masses.’ This, according to Evola, is due to the lack of real men in contemporary society and – paying his respects to Carlyle in the process – he goes on to warn us that we live in a ‘world of domestics that yearns to be ruled by a pseudo-hero’. Indeed, there is little doubt that the parliamentary system, for example, never fails to deviate from the idea of the nation as myth, despite the fact that the political sphere is never regarded as being sovereign in itself. Evola attacks universal suffrage because he sees it as the consequence of ‘the degradation of the ruling class’. It is certainly a fact that the reforms of the Nineteenth century were achieved at the expense of the ruling classes, but from an Evolian perspective the scales were tipped at both ends. The consequence of this formative episode in European history, modern democracy, saw the true political unit replaced with a corrupt and bastardised system based entirely on materialism.

But what of those nations which have actually followed the political principle to the letter? We are informed by Evola that the nation will always be potentially compromised, whilst ‘on the one side stand the masses, in which, besides changing feelings, the same elementary instincts and interests connected to a physical and hedonistic plane will always have free play; and on the other side stand men who differentiate themselves from the masses as bearers of a complete legitimacy and authority, bestowed by the Idea and by their rigorous, impersonal adherence to it. The Idea, only the Idea, must be the true fatherland for these men: what unites and sets them apart should consist in adherence to the same idea, rather than to the same land, language, or blood.’ This is a pretty bold statement, given that Evola is usually – and wrongly – associated with certain elements of the Far Right. Perhaps this is why the Assassins and their Knights Templar contemporaries found that they had so much in common? That which is most important, therefore, is not one’s adherence to a nation or a race – which instantly means that one must love, respect and work for the best interests of one’s compatriots without question – but one’s loyalty and fidelity to the very essence and spirit of Tradition. In Evola’s own words: ‘The true task and the necessary premise for the rebirth of the

“nation” and for its renewed form and conscience consists of untying and separating that which only apparently, promiscuously, or collectively appears to be one entity, and in re-establishing a virile substance in the form of a political elite around which a new crystallisation will occur.’ This, of course, is very different to the sheep-like mentality of most Nationalist groups. One only has to look at the recent revival in England of a pseudo-patriotism built upon the most base and plebeian values of modern culture. Aligning oneself with existing national stereotypes, of course, is hardly making an attempt to transcend the sterile values which are embraced by the masses. The Idea that Evola talks about is based upon ‘strength and clarity, rather than “idealism” and sentimentality’. The nation has to be integrated with the political, so that the whole concept is raised to a much higher level by replacing the degenerative ruling classes with a new, elite aristocracy of cadres.

3. PERSONALITY – FREEDOM – HIERARCHY

In this chapter the author begins by attacking liberalism, the chief scourge behind the French Revolution. Many have tried to define liberalism, including Traditional Catholics like Pope Pius XI (*Quadragesimo Anno*), Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre (*They Have Uncrowned Him*), Fr. Felix Sarda y Salvany (*What is Liberalism?*) and Rev. Fr. Stephen P. DeLallo (*The Sword of Christendom*), although today the word is wrongly associated with anarcho-capitalists and Right-wing libertarians. So how does Evola define the term?:

The essence of liberalism is individualism. The basis of its error is to mistake the notion of the person with that of the individual and to claim for the latter, unconditionally and according to egalitarian premises, some values that should rather be attributed solely to the former, and then only conditionally. Because of this transposition, these values are transformed into errors, or into something absurd and harmful.

Egalitarianism – another mainstay of the 1879 Revolution – is completely dismissed by Evola due to its fundamentally ridiculous belief in the equality of all individuals. It not only relegates the person

to the level of a mere part within the broader egalitarian mass, which Evola rightly shows to be a contradiction in terms, it obliterates human diversity by suggesting that no one person is significantly different from another. From the judicial perspective, of course, it is surely wrong to establish a form of fake ‘justice’ by ensuring that everybody is legally bound in an unjust manner. It is also entirely out of step with Natural Law. Evola explains:

The lower degrees of reality are differentiated from the higher ones because in the lower degrees a whole can be broken down into many parts, all of which retain the same quality (as in the case of the parts of a non-crystallised mineral, or those parts of some plants and animals that reproduce themselves by parthenogenesis); in the higher degrees of reality this is no longer possible, as there is a higher organic unity in them that does not allow itself to be split without being compromised and without its parts entirely losing the quality, meaning, and function they had in it.

When Evola speaks of parthenogenesis, of course, he is referring to those invertebrates and lower plants which engage in a form of sterile self-reproduction. The allegedly ‘free’ individual, therefore, is considered to be inorganic and much lower than its organic superior. Meanwhile, the true person is he who continues to remain ‘unequal’ due to his own distinct features and abilities. Natural individuation is not the same as crass individualism. At the same time, however, Evola does not infer that everyone deserves the ‘right’ to be regarded as a person. Thus, he dispels the liberal myth that all of us possess some form of ‘human dignity’ regardless of who we are. In fact there are several different levels of dignity each contained within a just and specific hierarchy. So once again, Evola is dismissing the egalitarian idea of a ‘universal right’, brotherhood of equality or an automatic entitlement of some kind. In times gone by, however, “peers” and “equals” were often aristocratic concepts: in Sparta, the title *homoioi* (“equals”) belonged exclusively to the elite in power (the title was revoked in cases of misconduct)’.

Moving on, the notion of freedom – a favourite catchword of those

engaged in the struggle between classes – is regarded in the same manner. It is something we enjoy as a consequence of who we are as a person, rather than simply because we happen to be a member of humanity. Evola remarks that freedom does not come in any one form, but is actually multifarious and homogeneous. He goes on to suggest that the freedom ‘to do’ is quite different from the freedom ‘for doing’. Indeed, whilst the former has to function within a controlled and standardised system of liberal ‘equality’ (which inevitably leads, therefore, to one class disregarding the freedoms of others), the latter has more in common with Aleister Crowley’s often-misunderstood expressions ‘do as thou wilt’ and ‘every man and woman is a star’. In other words, by possessing the freedom ‘to do’ one can follow one’s own unique course and act in accordance with one’s true nature.

So how does the individual relate to society as a whole? Tradition accords with the ultimate supremacy of the individual, or what Ernst Jünger has defined elsewhere as ‘the anarch’ or ‘sovereign individual’.^[3] Evola even puts the sovereignty of the person before the State, because he views people not ‘as they are conceived by individualism, as atoms or a mass of atoms, but people as persons, as differentiated beings, each one endowed with a different rank, a different freedom, a different right within the social hierarchy based on the values of creating, constructing, obeying, and commanding. With people such as these it is possible to establish the true State, namely an anti-liberal, anti-democratic, and organic State’. This vision, however, depends upon the advancement of the person through various stages of individuation and self-awareness. Natural inequality, therefore, will lead to an organic structure of society at the very helm of which stands the ‘absolute individual’. This figurehead, says Evola, is completely different to the mere concept of the individual because it encapsulates that which is most qualitative within man. The ‘absolute individual’ is fundamentally opposed to the concept that society itself is the ultimate manifestation of humanity. It is the sheer pinnacle of a transcendental sovereignty which represents the synthesising nature of the imperium. Moreover, of course, the idea can become manifest within the framework of the nation and seems defiantly opposed to present trends like globalisation and multi-racialism: ‘Thus, it is a positive and

legitimate thing to uphold the right of the nation in order to assert an elementary and natural principle of difference of a given human group over and against all the forms of individualistic disintegration, international mixture and proletarianisation, and especially against the mere world of the masses and pure economy.’ To achieve this process, Evola declares that the State must be established from the nation itself.

But if one is seeking to fully align himself with the principles of Evolian thought, a person who is free in the true sense of the word must never be constrained by national, racial or family ties. This does not imply that he should actively seek to turn himself against them, on the contrary, the importance is to follow one’s own path. Indeed, this course – which must lead towards the creation of the New Man – requires great discipline and understanding. Many who try, however, will fall by the wayside: ‘He who does not have the capability to dominate himself and to give himself a code to abide by would not know how to dominate others according to justice or how to give them a law to follow. The second foundation is the idea, previously upheld by Plato, that those who cannot be their own masters should find a master outside of themselves, since practising the discipline of obeying should teach these people how to master their own selves.’ People are therefore different, although Evola does make a distinction between the ruthlessness of ‘natural selection’ and that of respect. In ancient societies the people who were most respected and admired were those with special abilities and qualities, not simply animalistic strength and brute force. The secret, of course, is to ensure that ‘power is based on superiority and not vice versa’. It is certainly not necessary to bludgeon people into submission in order to get them to respect true leadership and ability. In the light of what Evola really thinks about such matters, therefore, you have to wonder why on earth Evolian Tradition was ever compared to Fascist totalitarianism in the first place.

The fact that Evola so openly acknowledges that there are various stations in life will outrage liberals, Marxists and advocates of democracy alike. But he is, nevertheless, absolutely correct. Forcing people to accord with a societal conglomeration which has been enshrined in law by a coterie of dogmatists and architectural levellers,

is simply not allowing people to discover and thus accomplish their true destinies. Evola believes that historical events have often been determined by the manner in which ‘the inferior’ – which is not used in a derogatory sense – regard their ‘superior’ counterparts. Indeed, to believe that humanity can somehow be subjected to a form of international utilitarianism is naive and misguided in the extreme. Humans are prone to ‘emotional or irrational motivation’ and, inevitably, this will usually be the dominant factor which shapes the course of their lives. The Evolian – and, thus, traditional – approach to organisation lies in what is described as the ‘anagogical function’ of the State and its latent ability to both engender and co-ordinate the individual’s sacrificial capacity to ally himself with a higher principle. The success of man’s organisational capacity, therefore, is not based purely on economics or prosperity but depends on whether the organic hierarchical balance has been maintained effectively. Within the liberal system, of course, the balance is upset by the fact that he ‘who becomes an individual, by ceasing to have an organic meaning and by refusing to acknowledge any principle of authority, is nothing more than a number, a unit in the pack; his usurpation evokes a fatal collectivist limitation against himself’. Liberalism, therefore, may appear to defend freedom but it is actually a means of subverting it altogether. Marxism functions in the same way and both ideologies stem – once again – from the French Revolution: ‘When Western man broke the ties to Tradition, claiming for himself as an individual a vain and illusory freedom: when he became an atom in society, rejecting every higher symbol of authority and sovereignty in a system of hierarchies.’ Fascism, by falsely claiming to restore the traditional equilibrium, actually worsened the situation by initiating a crude and materialistic form of totalitarianism.

The worst example of liberalism is its dependence upon economic exploitation. Evola charts the decline of economic stability from the death of the feudal system – when ‘the organic connection . . . between personality and property, social function and wealth, and between a given qualification or moral nobility and the rightful and legitimate possession of goods, was broken’ – and the onset of the Napoleonic Code, right through to the desanctification of property and the arrival

of the unscrupulous capitalist. So what, according to Evola, is the role of the traditionalist in light of the modern evils which were unleashed over two hundred years ago? Our response must be founded upon a return to origins: 'To go back to the origins means, plainly and simply, to reject anything that in any domain (whether social, political, or economic) is connected to the "immortal principles" of 1789, as a libertarian, individualistic, and egalitarian thought, and to oppose it with the hierarchical view, in the context of which alone the notion, value, and freedom of man as person are not reduced to mere words or excuses for a work of destruction and subversion.'

4. ORGANIC STATE – TOTALITARIANISM

Evola now attempts to make a distinction between the totalitarian and organic State. The democracies have gone to great lengths in order to portray the traditional State 'in a heinous way', ensuring that opponents of democracy are instantly equated with brutality and fascism. Totalitarianism, being a relatively modern word, is inevitably applied to past systems in a purely retrospective manner. Evola, however, seeks to approach the question of totalitarianism by examining the way in which the term is actually defined by the democracies. Therefore whenever the author refers to the more positive aspects of 'totalitarianism', these components are said to accord with the organic State: 'A State is organic when it has a centre, and this centre is an idea that shapes the various domains of life in an efficacious way; it is organic when it ignores the division and the autonomisation of the particular and when, by virtue of a system of hierarchical participation, every part within its relative autonomy performs its own function and enjoys an intimate connection with the whole.' It is not difficult to see how this differs fundamentally with the individualism and liberalism of the modern age. Evola rightly points out that more traditional societies were even able to accommodate a loyal opposition. In stark contrast to the representative party system of today, the early English Parliament was far more pluralist and was often heard to refer to 'His Majesty's Most Loyal Opposition'.

But the organic State also had a spiritual or religious dimension, whereby the political was formulated in accordance with a more

penetrating and unitary outlook. This, says Evola, is what makes the organic synonymous with the traditional. In the minds of the liberals and the Communists, of course, this healthy approach to former societies and a more pluralist style of organisation inevitably means that Tradition is wrongly equated with 'fascism'. Evola, on the other hand, is able to counter this fraudulent analogy by explaining that 'totalitarianism merely represents the counterfeited image of the organic ideal. It is a system in which unity is imposed from the outside, not on the basis of the intrinsic force of a common idea and an authority that is naturally acknowledged, but rather through direct forms of intervention and control, exercised by a power that is exclusively and materially political, imposing itself as the ultimate reason for the system'. Having lived through Mussolini's Italy, of course, Evola was more than aware of the shortcomings relating to the Corporate State. Totalitarian dictatorship also fails to accept the organic chain that runs between the upper and lower poles of traditional society, replacing pluralism, decentralisation and participation with the Führer-princip. Furthermore, the totalitarian State 'engenders a kind of sclerosis, or a monstrous hypertrophy of the entire bureaucratic-administrative structure'. The Orwellian ministries of Nazi Germany spring to mind, becoming 'all-pervasive, replacing and suppressing every particular activity, without any restraints, due to an insolent intrusion of the public sphere into the private domain, organising everything into rigid schemes'. But these characteristics are not a purely modern phenomenon; on the contrary, as Oswald Spengler notes in *The Decline of the West*: 'The great cultures accomplish their majestic wave-cycles. They appear suddenly, swell in splendid lines, flatten again and vanish, and the face of the waters is once more a sleeping waste'.^[4] Thus, a similar pattern emerged during the death-throes of Persia and Greece and, according to Edward Gibbon: 'The demise of Rome was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness. Prosperity ripened the principle of decay; the cause of destruction multiplied with the extent of conquest; and as soon as time or accident had removed the artificial supports, the stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure of its own weight. The story of its ruin is simple and obvious; and instead of inquiring why the Roman Empire was

destroyed, we should rather be surprised that it had subsisted so long.’^[5] Similarly, Evola likens the degenerative process to a living organism: ‘After enjoying life and movement, a stiffening sets in when they die that is typical of a body turning into a corpse. This state, in turn, is followed by the terminal phase of disintegration.’

The way in which the organic or traditional State is perceived is also important. Fascism and Marxism tend to lead to blind statism, but Evola believes that the organic State must be granted a degree of ‘Statolatry’. In other words, rather than seeking to worship the State for its own sake, ‘There is a profound and substantial difference between the deification and absolutisation of what is profane and the case in which the political reality derives its legitimisation from reference points that are also spiritual and somehow transcendent.’ This is the difference between the material and the spiritual, the totalitarian and the organic. The spiritual element acts like a societal adhesive, binding together the unitary whole to which the people are willingly attached without coercion or repression. In contemporary Western societies it is considered normal in certain occupations and ceremonies to undertake an oath. But despite being a remnant of the distant past, the oath today has been stripped of its sacred implications and has become empty, meaningless and contractual. This is because the State and various other national institutions have become a merely temporal form of authority, rendering the more spiritual expressions of verbal fidelity completely irrelevant. The gulf between the contractual and the traditional is demonstrated by the way in which the Official Secrets Act is designed to secure the loyalty of the individual to the State. In feudal times, of course, the intrinsically transcendent nature of the oath became manifest by way of the *sacramentum fidelitatis*. This was infinitely more binding than giving one’s allegiance to a company, an institution or a squadron.

But when the traditional State is said to represent a unitary organism it must not be compared, warns Evola, to the humanistic vision epitomised by Hegel’s ‘Ethical State’. Indeed, when Hegel perceives the individual to be part of a universal code of ethics, he is looking at humanity through rose-tinted spectacles. The unworkable liberalism

which pervades this idealistic interpretation will only lead to one thing: totalitarianism in the name of 'tradition' and 'order'. Therefore the 'ethical' State inevitably leads to the 'fascist' State, with the destructive multi-party system being replaced with an even more dangerous one-party dictatorship. Muammar al-Qadhafi, whose vision of the 'organic' State conflicts with that proposed by Evola and other traditionalists, defines the party thus: 'It is the modern dictatorial instrument of governing. The party is the rule of a part over the whole.'⁶ On this point Evola agrees, suggesting that once the party has ascended to power it simply tries to advance the interests of its own faction. It is therefore divisive and threatens the stability of that which must be unitary and transcendent. The solution to this problem, it seems, lies in the re-establishment of an elite suited to maintaining the balance of sovereignty and authority. Evola suggests that this can be done from within by both installing and enduring a period of interregnum, although National-Anarchists prefer to advocate the foundation of new decentralised communities on the periphery from which elite cadres recreate the very essence of true aristocracy.

5. BONAPARTISM – MACHIAVELLIANISM – ELITISM

Bonapartism is a rather unusual term and one which Evola borrows from R. Michels, author of the 1915 work *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. Michels demonstrates how representative democracy and 'government of the people' leads to the control of the State by a self-interested minority. This view is echoed by J. Burnham in *The Machiavellians*, who explains that the so-called 'will of the people' is eventually superseded by the domination of a bureaucratic clique. Thus Bonapartism begins with a popular demand for more freedom and equality and ends in the totalitarian 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. Evola likens this process to a people who have catastrophically 'led and disciplined themselves'. After the decline of its aristocratic nobility, ancient Greece witnessed the same systematically repressive phenomenon. Power simply became detached from a higher, spiritual authority, leading to fear and brutality. Evola then turns to Otto Weininger, who once 'described the figure of the great politician as one

who is a despot and at the same time a worshipper of the people, or simultaneously a pimp and a whore'. Indeed, by seeking to appeal to the masses the modern leader easily commands their respect and adulation. Not in the way that traditional societies gave their loyalty to the organic State, however, because instead of engendering a healthy diversity between the various levels (not classes) of society Bonapartism forces the politician to become a 'man of the people'. Therefore he is perceived as a common man, rather than as someone exceptionally transcendent and symbolic. This, Weininger called 'mutual prostitution'. Authority is perfectly useless unless it is attached to a central idea which runs throughout the social fabric and acts as a point of reference. This affects the individual because one 'is restricted not so much in this or that exterior freedom (which is, after all, of little consequence) but rather in the inner freedom – the ability to free himself from his lowest instincts'. Bonapartism – which Evola interprets here as a political, rather than militaristic, term – is equated with dictatorship because this is the logical result of its democratic *ethos*. It completely erodes the traditional values of human existence, refusing to 'distinguish clearly between the symbol, the function, and the principle, on the one hand, and man as an individual, on the other'. Instead, it rejects that a man be valued and recognised in terms of the idea and principle he upholds' and simply views man in terms of 'his action upon the irrational forms of the masses'. Similarly, Evola points out the errors which began with Social Darwinism and consequently found expression in Nietzsche's concept of the Superman (*Übermensch*): 'Most people, even when they admit the notion of aristocracy in principle, ultimately settle for a very limited view of it: they admire an individual for being exceptional and brilliant, instead of for being one in whom a tradition and a special "spiritual race" shine forth, or instead of whose greatness is due not to his human virtues, but rather to the principle, the idea, and a certain regal impersonality that he embodies.'

Machiavellianism – despite its frequent portrayal as an aristocratic notion – is also a highly individualist philosophy. Indeed, although the concept of 'The Prince' rejects democracy and the masses, it makes the fatal mistake of encouraging power

and authority to reside in the hands of man. In other words, man is himself the be all and end all of Machiavellian doctrine. Such men are not connected to a chain of Tradition, they are merely interested in deploying their political capabilities to advance their own interests. His very position is maintained by lies, deceit and manipulation, becoming a rampant political monster to which everything must be methodically subjected. This is clearly very different to the way in which traditional aristocracies functioned and indicates that Machiavellianism is a consequence of the general decline. True elitism, argues Evola, degenerates in four stages: In the first stage the elite has a purely spiritual character, embodying what may be generally called 'divine right'. This elite expresses an ideal of immaterial virility. In the second stage, the elite has the character of warrior nobility; at the third stage we find the advent of oligarchies of a plutocratic and capitalistic nature, such as they arise in democracies; the fourth and last elite is that of the collectivist and revolutionary leaders of the Fourth Estate.

6. WORK:

THE DEMONIC NATURE OF THE ECONOMY

When Evola discusses the 'demonic nature of the economy', we are instantly reminded of the capitalist free market and communism's deterministic assessment of man as economic unit (*homo oeconomicus*). In the modern age economic forces have become the new gods of Mammon, creating a dangerous and cataclysmic antithesis to the spiritual aspirations of the ancient world. We have already examined how Evola warns against the lack of hierarchical authority, and in this chapter he demonstrates how both capitalism and Marxism have completely subverted the organic nature of our whole existence: 'As long as we only talk about economic classes, profit, salaries, and production, and as long as we believe that real human progress is determined by a particular system of distribution of wealth and goods, and that, generally speaking, human progress is measured by the degree of wealth or indigence – then we are not even close to what is essential.' Thus work and the modern economy are depicted as the

penultimate goals of human endeavour, rather than man accepting that his natural interests must lie ultimately in the satisfaction of his own material needs. This is not to suggest that food, clothing and shelter are the most important facets of human existence, simply that they are the most basic prerequisites of all. Man also needs to be satisfied both spiritually and as part of a structure which 'neither knows nor tolerates merely economic classes and does not know the division between "capitalists" and "proletarians"; an order solely in terms of which are to be defined the things worth living and dying for. We must also uphold the need for a true hierarchy and for different dignitaries, with a higher function of power installed at the top, namely the imperium'. But this vision is hardly being fulfilled today. Everything is geared towards economic production and, inevitably, wage-slavery. Evola does not believe in the formulation of a new economic theory, instead he explains that the current obsession with economic matters can only decline once people change their attitudes completely: 'What must be questioned is not the value of this or that economic system, but the value of the economy itself.' This is a fundamental part of National-Anarchist thinking, too, a total rejection of the Left-Right spectrum which, once again, ever since the French Revolution has imposed upon us a wholly superficial antithesis between two allegedly opposed economic ideologies. Those so-called 'backward' nations which, thus far, have avoided economic development are said by Evola to 'enjoy a certain space and a relative freedom'. By seizing upon the issue of class, Marxists have deliberately obscured the components of the ancient world by smearing them with an economic grime. In traditional societies, of course, the economy was simply one area within an all-encompassing hierarchical structure. Terms like 'capitalist' and 'proletarian' did not exist and class struggle was redundant: 'Even in the domain of the economy, a normal civilisation provides specific justification for certain differences in condition, dignity, and function.' Marxism, says Evola, did not come about due to the need for a resolution to the social question, on the contrary, Marxism itself has exacerbated the problem by creating the myth of the class system. In traditional societies 'an individual contained his need and aspirations within natural limits; he did not yearn to become different from what

he was, and thus he was innocent of that Entfremdung (“alienation”) decried by Marxism’. Leninists, Trotskyists and other advocates of the class struggle will recoil in horror at this statement, but Evola is denouncing the materialist desires of the common economic agitator rather than supporting the aspirations of the ‘ruling class’. Indeed, economic determinism is considered to be unhealthy and detrimental because ‘it can legitimately be claimed that the so-called improvement of social conditions should be regarded not as good but as evil, when its price consists of the enslavement of the single individual to the productive mechanism and to the social conglomerate; or in the degradation of the State to the ‘State based on work’, and the degradation of society to ‘consumer society’; or in the elimination of every qualitative hierarchy; or in the atrophy of every spiritual sensibility and every ‘heroic’ attitude. There is little doubt, therefore, that the appliance of the economic worldview comes at great cost. Evola implores us to express our real selves and to unleash our true potential. Each of us has a different function and a unique position to fulfil. Class conflict, therefore, is a diversion which has been thrust in the path of the unitary and the organic. In terms of the way in which we approach work, Evola tells us that an American attempt to extract more labour from a Third World workforce by doubling their wages, was met with ‘a majority of the workers cutting their working hours in half’. Compare this traditionalist attitude with that of the modern-day office or factory worker who perpetually competes for overtime with his colleagues. Indeed, whilst traditional societies are merely interested in satisfying their basic needs, those in the West endure increasingly long hours, exhaustion, bad diets and severe health problems in their pursuit for computers, televisions and cars. Evola notes that, prior to the rise of the mercantile economy and the gradual evolution of capitalism, ‘the acquisition of external goods had to be restricted and that work and the quest for profit were justifiable only in order to acquire a level of wealth corresponding to one’s status in life: this was the Thomist and, later, the Lutheran view’. Work was always designed to satisfy man’s basic needs and provide him with the time he needed in order to pursue more worthy and meaningful pursuits. But when the acquisition of wealth becomes such an obsession that it imprisons the individual

within an economic straightjacket, something is clearly very wrong indeed. Success, therefore, is not determined by the credit in one's bank account or the growth of industry and technology, it relates to the way in which an individual is able to progress in a more spiritual sense. Living in accordance with one's own intrinsic nature (*dharma*) is far preferable to pushing oneself beyond the boundaries of normal behaviour through greed and materialism. This trend is epitomised by the restless nature of the capitalistic economy and its exploitative pursuit of new global markets, in the knowledge, of course, that once it has run its inevitable course the lack of available resources will herald its total collapse.

The emergence of capitalism has often been equated with the Protestant work ethic, and is here dismissed by Evola for the simple reason that labour has been transformed from a means of subsistence to an end in itself. It is not only the Right who are obsessed with work, of course, it is the Left too. One thinks of endless marches organised by the likes of Militant Labour and the Socialist Workers Party, during which the only objective is to enslave the proletariat to the employment system: 'The most peculiar thing is that this superstitious and insolent cult of work is proclaimed in an era in which the irreversible and relentless mechanisation eliminates from the main varieties of work whatever in them still had a character of quality, art, and the spontaneous unfoldment of a vocation, turning it into something inanimate and devoid of even an immanent meaning.' Evola sees this process as the very proletarianisation of life itself. There are certain parallels here with Richard Hunt's advocacy of the 'leisure society', in which man can rediscover the natural and qualitative values of his existence. But Evola warns his readers that we must not 'shift to a renunciatory, utopian, and miserable civilisation', but rather 'clear every domain of life of insane tensions and to restore a true hierarchy of values'.

But whilst the individual is inadvertently eroding his own freedoms by viewing work as the ultimate goal in life, the State is also endangering its own existence through the encroaching scarcity of resources to which increasing productivity leads. Evola argues that the

way forward lies in ‘autarchy’, and that ‘it is better to renounce the allure of improving general social and economic conditions and to adopt a regime of austerity than to become enslaved to foreign interests or to become caught up in world processes of reckless economic hegemony and productivity that are destined to sweep away those who have set them in motion’. On this point, however, Evola is perhaps forgetting that the decline of capitalistic economies is inevitable and therefore it is futile to postpone their collapse by implementing a policy of protectionism. This strategy may indeed enable a country to stave off the effects of an impending economic catastrophe, but given that all capitalist systems rely on the internationalist system, this simply would not work in the long term.

7. HISTORY – HISTORICISM

Evola now turns his attention to the way in which history is so often presented as a religious tenet of the modern age, representing the switch from a world of being towards that of a world of becoming. Indeed, whilst the former relates to an organic and stable form of civilisation, the latter denotes a chaotic and constantly evolving process in which ‘rationalist, scientific, and technological civilisation’ acts as the pied piper of our rapid decline. Rationalism was perceived by Hegel as reality itself. Likewise, reality is also rational. But traditional values, says Evola, cannot be analysed or defined in this way because they are based on something far beyond the comprehension of mere philosophy. Historicism often regards those episodes which it cannot account for as ‘anti-historical’. This has been said of historical phenomena which appear to obstruct the process of development in accordance with the rationalist worldview. This is why historicists and modernists are fond of portraying conservatives – in the true sense of the word – as ‘reactionaries’ and enemies of progress. Furthermore, it is not men who make history at all. Traditionalists like Evola have learnt to recognise and accept the transcendental forces which are never taken into consideration by rationalist historians: ‘Only an obsolete “historicism” can be so presumptuous to reduce everything to a linear development.’ Indeed, both Marxism and Christianity adopt this method and the cyclical nature of the universe is therefore ignored.

8. CHOICE OF TRADITIONS

Whilst the word 'Tradition' is used to describe Evola's cosmological stance against the modern world (and that of certain other traditionalists like Guénon, Nasr and Schuon), he also accepts that during certain key periods of his existence man has often used a series of more commonly known traditions in order to act as a unifying force. These forms of Tradition relate to specific 'suggestions and catchphrases' which are used to revitalise or regenerate a civilisation, although they can often assume a very 'non-traditional' form. Using the example of Italy, Evola points out that professional subversives from the ranks of liberalism, Communism and Freemasonry have distorted certain words to ensure that they are equated with patriotism and national pride. So to disagree with their objectives, therefore, is to invoke accusations of 'treachery' and 'disloyalty'. This makes it rather difficult for traditionalists to adopt traditions of their own without incurring the systematically-engineered confusion that sometimes accompanies them. Due to the fact that national traditions are associated with the historical realities of a country's particular development, attempting to place such terminology in its true context will inevitably lead to the adoption of the modern view that a country's tradition is based upon its whole history. This is why Evola recommends the deconstruction of the mythology which surrounds national patriotism itself. Italian pride consists in glorifying the Italian Commune, the Renaissance and the Risorgimento. French patriotism is based upon the principles of the French Revolution and the upheavals of 1848 which followed it. An atmosphere of petty-nationalism and xenophobia also fuels the flames of justification for the two destructive world wars which decimated Europe. Revolution and conflict is based on the struggle between diametrically-opposed ideas or economies, not upon racial or national antagonism. Evola suggests that Frederick I, for example, fought against the Italians because he saw it as his imperial duty and not because he simply happened to despise the Italian people or wished to subvert them to his will. Ironically enough, Frederick was committed to the re-establishment of Roman law and many Italians even fought alongside him. This completely demolishes the idea that the aforementioned episodes in Italian history were somehow

‘patriotic’. The importance of a struggle is characterised by the idea and not by the perceived national loyalties of those involved. Think of those Englishmen who fought in Hitler’s SS, for example, or the Muslims who travelled from around the world in order to fight against the Americans in modern-day Afghanistan. The ‘traditions’ of those who are committed to the obliteration of the ancient world, then, are highly questionable and – at the very least – intrinsically selective.

By charting the progress of the Italian Renaissance through to its logical conclusion, the so-called Enlightenment, Evola demonstrates that ‘in the same sense in which Renaissance Italy becomes the mother of geniuses and artists, it also becomes the forerunner of subversion. And just as the communes represent the first rebellion against an alleged political despotism, the civilisation of the Renaissance likewise represents the “discovery of man” and of freedom of the spirit in the creative individual, as well as the principle of the intellectual emancipation that constitutes the “basis of human progress”.’ The Risorgimento is not dissimilar in that it represented a paradoxical alliance between Masonry and patriotism: ‘The representatives of what at the time was still traditional Europe regarded liberalism and Mazzinianism in the same way as today’s liberal and democratic parties regard communism; the truth is that the subversive intentions of the former were not much different from the latter’s, the main difference being that liberalism and Mazzinianism employed the national and patriotic myth at the early stages of the disintegrating action.’ The Risorgimento, therefore, was a pseudo-tradition and at the very root of its secret machinations lay the destruction of Tradition itself. The Carbonari was not fighting ‘Austria’ at all, it was engaged in a bitter attempt to topple the Austrian dynasty and, thus, one of the final vestiges of Tradition in Europe. But this is not to suggest that the House of Austria had an impeccable track record. On the contrary, along with Russia and Germany its primary importance lay in opposing the rise of liberalism and modernism. This is demonstrated by the spirit of unity which permeates a letter sent to Wilhelm I by Bismarck in 1887: ‘The struggle today is not so much between Russians, Germans, Italians, and French, but rather between revolution and monarchy. The Revolution has conquered France, affected England, and is strong in

Italy and in Spain. There are only three emperors who can oppose it . . . An eventual future war will have less the character of a war between governments, but more so that of a war of the red flag against the elements of order and preservation.’ Beneath the surface of all dynasties, churches and governments, of course, lie the denizens of the single idea and the common struggle. A contemporary example on a far smaller scale, perhaps, is the tactical support offered by Alexander Dugin’s Eurasianists to Vladimir Putin’s government. The main point of this chapter, however, is the undermining of the popular fantasies which surround national ‘traditions’. Once we can stop focusing on the kind of nationalism served up by the historicists, therefore, it will be easier to accept the validity of an Idea.

9. MILITARY STYLE – ‘MILITARISM’ – WAR

Evola tells us that militarism is the enemy of democracy. This divergence of beliefs came about as soon as economics had replaced things like Prussianism and the Order of Teutonic Knights. Modern democracy, having originated in England, has led to the rise of a society in which ‘the primary element is the bourgeois type and the bourgeois life during times of peace; such a life is dominated by the physical concern for safety, well-being, and material wealth, with the cultivation of letters and the arts serving as a decorative frame’. It is the bourgeoisie who are presently in control of the State and, despite the absence of a militaristic spirit in modern society, whenever an ‘international crisis’ looms on the horizon they have no qualms about using militaristic techniques in order to advance their own interests. This is precisely the same form of shameless hypocrisy which usually regards warfare as ‘something materialistic and soulless’. But Evola makes a distinction between the soldier and the warrior. Indeed, whilst the former is a paid mercenary who sees warfare purely as a means of self-enrichment, the latter is a specific aristocratic caste which is altogether superior to the bourgeoisie. In the present atmosphere soldiers are used to maintain ‘the peace’, although in reality capitalism uses its Establishment shock-troops to crush its opponents and maintain its own position on the economic ladder. This means that the mercenary is employed by the merchant class, rather than a warrior caste ‘with its

own spirituality, values, and ethics' playing an active role in the nature of the State. But Evola is not suggesting that 'the military must manage the affairs of the State . . . but rather that virtues, disciplines, and feelings of a military type acquire pre-eminence and a superior dignity over everything that is of a bourgeois type'. Furthermore, he does not believe in the control of one's everyday affairs by a military clique: 'Love for hierarchy; relationships of obedience and command; courage; feelings of honour and loyalty; specific forms of active impersonality capable of producing anonymous sacrifice; frank and open relationships from man to man, from one comrade to another, from leader to follower – all these are the characteristic living values that are predominant in the aforementioned view.' Evola follows this up by explaining that external warfare compliments that occurring within the self. This is the spiritual battle which is waged by the individual in defiance of his own shortcomings, described by Evola in *Revolt Against the Modern World* as the 'big holy war' and the 'little holy war'; a jihad which is fought upon two fronts. This also has important similarities to the Hermetic concept 'as above, so below'. War against one's enemies is a macrocosm of that taking place within the individual. For the man who is born to be a warrior, this kind of asceticism becomes a way of life. It is not a form of mindless violence in which death and destruction become the central pillars of one's very existence, it is 'the calm, conscious, and planned development of the inner being and a code of ethics; love of distance; hierarchy; order; the faculty of subordinating the emotional and individualistic element of one's self to higher goals and principles, especially in the name of honour and beauty'. Herein lies the difference between the soldier and the warrior.

The decline of the warrior *ethos*, according to Evola, is due to the fact that democracies have diminished the importance of the political in favour of the social. Previously, of course, Evola had referred to the *Männerbund* or all-male fraternity. Without this vital heroic element, the modern State has inevitably become very inferior when compared to those of the past like Sparta. Western society is now in the hands of the bourgeoisie and lacks that key ingredient of atmospheric tension which acts as a safeguard against complacency and deterioration. Evola

is not implying that warfare and struggle are eternal concepts, but simply that the individual must seek out the active life in opposition to the pacifism and decay that comes with 'peace'. Therefore 'the nations in which such premises are sufficiently realised will be not only the ones better prepared for war, but also the ones in which war will acquire a higher meaning'. By sheer contrast, the democracies now claim to be fighting against war itself and use a force of their own in a purely defensive capacity. The ranks of those who fight however, are filled not with the bourgeoisie but with the paid mercenaries of the army and police. These soldiers do not fight for an idea or a higher principle, but for 'material well-being, economic prosperity, a comfortable and conformist existence based on one's work, productivity, sports, movies, and sexuality'. Modern warfare is also based upon the war of the machine, rather than on the physical or spiritual combat of warriors. This leads to a complex and technological manifestation of the heroic ideal, rather than offering the prospective warrior a just cause for which to fight. Evola attacks the manipulative propaganda and lies which have been used throughout the process of modern warfare, something which leads to the relativisation and systematic repackaging of the 'cause' itself. But what does Evola say about the attitude and motivation of the true warrior?

A warrior tradition and a pure military tradition do not have hatred as the basis of war. The need to fight and even to exterminate another people may be acknowledged, but this does not entail hatred, anger, animosity, and contempt for the enemy. All these feelings, for a true soldier, are degrading: in order to fight he need not be motivated by such lowly feelings, nor be energised by propaganda, smoky rhetoric and lies.

These elements have only come to the fore since the natural warrior caste was replaced by an army of enlisted mercenaries drawn from the ranks of society at large. Mussolini once wrote about the spirit of the trenches in which class divisions were eradicated in the name of a common cause, but Evola believes that today the masses have to be deceived before they will agree to fight for the ruling class. Modern conflicts are irrational, too, in that they are artificially constructed in

order to justify the ever-increasing expansion of capitalism. The wars of the past were quite different, in that they had a sovereign quality as the necessary determining force for the deployment of what Evola describes as ‘clearly defined goals’. Perhaps the antithesis of the just war is the very irrationalism which lies at the core of the ultimate form of modern combat we know today as nuclear war.

10. TRADITION – CATHOLICISM – Ghibellinism

Catholicism is perceived by many to be the pinnacle of Tradition. Evola accepts that it contains many traditional aspects, but goes on to say that in order to be seen as a legitimate form of authority and sovereignty it must become fully integrated within the sphere of Tradition itself. Catholicism alone is inadequate and represents only a minimal current of a far wider Tradition. Here, Evola opts to discuss the implications of this fact in both a political and contemporary context, despite using examples from the past.

Religion falls into various categories and cannot match the supreme and unitary nature of Tradition. In fact religion is simply an exoteric version of a deeper, esoteric undercurrent. Christianity, for example, panders to the masses, whilst Tradition is reserved for the spiritual elite:

In effect, nobody with a higher education can really believe in the axiom ‘There is no salvation outside the Church’ (*nulla salus extra ecclesiam*), meaning the great civilisations that have preceded Christianity (the still-existing millennia-old non-European traditions, such as Buddhism and Hinduism, and even relatively recent ones such as Islam) have not known the supernatural or the sacred, but only distorted images and obscure ‘prefigurations’ and that they amount to mere ‘paganism’, polytheism, and ‘natural mysticism’.

This statement would undoubtedly arouse in the more ‘traditional’ Catholic a feeling of revulsion and anger, perhaps even accusations of ‘ecumenicalism’. However, Evola is not advocating the unification of all religions, but the acceptance that there is a common Tradition which lies in each. He goes on to say that for a Catholic ‘to persist in the

sectarian and dogmatic exclusivism about this matter would amount to being in the same predicament of one who wished to defend the views of physics and astronomy found in the Old Testament, which have been made obsolete by the current state of knowledge on these matters'. Catholicism, then, is only 'traditional' in the sense that certain aspects tend to accord with Tradition itself. The same can be said of Islam or Judaism.

We now turn our attention to the centuries-old debate concerning Catholicism and Ghibellinism. The Ghibellines (like their Guelph rivals) were a political force in northern and central Italy between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries. These opposing groups began in Germany as partisans in a struggle for the throne of the Holy Roman Empire between two dynastic houses: the Welfs on the one hand (who were dukes of Saxony and Bavaria), and the Hohenstaufens on the other (who were rulers of Swabia). During the Thirteenth century the Welf leader, Otto of Brunswick, was involved in a fratricidal struggle for the imperial crown against Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, and the all-German battle soon moved south to Italy. The name Guelph is derived from Welf, whilst Ghibelline is a corruption of Waiblingen, an area of land belonging to the emperors of Hohenstaufen. According to the Ghibelline view of the world, as elucidated by Evola:

The Empire was an institution of supernatural origin and character, like the Church. It had its own sacred nature, just as, during the Middle Ages, the dignity of the kings themselves had an almost priestly nature (kingship being established through a rite that differed only in minor detail from Episcopal ordination). On this basis, the Ghibelline emperors – who were the representatives of a universal and supranational idea, embodying a *lex animata in terris* (a living law on earth) – opposed the hegemonic claims of the clergy and claimed to have only God above themselves.

The struggle between the Ghibellines and the clergy is usually discussed in political terms, but was actually a form of spiritual combat waged at the very highest level. Humanity, during the medieval period, was caught between two distinct paths: action and contemplation. Evola

tells us that this relates to the Empire and the Church respectively:

Ghibellinism more or less claimed that through the view of earthly life as discipline, militia, and service, the individual can be led beyond himself and reach the supernatural culmination of human personality through action and under the aegis of the Empire. This was related to the character of a non-naturalistic but 'providential' institution acknowledged in the Empire; knighthood and the great knightly Orders stood in relation to the empire in the same way in which the clergy and the ascetic Orders stood in relation to the Church.

This sounds like an analogy of the political soldier, but Evola is keen to demonstrate that such Orders 'were based on an idea that was less political than ethical-spiritual, and partially even ascetic, according to an asceticism that was not cloistered and contemplative, but rather of a warrior type. In this last regard, the most typical example was constituted by the Order of Knights Templar, and in part by the Order of the Teutonic Knights'. This subject is discussed at length in Evola's *Revolt Against The Modern World*, during which the author explained how the Emperor waged a calculated holy war against the pro-Guelphist clergy and how even the Crusades became an active consolidation of the imperial idea; just as the Empire had been in times of peace. The Ghibellines, he said, were engaged in an occult struggle 'against papal Rome that was waged by Rome itself' (p. 300). Indeed, the head of the Church is known as pontifex maximus; a title which is taken directly from the leaders of early Rome. Indeed, according to Evola the Emperor Julian opposed Christianity due to its 'upholding of an anarchical doctrine; with the excuse of paying homage to God alone, they refused to give him homage in the person of those who, as legitimate leaders of men, were his representatives on earth and drew from him the principle of their power. This, according to Celsus, was an example of impiety'.

Evola's whole point is that in ancient times the religious clergy were answerable to the Emperor himself; not simply from a political perspective, but also in a theological capacity: 'It was only during the Middle Ages that the priest nourished the ambition, not of being king,

but of being the one to whom kings are subject. At that time, Ghibellinism arose as a reaction, and the rivalry was rekindled, the new reference point now being the authority and the right reclaimed by the Holy Roman Empire.' But this does not presuppose that religion must be at the service of the State like those of 'a Masonic, anti-clerical character'. On the contrary, this leads to totalitarianism and the Concordats which were conveniently arranged in both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The separation of the spiritual and political spheres is epitomised by the Christian maxim 'render unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's', something which was quite unknown in ancient times. Needless to say, throughout history the Catholic Church has played a very large role in secular affairs by using politics as a mere wing of the religious establishment. Although in the later Middle Ages the Church did recognise the divine right of kings, Evola considers these 'atheistic' monarchs to have been at the forefront of the liberal ideas which later found expression in the French Revolution of 1789. Once the State had vacated the domain of the spirit and become secular, however, it turned against the Church. But this was different from the rebellion of the Ghibellines, because this current 'did not pursue the subjection of spiritual authority to temporal powers, but rather upheld, vis-à-vis the exclusivist claim of the Church, a value and a right for the State, different from those that are proper to an organisation with a merely human and material character'. However, lest one wrongly imagine that Evola somehow wishes to revive the Ghibelline struggle against the Church, the author carefully points out that the key point is to resist the secular State in all its forms. Only in this way can politics be ascribed to a higher level.

Catholicism today is in great decline. Not least because it is always forced to compromise with the prevailing ideologies among which it finds itself. Liberalism is gradually eroding the last vestiges of Catholic tradition in the same way that it is eating away at the edifice of Tradition in general. The likes of the Protestant Reformation and Vatican II have taken their toll, and we now see modernist popes tolerating bastardised currents like Liberation Theology, supporting the burgeoning New World Order and kneeling before the might of International Zionism. Evola tells us that 'the decline of the modern

Church is undeniable because she gives to social and moral concerns a greater weight than what pertains to the supernatural life, to asceticism, and to contemplation, which are essential reference points of religiosity'. It is certainly not fulfilling any kind of meaningful role, either: 'For all practical purposes, the main concerns of Catholicism today seem to turn it into a petty bourgeois moralism that shuns sexuality and upholds virtue, or an inadequate paternalistic welfare system. In these times of crisis and emerging brutal forces, the Christian faith should devote itself to very different tasks'. In the medieval period the Church possessed a more traditional character, but only due to the fact that it had appropriated so many Classical elements and, by way of Aristotle, lashed them firmly to the theological mast being constructed by Thomas Aquinas during the Thirteenth century. Catholicism, however, will never reconcile itself with the problem of how to deal with politics and the State because it relies upon separation and dualism. Tradition, on the other hand, is integralist and unitary.

Evola notes that certain individuals and groups have sought to incorporate the more traditional aspects of Catholicism within the broader and far more encompassing sphere of Tradition itself. Evola's French philosophical counterpart, René Guénon, for example. Catholics, however, are far too dogmatic and would merely seek to make Tradition 'conform' to their own spiritual *weltanschauung*. This, says Evola, is 'placing the universal at the service of the particular'. Furthermore, of course, the anti-modernists who are organised in groups such as The Society of St. Pius X and the Sedavacantist fraternity do not speak with the full weight and authority of the Church. They are, therefore, powerless because 'the direction of the Church is a descending and anti-traditional one, consisting of modernisation and coming to terms with the modern world, democracy, socialism, progressivism, and everything else. Therefore, these individuals are not authorised to speak in the name of Catholicism, which ignores them, and should not try to attribute to Catholicism a dignity the latter spurns'. Evola suggests that because the Church is so inadequate, it should be abandoned and left to its ultimate doom. He concludes by reiterating the fact that a State which does not have a spiritual dimension is not a State at all. The only way forward, he argues, is to

‘begin from a pure idea, without the basis of a proximate historical reference’ and await the actualisation of the traditional current.

11. REALISM – COMMUNISM – ANTI-BOURGEOISIE

Intellectuals are often attracted to communism because it claims to be anti-bourgeois, despite communism itself claiming to despise the intellectual for his bourgeois origins. According to Evola, however, this is misleading and such people are deluding themselves. Evola also accepts that the word ‘bourgeois’ relates to far more than economics; something representing a specific cultural niche in which everything is ‘empty, decadent, and corrupt’. The role of the traditionalist must be to overcome these materialist concepts. Indeed, the perennial attraction of communism indicates that it would be a big mistake to combat Marxist values with a ‘bourgeois mentality and spirit, with its conformism, psychological and romantic appendices, moralism, and concerns for a petty, safe existence in which a fundamental materialism finds its compensation in sentimentality and the rhetoric of the great humanitarian and democratic worlds – all this has only an artificial, peripheral, and precarious life’. This is why conservatism has always been so ineffective, and why the adoption of a true anti-bourgeois spirit is so essential in the ongoing replenishment of Tradition. For Evola, the solution lies in realism.

In its efforts to overcome the unreality of bourgeois society, Marxism simply relegates the individual to an even lower level. This results in the systematic spawning of *homo economicus*, a process in which ‘we go toward what is below rather than above the person’. It represents a collective reduction of the human type, rather than a raising of the individual consciousness. So how does Evola’s realism differ from the kind of ‘neo-realism’ advocated by Left-wing philosophers such as Sartre? The latter, of course, brings human existence into line with transient concepts such as psychoanalysis. This is achieved by creating a kind of psycho-collectivisation, whereby man’s various personality traits are said to originate from below. Evola, on the other hand, accepts ‘that existence acquires a meaning

only when it is inspired by something beyond itself'. Therefore the political, economic and psychological aspects of Marxism are identical and adhere to a decidedly false sense of 'realism'.

Given the confusion which has been generated by the Marxists and their misleading interpretation of 'realism', perhaps another solution is needed to counteract the unreality of the bourgeoisie; one which seeks to go higher, rather than lower? Evola explains:

It is possible to keep a distance from everything that has only a human and especially subjectivist character; to feel contempt for bourgeois conformism and its petty selfishness and moralism; to embody the style of an impersonal activity; to prefer what is essential and real in a higher sense, free from the trappings of sentimentalism and from pseudo-intellectual super-structures – and yet all this must be done by remaining upright, feeling the presence in life of that which leads beyond life, drawing from it precise norms of behaviour and action.

This means that a new breed of individuals must bear the task of combining strong anti-Marxism with a committed opposition to bourgeois society: 'Lenin himself said that a proletarian, left to himself, tends to become a bourgeois.' It is therefore not necessary to become a communist in order to reject the trappings of conformity and sterility, although the shortcomings of Fascism and its well-documented reliance upon the bourgeoisie suggests that it, too, is incapable of providing real solutions to the problem. Evola also notes that 'even those who call themselves monarchists can only conceive of a bourgeois king'.

I have already discussed how Communists harbour an ironic grudge towards the intellectual, but Evola demonstrates that the only answer to the intellectual/anti-intellectual debate is to put forward a third option: the *Weltanschauung*, or worldview. This is 'based not on books, but on an inner form and a sensibility endowed with an innate, rather than acquired, character'. In other words a mentality which does not remain fixed in the mind or submerged in theories, but realised in a more practical sense through the deployment of the will. Thought alone is

incapable of taking on a life of its own or significantly changing anything. Here we return to the traditional idea of an organic civilisation which is expressed not by culture, but through a deeper understanding of eternal values. Thus, intellectualism and culture are merely used to express the more fundamental worldview, not designed to evolve into determining characteristics of humanity in their own right: 'This is sheer illusion: never before as in modern times was there such a number of men who are spiritually formless, and thus open to any suggestion and ideological intoxication, so as to become dominated by psychic currents (without being aware of it in the least) and of manipulations belonging to the intellectual, political, and social climate in which they live'. The worldview of which Evola speaks, of course, is Tradition. This represents the basic impetus which must beat firmly within the heart of all those who wish to bring to an end the contaminating era of the bourgeoisie.

12. ECONOMY & POLITICS – CORPORATIONS – UNITY OF WORK

In Chapter Six, Evola attacked mankind's dependence upon the economy and suggested that change must come from within. In this chapter, the author presents an alternative economic plan by which the forces of anti-Tradition can be kept at bay. Recalling the fact that the State represents 'an idea and a power', Evola has little hesitation in rendering it superior to the economic sphere. This is because he feels that the State is endowed with an overriding spiritual perspective and that it is there to both guide and judge all economic concepts, although this does cause one to wonder whether such power and authority can be expressed in a non-statist context. Especially in light of the seemingly irredeemable nature of the world's states today and the fact that no one State can last forever.

Evola's solution to the economic crisis – as well as the fact that it needs to be brought in line with Tradition – is a form of corporativism 'based on the principles of competence, qualification, and natural hierarchy, with the overall system characterised by a style of active impersonality, selflessness, and dignity'. This opinion has been formed

by the author's self-confessed admiration for the craft guilds of the Middle Ages and, before them, the Roman system of proto-corporativism. He rightly points out that the medieval artisan had a great love for his work, unlike the contemporary wage-slave who labours under great strain and duress. Evola goes into this concept in *Revolt Against The Modern World*, too, contesting that work only becomes slavery once it is viewed as a laborious task. It is also a fact that one's adherence to a common objective gives even the most seemingly ordinary task a higher degree of significance: 'The commitment of the workers was matched by the master of the art's competence, care, and knowledge; by their effort to strengthen and to raise the quality of the overall corporate unit; and by their protecting and upholding the code of honour of their corporation.' Issues such as capitalist exploitation were unheard of, at least until the advent of the Industrial Revolution.

Corporativism is usually regarded as a Fascist objective, but Evola argues that it cannot work under such a system because Fascism itself continues to tolerate the trade unions. This means that the class system is still being perpetuated and thus the unitary whole is threatened with division. After all, what use are trade unions if everyone is pulling in the same direction? The workers' co-operative is another example of just how redundant trade unionism has become. Evola also believes that Fascism and Marxism fail to 'reconstitute' the unifying concept of work itself, seeking to replace class division with a series of bureaucratic ministries. German National Socialism, however, was more successful than Italian Fascism because 'it understood that what mattered most was to achieve that organic solidarity of entrepreneurs and workers within the companies, promoting a down-sizing that reflected to a certain degree the spirit of traditional corporativism'. Evola is praising the fact that German bosses took a more hands-on approach to the question of leadership, and it is a fact that the German civil service, for example, remained exactly the same after Hitler's ascension to the throne of German politics. So it was a change of attitude, rather than a profound economic change of any kind. But I feel that Evola's enthusiasm is slightly misplaced, particularly as Hitler's economic drive was geared towards putting the country on a total war

footing and that the NSDAP itself had been financed by German Big Business.

So what is necessary for this proposed shift in attitude? Evola advocates ‘the deproletarianisation of the worker and, on the other hand, the elimination of the worst type of capitalist, who is a parasitical recipient of profits and dividends and who remains extraneous to the productive process’. Evola therefore accepts that such despicable creatures have become easy targets for communist agitators, and that capitalism itself must be vigorously opposed by those who wish to transcend both systems. Evola believes that capitalists should become more involved with their businesses, rather than sitting at home counting their shekels and raking in the profits. But this will not alter the fact that they will continue to own the means of production, so perhaps Evola is being more than a little optimistic when it comes to ‘loyal workers who are free from trade union control and are proud to belong to his company’.

We are then introduced to what Evola believes to be the ideal relationship between the State and the economy. Again, modern conditions and the servile nature of industrial capitalism are identified as being the main obstacles to a more healthy attitude towards work. He feels that the real problem lies in the way an employee is ‘inclined to regard his work as mere necessity and his performance as a product sold to a third party in exchange for the highest possible remuneration’. Work, he argues, must cease to be monotonous, repetitive and dull. Furthermore, workers must have ‘the right of co-direction, co-management, and co-determination’ that is presently lacking in the majority of occupations. These sentiments appear to echo the co-operative ideas of Robert Owen and the Rochdale Pioneers, which took shape during the Nineteenth century. In other words, workers must have a real stake in the business concerned, rather than be considered as a mere cog in the capitalist machine: ‘This would be the best way to “integrate” the individual worker into his company, motivate him and raise him above his most immediate interest as a mere rootless individual. In this way we could reproduce in a company’s life the type of organic belonging that was proper to the ancient corporative

formations.’ This microcosmic representation of the State within the field of economics all sounds very well, although one must remember that any economic idea that plans to attach itself to the present economic system must inevitably rise and fall in accordance with the very system itself. The West is dying. This means, therefore, that all solutions which advocate forms of participation within the current system – including distributist guilds and workers’ co-operatives – merely represent a temporary postponement of the inevitable crash. The real solution lies on the periphery.

Evola criticises the politicisation of the workplace by trade unionists, a process which – he believes – only serves to divide, confuse and worsen the lot of the average worker. This activity, he contends, is used as a springboard from which to attack the State. I believe that Evola is right to condemn Marxist interference, but wrong to suppose that the industrial sphere can ever be reformed. In the words of Nietzsche: ‘That which is falling must also be pushed.’ Indeed, the vast majority of our fatcat executives are hardly likely to admit to their shortcomings and start expressing the type of leadership and initiative which Evola believes will transform the very nature of the economy. I believe that Evola is being just as idealistic as the Fascists and the Marxists. The decline of the West is inevitable, and, in terms of having run its civilisational course, will represent the completion of the *Kali Yuga* and thus the very end of the macrocosmic cycle.

But the author does accept that modern companies cannot be truly autonomous within the present economic climate, because ‘no matter how powerful and wide-ranging they are, these companies must deal with forces and monopolies that control to a large degree the fundamental elements of the productive process’. Evola believes that certain restraints have to be placed upon the ruthlessly competitive sharks of international capitalism, but his solution to the problem merely involves increasing the power and authority of the State. He also believes that such a State can be created within a modern context, but thirty years after Evola’s death this seems very unlikely. He also suggests that capitalists should be ‘ostracised’ by the State, but surely this is impossible given that the State itself is little more than an

elaborate front for the interests of Big Business and international finance? Evola's fear of leftist subversion means that he is forced to accept a kind of pallid reformism or – in his words – a 'revolution from above' (a concept not dissimilar to the 'revolution of the centre' proposed by French fascists and elements of the Nouvelle Droite), when in reality he should be supporting the emergence of new centres of Tradition on the periphery. After all, as the Rumanian author Mircea Eliade demonstrated in *The Myth of the Eternal Return*^[2] the founding of new symbolic centres is perfectly in tune with Tradition.

The feudal system is cited as a worthy example of economic autonomy and unitary collaboration between the various complimentary sections of medieval society, although he does suggest that it needs updating so that it can be applied in a modern setting. The overriding atmosphere of defensive perpetuity and the bonds of loyalty which characterised the feudal period are said by Evola to have strengthened both responsibility and decentralisation. Despite the intermittent shortcomings of feudalism, it is pretty hard to deny the fact that it had many worthy attributes. On the other hand, however, Evola still fails to prove that anything remotely similar can be re-established today. At least at the centre and within the current economic system. Likewise, Evola believes that the traditional caste structure can also be reapplied to the modern State: 'The ultimate goal of the corporative idea, understood in this fashion, is to effectively elevate the lower activities concerned with production and material concerns to the plane that in a qualitative hierarchy comes immediately after the economic one in an ascending direction; in the system of ancient or functional castes, this plane was that of the warrior caste, which ranked higher than the merchant caste and the workers' caste.' Up until very recently the caste system was still in operation throughout India (and still prevails in the more rural areas of the North), but modern government legislation has resulted in the lower castes ('Untouchables') receiving positive discrimination and other liberal reforms designed to create the kind of 'egalitarianism' that we are used to seeing in the West. The caste system is a highly complex and functional system and has been around for many thousands of years, but I doubt whether it can be applied to a modern society. Only

by establishing centres on the periphery can traditional methods be realised in the modern world. Evola's comments about caste and hierarchy are extremely valid, but the process of degeneration can never be reversed at the centre.

The author also suggests that a Corporate House of Representatives be created. Not something which is managed in a bureaucratic manner like that administered previously by Italian Fascism, but a system in which everything finds its true level in relation to everything else. At the same time, it 'should not have the traits of a political assembly. It should merely constitute the Lower House; political concerns would be dealt with in an Upper House, ranked above the former'. Again, Evola remains strongly opposed to political interference within the sphere of socio-economic activity. But even his 'Lower House' sounds rather bureaucratic once it is compared to a basic workers' co-operative, although the objective here is obviously to unite all such concerns into a single, unitary whole. Modern-day Libya has a similar arrangement in that its professional, educational and various other categories are united within a series of congresses. Not that Evola would agree, of course, with the fact that real power and authority in Libya's 'state of the masses' emanates from below, rather than from above.

13. OCCULT WAR – WEAPONS OF THE OCCULT WAR

And now we come to one of the most interesting chapters of the book, in which Evola questions whether the various areas of human existence have been affected by higher forces. In other words, by those of the supernatural or occult dimension. The decline of the West, in particular, is said to be a direct result of the hidden forces at work. Evola explains:

The occult war is a battle that is waged imperceptibly by the forces of global subversion, with means and in circumstances ignored by current historiography. The notion of occult war belongs to a three-dimensional view of history: this view does not regard as essential the two superficial dimensions of time and space (which include causes, facts, and visible leaders) but rather

emphasises the dimension of depth, or the ‘subterranean’ dimension in which forces and influences act in a decisive manner, and which, more often than not, cannot be reduced to what is merely human, whether at an individual or a collective level.

This seems clear enough. Indeed, the current of which Evola speaks transcends the governmental domain and concerns the forces which lie far beyond the purely exoteric plane. By ‘subterranean’, Evola is alluding to the fact that such activity takes place not within the human subconscious, but as part of a deliberate plan which has been meticulously formed by capable and intelligent agents of subversion. But this third dimension should not be seen as some kind of ridiculous or convenient fantasy designed to account for the erosion of Tradition, it is a concept which is fully steeped in reality. Catholics regard the decline of traditional values and the onset of liberalism and moral decline as part of a divinely orchestrated process, although Evola believes that such a view need not rely on abstract metaphysics or theology. He cites the Classical idea in which the forces of the cosmos are waged against the forces of chaos: ‘To the former corresponds everything that is form, order, law, spiritual hierarchy, and tradition in the highest sense of the word; to the latter correspond every influence that disintegrates, subverts, degrades, and promotes the predominance of the inferior over the superior, matter over spirit, quantity over quality.’

History undoubtedly has a more secretive side. Indeed, at times it becomes impossible to explain certain aspects in terms of their possessing a basic or fundamental causality. Evola is careful to warn against inventing ridiculous or fantastical notions to account for this more covert analysis of history: ‘The fact that those who have ventured in this direction have not restrained their wild imaginations has discredited what could have been a science, the results of which can hardly be overestimated. This too meets the expectations of the hidden enemy.’ Evola then mentions Disraeli’s well-known Nineteenth century admission, concerning the unseen forces that govern the world and create the necessary conditions for their own pernicious advancement.

This brings us on to one of the most famous – or infamous – documents of all time, *The Protocols of The Learned Elders of Zion*, in which it is alleged that a secret Jewish cabal is intent on world domination. Evola does not defend its authenticity, however, he agrees with René Guénon that secret organisations of this nature are not likely to write everything down in great detail and that – similar to the conclusions expressed in Professor Cohn’s *Warrant For Genocide* – it was probably a Tsarist police conspiracy. But he does go on to say that ‘the only important and essential point is the following: this writing is part of a group of texts that in various ways (more or less fantastic and at times even fictional) have expressed the feeling that the disorder of recent times is not accidental, since it corresponds to a plan, the phases and fundamental instruments of which are accurately described in the *Protocols*’. But what of the contention that the individuals behind the conspiracy are apparently Jews: ‘One of the means employed by the occult forces to protect themselves consists of directing their opponents’ attention towards those who are only partially responsible for certain upheavals, thus concealing the rest of the story, namely a wide sequence of causes.’

Evola also discounts the theory that the conspiracy is being waged by agents of the Judaic religion, particularly as the occult forces themselves inspired the Renaissance, Darwinism and other rationalist developments which fly directly in the face of such principles. The fact that Israeli troops can often be seen battling in the streets of Jerusalem with fanatical Zionist rabbis also demonstrates that the hidden powers cannot possibly be genuinely connected to Judaism. The *Protocols* also allege that Judaism is working in close allegiance with Freemasonry, although Evola only accepts that the foundation of the Grand Lodge of London in 1717 brought it into line with the grand plan of subversion. This is correct. Masons on the European mainland differ significantly from their English cousins and many associated with the Grand Orient look upon Egypt as being the traditional fount of ancient knowledge and wisdom, rather than to specifically Jewish sources. This is reflected in the absence of the Memphis-Mithraim rite from the practices of the Grand Lodge. But at the same time, however, Judeo-Masonry has often been used as a vehicle for global subversion and Evola compares this

process with the regression of the caste system. When the rot gradually sets in at the very top, it tends to infect the whole body and thus sets off a new chain of events. Furthermore, 'regardless of the role played by Jews and Masonry in the modern subversion, it is necessary to recognise clearly the real historical context of their influence, as well as the limit beyond which the occult war is destined to develop by employing forces that not only are no longer those of Judaism and of Masonry, but that could even totally turn against them'.

Using some of René Guénon's ideas, Evola now attempts to examine some of the methods which are used by the global subversives. Firstly, 'scientific suggestion' is used in order to explain history purely in terms of key events being influenced by political, social or economic factors. Secondly, whenever the first method becomes impossible the hidden forces decide to use the 'tactic of replacement' instead. This involves the dissemination of certain philosophical ideas which can be used as a diversion for those events which defy a positivist explanation. It functions as a means of preventing the intellectuals from understanding the true nature of what is really going on in the world. This leads us towards the third strategic category: the 'tactic of counterfeits'. This latter stage is essentially designed to explain away those factors of the conspiracy which unavoidably find their way into the mainstream and cause a backlash. This development, according to Evola, can often take the form of a Traditional reaction to the degeneration of society, although the occult powers then use terms such as 'anachronism', 'anti-history', 'immobilism' and 'regression' in order to counteract this process and thus prevent their enemies from winning popular support.

The fourth ploy is the 'tactic of inversion', in which the enemy concentrates its efforts on attacking the spiritual realm: 'After limiting the influence that could be exercised in this regard by Christianity, through the spread of materialism and scientism, the forces of global subversion have endeavoured to conveniently divert any tendency towards the supernatural arising outside the dominant religion and the limitation of its dogmas.' This means that the individual is encouraged to lose him or herself in shallow distractions such as psychology and

Spiritualism, rather than try to advance in a truly superior and supernatural way. Evola criticises the West's distorted analysis of Eastern mysticism, and the fact that the traditional wisdom of the Orient has often been repackaged within Masonry or Theosophy and forcibly reconciled with Western values. And, due to this process of dilution, it has been easily torn to shreds by the secret denizens of the conspiracy and thus laughably rejected as pure superstition. Another method is the 'tactic of ricochet', through which those sympathetic to Tradition are falsely assured that by attacking the remaining traditionalist structures they are somehow advancing their own cause: 'Those who do not realise what is going on and who, because of material interests, attack Tradition in like-minded people sooner or later must expect to see Tradition attacked in themselves, by ricochet.' Modern States, of course, use infiltration in order to sow the seeds of ideological discord. This can lead to personality clashes, greed and self-advancement at the expense of the very Idea itself.

The sixth category is the 'scapegoat tactic', which results in the targeting of individuals or groups which usually turn out to be mostly blameless. The *Protocols*, for example, may seem fairly accurate when it comes to identifying the Masons and the Jews as the source of all our problems, but to scapegoat people to this extent is misleading and unrealistic. The next step – the 'tactic of dilution' – relates to the use of nationalism as a means of bringing people down to a common level, rather than of restoring true perspective and hierarchy. This process 'dilutes' the traditional components inherent within nationalistic ideas and redirects them in accordance with the objectives of the secret powers. One method is the way in which revolutionary nationalists have eroded all traces of that which preceded their ascending to power, thus helping to bring down the final vestiges of Tradition. Using an example from the psychoanalytical sphere, Evola tells us that

...among those who are capable of a healthy discernment there has been a reaction against the coarsest forms of this pseudo-science, which correspond to pure or 'orthodox' Freudianism. The tactic of dilution was employed again; the formulation and spread of a spiritualised psychoanalysis for more refined tastes

was furthered. The result was that those who react against Freud and his disciples no longer do so against Jung, without realising that what is at work here is the same inversion, though in a more dangerous form because it is subtler, and a contaminating exegesis ventures more decidedly into the domain of spirituality than in the case of Freud.

The next tactic is the ‘deliberate misidentification of a principle with its representatives’. In other words, confusing an idea or a principle with those purporting to represent or advance it. This leads to the defilement or devaluation of the idea itself. Evola’s final evaluation of subversive tactics examines the concept of ‘replacing infiltrations’. This is when an idea or an institution has degenerated so much that it becomes unrecognisable. One thinks of the comparative emptiness of Grand Lodge Masonry when compared to its Grand Orient rival, or the Church of England’s systematic take-over by the organised homosexual lobby: ‘These forces, while leaving the appearances unchanged, use the organisation for totally different purposes, which at times may even be the opposite of those that were originally its own.’

Evola’s solution to this multifarious problem involves a Traditionalist awakening during which its most devoted adherents realise the extent to which the battle is being waged on the occult plane. However, he also accepts that we do not presently have the men capable of fighting this disease.

14. LATIN CHARACTER – ROMAN WORLD – MEDITERRANEAN SOUL

The historic tendency of the Italian people to react with hostility towards Germanic culture is dismissed by Evola as a ‘misunderstanding, for the most part caused by stereotypical phrases and superficial ideas’. The Italians, of course, prefer to depict themselves as being distinctly Latin and Mediterranean. Evola – in a similar manner to that of Benito Mussolini before him – questions the very idea of the Latin character, suggesting that it relates more to art and literature than race. Evola prefers the phrase ‘Romanic element’, since it has a much wider base and is formed by the Classical

populations and languages which comprised the Roman Empire. Therefore the Empire itself includes the Germanic peoples, too. But whilst Evola is correct in this sense, it is also true that the Romans themselves are obviously extremely indebted to the Ancient Greeks and borrowed many of their ideas. So it can, therefore, be said that Rome was actually forged from Hellenic civilisation. Evola then goes on to deplore the revival of the neo-Classical element during the Renaissance period, something which – he believes – led to the celebration of the Graeco-Roman world's most degenerative stage rather than its earlier Age of Heroism.

The Latin peoples are not that distinct from their Germanic neighbours at all. The language and racial characteristics of the Mediterranean peoples, for example, are both derived from Indo-Aryan origins: 'A heroic-sacred world that was characterised by a strict ethos, love of discipline and of a virile and dominating spiritual attitude.' The tide of anti-Germanic feeling that engulfed the post-Roman world was propagated by the Catholic Church and its hatred for the Ghibellines and, soon afterwards, by the rise of Luther and Calvin. However, Evola points out that 'in Germany, despite its being mostly Protestant, the feelings of order, hierarchy, and discipline are very strong, while in Italy, despite its being a Catholic country, all this is present to a negligible degree, while individualism, disorder, instinctiveness, and lack of discipline tend to prevail'. He goes on to suggest that, from a Faustian perspective, unlike a German an Italian would even be prepared to retract his agreement with the Devil. This is certainly a very frank admission coming from an Italian, but it does demonstrate that Evola's Germanophile brand of imperial Tradition completely transcends the petty squabbles which have dominated Europe for so many centuries. Many of Evola's countrymen, it is argued, despised the German-Italian Axis which came to pass during the Second World War: 'All these people can be happy again, now that Italy has returned to itself – the petty Italy of mandolins, museums, "O Sole Mio", and the tourist industry (not to mention the democratic quagmire and the Marxist infection), having been "liberated" from the difficult task of forming itself on the inscription of its highest traditions, which must be described not as "Latin", but as "Roman".'

The book then switches its attention to one of the greatest taboos of our age: that of Race. Evola is not interested in biological racism, he notes that several more races exist within each general category; be they Black, Yellow or White: 'These elementary races are defined in terms that are not merely biological and anthropological, but psychological and spiritual as well. To each of the racial components there correspond various dispositions, forms of sensibility, values, and views of life which are also differentiated.' Evola disputes the fact that individuals belong to the same one race, explaining that each contains differing strengths and weaknesses. In Germanic peoples it is the Nordic element which seems to occupy the highest rung of the ladder, something echoed by the Roman type among the Italians. So Evola is basically suggesting that within each individual there is a dynamic spark which is derived not from biological sources but from a more spiritual tradition. Therefore the fact that racial nationalists seek to incorporate all individuals within one solid bloc goes completely against the traditionalist worldview. Individuals of the same 'race' are markedly different, regardless of the seemingly common ancestry which has been attributed to them by Nineteenth century scientists and modern geneticists. In the midst of this racial conglomeration, of course, lies the substance of the New Man. It is he who epitomises the most superior quality of all.

One inferior facet which Evola believes to be detrimental to the superior Roman spirit, is the Mediterranean type. But what does the term 'Mediterranean' actually mean? The author tells us that it 'merely designates a space, or a geographical area in which very different cultures and spiritual and racial powers often clashed or met, without ever producing a typical civilisation'. So, unlike the Roman spirit, it can be said that the 'Mediterranean' concept never came to fruition in any meaningful sense. Furthermore, he says: 'Psychologists have tried to define the Mediterranean type, not so much anthropologically, but in terms of character and style. In these descriptions we can easily recognise the other pole of the Italian soul, namely negative aspects likewise found in the Italian people, that need to be rectified.' Evola then refers to the excitable persona, the sexual promiscuity, the vain exhibitionism and the gesticulative hot-bloodedness of the

Mediterranean type, something quite unlike the ‘anonymous heroes’ of Rome. Herein, perhaps, lies the fundamental difference between the Actor and the Act: ‘The best model to follow would be that of the ancient race of Rome – the sober, austere, active style, free from exhibitionism, measured, endowed with a calm awareness of one’s dignity.’ The Roman spirit, therefore, is rather akin to the Indo-Aryan concept of nobility. The Mediterranean soul, on the other hand, has a ‘tendency towards a restless, chaotic, and undisciplined individualism. Politically speaking, this is the tendency that, after asserting itself by fomenting struggles and constant quarrels, led the Greek city-states to ruin’. The solution, according to Evola, is to awaken amongst the Italians a truly Roman – rather than Mediterranean – *ethos*. This, he believes, will occur ‘in almost organic terms at the end of dissolutive processes’.

15. THE PROBLEM OF BIRTHS

This chapter deals with population growth. Evola postulates the view that reducing the population would help us towards ‘a relaxation and a decongestion that would limit every activist frenzy (first among them, those that pertain to the overall power of the economy) and greatly propitiate the return to normalcy, thanks to a new, wider, and freer space’. The Anarchist thinker, Richard Hunt, believes that such a reduction can be achieved through implementing methods of birth control and thus lead us towards a more natural society, although, given the eventual collapse of internationalist capitalism, such a process would surely happen naturally in the wake of widespread conflict and famine. Evola, on the other hand, believes that ‘nothing is done about the population explosion, because then man would have to act upon himself, his prejudices and instincts’. But he also criticises the purely materialistic analysis as espoused by Malthus, because the worst thing about population growth is not the increasing scarcity of resources but the acceleration of production and the rampant capitalist economy: ‘The result is an increasing enslavement of the individual and the reduction of free space and of any autonomous movement in modern cities, swarming as though in putrefaction with faceless beings of “mass civilisation”.’ Evola explains that there is no safety in numbers,

a slogan that has become one of the watchwords of the modern epoch. Successful empires, he argues, arise not from population growth but from the intuitiveness and ability of an elite minority. Furthermore, geographical locations which find themselves subject to a large-scale increase in population soon run contrary to natural order: 'The fact is that the inferior races and the lower social strata are the most prolific' and inevitably leads to 'a fatal involution of the human race'. Evola goes on to explain that the movement of peoples for the purposes of cheap labour – such as that presently taking place among those economic migrants currently flooding into the British Isles – means that 'the fatal effects will be inner crises and social tensions representing manna from heaven for the leaders of Marxist subversion'. No wonder, therefore, that we constantly see the likes of the Socialist Workers Party campaigning on behalf of these so-called 'refugees'.

At this point Evola launches a fierce broadside against Catholic opposition to birth control. He denies that procreation – which, in his opinion, is derived from Jewish sources – should have a religious or theological dimension, and believes that the Church is being hypocritical when it comes to encouraging the use of the sexual urge to create life: 'In every other instance besides sex, the Church praises and formally approves . . . the predominance of the intellect and will over the impulses of the senses.' Indeed, Catholicism does tend to relegate the act of sexual union to the level of an animalistic act which is considered necessary for procreation. Abstinence and celibacy, says Evola, are far more in tune with asceticism and the pursuit of the supernatural. At this stage in the debate, Evola has not even mentioned the use of contraception or abortion, so I would therefore agree with his alternative conclusions about the more sacred nature of chastity. Birth control, he argues, is a bourgeois concept and the New Man 'by adopting an attitude of militant and absolute commitment, should be ready for anything and almost feel that creating a family is a 'betrayal'; these men should live sine impedimentis, without any ties or limits to their freedom'. This approach certainly makes sense, but I also feel that there is a strong case for the perpetuation of the New Man through the foundation of alternative, revolutionary-conservative families which live in accordance with Tradition. Evola – inspired by Nietzsche's idea

that ‘men should be trained for war and women for the recreation of the warrior’ – may indeed dismiss such a process as being little more than a form of ‘heroism in slippers’, but such families can also act as a beacon and a source of inspiration for those warriors who remain unbound. Evola has considered the idea of elitist families, without doubt: ‘The example of those centuries-old religious orders that embraced celibacy suggests that a continuity may be ensured with means other than physical procreation. Besides those who should be available as shock-troops, it would certainly be auspicious to form a second group that would ensure the hereditary continuity of a chosen and protected elite, as the counterpart of the transmission of a political-spiritual tradition and worldview: ancient nobility was an example of this.’ However, he remains very sceptical and considers the revival of such an idea utopian because it would be difficult for a father to have control over his offspring amid the turmoil of the West. This is very true, but the increasing success of home-schooling in both America and the British Isles does prove that it is realistically possible to build a network of alternative families who reject the materialism of the West itself.

Evola’s solution is based upon the destruction of the egalitarian ideal and, perhaps more surprisingly, of adopting an open mind towards the possibility of a third world war. Any future conflict which is waged on such a vast scale would inevitably reduce the population, of course, but I believe that with the increasing collaboration taking place between the West and its subjugated puppet-states abroad, our real hope lies in the gradual disintegration of the internationalist system on the periphery. This process of detaching the children from the nanny, for better or for worse, will undoubtedly lead to the biggest death-toll the world has ever seen. Indeed, it will not be invoked by birth control programmes or inspired by government policy, it will actually lead to the removal of government itself.

16. FORM AND PRESUPPOSITIONS OF A UNITED EUROPE

According to the author, support ‘for a united Europe is strongly felt

in various milieus today. It is necessary to distinguish where this need is upheld on a merely material and pragmatic level from those situations in which the issue is posited at a higher level, emphasising spiritual and traditional values'. Given the huge attention that the idea of a united Europe has attracted during the last few decades, this chapter should be of interest to a great many people. During the period in which this book was written, Europe was entrenched in the Cold War and firmly divided between the superpowers of the USA and USSR. Evola, therefore, believes that – despite its decidedly economic agenda – the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) was a logical development. Evola then pours scorn upon the ideas of Jean Thiriart who, during his lifetime, sought to create a European empire of more than 400 million people. Thiriart arrived at this figure by including the populations of Eastern Europe, which at that time were under Soviet control. According to Evola, the fact that the Communist economies of Russia and China have an influence upon the outcome of any militaristic strategy renders the whole plan obsolete. The solution, says Evola, is firstly to withdraw from the United Nations (UN) – which, perhaps, is easier said than done – and then to reject the Soviet Union as much as America. Again, we are talking about the situation which existed during the period in which Evola wrote the book. Today, of course, we find ourselves on the verge of a one world government controlled solely by the USA and its closest allies. So how, exactly, does Evola propose that a united Europe be achieved in a profoundly traditional sense?

The way ahead must rely upon a completely organic strategy. Not a nationalistic myth orchestrated by fascists, but something 'which would generate a unitary impulse and an elan that in European history – let us admit it – finds scant antecedents'. Indeed, it is undoubtedly a fact that the history of Europe is one of division and conflict. Evola continues: 'What should be excluded is nationalism (with its monstrous appendix, namely imperialism) and chauvinism – in other words, every fanatical absolutisation of a particular unit.' Therefore the future European empire must replace the obsessive petty-nationalism which has plagued our beleaguered continent for so many centuries. In fact as we have already seen, the very idea in which both 'unity and

multiplicity' were nurtured did previously exist in the medieval period. The empire was a transcendental concept which refused to become involved in the political realm, concentrating its efforts upon the representation of an ultimately spiritual power and authority. It was a dynamic form of organic federalism; a flowing stream in which all fish were happy to be swimming in the same direction. Whilst nationalism always results in fragmentation, the coming *imperium* must lead to a unitary order of solidarity: 'The integration and consolidation of every single nation as a hierarchical, united, and well-differentiated whole. The nature of the parts should reflect the nature of the whole.' Evola believes that a stable centre will result in the increase of regional, linguistic and cultural diversity at the grass roots. Unlike the present democratic EC infrastructure which is centred in Maastricht, however, Evola's model of European unity relies upon authority from above rather than from below. Democracy itself, he believes, should be erased from the face of Europe. A new focus or point of reference must also come into being, one which, in previous centuries, was represented by the monarchy. It must be spiritual in nature, too, although, unlike Christian Europe during the Middle Ages, it should both permeate and involve all nations. It must also, he contends, exclude non-Europeans, although in the present day and age there is a lot to be said for the ideas of Alexander Dugin and his belief in a Eurasian alliance. The new centre, on the other hand, cannot be constructed purely around what is commonly known as 'European culture': 'Goethe, von Humboldt, and all the other representatives of a sophisticated culture should be paid high honours, but it would be absurd to believe that their world could supply an arousing and animating strength to the forces and revolutionary elites that are struggling to unify Europe: their contribution belongs to the mere domain of a dignified "representation", with an essentially historical character.' On the contrary, Europe also has much to be ashamed of. And neither is the solution designed to create a European bloc to rival America, Africa or Asia, because Europe itself has influenced these continents to such an extent that it now risks becoming part of a globalised world. A positive manifestation of European unity was demonstrated by the various regions from which the soldiers of the SS were recruited during the

Second World War, although it remains a great pity that their efforts were so misguided and self-destructive. Evola warns us that ‘a European action must proceed in parallel with the rebirth and the revolutionary-conservative reorganisation of the individual European countries: but to recognise this also means to acknowledge the disheartening magnitude of the task ahead’.

The road to the new European imperium, Evola says, must be undertaken by two groups. Firstly, he proposes that we should attract the remaining families of the ancient nobility: ‘who are valuable not only because of the name they carry, but also because of who they are, because of their personality’. Secondly, it is necessary to create a warrior caste: ‘These men harbour a healthy intolerance for any rhetoric; an indifference towards intellectualism and politicians’ gimmicks; a realism of a higher type; the propensity for impersonal activity; and the capability of a precise and resolute commitment.’ Evola accepts that such an Order presently remains leaderless, but the removal of the political class and a defiance of the modern world is an imperative. He concludes his work by saying that we now require men who, ‘in spite of it all, still stand upright among so many ruins’.

^[1] Princeton, 1991.

^[2] Inner Traditions, 1995.

^[3] See *Eumeswil*, Quartet, 1993.

^[4] Oxford University Press, 1991, p 73.

^[5] *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Chatto & Windus, 1960, p 524-5.

^[6] *The Green Book*, Tripoli, 1977, p 11.

^[7] Princeton, 1991.

PART III:

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

FROM SACRIFICE COMES VICTORY

THE task we have set ourselves is a great one. The fight for race and nation – the renewal of the bond between blood and soil – is a cause that gives us a great sense of purpose and destiny. And yet, for those who are called to this fight in the immediate future, we can only offer a long and difficult road which is often characterised by disappointment and pain.

Due to the fact that the path of the revolutionary is so difficult, many who join us simply fall by the wayside, unable to live up to the ideals. Such people inevitably cite a multitude of reasons for dropping out; from family problems to the fear of being ‘exposed’ as a National-Anarchist. But behind the excuses lies just one reason: the fact that they are not prepared to make even the smallest of sacrifices within their own lives to help us gain victory. Needless to say, we can well do without such people. In place of people such as this we seek a new type of individual, someone who is prepared to put his or her ideals before anything else. Here is the mark of a true revolutionary; an activist in the unselfish service of race and nation. And rest assured, never has our vision been in greater need of such individuals.

In this modern era the concept of sacrifice is anathema to virtually everyone. Modern man laughs at the idea of sacrifice. He proclaims: ‘If I do a job I want paying for it. I never do anything for nothing.’ Such a man has no understanding of higher ideals and knows even less about how to fight for them. It is because of such people and their selfish egocentrism that our civilisation is in such decay.

One notable exception to this decline in idealism is that given to us by Hamas fighters waging a war of liberation in Jewish-occupied Palestine and, in particular, the men within their ranks who are prepared to die for their beliefs. Such heroism in the face of overwhelming odds is inspired. It shows us that the concept of personal sacrifice in pursuit of a political goal is not dead. It also shows that where such an ideal is harnessed and used it becomes a deadly force that cannot be beaten. Zionist Jews know all about the consequences of

Hamas Martyrdom and, make no mistake, they fear it.

If we are to win then we must follow such an example, an example born of purity of thought and action. We must endeavour to go down this road because it is the only road that will lead us to victory. Our ideals must inspire in us the same level of dedication and fanaticism; they must give us the same inner strength which breeds invincibility. Only if we can achieve this will we become a force capable of confronting and beating our enemies.

In working towards this aim there are two immediate goals that must be achieved by everyone. Firstly, we must not be like other men and women, people who are solely the product of corporate advertisers, media propagandists, the liberal agenda and the materialist ethos. We must set ourselves apart and become true followers of the revolutionary way. Only when we are ideologically free of the System can we attack it with the clarity of vision needed to defeat it. Secondly, our goal must be to fight. Always to fight. If we are fighting, then we are winning. If we put down the sword, then we have already lost. This fight demands loyalty and it demands commitment. If we are not prepared to give our blood, sweat and tears then we will achieve nothing. There will be no advance and no victory. Nothing is more certain.

The ideal of sacrifice is not new. We revolutionaries have been pushing both it and the relationship between sacrifice and victory for a number of years. But whilst in the past these words seem to have fallen on deaf ears, they are now being taken seriously by dedicated revolutionaries. It is testimony to the strength of the National-Anarchist revolutionary that after all the betrayals and sell-outs of recent years, there has emerged a new mode of dedicated and dogged fanaticism. It is in this atmosphere, cleansed of compromise, that the possibility exists for moving the revolutionary cause into a new and more threatening position. For the sake of our future communities and their people the opportunity must be seized.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

THE INEVITABILITY OF DEPOPULATION

REDUCING the population is one of the central planks of our decentralist strategy and it is only right that we thrash out the details of this plan between us. However, there appears to be a problem. Thus far, none of us have satisfactorily explained just how we intend to carry out such a process.

In the last issue of *Alternative Green*, Mike Shankland^[1] expressed his concern that – despite being in favour of cutting the population – it may be difficult to achieve this objective ‘without compromising’ the rest of our programme. In his seminal text, *To End Poverty: The Starvation of the Periphery by the Core*,^[2] Richard Hunt tells us that ‘in Britain there are about 33 million acres of farmland, excluding rough grazing. There are about 58 million people, about half an acre per person’.^[3] He also calculates that ‘a family needs about 8 acres to be self-sufficient. That means Britain could support a population of about 15 million self-sufficiently, without exploiting anyone else’.^[4] However, whilst Richard is correct to point out that cutting the size of the political unit is futile if no attempts are made to reduce the population, I believe that such a reduction is inevitable and, therefore, something which will happen naturally as part of an all-encompassing cosmological master-plan. Indeed, when during a recent telephone conversation I asked Richard to elaborate upon his theory, he put forward one or two additional examples of how to reduce the population; namely, cutting child benefit for the rich, opposing immigration, discouraging large families and offering support for abortion and contraception. Whilst I personally reject both abortion and contraception due to the fact that I believe them to be contrary to the Natural Order, I would go even further and suggest that all attempts to achieve political, social and economic decentralisation by reforming the present system are doomed to failure. Quite simply, it is out of our hands. Let me explain further.

According to the Revolutionary Conservative thinker, Oswald Spengler, human cultures and civilisations are purely organic in nature.

Even more important is the fact that all great empires, civilisations and historical peaks are transitory and both grow and wither in accordance with the remorseless march of Time itself. In the words of Spengler, ‘The great cultures accomplish their majestic wave-cycles. They appear suddenly, swell in splendid lines, flatten again and vanish, and the face of the waters is once more a sleeping waste.’^[5] The Italian philosopher, Julius Evola, remarks upon this process when comparing American civilisation with that of Europe. Indeed, whilst America is far younger in terms of the fact that European civilisation has been around far longer than its more arrogant cousin, Evola believes that America is already in the final stages of decline: ‘The structure of history is however, cyclical not evolutionary. It is far from being the case that the most recent civilisations are necessarily “superior”. They may be, in fact, senile and decadent’.^[6] Edward Gibbon says much the same thing in *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*: ‘The demise of Rome was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness. Prosperity ripened the principle of decay; the cause of destruction multiplied with the extent of conquest; and as soon as time or accident had removed the artificial supports, the stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure of its own weight. The story of its ruin is simple and obvious; and instead of inquiring why the Roman Empire was destroyed, we should rather be surprised that it had subsisted so long’.^[7] So what has all this to do with reducing the population?

My basic contention is that International Capitalism will eventually overreach itself with disastrous consequences, and, just like the seemingly indestructible civilisations of Egypt, Greece, Rome and the British Empire, is destined to come crashing down like the proverbial house of cards. In other words, attempts to reform the system will only prolong the inevitable demise of the system itself. Furthermore, whilst being very gradual in nature (allowing the most pragmatic individuals to pool their resources and create fresh alternatives on the periphery) the penultimate collapse of the bureaucratic core will have devastating effects on population levels. The State will become an irrelevancy and its disappearance will be followed by famine, disease and internecine conflict. Richard Hunt’s ‘grubby utopia’ will seem like a breath of

fresh air once the local mafiosi, drug barons and criminal opportunists have taken advantage of the situation. Amidst burnt-out cars, empty factories and the smouldering ruins of the newly-slain technocracy, the dazed hunter-gatherers who remain will count their lucky stars that they got out whilst there was still time. Returning to Spengler:

At this level all civilisations enter upon a stage, which lasts for centuries, of appalling depopulation. The whole pyramid of cultural man vanishes. It crumbles from the summit, first the world-cities, then the provincial forms and finally the land itself, whose best blood has incontinently poured into the towns, merely to bolster them up awhile. At the last, only the primitive blood remains, alive, but robbed of its strongest and most promising elements.^[8]

The population of the British Isles will not be significantly reduced either by halting immigration or by implementing a series of reforms pertaining to birth control. On the contrary, mankind is part of a perpetual cycle which is ultimately determined by extraneous powers beyond our control, although this should not cause us to shirk our responsibilities. According to Evola: ‘It is typical of a heroic vocation to face the greatest wave knowing that two destinies lie ahead: that of those who will die with the dissolution of the modern world, and that of those who will find themselves in the main and regal stream of the new current.’^[9] Under the circumstances, therefore, the best that we can do is to prepare for the inevitability of this fact.

^[1] *The Population Problem*, pp. 8-9.

^[2] *Alternative Green*, 1997.

^[3] p. 201.

^[4] *Ibid.*

^[5] *The Decline of the West*, Munich, 1926, p. 73.

^[6] ‘American “Civilisation” in *Further Thoughts of Julius Evola*, The Rising Press, 2001, p. 18.

^[7] Chatto & Windus, 1960, p. 524-5.

^[8] p. 251.

^[9] *Revolt Against the Modern World*, Inner Traditions, 1995, p. 366.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

MERITOCRACY: THE RULE OF THE ELITE

. . . the mission of all governments, monarchical, constitutional, or republican, is to protect and maintain by force the privileges of the classes in possession, the aristocracy, clergy and traders.

– **Peter Kropotkin**, *Law and Authority*

Anarchy is a form of government or constitutions in which public and private consciousness, formed through the development of science and law, is alone sufficient to maintain order and guarantee all liberties . . . The institutions of the police, preventative and repressive methods, officialdom, taxation etc, are reduced to a minimum . . . monarchy and intensive centralisation disappear, to be replaced by federal institutions and a pattern of life based upon the commune.

– **Pierre Joseph Proudon**, *Selected Writings*

ACCORDING to *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*, meritocracy is defined as ‘government by persons selected according to merit’. In other words, meritocracy may be described as a system in which only those most suited to the task of leadership have a recognised authority. However, unlike the present democratic system, this particular method of authority is not enshrined in the contractual laws of mankind but in the irrevocable laws of nature.

By seeking to obscure the inherent differences between individuals, groups and races through a systematic programme of ‘egalitarianism’ and the inordinate championing of the weak, democracy itself represents a highly detrimental threat to the normal and healthy development of people throughout the world. Furthermore, it is nothing other than the disorderly rule of the common mob and is a major hindrance to the abilities of the most able. In the real world, people are fundamentally different and have natural stations in life. Although liberalism is chiefly responsible for attempting to force the most able members of society to live, work and study side by side with those of a

lesser ability and lower horizons, Capitalism is also an impediment to the natural order of humankind through the imposition of its parasitical class structure. So whilst on the one hand we are told to accept that the most anti-social elements are our brothers and sisters, on the other many of us are unable to rise to our natural level due to the greed and repression of the pseudo-aristocratic ruling class. In an attempt to decipher the complex nature of our personalities, some have argued that human development is shaped purely by the manner and the environment in which we are raised, contesting that – given the opportunity of an ‘identical’ upbringing – the road sweeper is capable of rising to the intellectual level of the scientist or the philosopher. Whilst this may be true in some cases, especially given the more favourable educational advantages conferred on the sons and daughters of the ruling Establishment, it remains a fact that individual human development is overwhelmingly determined by genetics. This is the single most important biological characteristic of any human being and, whilst the Nature vs. Nurture debate is sure to rage on for many years to come, when all is said and done individual ability has far more to do with racial origins than social circumstances. That said, under Capitalism a parasitical minority is permitted to prosper at the expense of those whom – in a more natural society – would be in charge of their own destinies and not held subject to the professional moneylenders by the paid mercenaries of the police and armed services. So whilst the Left seeks to obscure the healthy spirit of natural human endeavour and confine us all to the lowest possible level, the Right seeks to prevent us from becoming a threat to the bacterial gangsters who, through force of arms, reserve the highest echelons for themselves.

Government in a natural sense, therefore, would involve the participation of the most able and not representation by the purely treacherous and self-seeking. In the past, some of us in National-Anarchist circles have campaigned for a meritocratic form of government known as Popular Rule, a system chiefly espoused by Muammar al-Qadhafi in *The Green Book* (Tripoli, 1977). Under this arrangement, the will of the people is expressed through a series of street, area and regional councils, culminating in a national committee of delegates. However, given that society will eventually fragment in

accordance with the gradual demise of Capitalism it would be ludicrous to suppose that we could ever hope to establish any kind of administrative system on a national scale. But this is not the only reason for our change of tact. On the contrary, when we come to form our own pockets of resistance in line with our National-Anarchist objectives, we will have absolutely no intention of living amongst or sharing power with those who do not share our vision. Power is a means to an end, and, by conferring it upon the desensitised masses – most of whom are riddled with materialism and only out for themselves anyway – we would be throwing pearls before swine. Our communities will be maintained by and for National-Anarchists, so, given that Popular Rule is a decidedly meritocratic system, it will be reserved for those who have earned it. Unlike the present democratic system, which raises the voice of the uninformed majority above that of truth, common sense and justice, within our communities issues contrary to the Natural Order such as abortion and homosexuality will be non-negotiable. If those outside of our boundaries wish to live by such precepts, then so be it. On the other hand, if at any time such people become a threat to the internal stability of our own areas they will be dealt with accordingly. As far as contact between those areas populated by National-Anarchists is concerned, we are in support of a federal union of independently maintained areas which – if necessary – can work together in either a defensive or offensive capacity.

But Popular Rule will not represent a form of government in the current sense of the word. Our variant of Popular Rule will be entirely stateless and more akin to Traditional Anarchy than that currently being propagated in countries like Libya and others. In fact as Richard Hunt has observed, the overall trend in society is one of decentralisation and as a result small communities have no need for governmental structures because, after all, ‘the specific object of government was to take from the many and give to the few’.^[1] Similarly, John Pfeiffer^[2] has noted that a natural, organic society has no need for policing practices until the population has exceeded more than 500 persons. This is because 500 is considered to be the maximum number of people that any one person could possibly know. So, as Richard Hunt explains, although our society would inevitably ‘have a

natural peck order . . . those at the top could not demand obedience of the others'.^[1] Obedience to an ideal, certainly, but not to a dictatorial overlord as has been the case up to now. When we talk of meritocratic leadership, therefore, we are referring to self-rule by an elite; in this case, due to its diminutive size, the localised community. Given that those who are most pragmatic will have forged the best communities, it logically follows that by this time the most pragmatic beings will have joined with and sought to live amongst those of a similar type. And without a statist institution or an accompanying police force to control or monitor the inhabitants of such communities, of course, it would be possible to achieve freedom in the truest sense.

^[1] *To End Poverty: The Starvation of the Periphery By the Core*, Oxford, 1997.

^[2] *The Emergence of Man*, Harper Row, 1972.

^[3] *The Natural Society: A Basis for Green Anarchism*, Oxford, 1994.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

THE CASE FOR NATIONAL-ANARCHIST ENTRYISM

WE have suggested entryism as a means of revolutionary agitation in the past, most notably in *Revolutionary Action: A Booklet for the Cadre*.^[1] Here I will seek to further elaborate on this tactic and provide National-Anarchists with a few guidelines which may help them in the future. It does not compromise the security of our current operations, because at this stage nobody has the slightest clue about what we are really up to. Furthermore, of course, we hope that it will encourage others to join us.

We have made no secret of our dissatisfaction with the tactics of most racial separatist organisations in this country; in fact it is clear to us that the farcical manner in which they approach political action is merely bringing us closer to the day when we are completely defeated. Up until now, groups of this nature have indulged in electioneering and street activism like paper sales, postering, stickering and leafletting. Our thoughts on electioneering are already fairly well known, but there is still a place for street activism. Indeed, intelligent street propaganda can lead to very effective results. The problems begin whenever we come to rely on these methods as our sole means of political agitation. There are two reasons why this is so. Firstly, it beggars belief that some people can be so utterly naive as to think that revolution will come from plastering the streets with stickers and posters and that by some miracle the populace will rally to our cause. Anyone who has been active for any significant period of time will know how ridiculous this is. Secondly, it is precisely because the State has cut off (or rather thinks that it has cut off) all other avenues through which we can get our message across to a wider audience that nearly all activists have been forced into relying upon the dead-end practice of disseminating posters and stickers. The State is perfectly happy to let us indulge in such activity, because it knows how little we can gain from such a strategy. Indeed, if this kind of activism was ever considered to be a real threat to the State then it would have been banned immediately.

National-Anarchists are not prepared to let the State dictate which activities we can or cannot pursue. We realise that potentially, at least, we could well become the subjects of widespread State repression and that it is becoming increasingly difficult to operate, but instead of becoming pessimistic or defeatist all that is required is a little more intelligent thought. Standing back and taking stock of the situation can often help to overcome some of the most seemingly impracticable difficulties. And one of the most useful solutions we have at our disposal is entryism.

Entryism is the name given to the process of entering or infiltrating bona fide organisations, institutions and political parties with the intention of either gaining control of them for our own ends, misdirecting or disrupting them for our own purposes or converting sections of their memberships to our cause.

This tactic has already been used successfully by the Militant Tendency in Liverpool, which managed to gain control of the Labour Party in that city and ended up effectively running Liverpool itself. Decades of postering and paper sales will not get us into that position and, if we continue down the road of street activism alone, at best we shall recruit a decent activist from time to time in order to replace those who retire or drop out. In effect, we will retain our current strength. It is also possible that we could decline to a position where it is no longer viable to continue the struggle. Entryism, therefore, is vital for the continuation and longevity of our cause and from it comes the only possible chance of victory. Look at it this way: much of what passes for the Far Left has no viable ideology, it has nothing to say and its ideas are completely unworkable. Yet it has influence. This influence is partly due to organisational strategy. On the other hand, we have good ideas and very little influence whatsoever. This can only be the result of poor tactical organisation and weak strategy. Therefore what is required is an adoption of the kind of strategy which, up to now, has been used by the Left.

So how do we pursue entryism? Firstly, it takes the right kind of person or group to engage in this kind of work. What we require are intelligent individuals who are familiar with National-Anarchist ideas and look the part. Normally, these people would be under the direction of a more experienced cadre, but this is not essential as long as they know what they are doing. Not everyone is suited to this kind of work, however, because individuals who have a high profile or a past history of street activism must be excluded. People who have blown their cover, so to speak, are really no use to us in this regard. Secondly, the target organisation must be chosen very carefully. The way to do this is to choose any number of active organisations in a given locality and visit them all over a period of time, if possible with different activists. It is often the case that individuals already active with one organisation will also be members of a number of other groups in the area, and we do not want to draw attention to ourselves at this early stage. Once the information has been gathered, you will know which organisation has the most potential.

So what are we looking for? Any organisation with a weak, apathetic or elderly leadership. An organisation that has a youth section or youthful membership; groups that contain middle-aged, middle-class or self-satisfied individuals are no use to us. What we need is an organisation that has idealists, people motivated by ideology and an organisation that has – or could have – some form of influence, given the right leadership, in the community.

Once the target has been chosen, get one or two people to join through the usual channels (membership forms, invitations to meetings, etc). Appear keen, but not over keen. Show interest. If you are asked to do anything then do it diligently, work hard. Be courteous, pleasant, cultivate relationships and make friends. By all means have an opinion, but keep your politics to yourself. Let some time elapse, perhaps six months or a year, and then get more of our people to join. You were already friends, so it will not arouse suspicion when you associate together. You will take the credit for bringing extra people on board and increasing the organisation's membership. Leave it for another six months, possibly more, and then begin to turn up the heat.

Single out those individuals who may be more sympathetic towards National-Anarchist ideas and start to work on them. Slowly, quietly and with a degree of subtlety. Do not arouse suspicion, make friends with those concerned and arrange to meet him or her outside of the organisation's own events. Make them part of our group without them even knowing who we are. Flatter them, buy them drinks, make them feel welcome, but keep your politics to yourselves. Let some more time elapse and then start to increase the heat even more. Start to criticise the target organisation, perhaps you can pick out something with which the membership is clearly not happy. Do this within your own group. Get one of our people, maybe even two, to argue against you so that no suspicion is aroused. Don't let the person or people you are working on think that you are in league with one another, but make sure that your 'opponents' eventually capitulate and come over to your side of the argument.

This is the most important part of the whole operation. It is hard and takes a lot of time, so be very patient. Don't rush it, stay calm and just take your time. Persevere. Slowly, quietly, try to expand the group. Make more friends and get even more of our people to join. You are beginning to get noticed, there are a few of you now and some of the other members may begin to wonder what is happening. Just relax. There is nothing going on and you're all friends working for the same cause. Nobody realises who you really are or what you actually represent. If possible, try to get some of our people elected to the steering committee. Get them into positions of responsibility. See if you can become the treasurer. But don't push too hard too fast. It must seem like a natural process.

Go as far as you can by cultivating friendships and relationships. How many people we have at this stage will dictate just how successful the final outcome will be. Now is the time to decide which way you want to go with the organisation. You may wish to settle with what you have or try to attain a position of power from which you can gather information. You may feel that some of the people you have been working on can be recruited to the cause of National-Anarchism itself, if this is the case then attempt to recruit them. If you are successful and the target organisation has nothing left to offer, simply move on to somewhere else.

There may be another scenario. It may be the case that the organisation you have joined has no immediate potential and you may not be able to have any influence or get anything from it. Even so, it may be an organisation that we need to have an influence in as it may well play a vital role in a revolutionary situation. If this is the case then you must stay in and persevere, only becoming active for our own cause when the time is right. We are preparing for the future. The goal is long-term and we must get people into society's institutions right now.

Another option could be a public defection. If you have managed to work your way up into the hierarchy of an organisation and have a few people around you with some influence, it could be the case that a very public defection either by you or your group to National-Anarchism would be very beneficial. We achieved this in 1997, when the two main organisers in the Burnley branch of the British National Party (BNP) came over to the English Nationalist Movement (ENM) and brought several West Yorkshire activists with them. Imagine the media scrum that would occur if a local councillor or politician left in order to join the ranks of National-Anarchism. The more respected the individual concerned, the more damage it will cause to the Establishment. And it is usually the case that if one prominent individual defects, he or she will bring many others with them.

The final option is the most exciting and has great potential. It is that of attempting to take over, from within, the organisation which you have targeted and then recruiting it in the service of our own agenda. If such an organisation has influence within the community or even power over it, we will find ourselves in a position of great strength.

The first step is to form a faction, a fighting propaganda group within the target organisation. Pick an ideological line that is in tune with our own position and which attacks the current position of the organisation and, most importantly, is an idea or set of ideas that are seen to be just and to which people can rally. The methods to use are leaflets, bulletins, meetings, open debates, talks and social gatherings. Once the faction has been formed the momentum must be kept up and you must move quickly. The target organisation's leadership will be alarmed and, sooner or later, they will have to act in order to stop you. Fight back. Get the youth on your side, openly attack the current leadership, intervene in their meetings, heckle them, upstage them. When you have won enough people, call on the membership to oust the leadership and replace it with our own people. These will be our first victories. This is entryism. This is revolutionary action. The organisation is now in our hands and we can do whatever we like with it.

It must be understood that if we are to improve the fortunes of National-Anarchism in this country and elsewhere, the strategy outlined in this article is one that we must pursue and begin immediately. There are no barriers for us. There are no organisations or institutions that we cannot enter. Some might say that we should avoid the enemy and stay away from those over whom it has influence. No. We target them all. The enemy has always done likewise and has never hesitated when it comes to destroying or undermining us. We must now set about destroying and undermining them. It is the case that many organisations currently dominated by both Left and Right simply need turning away from their present ideology and setting on the National-Anarchist path. This is work that we ourselves must do. Even if we can't win them to our cause we can still get in amongst them and mess them up. Up until now we have always tried to fight the enemy overtly, but no longer. We must crush them from within.

The State fears nothing more than an organised current of insurgency that can use its head. Currently, groups like the BNP and NF are using the political means which have been prescribed for them by the State itself. Indeed, whether it be the ridiculous sham of electioneering or the part-time hobbyists trapped in a dead-end cycle of street activism, the State can easily cope with them and always will. The British Establishment has had thirty years experience in Ulster to work out the methods it will use against subversives on the mainland. We know that the ballot box has nothing to offer us. We know that we cannot presently use freedom fighters to liberate our land, so therefore we must forge a new way.

This new way is entryism, working within society's institutions and organisations with committed revolutionaries. At this stage in our development, it is the only logical course of action. In the long-term, it is the only possible road to victory.

[\[1\]](#) The Rising Press, 1995.

CHAPTER TWENTY

ORGANISING FOR THE COLLAPSE

THE State has been heavily preoccupied with establishing alleged links between ‘far right extremists’ and proto-terrorist activity for many years. There was John Tyndall’s well-publicised japes with the Spearhead training group during the 1960s; Tony Malski’s fictitious plot to bomb the Notting Hill Carnival; the involvement of *Searchlight* agent-provocateur, Dave Roberts, with Column 88 during the early 1980s; and the National Front’s non-existent collaboration with Arab terrorists in 1988.

The fact that there remains little or no truth in any of these orchestrated assumptions does not necessarily mean that racial separatists have been successful in avoiding the dangerous and incriminating trappings of paramilitary activity; it simply illustrates the fact that we have not done enough to clarify our position with regard to this highly controversial topic. As a revolutionary current, any consistent failure on the part of National-Anarchists to deal significantly with this issue would be totally inexcusable. It is time to assess the modern climate and modify our strategic approach accordingly.

The first question we must ask ourselves, is whether conflict between National-Anarchists and the State is inevitable? I have already dealt elsewhere with the futility of the ballot box and the electoral tactics of organisations like the British National Party (BNP), but is our own alternative of organic growth within the community really enough? It is a fact that community action initiatives can lead to the creation of a new social, political and economic order which can actually undermine the old regime. Indeed, once we cease to rely upon its bureaucratic institutions the State will become increasingly superfluous to our requirements and eventually be swept aside. But is this really enough?

Recent developments leave us with little doubt that the ruling class will employ the full militaristic might of its extensive and highly-trained armed forces in order to deal with any threat to capitalism’s

ongoing exploitation of the people. Those who fail to perceive this fact have no right to be involved in the anti-capitalist struggle, and that includes activists and supporters throughout the whole left-right spectrum. It is obvious that the clandestine forces behind the super-rich global empire will never relinquish their immense power and influence without a fight to the death. Creating a counter-culture or, indeed, a counter-power structure alongside the existing system is a basic necessity, but looking at current trends realistically, there is to be no peaceful or purely political solution to the multifarious ills of modern society.

So if conflict does seem inevitable – at least for those of us who have not managed to found our own communities elsewhere – what form is it likely to take? The answer to this question cannot be instantly culled from a revolutionary's pocket catechism; we are clearly not in control of the future direction of society at this stage and must simply approach each situation as it comes along. On the other hand, the scenario most likely to affect England's largest towns and cities will be one of chaos and disorder. As more and more people are classified, identified, categorised and basically regarded as non-consuming denizens of a growing underclass, it seems fairly certain that these outsiders will constitute the new revolutionary bedrock from which we shall carve our resistance to the machinery of the repressive State.

Multi-racialism is going to play a large part in the disintegration of the societal fabric, a fabric that was never going to be woven together by the liberal agents of 'political correctness' and 'positive discrimination' in the first place. Blacks will side with Blacks, Asians with Asians and – faced with increasing economic hardship and criminal activity – whites will seek protection, solace and respect amongst their own kindred. It will always be the case that chaos inadvertently contains the redeeming elements of sanity and redemption, and this unifying spirit will engender a common identity and enable people to pull together and fight back.

This scenario is not designed to sound romantic or over-dramatic, it is a realistic interpretation of how National-Anarchists will emerge from the ruins of capitalist society. The *petit bourgeoisie* can have their

barbecues, their satellite television and their fitted kitchens for now, but they had better make the most of them. The black clouds of war are beginning to gather overhead as England begins to enter its death-throes, and it is up to us to prepare the way for victory during the inevitable conflict that will undoubtedly ensue. But where do we begin?

The means for the preparation of revolutionary combat already exist, and are there to be exploited. Let's examine three areas into which National-Anarchists should be integrating themselves with the specific intention of gleaning some vital knowledge for the future:

1. Physical Fitness: The materialist age has undoubtedly led to an increase in human vanity and an egotistical search for 'the body beautiful', but at least both the facilities and the opportunities for physical development have increased accordingly. This country has thousands of sports centres, track and field associations and gymnasiums, and there is no reason why National-Anarchists cannot use such places to improve themselves physically. Whilst the masses sit in front of their television screens, stuffing their faces and belching intermittently between mouthfuls of rancid kebab, we must embody the age of the Warrior and the New Man. If you are unfit, then do something about it. Stop smoking; cut down on excessive drinking; try to eat the right food; find out how you can join other National-Anarchists on camping or hiking weekends; and, most importantly, stay active. To be healthy in body, of course, is to be healthy in mind.

2. Self-Defence: The individualistic, dog-eat-dog mentality of capitalism has almost extinguished the final vestiges of neighbourliness and respect that remain. The violent and the deranged think nothing of stabbing or shooting somebody in the street for the price of an ounce of cannabis, and in many areas neither young nor old can walk the streets without fear of attack. For women, children and the elderly, the situation is considerably worse and rapists, child molesters and other sociopaths find it easy to prey upon the weak and vulnerable. But once again it is possible to counteract this trend by improving oneself in terms of getting to grips with self-defence and unarmed combat. Whether it is kung-fu, judo or kick-boxing, learning the basic skills of self-defence is a prerequisite for the coming age of struggle.

As society continues to crumble, we will have to form vigilante groups and police our own communities. Social disintegration leads to a growth in gangland activity and one only has to look at countries like Russia and Albania for examples of how a major economic catastrophe can lead to organised crime. When the time comes, it may be necessary to secure food, electricity and water supplies, and we must control the streets in order to defend ourselves, our families and our property.

3. Further Activity: If revolutionary activists are forced to defend themselves and their families from the faceless mercenaries of the State – and this includes the police, army, landlords, tax collectors, bailiffs etc – then they must become familiar with the means to do so. It is worth noting that if you can spare one evening a week and just one weekend every month, then why not join the Territorial Army (TA)? The TA pays its volunteers the same rate of pay as a regular soldier, so by taking advantage of the situation you can actually be paid and trained by the State to deal with its consequences.

These three options are not suitable for all National-Anarchists and we have always maintained that we can incorporate differing attributes within our flexible range of interests. However, all able-bodied people should think very seriously about improving themselves in one way or another. The outcome of these initiatives cannot be foreseen, but as England steadily decomposes amid the gradual collapse of liberal democracy, none but the most organised and prepared will arise in triumph to restake their claim amid the shattered ruins.

PART IV:

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

THE SYMBOLIC & PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CENTRE

OUR preoccupation with the significance of the Centre has lasted for millennia. One thinks of the legends of Agartha and Shambala or the fantastic stories of French novelist, Jules Verne. There is nothing quite like a fresh start or new beginning and our ancestors frequently expressed this desire to wipe the proverbial slate clean, so to speak, by creating unique cosmological points of spiritual convergence. For Wodenists, of course, the Irminsul or World Pillar is the central mainstay of our North European heritage and the key to all Nine Worlds of the Yggdrasil. Indeed, Charlemagne and his Papist minions knew all about the vast significance of the Irminsul and even went so far as to chop down a mighty Saxon oak long considered to represent the exact Centre of the Wodenic cosmos. But there have been many such centres around the world and even right here in England we have several locations which each claim to mark the sacred Centre of our land. These include Midland Oak at Lillington, an old stone cross in the Warwickshire village of Meriden, Royston in Hertfordshire, Banbury Cross in Oxfordshire, the Cross Shaft at Dunstable and, during the Roman occupation, the High Cross at Venonae. All seem to fulfil the rough geographical requirements discussed by John Michell in *At the Centre of the World: Polar Symbolism Discovered in Celtic, Norse and Other Ritualised Landscapes*,⁴ but surely the fact that we have a whole plethora of sacred Centres implies that the vast majority are fraudulent and that only one Centre can be truly genuine? On the contrary, this view is incorrect because there can be hundreds – nay, thousands – of potential Centres, as I hope to demonstrate during the course of this article.

The similarities between our native Anglo-Saxon mythology and the comparatively more ancient aspects of Indo-European spirituality, most notably Hinduism and Buddhism, have already been explored elsewhere. For most people, however, anything which emanates from the East is instantly viewed with suspicion or perceived as being totally at odds with the European mindset. But prior to these religions being

taken on by Asiatic peoples, they were deeply Aryan in character and therefore remain part of our collective psyche. Indeed, whilst most contemporary religions are little more than profane expressions of a much more significant and enduring Tradition, there are important cross-over points where the myths and legends of each suggest a series of common or unitary origins. In academic circles, the study of these points of reference is known as comparative religion, with the world's leading expert being the Rumanian scholar, Mircea Eliade.

The Centre & Symbolism

In *The Myth of the Eternal Return*^[2], Eliade discusses the architectonic symbolism of the Centre. This includes sacred mountains like Mount Meru in Hindu legend, the Mount of the Lands in Mesopotamia and Mount Tabor in Palestine, all of which denote the Centre of the world. There are holy palaces and temples like those in Ancient Babylon, which were connected with a divine monarch and actually mirrored the cosmos. Finally, there is what is known as the *axis mundi*, or place where the heavens above meet with the earth below in a kind of supernatural intersection. But at the root of all these interpretations is the notion that the universe or, perhaps, certain aspects of the universe, are being reflected on the earth. Not as a token brick-to-lego imitation, but in terms of actually recreating and reconstructing the divine.

Indeed, Eliade refers to this as the 'repetition of the cosmogony', which means that the divine is actually becoming manifest on a smaller scale. The macrocosm in the microcosm. As above, so below. Once again, not as a worthless simulation, but as a supernatural display of fidelity and perpetuation. In other words, every time this process takes place the actual Creation of the world is repeated once again at that very moment. It's rather like the difference between the Catholic and Anglican churches, in that, for the Catholics, each time they celebrate Mass it is suggested that Christ actually appears right there on the altar and that it is a direct repetition of the events at the Last Supper. But whilst I am not prepared to discuss the accompanying shortcomings of Christianity here, we know only too well how Catholics have appropriated certain aspects of Tradition for themselves and this is just

another example of the primordial undercurrent that I mentioned above. Sometimes, of course, it is possible to detect or unearth Traditional fragments within the realms of the spiritually profane, but it is essential for readers to grasp the fact that creating new Centres – if done properly – is an act worthy of the Gods themselves. Eliade continues:

The Centre, then, is pre-eminently the zone of the sacred, the zone of absolute reality. Similarly, all the other symbols of absolute reality (trees of life and immortality, Fountains of Youth etc) are also situated at a centre. The road leading to the centre is a ‘difficult road’, and this is verified at every level of reality: difficult convolutions of a temple (as at Borobudur); pilgrimage to sacred places (Mecca, Hardwar, Jerusalem); danger-ridden voyages of the heroic expeditions in search of the Golden Fleece, the Golden Apples, the Herb of Life; wanderings in labyrinths; difficulties of the seeker for the road to the self, to the ‘centre’ of his being, and so on. The road is arduous, fraught with perils, because it is, in fact, a rite of the passage from the profane to the sacred, from the ephemeral and illusory to reality and eternity, from death to life, from man to the divinity. Attaining the centre is equivalent to a consecration, an initiation; yesterday’s profane and illusory existence gives place to a new, to a life that is real, enduring, and effective.^[3]

This process must involve a divine model, or archetype: ‘We must do what the Gods did in the beginning’.^[4] The creation of the Centre itself is a ritualised pursuit of cosmological unity and balance.

The Centre & Wodenism

As Wodenists, therefore, we are interested in creating new Centres in accordance with our Anglo-Saxon Gods and Heroes, but the Primordial Tradition, like a perennial flame, continues to burn deep in our folk-memory and can help us in the quest to rediscover the esoteric symbolism that still dwells within the collective unconscious. In Hinduism there are three gods of the Trinity (*Trimurti*), two of which are Shiva and Vishnu. The third, being Brahma, is the god of creation and rides a White Swan. He is shown with four heads, each bearing a

different face. I don't intend to discuss the myths surrounding Brahma here; suffice it to say that Brahma – as an Aryan archetype – does still have an important bearing on the creation of a new Centre for our English folk. After *Ragnarök*, of course, there will be four key gods involved in the process of leading us into a new Golden Age. These will be Wōden's son, Widar the Silent, who will avenge his father's death by ripping apart the ferocious jaws of the Fenrir Wolf; his brother, Wali, who was responsible for the death of Hödur; and Thor's two sons, Módi and Magni. I believe that these are the four aspects of re-creation as expressed in the multi-headed symbolism of Brahma. Meanwhile, the important task undertaken by Widar, Wali, Módi and Magni will be to re-create a new Centre in the wake of much chaos and destruction. The four aspects of Brahma will become manifest as the four conquering heroes of Asgard and will go on to replenish the Nine Worlds and create a new social order in Midgard. Their role is clearly more vital than ours, but the Brahma symbolism inherent in the Widar-Wali-Módi-Magni quartet can be useful when creating new Centres that essentially mirror the post-*Ragnarök* era in a realistic, practical and ritualistic sense.

The Centre in Practice

Some authors have laid out the basic principles of the Cosmic Axis Rite. There is no difference between this and Eliade's 'repetition of the cosmogony'. Firstly, however, it is necessary to create some magical space for yourself by consecrating a specific area in which you intend to work. The name for this area is a Ve and the ritual is best performed outdoors at either a sacred site or a place of personal significance where you won't be disturbed. You are about to make a circle in which to perform the more important rituals later on. Nigel Pennick's ever-useful *Rune Magic*^[5] suggests using holy water taken from a sacred well, some incense and a rune-staff, but rather than cover exactly the same ground as Nigel Pennick I will simply encourage you to obtain the aforementioned book for yourself and thus concentrate on the Wodenist ritual which involves the creation of a new Centre.

Once you have purified the Ve, or magical space, you should grasp the runic wand or staff in your right hand and imagine that you are

enclosed within a circular force-field. You should be able to feel the power of Ond, or Divine Breath of Life, coursing through your body. Now conjure up in your mind the four transcendent 'Grail' runes of the Anglo-Saxon Futhark, namely Cweorth (fire-twirl), Calc (chalice), Stan (stone) and Gar (spear). Remembering the four symbolic faces of Brahma or, in this case, of the four surviving Gods of *Ragnarök*, you must now create the Cosmic Axis that will form the Centre.

1. Face North, raise your staff and visualise the Gar rune whilst saying the following:

Great Widar, hooded hero of Ing-Land, who slew the Wolf Fenrir and took unto himself the revived essence of the Allfather, be our protector in the North. The Gar will become our Spear of Destiny.

2. Now turn East and focus on the Stan rune whilst saying:

Great Wali, son of Rinder, who slew Hödur the Blind and thus avenged the death of Baldur, be our protector in the East. The Stan will reveal our destiny.

3. Then face South and think about the Calc rune:

Great Módi, embodiment of Anger and son of Thor the Giant-Slayer, be our protector in the South. The Calc will spur us on in our quest.

4. Finally, turn to the West, concentrate on the Cweorth rune and say:

Great Magni, embodiment of Strength and Bearer of Mjölfnir, be our protector in the West. The Cweorth will be our Guiding Light.

When you have completed this magical ritual, gently lower your rune-staff and bring it to rest on the ground beside you. At this stage you have not merely consecrated the Ve, you have gone on to re-create your own Centre. This is the 'repetition of the cosmogony' and a mirror-image of the re-creative activity that will take place in the wake of *Ragnarök*. The Wodenist magician now stands at the very heart of the Universe. It matters not whether he or she is physically, mathematically or geographically at the Centre; the Cosmic Axis Rite

is a transcendent method that places man completely outside of time and space. Eliade explains:

As the first step, the ‘reality’ of the site is secured through consecration of the ground, i.e. through its transformation into a centre; then the validity of the act of construction is confirmed by repetition of the divine sacrifice. Naturally, the consecration of the centre occurs in a space qualitatively different from profane space. Through the paradox of rite, every consecrated space coincides with the centre of the world, just as the time of any ritual coincides with the mythical time of the ‘beginning’. Through repetition of the cosmogonic act, concrete time, in which the construction takes place, is projected into mythical time, *in illo tempore* when the foundation of the world occurred. Thus the reality and the enduringness of a construction are assured not only by the transformation of profane space into a transcendent space (the centre) but also by the transformation of concrete time into mythical time.^[6]

Our ritual, of course, is based on the re-creation of the worlds after *Ragnarök*, but there is nothing to prevent us from performing the same process in repetition of the original Wodenist creation at the beginning of the world. The characters will be different, naturally, but the objective will be the same. I shall leave you with these words from John Michell:

The essence of an individual, one’s centre and citadel, is the mind. But it is not the ultimate centre, and if you think it so you are properly called self-centred and a solipsist. In that case, life’s greater realities pass you by.^[7]

^[1] Thames & Hudson, 1994.

^[2] Princeton, 1954.

^[3] Ibid, p. 18.

^[4] *Satapatha Brahmana*, VII, 2, 1, 4.

^[5] Aquarian, 1993.

^[6] Ibid pp. 20-21.

^[7] John Michell, op. cit., p. 7.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

BEACHY HEAD & THE NEGATION OF THE SOLAR

LIKE an indomitable testimony to the tragedy of man's self-destructive nature, the chalk headland of Beachy Head in East Sussex has long been viewed as a gruesome epitaph for those wishing to dispense with life itself. Beachy Head has acquired near-cult status in modern times and was used for the cover of an Industrial album released by Throbbing Gristle and for the final scene in the film *Quadrophenia*, but today the Samaritans charity has even set up a special cliff-top telephone in the hope that potential suicides will be deterred from taking the 530-foot plunge onto the rocks below. But what is it about the area that, in many cases, still causes large numbers of people to travel great distances in order to end it all so dramatically? The obvious answer is that the huge descent will guarantee a swift death with little or no chance of survival. But if this is the case, then why is it that more suicides don't simply throw themselves off high city buildings? What is it about the Eastbourne area that they find so inextricably magnetic?

I use the word 'magnet', not as a convenient metaphor, but simply because this is the way it actually works. Indeed, running directly through the centre of Beachy Head is an ancient ley line. Often known as 'dragon lines', these link together various geographical sites of interest and function as a kind of magical energy grid. It was Alfred Watkin's *The Old Straight Track* (1921) which brought ley lines to the attention of the public for the first time, although they have also been discussed in the fictional works of Alan Garner (see *The Weirdstone of Brisingamen* and *The Moon of Gomrath*). Two German researchers, Wilhelm Teudt and Josef Heinsch, demonstrated at the famous Externsteine rock formation close to the Teutoburger Wald in Lower Saxony, that these holy lines – or '*Heilige Linien*' – were indeed coursing through the natural geography of Northern Europe like sacred markers to our primordial spiritual heritage. But whilst the purveyors of the burgeoning New Age movement are keen to 'prove' that ley lines have some kind of internationalist dimension, the significantly more astute John Michell notes that 'leys and megalithic alignments are generally confined to a limited area, reflecting the local rather than

national organisation of Neolithic farming societies’.^[1]

The ley line that runs through Beachy Head is the Andraste. This begins at the North Downs in the Basingstoke area and carries on southwards across Old Winchester Hill and Petersfield before arriving in East Sussex. Once it gets to the South Downs, the Andraste goes down into the beautiful Cuck Valley and along the meandering Cuckmere river before arriving at Beachy Head itself. Two millennia ago, of course, most of southern England was covered by the Andraste Wald forest. Andraste is a fertility goddess usually associated with the hare and the name of the Andraste Wald still endures today in the modern Sussex place-names ‘Ashdown’ and ‘Weald’. In fact the famous warrior queen, Boudicca, invoked Andraste in her struggle against the Roman occupiers back in the First Century:

‘Let us, therefore, go against [the Romans], trusting boldly to good fortune. Let us show them that they are hares and foxes trying to rule over dogs and wolves.’ When she had finished speaking, she employed a species of divination, letting a hare escape from the fold of her dress; and since it ran on what they considered the auspicious side, the whole multitude shouted with pleasure, and Buduica, raising her hand toward heaven, said: ‘I thank thee, Andraste, and call upon thee as woman speaking to woman’.^[2]

It’s rather curious that Andraste is connected with the pursuit of hares and foxes, because when people feel desperate enough to want to end their lives they are inevitably running away from something. One can imagine the burden of life snapping at the heels of a potential suicide all the way down to Beachy Head, before the tragic figure is rudely discarded like a biological waste product from the proverbial bowels of our land. But as I aim to show here, the ley line itself – based, as it is, on the cult of a goddess – represents a spiritual inversion that still assails the beleaguered psyche of our folk. It is precisely this negative ‘Earth’ energy that we need to counteract in order to create a sense of balance and perspective.

The Italian philosopher, Julius Evola (1898-1974), wrote a brilliant work centred on the divisiveness and discord that underpins the

contemporary age. But his *Revolt Against the Modern World* ^[3] deals not only with the chaos of the present, it also concentrates on the Golden Age of Tradition. Evola contrasts the Heroic and Solar qualities of our original Hyperborean existence with those of the Lunar and Uranian age in which we currently find ourselves. The cycle of decadence and a gradual decline of race and caste saw the Hyperboreans leaving their ancestral lands in the wake of the Polar shift and travelling to parts of America and southern Eurasia. These conquering races were the last pure Aryans and founded both the civilisations of the Incas and Mayans, as well as that of Ancient Egypt. Since then, however, the rise of Southern races and civilisations has resulted in a degeneration of the original stock. Evola tells us that these civilisations were based on the cult of the Mother (Divine Woman) and influenced by earthly, telluric forces that revolve around the symbolism of water and serpents. This degeneration was the beginning of the Silver Age and the Aryans became mixed with the Negroid, Lemurian elements who worshipped the yellow moon (Lunar); itself a pale inversion of the golden sun (Solar). The Southerly races essentially have primordial chthonic roots, completely at odds with our own masculine-based Tradition.

Another Italian writer, Camille Paglia, has pointed out the vast differences that exist between the Solar and Lunar aspects.^[4] As far as Paglia is concerned, the Solar is the expression of the male Apollonian who gives shape to the formlessness of the earth. The Apollonian principle can be found in the direction of the male ejaculation or during the process of urinating, both of which arc upwards, towards the heavens. Meanwhile, the feminine or Dionysian principle can be seen in the way that women give birth or urinate close to the ground. The Apollonian represents the straight lines of geometry and architecture, whilst the Dionysian is all about the nature-based curvaceousness and voluptuousness of the female form. In Ancient Greece (Hellas) this was symbolised by the struggle between Apollo and the Python. The gradual encroachment of the Cthonic is exactly why maternalistic societies came about and why our present society has been indelibly stamped with the mark of effeminacy. Evola includes the demise of the warrior-king and the coming of democracy as chief factors in the attempt to

make the virile, heroic male something of the past.

But what on earth has all this got to do with Beachy Head? I believe that the Andraste ley line is a channel of negative energy that essentially helps to bring about the demise of our people by enticing them – like an invisible siren – towards their physical and spiritual destruction. The vast majority of suicides, of course, are people who have no place in the modern world. Wodenism is a Solar tradition that rejects the maternalistic tendency. Not because it is afraid of feminine expression like the Judaic, Christian and Islamic religions; on the contrary, the important roles of goddesses such as Frigg and Freya are well-known. The problem is that the Lunar or Cthonic religions create an imbalance between the male and female principles. Authors such as Helena Blavatsky (*The Secret Doctrine*) and Miguel Serrano (*Nos: Book of the Resurrection*) have touched upon the relevance of the Cosmic Egg, a unitary and idyllic state of being at the dawn of the universe when the masculine and feminine principles were combined and therefore complementary to one another. The Goddess cults of the New Age movement, on the other hand, are designed to castrate the male once and for all and to sow division between the sexes. Not merely in a political sense, through feminism, but more importantly by eroding the Primordial Tradition and bringing upon us the *Kali Yuga* or Age of Iron.

We have already established that the energies of the Andraste ley line are Tellurian in nature, but what does that really mean? The word ‘Tellurian’ comes from the Latin *tellus*, meaning earth, and represents far more than a useful form of terminology to describe the Southerly, Lunar and Cthonic forces. There is also such a thing as a ‘Tellurian current’ which flows underground through the sea. This takes the form of an electrical charge emanating directly from the Earth’s crust and is caused by changes in the Earth’s magnetic field. This is why the word ‘magnet’ was not intended as a metaphor. Tellurian currents are a scientific phenomenon and are influenced by the way the magnetosphere shields the Earth from solar winds. On the one hand, of course, this could be interpreted as a positive thing, but on the other hand, the denial or suppression of the Solar could be part of a wider

cosmological strategy to facilitate the rise of the Tellurian current itself. Wind, of course, is also connected with the power of Woden. In the world of fiction, meanwhile, Umberto Eco's novel, *Foucault's Pendulum*, also mentions this Tellurian current, with the Knights Templar striving to tap the hidden properties of these secret energy flows in order to control the destiny of the world.

We certainly need to do a lot more research into these matters, but it is interesting to note that another key ley line exists in the same area. Close to Beachy Head is the Alfriston ley line, which unites sacred sites at Alciston, Alfriston and Friston. Running from north-west to south-east along a seven-mile intersection, the Alfriston ley takes in a range of important burial sites, including two sarsen stones at Alciston, an ancient cross-roads near the river Cuckmere, Hollow Hill ('hallow' = grave) at Alfriston where 150 Anglo-Saxon graves were found in 1912, the 'Alfriston Stone' set into a garden wall beside the local post office, and a stone pillar known locally as 'the Cross Stone'. Another four sarsen stones can be found at nearby St Andrew's Church, from which a local dowser – Colin Bloy – was able to detect eight concentric bands of flowing energy. This went down the southern aisle of the church, over the church wall and through the 'Cross Stone' mentioned above. During the Medieval period, local villagers also saw four oxen sitting back to back on the nearby mound in the shape of a cross. John Michell's *The View Over Atlantis*^[5] also mentions an animal mural in the church which depicts St Catherine as a dragon. The image of the dragon, of course, is synonymous with ley lines. The Alfriston ley continues through a long barrow close to the village of Litlington, through Friston Forest and on to Friston church. The nearby Star Inn also has dragon iconography on its walls and there are rumours of an underground passage stretching three miles to the sea. The pub also houses a carving depicting two serpents with their tails entwined, which could be interpreted as the symbol of Aquarius. A second carving shows two animals climbing a caduceus, which is the ancient symbol of the Greek god of healing, Asklepios. Contrast the healing nature of this symbol and the underground passage to the sea at Friston, with the immediate death and destruction at Beachy Head. According to Cornelius Agrippa, the caduceus also symbolises the transportation of

Mercury, ‘the quicksilver deity that hovers over the straight tracks and standing stones’. The symbolism, therefore, is decidedly Solar, and even the pub sign, with its yellow sun-star, fulfils this trend.

To conclude, I strongly believe that Beachy Head is one of the most negative points in the British Isles and that something quite cataclysmic is taking place beyond the gaze of the ordinary masses. We have long known that an Occult War is taking place on this historic island of ours and the only way that we can counteract this process is by re-energising the more authentic points which concord with our spiritual and psychological heritage. The Alfriston ley is perhaps our salvation in this regard and it does seem as though this relatively unexplored centre of positive energy can provide us with an alternative to the decay and degeneration of the Andraste line. This matter will be explored in future works. But meanwhile, it is time to raise the banner of the Northern Sun against the Lunar-centred darkness that envelops our land.

^[1] From *At the Centre of the World: Polar Symbolism Discovered in Celtic, Norse & Other Ritualised Landscapes*, Thames & Hudson, 1994, p 109.

^[2] Dio Cassius, *Roman History*.

^[3] Inner Traditions, 1995.

^[4] See *Sexual Personae: Art & Decadence From Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson*, Yale University Press, 1990.

^[5] Ballantine Books, 1972.

PART V:

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

INTERVIEW:

Q: I am afraid that I am starting this interview with a possible prejudgement, that of having radically opposed aims and conceptions, but this is a position that, in the end, will only guarantee our objectivity. Going back in time and remembering the first years of your political activism, what can you tell us about your initial motivations, ideas and the personal history that made you into the well known traditionalist and anti-Capitalist thinker of today?

TS: I was born and raised in Crystal Palace, South London, and come from a typical working class background. My mother was just sixteen when I was born, so I am part of a very young family. She eventually became an auxiliary nurse, whilst my father earned the qualifications to become a chartered surveyor. Apart from being very patriotic in a purely instinctual sense, I did not show a great deal of interest in politics or philosophy as a youngster, although I did vote for the Labour Party shortly after my eighteenth birthday in the mistaken belief that it was somehow capable of overthrowing Margaret Thatcher's dominant Conservative Government and heralding a new age of social justice. However, by 1984 I was attending a Bad Manners concert in Croydon, Surrey, when a friend introduced me to several members of the local National Front (NF). I was rather cautious, to say the least, and would never have described myself as a 'racist'. Consequently, I joined the NF because I found myself in agreement with two main principles: Popular Rule and Distributism. The former is a socio-political system based upon Muammar al-Qadhafi's *The Green Book* (1977), advocating the establishment of a decentralised area and regional committees in accordance with the authority of the people. The latter is an economic current which was originally started by Hilaire Belloc (*The Restoration of Property*, 1936) and G. K. Chesterton (*The Outline of Sanity*, 1926), two giants of English literature who converted to Catholicism and forged their unique alternative to Capitalism and Marxism from the key papal encyclicals of Leo XIII (*Rerum Novarum*, 1831) and Pius XI

(*Quadragesimo Anno*, 1931). My acceptance of the NF's more prominent stance on racial separation developed much later, although by this time I had accepted that the universe is governed by a Natural Order and, therefore, that multi-racialism was – and remains – disastrous for the whole of humanity. This belief was further strengthened by my conversion to Catholicism in 1987, a decision which had been partly inspired by Douglas Hyde's *I Believed* (1950) and Chesterton's *Orthodoxy* (1959). Another major ideological figure in my political and spiritual awakening – and one well known to readers of *l'Ecole Europa* – was Corneliu Codreanu, a man whose selfless crusade against Judeo-Communism has already inspired several generations. Others were William Morris (*News From Nowhere*, 1890), Robert Blatchford (*Merrie England*, 1893), John Jenkins (*Prison Letters*, 1981), William Cobbett (*Cottage Economy*, 1821) and Otto Strasser (*Germany Tomorrow*, 1940).

Q: The tumultuous and revolutionary beginnings of the 1990s found you in the position of a conservative Catholic, being strongly involved with the circle of Final Conflict and the International Third Position. How were those times and how were they manifested within you?

TS: When the official NF began its penultimate demise in the Autumn of 1989, the International Third Position (ITP) seemed to be a logical response to the irrepressible personality differences which had torn the NF leadership apart. After serving an eighteen-month prison sentence for my involvement in a street battle with the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) in Brighton, I became a leading ITP organiser, being responsible for writing, producing and publishing a variety of regionalised publications like *The Kent Crusader*, *Surrey Action*, *Eastern Legion* and *Catholic Action*. At that time, the ITP appeared to be the legitimate heir to the National Revolutionary movement in the British Isles, although the lies, dishonesty and political hypocrisy of individuals such as Roberto Fiore and Derek Holland soon led to a major split in the ranks of the organisation. At this time, the ITP's present magazine – *Final Conflict* – had only just been conceived and the aforementioned publications (including *Northern Rising*) were

under the control of those of us who eventually left to form the English Nationalist Movement (ENM) in September 1992. Thus, whilst our departure absolutely decimated the ITP it also saved many worthy and committed individuals from becoming pointlessly embroiled in crypto-fascism.

Q: The decision of departing from Derek Holland's crew and the ITP did come almost inevitably. What were the real motivations behind this act? Personal conflict, the apparent dogmatism of the ITP, or what else?

The ITP completely turned its back on the true principles of Revolutionary Nationalism and had begun to adopt a position of reactionary clerical-fascism. Indeed, this was perceived as a major step backwards and whilst both myself and the various other radicals within the group were trying to promote a form of patriotic socialism amongst ordinary people on the streets, our opponents on the Right were rediscovering figures such as Mussolini, Pétain and Franco. This attitude was chiefly a result of the organisation's emerging tendency to adopt a more overt expression of Catholicism, but this became a great embarrassment to those of us who were trying to advance the principles of Revolutionary Nationalism in a more gradual and organic sense. Indeed, whilst the majority of us were doing most of the real work by selling in excess of thirty magazines door-to-door every night and organising various pickets and demonstrations, self-appointed 'leaders' like Roberto Fiore were courting French, Spanish and Italian neo-Nazis and lining their pockets by exploiting travelling students who were charged an absolute fortune to live in squalid and decrepit bedsits in West London. These problems were eventually compounded when Derek Holland and Roberto Fiore stole thousands of pounds in property from ordinary ITP activists who had invested their savings in the group's disastrous rural project in Northern France. Unsurprising, several years later it emerged that these converted farm buildings were collectively up for sale in the name of Fiore's wife.

Q: A surprising decision came with your renunciation of Roman Catholicism, a symbolical gesture which was seen as a betrayal and a blasphemy by third positionists and conservative Right-wing

nationalists.

TS: My decision to reject Traditional Catholicism and, inevitably, The Society of St. Pius X, was a personal decision. If my judgement has upset anyone in conservative circles then that is their problem. The Catholic Faith was extremely dear to me at one time, but I saw with my own eyes the deep-set bigotry amongst those who consider themselves the occupiers of the moral high-ground. For most people this attitude soon develops into conceit and bigotry. Those who spend their time moralising to others should find time to look into their own hearts. I have seen Catholics leave the confessional and, within five minutes, begin ranting or gossiping about others. One of my closest friends has remained a Traditional Catholic and there is no conflict between us whatsoever. We simply respect one another's personal beliefs. When all is said and done, of course, it is the individual who has to face the consequences of his or her own actions. The ITP, for example, may seem respectable when they are kneeling in the pews amid grey-haired widows and unsuspecting priests, but it is they who will have to answer for their duplicity, deception and false piety. But this is simply one perspective. I would gladly have stifled my growing disgust and even endured a whole army of self-satisfied Catholics if assured of my place within the heavenly scheme of things, but I was slowly becoming exposed to a variety of new and exciting influences. One such current was Mithraism, the Roman sun cult which had almost eclipsed Christianity during the fourth century and become the world's chief religion. But I was not about to replace one form of monotheism with another; on the contrary, my interest lay not in personal conversion but in the historical and theological considerations which marked the struggle between Mithraism and Christianity. After studying works such as Franz Cumont's *The Mysteries of Mithra*^[1] and D. Jason Cooper's *Mithras: Mysteries and Initiation Rediscovered*,^[2] I soon came to realise the extent to which Catholicism had blatantly plagiarised the ritualistic and liturgical trappings of its Mithraic adversary. For many years, of course, I had chosen to ignore the fact that many Christian feast-days were deliberately engineered to obscure the traditional pagan festivals which had long preceded them. As far as I was concerned, this latest revelation became the straw which finally broke the camel's

back. This process helped to remove the blinkers from my eyes and I have been exploring the spiritual alternatives ever since.

Q: Your views on the Living Tradition of Europe seem to contradict with the scholastical Christian views of the First Fathers and philosophers, your own philosophical system being closer to a certain neo-pagan culture. Why is this radical position necessary, to split Europe's Tradition between the Christian and the Heathen?

TS: I don't view things in this fractured context at all. I must admit that when I first rejected monotheism I did approach cosmological matters from a fundamentally 'heathen' or non-Christian perspective, but I suppose that I was pretty used to evaluating the universe in a systematic fashion and therefore I rather reluctantly embraced the 'pagan' epithet because it appeared to represent everything outside of Christianity itself. Three or four years later, however, I am more inclined to search for evidence of Tradition within a whole multitude of esoteric categories, be they Catholic, Gnostic, Sufi, Hermetic, Yogic or Cabbalistic. Tradition is an underlying current which both permeates and transcends all.

Q: As we understand, you no longer support the Catholic Church, but it still cannot be said that you are a heretic. I know that you also studied Theology for some time. Which are the most important ecclesiastical figures, Holy Fathers or Saints that you still appropriate in terms of your current ideas?

TS: I am descended from the famous Scottish clan of Maclean, whose Catholic luminaries include the last two abbesses to serve on the Isle of Iona and the more well known St. Columba. I still find myself inspired by a vast range of Catholic figures, but the main problem I have is with the rigid dogmatism of the Church itself. At one time, the mere suggestion that Catholicism was not completely perfect would trigger a series of tiny alarm bells in my head. Nowadays, however, I prefer to look at certain saints or particular events in isolation. But not in order to detach them from what I consider to be a much wider Tradition, but simply because it is easier to study given examples of mysticism and the miraculous without them being quantified or

tarnished by religious stricture. I believe that the Church has consistently approached the supernatural in one of two ways; indeed, when it is not burning people at the stake it is claiming them for its own. Joan of Arc and St. Francis, for example, are but two mystical figures with whom the conscience of the Church has been forced to wrestle. Catholics will argue that the Church is God's representative upon earth, but it is due precisely to the overpowering stench of human involvement – and, thus, corruption – that I have come to reject its validity. I think that when it comes to obtaining inspiration from the saints and scholars of yesteryear, we can each judge for ourselves without the interference of the codifiers and the law-makers.

Q: The so-called Anarchism of the National Revolutionary Faction (NRF) differs from what is usually understood by this concept. Being heretical by its intrinsic nature (anti-dogmatic, non-spiritual, anti-conservative), you claim the possession of a form of Anarchism which has no definitive roots in the Leftist context. Can we speak then about the Right-Anarchism of the NRF, and what are more precisely the ideas behind National-Anarchism?

TS: National-Anarchism essentially transcends the Left-Right spectrum, concluding that both epithets are simply convenient terms for the political establishment. We do not emanate from the Left, as you say, but then neither do we come from the Right. The NF was undoubtedly a Right-wing organisation, at least prior to the mid-1980s, but political movements are nothing more than vehicles for the realisation of ideas and objectives. In fact their memberships are often extremely diverse. One thinks of the conflicting ideas that prevailed within the early Fascist and National Socialist movements, for example. National-Anarchism is also very different to the vast majority of ideological tendencies in that we completely reject the Protestant work-ethic which runs through Western society. Bob Black explains this perfectly:

Curiously – or maybe not – all the old ideologies are conservative because they believe in work. Some of them, like Marxism and most brands of anarchism, believe in work all the more fiercely because they believe in so little else . . . Marxists think we should

be bossed by bureaucrats. Libertarians think we should be bossed by businessmen. Feminists don't care which form bossing takes so long as the bosses are women. Clearly these ideology-mongers have serious differences over how to divvy up the spoils of power. Just as clearly, none of them have any objection to power as such and all of them want to keep us working.^[3]

Another feature which distinguishes us from the mainstream 'anarchist' movement, is our profound belief in racial separatism. Here in England, National-Anarchists have consistently been labelled 'fascist' by a minority of self-seeking Trotskyists and anarcho-dogmatists, but despite their threats and cajoling our enemies are beginning to realise that this term is a complete misnomer given that we wish to establish or own areas in which to live according to our own principles. Indeed, we have no desire to rule over an administrative structure or disaffected population of any kind. This is what makes us so unique. Whilst they choose their own destinies, we shall choose ours. National-Anarchists also have an interest in Synarchy and the so-called 'Anarchism of the Right', which has developed in France. The German philosopher Ernst Jünger has also discussed the concept of the 'Anarch' in his novel, *Eumeswil*,^[4] with the main character being used to represent a purely sovereign individual.

Q: You collaborate with and support one of the most 'repugnant' (at least for conservative New Right activists) ideological groups, the National Bolsheviks. How are your relations with this current?

TS: We have a fairly good relationship with Alexander Dugin, but see him more as an independent sage than as a representative of the National Bolshevik current per se. Indeed, he appears to be an extremely talented and multi-faceted thinker and is bringing together political, cultural and spiritual personalities from around the world. We also have an excellent relationship with National Bolsheviks like the American Front (AF), who, despite the fact that they do not share our anarchistic tendencies, are basically working for very similar objectives. Thus we differ with National Bolshevism when it comes to supporting a State infrastructure, but we do share their attitude towards Eurasian geopolitics.

Q: Eurasia – a theory built for justifying the new Russian imperialism and, on the other hand, the perspective of the creation of an invisible Islamic spiritual domination within the heart of Europe. This tends to become the general impression of the persons from outside of the National-Anarchist and traditional perimeter regarding the Eurasian issue. What are your concrete thoughts about this concept?

TS: I understand perfectly well that critics of Eurasianism will inevitably suspect that Russia is secretly preparing to dominate the world by bringing together the opponents of Americanisation and the New World Order, but despite her messianic reputation I sincerely believe that Russia offers us all a golden opportunity. I do not believe that Islam will be the dominant trend in the coming Eurasian alliance, although it will definitely have an important role to play. When Alexander Dugin launched his 'Eurasia' movement on 1 January 2001, it was made absolutely clear that religious dogmatism and monotheistic bigotry has no place within the Eurasian plan. Indeed, just four months later Eurasia staged a meeting at which delegates from fifty-one regions of the Russian Federation included Talgat Tadzhuddin (Supreme Mufti of Russia), Ioann Ekonomtsev (Chairman of the Department of Theological Education and Catechesis of the Russian Orthodox Church), Ioann Bogoslov (Rector of the Russian Orthodox University) and Andrey Lupsandashievic Dondukbayev (Chassidic rabbi and leader of Bead Artzein). At the same time, however, the NRF believes that Eurasia must take the form of a decentralised imperium comprised of like-minded allies. Not a uniform bloc in which cultural diversity and regional autonomy are stifled or obliterated, but a general stream of life, love and liberty which flows in the same direction for the general interest of all. But this is not simply a utopian dream designed to convince humanity that we can live in peace for all eternity; it is a realistic appreciation that we can only survive Coca-McDeath if we learn to join forces with other freedom fighters and pool our resources. Perhaps one of the best examples of positive collaboration between ideologically or religiously-opposed groups, is that of the great rapport which took place between the Knights Templar and their Sufi Assassin contemporaries during the Crusades. Julius

Evola wrote about the vision of a new imperium in his *Revolt Against the Modern World*,^[5] pointing out that one of the very final vestiges of Tradition in Europe was led by the Ghibellines during the Middle Ages. He also made an important distinction between medieval imperium as represented by the Holy Roman Empire, and the imperialistic shenanigans which later characterised the internecine struggle between competing nation-states. More importantly, of course, Eurasianism is part of a long and unbroken esoteric strand and must always retain its spiritual content. In the words of Alexander Blok, a Eurasian poet who attempted to compare the dynamic ‘mystical-anarchism’ of early Twentieth century Russia with the fading shadow of the dying West:

Centuries of your days are but an hour to us

Yet like obedient slaves

We’ve held a shield between two hostile races – Europe, and the Mongol hordes . . . From war and horror come to our open arms

The embrace of kin

Put the old sword away while there’s time

Hail us brothers . . . Ah, Old World, before you have perished, join our fraternal banquet.^[6]

Q: Your sympathy and support for Islam surely maddens the conservative traditionalists. What, in your opinion, is the principal success of Islam in one of the most profound Christian countries of Europe (France and England being just a few notorious examples)? Could this come in accordance with the grave moment of social and doctrinal weakness through which the Church seems to have passed in the last decade (something which has already culminated with the sudden conversion of the oldest and most glorious part of Christianity to Islamicism in the Seventh and Eighth centuries)?

TS: I think the reason Islam has managed to achieve so many victories within the heart of Europe is due to its vitality and dynamism in the face of a decaying civilisation. The decline of institutional Christianity has left a huge spiritual void, and one which – in England,

at least – is now being filled by second and third generation Asian immigrants, many of whom are often far more radical and devout than their parents ever were. But I think that whilst Islam is potentially very rewarding for many young Pakistani and Indian immigrants, it is foolish to dismiss Mohammedanism as a purely racial entity. Right-wing organisations like the British National Party (BNP), for example, are trying to make great capital from the recent upsurge in Islamophobia. The NRF supports Islam from the perspective that many of its adherents are vigorously opposed to International Zionism, although those groups which act as mere pressure-valves for opponents of immigration will achieve very little if they do not attempt to awaken a spiritual consciousness within their own people. In France, of course, Islam has also attracted the interest of many leading intellectuals.

Q: There is a whole current nowadays (promoted especially by Jean Parvulesco and Alexander Dugin) that speaks about a new Axis, under the slogan Paris-Berlin-Moscow. How do you see the role of Russia at the beginning of this new year, considering that at the beginning of the 1990s (just after the fall of the Iron Curtain in Europe) Russia was seen by all Western countries as the perpetually evil Mr. Hyde of Europe?

TS: I think that due to its great influence within Asia and Eastern Europe, Russia has proved invaluable in the American quest for world domination. Vladimir Putin, a former KGB spy, now appears to be forging a close relationship with President George W. Bush. In fact the eagerness of the Washington administration to get Russia ‘on-side’, so to speak, must come as no surprise to those of us who understand the mechanics of geopolitics. The only problem we have, is that if we are to put forward the Eurasian plan and unite the opponents of America throughout the world, it is vitally important for Russia to retain her ‘dissident’ status. Therefore we do not welcome the alliance between Russia and America because it helps to postpone the inevitable division between Russia and the West.

Q: You recall being influenced by Mircea Eliade and Julius Evola, to mention just a few. Also, it is no secret that you once had sympathies for the ideas of Corneliu Codreanu and the Legion of

the Archangel Michael. How do you see the austere Tradition of the Iron Guard within the general context of the traditional European Idea nowadays?

TS: We must take great inspiration from Codreanu, not least because he continues to symbolise one of the finest examples of a true synthesis between the political and the spiritual. The 1920s and 1930s gave birth to a pan-European backlash against the increasing technocracy and materialism of the modern world, but today we have a situation in which we must both think and act in a more cosmological and global fashion. In other words, whilst we should indeed be very proud of our Indo-European heritage, we must also break out of the Euro-centric mould within which we have become imprisoned. In other words, we have to relinquish the very idea of the West. As Guillaume Faye points out:

This is the hideous face of a civilisation, which, with an implacable logic, has forced itself onto every culture, gradually levelling them, bringing all peoples into the gamut of the one-world system. What use is the cry ‘Yanks out!’, when those who shout the slogans are Levi customers? More successful than Soviet Marxism this civilisation is realising the project of abolishing human history in order to ensure the perpetual well-being of bourgeois man . . . This system, this civilisation, which is eradicating the identities of the peoples of Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas has a name: it is called Western Civilisation.^[2]

I am certain that Codreanu – whilst seeking to conserve and maintain his own Rumanian Orthodox tradition – would have appreciated the subtleties which lay behind this sentiment, not least because like Che Guevara both he and other martyred comrades such as Mota and Marin understood the importance of fighting common struggles in other lands. We Europeans are residing deep within enemy lines, therefore we must support revolution on the periphery whilst encouraging dissent and resistance from within.

Q: Did you have any contact with the legionary circles from Rumania in the first part of the 1990s? And I am thinking here of

the notorious *Gazeta de Vest* publication of Ovidiu Gules, an organisational magazine well known and directly supported by the English Right-wing and traditionalist forums. Or perhaps other circles or persons?

TS: I had no personal contact with Rumanian organisations during that period, although we did receive copies of *Gazeta de Vest* from time to time. My own impression of this publication was that it was a thinly-disguised propaganda outlet for the ITP. In fact it probably appeared in English because the ITP were keen to portray themselves as the ‘heirs’ of the Legionary ideal in England, despite the fact that the NRF has itself been conducting forest camps and cross-country hikes for many years now. We have also held torchlight rituals during which small bags of earth were distributed in the manner of the Iron Guard.

Q: Decentralisation or Centralism? As a traditionalist thinker how do you conceive a perfectly decentralist authority in a modern society?

TS: National-Anarchists wish to create a series of village communities. These communities will be politically and culturally independent of one another, although at a higher level each village may or may not wish to form part of a confederated alliance. We do not presume that National-Anarchist communities will live in perpetual harmony; on the contrary, human nature determines that there will always be people wishing to infringe upon the lives and property of others. Therefore our villages will have to be primed for self-defence. At a higher level still, the regional alliance will give its allegiance to any group of individuals who – regardless of their spiritual or cultural aspirations – wish to maintain and preserve their own identities and freedoms. It is a fact that new communities are usually forged by the most pragmatic and superior individuals; therefore by the time the Capitalist System finds itself in a position of acute decline National-Anarchists will have grasped the practicalities which are demanded by an alternative lifestyle. As far as authority is concerned, we have no desire to create a governmental infrastructure in the way that nations and states are run today. Who knows, perhaps we will see the return of the Anglo-Saxon moot system. Furthermore, of course, the collapse of

Capitalism will be accompanied by an inevitable regression of technology and, whilst we are not strictly advocating the establishment of primitivist or hunter-gatherer societies, there remains little doubt that without people working day and night in the factories to produce the so-called 'luxuries' of the fool's paradise, we will all have to knuckle down and get to grips with the harsh realities of the real world.

Q: These are unfortunate years, in which the cultural elites have a tendency to identify themselves with the political elites. Where is the place of the elites and what is (or should be) their role in a National-Anarchist state?

TS: Elitism is a natural phenomenon and, thus, we perceive it to be a perfectly ordinary (or, in some cases, extraordinary) part of human endeavour. We also believe that political revolutions usually succeed on the coat-tails of their cultural counterparts. National Socialism is a prime example of how politicians managed to tap the cultural vein of Germany and appeal to the sensibilities of the masses. We, on the other hand, do not wish to appeal to the masses. In fact we are rather misanthropic in that we choose to shun the trappings of mass society and create alternatives from without. One of my favourite quotations is that of E. Günther Gründel:

The new man is still evolving. Indeed, he is not yet visible to everyone, for he does not come from the noisy centre which constantly attracts the attention of the crowd, but from the quiet periphery. Every force that is destined to topple an age which has run its course comes from the periphery of that age with all its values and pseudo-values. It is in the moments of great crisis in the emergence of the new that the 'outsiders' take on their special function of forming the nucleus of a new centre around which the coming world will henceforth order itself.^[8]

Q: You support and have contact with the circles of Robert Steuckers, Pierre Vial, Guillaume Faye, Alain de Benoist and Alexander Dugin. What do you think separates them and what do you think unites them? How much of their programme do you support?

TS: I have only had contact with two of these individuals, namely Alexander Dugin and Robert Steuckers. I think each of us differs in various ways but what makes our contact so exciting and constructive is that we are consistently searching for common ground. The differences between various thinkers often seem multifarious and irreconcilable, at least until one examines the possibilities that can arise from the similarities. There is no single person in the world with whom I could agree on every principle, so it is always a question of weighing up the positives and negatives. This, after all, lies at the very root of all synthesising processes.

Q: How do you view regionalism, federalism and their tendencies these days?

TS: In England we have quite a number of regionalist groups, one of which – the Wessex Regionalists – was closely involved with National-Anarchists during the successful Anarchist Heretics Book Fair we organised in May 2000. I support regionalism wholeheartedly, right down to the lowest possible denominator. On the other hand, I do realise that in order for us to achieve our objectives it is necessary to exhaust the centralist alternatives. In other words, I happen to believe that a one-world government is inevitable. I don't like the idea, but unless people learn by their mistakes it becomes far more difficult to obtain political, social and economic decentralisation in the long term. Therefore, real progress can only be made from a position of total and utter defeat. Within the New World Order we must agitate for European autonomy; this must be succeeded by a campaign for an independent England; followed by the quest for regionalism and village communities.

Q: What role has tolerance within the context of National-Anarchism?

TS: This is a difficult question. Anarchists are usually in favour of absolute freedom, but I think that it depends on the community. The NRF has long opposed issues such as abortion and homosexuality, believing them to be non-negotiable because they conflict with Natural Order. Alternatively, we are not reactionaries in the sense that we are

seeking to impose our beliefs upon others because that would indeed be contrary to genuine Anarchist principles. We accept that people should be free to practice whatever they choose within their own areas, but at the same time we uphold the right to form communities in which like-minded people live according to a series of distinct beliefs. Not in a governmental capacity, but due to the fact that there remain inviolable laws of nature. According to Cicero:

There is in fact a true law – namely, right reason – which is in accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is unchangeable and eternal. By its commands it summons men to the performance of their duties; by its prohibitions it restrains them from doing wrong. To invalidate this law by human legislation is never morally right, nor is it permissible ever to restrict its operation; and to annul it wholly is impossible.^[9]

So when Natural Law is applied to the whole of humanity, it actually creates a form of true and just equality. Likewise, simply because Anarchism is defined as the absence of government it is not necessary to reject authority at the same time.

Q: Monarchism represents an integral part of the English soul and holy tradition. What are your own thoughts on the limitation of monarchism in front of a decayed and desacralised civilisation?

TS: I would not describe myself as a complete opponent of monarchism, not least because I have closely studied the system which prevailed during the Heptarchy of Anglo-Saxon England. The kings and queens of the past were often warriors and philosophers, hardly comparable to the unworthy corpse that presently squats its rotting arse upon the English throne. It is natural for aristocrats to spring from the ranks of humanity, but when they deteriorate into dynastic parasites who maintain their grip on power by using their wealth to fund an army of paid mercenaries, it becomes a travesty and a farce. In tribal societies monarchs are duty-bound to serve their people rather than to rule over them with an iron fist, but these ‘kings’ and ‘queens’ are more often than not the strongest or most intelligent within their communities. In the animal kingdom – and I use the word ‘kingdom’

deliberately – this is known as the peck order.

Q: Thank you for this short interview, the last word is yours.

TS: I would like to thank Dan Ghetu for his very thorough and cordial interrogation and hope that the readers of *L'Ecole Europa* will find my replies stimulating. It is a pleasure to be conversing with the sons and daughters of such a fine and proud nation as Rumania. Hail the Captain!

^[1] Dover, 1956.

^[2] Samuel Weiser, 1996.

^[3] From *The Abolition of Work and Other Essays*, Loompanics, 1985, pp. 1-2.

^[4] Quartet, 1995.

^[5] Inner Traditions, 1995.

^[6] Quoted in *The Secret of Eurasia* by Mehmet Sabeheddin, New Dawn, Issue 68, Autumn 2001, p. 84.

^[7] Quoted in *Spotlight On the New Right* by Michael Walker, *The Scorpion*, Issue #10, Autumn 1986, p. 9.

^[8] From *Die Sendung der jungen Generation*, Munich, 1933, p. 337.

^[9] From *De Republica*, III, xxii, 33.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

INTERVIEW:

Q: Troy, you are one of England's most influential and radical ideologists. How did your political views develop, and, more generally, how did a young South London lad get in touch with rather abstract philosophical and political concepts?

TS: As a child I always had a strong social conscience, something I inherited from my father. As a result, therefore, I was constantly aware of the great disparity between the immense wealth and riches enjoyed by the West and the comparative poverty in so-called 'Third World' countries like Ethiopia and India. In my final two years at school I became very interested in the six main bands from the Two Tone scene that were releasing protest songs in opposition to Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Government. These included The Beat, The Specials and The Selecter. The deeper message behind Two Tone, apart from promoting racial harmony, was centred on urban decay and the effects that Capitalism was having on ordinary people's lives. In my teenage years we moved from a council estate in Crystal Palace, South London, to a small bungalow in the country town of Crowborough, in East Sussex. When I was eighteen I decided to vote Labour in the General Election, following my father's example. By this time, the rest of my family were becoming Conservatives and involving themselves in the expanding housing market. Despite the fact that I was very mistaken to believe that the Labour Party was anti-Capitalist, the fact that my father was virtually the last person to stick to his working class roots inspired me a great deal. Meanwhile, the fact that I now found myself in such a rural environment meant that I had to travel up to London on a regular basis to see the rest of my family or to buy clothes and records. The fact that I always kept in touch with my South London roots, therefore, eventually led to me discovering the National Front (NF). I had heard of the NF on various occasions, not least because they were regularly denounced at many of the Two Tone and 'Rock against Racism' events that I was attending several years earlier. But there was a great deal of crossover between the skinheads of the Ska movement and those who

attached themselves to racialist causes, so during a visit to East Croydon to watch Bad Manners in 1984 a chance meeting with an old friend led to me accompanying him to the 'NF pub' across the road. Consequently, I ended up buying a copy of *NF News* and reading it on the train home. The first thing that struck me was how incredibly anti-Capitalist and pro-socialist the Movement was, particularly the articles about the Mondragon Co-operative in Northern Spain, the distributist views of Hilaire Belloc and G.K. Chesterton, and Otto Strasser's defiant struggle against Hitler and Big Business. Before long, I found myself travelling up to South London twice a week in order to socialise with members of Croydon NF like Chris Marchant, Gavin Hall and John Merritt. They were a few years older than I was and, in between pints of ale, I spent the evening picking their brains about the history of the NF and various ideological issues. I was astonished to discover that the stereotypical media image relating to a group of alleged race-hating, neo-Nazi thugs was complete and utter hogwash. Eventually I was made East Sussex Regional Organiser, given the role of taking *NF News* to the printers and joining the likes of Derek Holland, Nick Griffin, Graham Williamson and Patrick Harrington in the Movement hierarchy. It was a very exciting and formative period and I look back on that period with a good degree of fondness and nostalgia.

Q: What, exactly, was the National Revolutionary Faction and why was it disbanded in 2003?

TS: In 1990, the NF changed its name to Third Way after a bitter personality clash had driven a wedge between those in the leadership. Many of us left to form the International Third Position (ITP), but by 1992 a large group of us became disenchanted with the fact that certain individuals like Roberto Fiore (now Forza Nuova) and Derek Holland had betrayed the genuinely anti-fascist principles of the late-80's NF by forming alliances with counter-revolutionary elements in the Catholic Church and neo-fascist groups overseas. As someone who has always been extremely suspicious of Right-wing reaction, this was not what I wanted at all. Consequently, when it emerged that Fiore and company had also stolen thousands of pounds from a very close friend of mine who had invested money in their abortive 'farm' project in Northern

France, we formed the English Nationalist Movement (ENM) and took most of the ITP's regional units and publications with us. One of our more senior members, on the other hand, had spent over twenty-five years in Gerry Healey's Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP) and taught me a great deal about strategy and organisation. The ENM restored the old socialist values that had come to the fore in the 1980s NF and produced a barrage of printed material about Robert Blatchford, William Morris, the Strasser brothers, Robert Owen and others. The ENM was fairly successful and earned itself quite a reputation, but in 1998 we decided to take things one step further by establishing the National Revolutionary Faction (NRF). The NRF was a hardline revolutionary organisation based on an underground cell-structure similar to that used by both the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and the IRA. Our main centre of operations was in West Yorkshire, where we established a system of 'leaderless resistance' and worked alongside local resident groups concerned about the large number of Asian attacks in the area. This was not designed to affect innocent people, but to counter the increasing violence against the indigenous White community. Eventually, however, a combination of State repression and half-heartedness on behalf of some of our cadres led to us having to scale down the whole operation. The fact that we had been greatly inspired by the work of Richard Hunt and Alternative Green and were also in the process of changing the NRF into an Anarchist organisation also took its toll. In 2003 we finally decided that it was futile to portray ourselves as a 'movement' when, in fact, there were never more than 20-25 people involved at any one time. These days, we simply refer to ourselves as 'the National-Anarchists' and believe that we represent a current rather than an actual organisation of any kind. What is also quite fascinating, however, is that National-Anarchism developed in several different countries at the same time. Hans Cany (France), Peter Topfer (Germany) and myself are each part of a simultaneous phenomenon that developed as a logical antithesis to the ideological bankruptcy that characterised the end of the Twentieth century. It is with this new platform in mind that we now enter the next century and attempt to overcome the difficulties and tribulations that dominated the last.

Q: The idea of National-Anarchism is certainly very attractive, but its critics seem to be justified in claiming that it can make a territory – we are consciously avoiding words like ‘state’ and ‘country’ – extremely vulnerable to foreign intervention. How can a society based on National-Anarchist principles defend itself against a centralised, totalitarian aggressor? Surely the principle of ‘blood and soil’ would make it impossible to be loyal to a greater entity than one’s local community, and thus to successfully oppose globalisation, foreign economic domination and cultural imperialism?

TS: We all know what happened to the innocent children of Waco, the family of Randy Weaver and the anti-tax rebels of the Michigan Militia, so in order to be as successful as possible it is crucial that National-Anarchist communities do not seek to maintain a high profile or invite confrontation with the State. There are peaceful Anarchist and secessionist communities all over the world, let alone tribal societies that have existed for many thousands of years. It’s just a question of keeping one’s head beneath the parapet. Large-scale immigration and socio-economic decay has meant that countries like England have become totally irretrievable, and therefore it may even be necessary to create these communities abroad. Given that Indo-Europeans have migrated on countless occasions before and, indeed, in the case of people emigrating to New Zealand and Spain are continuing to do so in great numbers today, this is not as drastic as it sounds. As the West continues its inevitable decline and fall, National-Anarchists will continue to investigate those socio-economic alternatives which can provide a real alternative to the system that is crumbling around our ears. In many ways, the real struggle against Capitalism will take place on the periphery, rather than at the centre. We must remember that the West can only retain its privileged lifestyle by exploiting the so-called ‘Third World’, and this is precisely why revolution on the periphery is a far more feasible option than attempting to fight the Capitalists on their own turf in Europe or North America. In fact the very same process brought about the collapse of the imperialistic Roman Empire. It is also vital to view National-Anarchism as part of a long-term

strategy and understand that it could take many decades before these ideas really begin to swing into action. One thing we do have on our side, however, is that every time the system weakens we actually get that little bit stronger. As more and more people turn their backs on mass consumerism, the concept of living in small, decentralised communities with others of like-mind will become more realistic and attractive.

Q: What are your views on natural rights? Is there such a thing as a right to life?

TS: I don't believe that anyone, man or beast, has a specific 'right' to life. That is not to suggest, on the other hand, that we shouldn't continue to resist those who seek to exploit our labour in the factories and the fields, attempt to bleed us dry through the machinations of the international banking system, or cruelly torture innocent animals in the name of fashion or medical science. We hear a lot about 'rights', but never enough about duties. What about our responsibility to the environment, for example, or our duty to ensure the well-being of our children and not leave them vulnerable to the corrosive effects of the liberal 'education' system? But in short, nobody has a 'right' to anything. 'Rights' are purely contractual and can only be drawn up superficially. We know from experience, however, that just as weeds will overrun a beautiful garden, basic human nature ensures that even the best intentions inevitably come to nothing. This may sound very pessimistic, but these utopian liberal bubbles are there to be pricked.

Q: What are the links between your vision of National-Anarchism and Julius Evola's writings? How can his concept of the Empire co-exist with that of Anarchism? In this context, what is your view of Francis Parker Yockey's ideology?

TS: National-Anarchism and Julius Evola do not necessarily go hand in hand. As a former student of Theology and Religious Issues, I have a personal interest in Evola because his seminal work, *Revolt Against the Modern World*, taught me a great deal about the irreconcilable differences between tradition and modernity. That obviously has great implications for the development of traditional communities that have

rejected the contemporary world. And, like the German novelist Ernst Jünger, Evola also adhered to the concept of the Anarch or Sovereign Individual – the man or woman that has learnt to ‘ride the tiger’ and retain both their sanity and dignity in the face of cosmological decline. But as far as Evola’s belief in a European Imperium is concerned, whilst I agree with a transcendental and unitary vision to which people can give their allegiance, I still support political, social and economic decentralisation right down to the lowest possible unit. This may sound like a contradiction in terms, but it is possible to give one’s allegiance to a higher ideal and still retain a sense of localised autonomy and self-determination. I don’t find Yockey’s work that inspiring, to be perfectly honest, and a centralised European superstate has no appeal for me whatsoever. On the other hand, he did understand the threat that America and its Zionist allies present to the world and proved himself to be a brave and competent liaison officer.

Q: It seems that, while the best men devote their lives to the development of conservative-revolutionary ideas, the worst men succeed in putting them into practice. One can easily sympathise with Moeller van den Bruck’s heroic vision of the Third Reich, but not with Hitler’s regime. The same is true of other great thinkers when compared to the brutal and bureaucratic regimes their works indirectly helped to establish. This, in fact, has led to great pessimism among those who felt their ideas were betrayed. Gottfried Benn or Jünger, for example. Does this mean the Conservative Revolution is a largely utopian concept, more romantic than it is practical?

TS: I certainly don’t believe that it is possible for Revolutionary Conservatives to take control of a national government, if that’s what you mean. At least not in Europe. Here in England, for example, the New Right is confined to small fringe groups like the Conservative Democratic Alliance, Monday Club, Freedom Party and *Right Now* magazine. Meanwhile, of course, working on the fringes does not present a problem for National-Anarchists; in fact that’s the whole point of our opposition to the centre. The Gramscian method can work on the Left, it seems, but not on the Right.

Q: What is your opinion of Sir Oswald Mosley, and of other ‘home-grown’ fascist ideologues?

TS: I am opposed to all totalitarian doctrines, be they Fascist or Communist. But whilst Mosley himself was a thoroughly dislikeable character, I do believe that he was a genuine and principled individual and to a certain extent I have respect for what he tried to achieve. He went the wrong way about it, of course, but if the British Union of Fascists (BUF) had not made the mistakes that it did, we would have to go through the whole process again.

Q: As a patriot, how do you view the Right-wing of England’s politics? What are the main problems you have with nationalist groups like the British Nationalist Party (BNP), or the even more moderate United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)?

TS: I’m not sure I would describe myself as a ‘patriot’. As I’ve already explained, the whole notion of England as representing both a geographical area and a people is becoming increasingly hard to substantiate. The only way England can ‘survive’ is by being constantly redefined – by using ridiculous and contrived phrases like Tony Blair’s ‘Cool Britannia’, for example. But let’s face it, the main towns and cities of modern-day England have become multi-racial hellholes and despite the flag-waving that accompanies any major football tournament, it’s quite ridiculous to cling to the belief that we can somehow restore our nationhood by repatriating all immigrants and their descendants. It won’t happen. Ever. Parties like the BNP are merely postponing the inevitable decline. Furthermore, of course, the fact that they continue to tread the discredited boards of parliamentary politics simply perpetuates the whole charade. We need people to become disillusioned with the ballot box, not to cling to the mistaken belief that voting for the BNP can solve all of our problems. One way in which it is possible to have some kind of influence, on the other hand, is by using UKIP as a vehicle to disrupt the European Union. Besides, whilst UKIP itself is comprised of bankers and industrialists worried about the threat of the single currency, the fact that it remains a single-issue pressure group means that it is still possible to upset the federalist appellation without compromising one’s own principles.

Voting for parties, therefore, is futile, but UKIP MEPs only seek election in order to interfere with the very process itself. This, perhaps, would be a worthy target for the attentions of the New Right.

Q: What about the Left? Are there any forces associated with Left politics that you are prepared to ally with? Have you been influenced by Left-wing authors and ideas?

TS: I have certainly been far more influenced by the Left than the Right, if that's what you mean. The so-called 'anti-fascists' on the Left appear to have trouble with the fact that I cut my political teeth, so to speak, in the NF. But this is quite irrelevant. I've never considered myself to be Right-wing and when I joined the Movement it had progressed beyond the stage of being a Right-wing organisation. Furthermore, the terms 'Left' and 'Right' each have their origins in the build up to the 1789 French Revolution, anyway, and my lifelong opposition to the established order must surely put me on the Left. Not that I even consider this to be a valid description of my beliefs, of course. National-Anarchists are prepared to form alliances with anyone and have attended many protests and demonstrations in order to express our solidarity with the wider opposition to International Capitalism. To paraphrase Lenin, 'we must march separately but strike together'. Indeed, when a young Palestinian militant throws a petrol bomb at an Israeli tank, he speaks for us just as we speak for him. My own 'Left-wing' influences include George Orwell, Mikhail Bakunin, Emma Goldman, Peter Kropotkin, Gerard Winstanley, Max Stirner, Nestor Makhno, Che Guevara, Sergei Nechayev, Hakim Bey, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the Angry Brigade, and the Red Army Faction.

Q: Generally, how flexible is your movement when it comes to strategic alliances? What would you say is the political common denominator, the decisive streak a group or a party must have in order to become your ally? Is it anti-Americanism, anti-globalism, anti-liberalism, Third Positionism?

TS: I don't think there are any common denominators. Useful opportunities come in all shapes and sizes and world history is full of surprising alliances that have taken place between seemingly opposed

groups. *Realpolitik* is necessary whenever and wherever the need arises. Much of what we do has to be covert, because the groups that direct the anti-Capitalist movement are usually controlled by Left-wing dogmatists who believe that we National-Anarchists are trying to subvert Anarchism for our own sinister ends. But this is false. As we've said elsewhere time and time again, we are not 'racists' or 'supremacists' with some kind of secret agenda, we are seeking our own space in which to live according to our own principles. Sadly, however, most people on the Left want more than that and will not rest until they can organise every minute aspect of people's lives. It's a self-perpetuating disease. This is why they talk of the 'right to work', when – as Bob Black rightly points out – the real problem is work itself. The Left, just like the totalitarian Right, refuses to tolerate anyone who tries to opt out of its vision of an all-inclusive society. Some of us, however, want no part of this and will only be 'socialists' among ourselves and with our own kind.

Q: A somewhat provocative question: do you sometimes feel that radicalism and marginal politics have grotesque and ridiculous sides, as famously described in Stewart Home's novel *Blowjob*? Ideologists switching from left to right and back again within an hour, supposedly dangerous parties consisting of just a few members – doesn't all this sometimes remind you of a political carnival rather than *realpolitik*?

TS: Despite being regarded by Stewart Home and his friends as some kind of 'anarcho-fascist', I can't say I've actually read his book. But I do understand the point you're trying to make. The ITP accused me of being fickle once I had left the Catholic Church and began exploring paganism and the occult, but I think it's a question of personal development. Some people will always be political opportunists, of course, but in my case it was a question of gravitating slowly over the course of several years. Without being arrogant, I believe that intelligent people tend to think their way out of the party. And if you look at my track record, it does actually make sense. I've always tried to be as genuine and open-minded as possible, doing the research and exploring the options available to me instead of following blindly like

those who decided to remain in the ITP rather than try to put things back on track. National-Anarchism isn't some kind of middle-class adventurism designed to shock, it's what I like to describe as a form of 'realistic escapism'.

Q: What about using the enemy's weapons instead of fighting with guerrilla tactics from the underground? I'm talking about unorthodox means such as using the style of glamour mass-media together with aggressive propaganda of a 'trendy revolution' aimed at the youth. We know that the System has so far managed to digest the most marginal and revolutionary elements of counter-culture and make them harmless, so surely the adequate response to this is to position oneself as 'mainstream' right from the start, thus preventing the ruthless market from exploiting one's 'non-conformity'? Can you accept this position, or do you see the process of 'reclaiming the streets' as the only effective tactic?

TS: I don't believe in reclaiming the streets at all. We tried that in the ENM and failed. But I do make a distinction between politics and culture, so therefore I support these forms of counter-culture because the political struggle can only make progress if there is a cultural struggle to accompany it. This was how the NSDAP managed to achieve so much progress in 1930s Germany; it simply tapped into an existing cultural vein and rode it all the way to the Reichstag (with more than a little help from wealthy German industrialists, of course). I'm not suggesting that it's still possible to gain control of the national state in this way, but it's all a question of identity. An individual can empower him or herself by joining together with like-minded people. If this relates to an ideal that is connected with music or fashion, for example, then all the better. I think the strategy currently being deployed by *Kinovar Magazine* is the right path to take.

Q: How strong is your link with the Russian 'International Eurasia Movement'? You are, after all, the man behind the 'Eurasian Movement' which stresses the importance of 'the geopolitical vision' of 'contemporaries like Alexander Dugin', and you could therefore easily be seen as Dugin's man in England. And

yet his approach to politics seems to differ greatly from yours. Can you share all of his views and accept his strategies?

TS: I won't pretend that the Eurasian Movement in England is making any real progress at the present time, because Eurasianism in general is still a fairly new concept in Western Europe. More than anything, I think, the Eurasian Movement is simply a convenient rallying point for those familiar with Dugin's ideas and who are gravitating towards such concepts. But we are part of the Eurasianist International, if you like, and recently sent a message of support to the annual Eurasianist gathering in Moscow. Dugin is not a National-Anarchist by any stretch of the imagination, but as an advisor to Vladimir Putin he is in a position to influence Russian affairs and policy-making at the very highest level. In many respects this is similar to the role of UKIP, referred to above. Eurasianism is important to National-Anarchists because it puts our struggle into a wider perspective. Indeed, whilst we are primarily concerned with what goes on at the level of the village or on our own doorstep, so to speak, we still believe that we can export our ideas by offering support to a new 'dissident' alliance against Western interests. But we are not interested in the formation of a new Eastern imperialism, by which Russia can then dominate her immediate neighbours for her own narrow interests. We want to help create a network of decentralised allies all striving towards a similar ideal, but each retaining their own unique character. The best – despite being a fairly simplistic – example that I can think of in this regard, is the collaboration that takes place between Hobbits, Elves, Dwarves and Men against a common totalitarian enemy in Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings*. Instead of creating a counter-imperialism, of course, when the battle is finally won the Fellowship gradually subsides and the various races get on with their own lives in their own peculiar way. This kind of loose defence structure is completely in tune with National-Anarchism and its opposition to large standing armies and militaristic autocracy in general.

Q: What is your vision of the European and English future in 50-100 years' time?

TS: To some extent I dealt with this issue in Question 8. But let me

give you an example. Imagine if you had a glass of clean water and then began to add several drops of another liquid, such as ink. At first, the water would become rather cloudy, but as more and more ink is added the water then begins to lose its original appearance altogether. Eventually, of course, it would be ridiculous to refer to it as 'water' at all. This is how I see the future of both England and Europe. The fact that our continent is changing at such an alarming rate means that it can no longer be seen as representing a homeland for people of Indo-European stock. Coupled with the fact that thousands of Europeans are emigrating abroad to places like Australia and New Zealand, the future of Europe is beginning to look very precarious indeed. Many will stay and fight, of course, but the most sensible option in this increasingly tenuous situation – I believe – is to create new homelands on the periphery. But just how far we will have to go in order to avoid the wrathful clutches of the West remains to be seen.

Q: One has the impression that a number of our contemporaries who identified with the Conservative Revolution were inspired by Russian culture. For example, David Tibet has mentioned Solovyev among his spiritual influences, while your friend and ally, the radical Christian and conspiracy theorist Wayne John Sturgeon, seems to be inspired by Berdyaev. We know you are interested in Tarkovsky, who is, in fact, extremely popular with the European intellectuals (his name has practically become a cliché), but apart from him, who were the other Russian thinkers to influence you?

TS: David Tibet has many influences and Solovyev merely relates to his interest in revelation and apocalyptic matters in general. Wayne John Sturgeon, on the other hand, who is a good friend of mine, is probably more interested in the remarkable English mystic, William Blake, who was convinced that a new Jerusalem could be constructed in the British Isles. The main Russian thinkers that have inspired me, however, include Mikhail Bakunin and Fyodor Dostoyevsky. The former, for his defiant opposition to Marxist dogmatism and state socialism, and the latter, for his deep and profound insights into Russian poverty and the latent power of the human spirit. Sergei Nechayev is also very interesting, because he describes the

uncompromising attitude that must be adopted by the serious revolutionary.

Q: What about Alexander Blok? I recall you quoting from ‘The Scythians’ at some point.

TS: Reliable information about Alexander Blok is often hard to come by in English, but I do admire his melancholic attitude, his poetic romanticism and the undisguised hostility that he expressed towards civilisation and materialism. He also believed in the idea of messianic revolution, something clearly at odds with his initial support for the events of 1917 and the Soviet regime’s bitter campaign against both orthodox and unorthodox religion.

Q: Let’s return to England. If asked to name five Englishmen whose works you have learnt from, who would you include in the list?

TS: This is a very difficult question, not least because it is so confined. But if I had to name just five individuals, I would choose William Cobbett for introducing a city boy to the joys of self-sufficiency and the countryside, Richard Burton for epitomising the indomitable hero and for awakening my interest in Africa and the Middle East, Charles Dickens for bringing the misery of working-class life to the educated public mind for the first time, George Orwell for having the courage to share with us his shattered dreams and illusions about International Socialism, and Hilaire Belloc for teaching me what it means to be English in the first place. Apologies to Morris, Reed, Chesterton, Blatchford, Lawrence and several others!

Q: You seem to be a music lover and an expert, especially when it comes to Neofolk and Industrial music. Which bands do you value most, and why?

TS: I’m certainly no expert, but I’ve always had a deep love of music from a very young age. I also enjoy Traditional Folk (Shirley Collins, Planxty, Dubliners, Steeleye Span, Yetties), Bluegrass (Bill Monroe, Stanley Brothers, Country Gentlemen, Merle Travis, Doc Watson), Classical (Strauss, Bach, Chopin, Vivaldi), Metal (Iron

Maiden, Rammstein, Cradle of Filth, Marilyn Manson, Black Sabbath), Psychedelic (Bevis Frond, Hawkwind) and Electronic (Kraftwerk), but the reason so many Neo-folk and Industrial groups have fired my interest in recent years is due to the way in which, unlike the contemporary mush of the musical mainstream, they have an ability to convey thoughts and ideas in a less well known but extremely powerful manner. Rather like the way symbols and archetypes can work on the human subconscious. It would be unfair of me to single out a mere handful of groups or individuals when there are clearly so many talented examples out there, but the more professional and significant of them emanate from labels such as Cold Spring, Dark Holler, Mute, Tesco, World Serpent, Eis & Licht, Athanor, Somnambulant Corpse, Tursa, Fluttering Dragon, Svartvintras, and Cynfeirdd. But the reason these artists stand out, at least for me, is due to their unwillingness to compromise or to popularise themselves in the name of profit. It's also a fact that several of our main influences – Jünger and Codreanu, for example – feature in many of the songs.

Q: Have you ever been in a band yourself? Ever written lyrics or poetry?

TS: Yes. I used to write fiction and poetry as child, winning minor prizes at school and college, and then as a teenager I was a vocalist in several Ska and Oi! bands and played gigs in and around London and the southern counties. I also play Folk and Bluegrass songs on acoustic guitar and a close friend of mine often joins me on the mandolin for long jamming sessions. These days, however, I'm a writer and vocalist with the mainly Dutch group, H.E.R.R., and have written and recorded for the harsh Swedish electronic outfit, Survival Unit.

Q: What are your views on the importance of music for the revolutionary struggle?

TS: I believe that music can act as a true voice in the quest for revolutionary change. We've all seen the immense power and influence that can be produced by certain genres, the musical categories mentioned above being testimony to that fact. Music can be far more than a pleasurable experience, however. It can also function as a means

of anger, self-expression and experimentation. This has been going on ever since the Teddy Boys of the 1950s, or the Mods and Rockers a decade later. Music and its accompanying lifestyles can inspire real belief. Once that power is shackled to a political current it can become a dynamic cocktail.

Q: The majority of the Industrial/Neo-folk scene is highly sceptical of ‘sellout’ musicians, rejecting an artist’s work as soon as he becomes accepted by MTV. You don’t seem to judge according to the same criteria, your praise of Marilyn Manson’s performance in London being just one example. In today’s totalitarian ‘society of the spectacle’, can anyone be accepted by the masses but still remain an inspirational and great artist?

TS: I think that a lot of this talk about ‘selling out’ completely misses the point. Moreover, it’s often something alluded to by the more pretentious or superficial music fan. As long as the central or unifying idea of a particular form of music is not compromised or watered-down, it can actually help to spread these ideas to a far larger number of people. Surely the whole point is to reach as many people as possible. Besides, I would rather see young teenagers wearing corpse paint and painting their nails black than going out to night clubs and listening to the manufactured pap of the music industry. The very nature of most Industrial and Neo-folk artists, however, usually precludes them from ever being accepted by the masses. They are necessarily elitist and often deal with misanthropic or deeply philosophical themes.

Q: What is your opinion of the vague concept of ‘postmodernism’? Is postmodernism merely another step down the slope of kali-yugian degradation, or is it a bizarre but fascinating cultural period in which ancient values and traditional rites suddenly re-appear? Does it possess a positive side, in the way that it is anti-modernist?

TS: In some respects, yes. I think this is particularly true of the way it presents a more fractured and fluid interpretation of the world in stark contrast to the modernist tendency to centralise or internationalise

everything. I haven't quite decided whether postmodernism offers a real alternative to modernism, but we can learn a lot from the way it has sought to dissect and analyse both the period in question and that which now follows in its wake. Postmodernism also appears to harbour a distaste of science and technology, something I find easy to identify with. However, the problem with postmodernism in general is that it seems to encompass a vast array of thought and has no real direction of its own.

Q: When and how did you come into contact with the internet? What are views on the web from a political and cultural perspective?

TS: I first came into contact with the Internet in the mid-1990s, whilst at university, and finally got online myself around 1995. But I have very mixed feelings about it. Whilst I can see the wonderful advantages it offers in terms of being able to spread ideas or make oneself heard, I also feel that it leads to a greater dependence upon technology. In some respects this is a good thing, because it makes the System even more fragile than it is, but the Internet can also act as a huge distraction from the true realities of our existence. The best thing about it, of course, is being able to have all this incredible knowledge at your fingertips, but that's no good if you can't even drag yourself out of the chair to act upon it all.

Q: Your *SYNTHESIS* magazine only exists online, and yet we know that you have been actively involved in a variety of printed magazines. Do you see the printing press as inferior to the Internet when it comes to cultural and political warfare in today's world?

TS: Yes, very much so. In fact the very people that we have always sought to target through the medium of print, those already involved to some extent or another, are all on the Internet already. On the other hand, you can't beat a proper magazine or newspaper in terms of giving people a tangible and living example of your work, but the results are often very minimal when compared to the expenditure that is necessary to produce them. The stationary industry in this country has become a vast racket, not to mention the amount of trees that have to be felled for

human consumption.

Q: Have you ever thought about writing for big magazines and thus making your ideas reach a greater and more diverse audience? If, hypothetically, you would be offered a weekly column in a broadsheet on the condition of making your views slightly more moderate, would you compromise or reject the proposal?

TS: I would certainly relish the opportunity of promoting National-Anarchism in this way, but I wouldn't be prepared to actually change my views to that extent. It may be possible, on the other hand, to stick within certain limits rather than raise the more inflammatory subjects like Race or Zionism.

Q: Do you fear governmental action against you or your movement? Have you ever had serious troubles with the police due to your political activity?

TS: I don't fear it, but the possibility is always there in the back of my mind. National-Anarchists like Peter Topfer, on the other hand, have experienced almost constant repression by the State and he has been persecuted many times. I have been arrested many times for stickering and fly-posting, as well as on Anarchist demonstrations, but the worst case scenario occurred in 1987 when I was charged with Actual Bodily Harm (ABH) and Affray and eventually consigned to Lewes Prison for eighteen months the following year. Apparently, the very fact that I and a handful of others were trying to defend ourselves against 200 violent Communists was neither here nor there. But the British State got what it wanted and, by throwing me in jail, managed to disrupt the steady growth of the NF in one of its newest areas.

Q: Please excuse our curiosity, but do you have a job besides being engaged in various National-Anarchist related activities? May we know something about your family?

TS: It's impossible for me to work full-time because I teach my four children at home. This takes up a great deal of my time and can be extremely hard work, not least because of the differing age levels, the lack of State funding for home-schooled families in this country and

the fact that we often have to rely on self-help organisations like Education Otherwise. I've been married for over fourteen years now and we have two girls and two boys. We don't have a car for environmental reasons and therefore a lot of our time is spent exploring local parks or hiking through the countryside. The children are very artistic and enjoy making their own collages and fantasy comic strips, whilst my wife – originally from Tunbridge Wells, in Kent – has a strong interest in Punk Noir, psychology and basset hounds. I spend my spare time reading and discussing theology, forcing people to eat my attempts at Italian and Indian cookery, enjoying the fantasy novels of Michael Moorcock, and organising football matches with the other kids in the area.

Q: Your Iron Youth Internet site, giving advice on how to bring your kids up as National-Anarchists, features a reading list of childrens' literature: Swift, Poe, Wilde, Stephenson... Most of these classical authors are now being read at university level by literature students only. Why do you think the current state of English education is so poor, and do you see a way out of this crisis?

TS: The reason the educational standards are so awful in this country, is because the mass media is continuously dominating every aspect of people's lives. The last few years have seen the growth of a huge social underclass, which seems to be comprised of promiscuous girls and violent males. But it's futile to completely blame this on poverty. Many of these people have managed to acquire a certain degree of wealth and affluence, but they can't seem to escape the debilitating peer pressure which encourages people to live in a world of fast cars, fast sex and fast food. There is also a severe identity crisis in England, which has been caused by Americanisation on the one hand, and multi-racialism on the other. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that a culture which prides itself on drunken thuggery and so-called 'reality TV' has no interest whatsoever in academic matters or the intellectual development of the individual. The only solution to this crisis is home-schooling. Once you take your children out of this detrimental environment, they are free to develop naturally without the constraints imposed by their peers. In South London, for example, most white

schoolchildren have incorporated black slang into their vocabulary, blurring the distinctions between the races and creating a uniform monoculture. To be an individual in modern England, therefore, is to become a virtual outcast.

Q: What is your opinion of elitist educational institutions like Eton, Oxford or Cambridge? On the one hand, you support elitist meritocracy, but on the other, you reject centralised education. In a National-Anarchist society, would the likes of Oxford and Cambridge have a chance to survive?

TS: Firstly, National-Anarchists do not recognise nation-states and, secondly, given that we expect the internationalist system to decline to the extent that it leads to a full-blown technological crisis, it would be impossible for universities to continue as they are at the present time. At the village level, on the other hand, I would expect children to be educated naturally and in accordance with their abilities. Egalitarianism is a myth and some children will always be slower than others, that's life. But this should take place in a community setting, rather than at a privileged institution, because it is possible to learn from those around you without ever having to establish schools or education systems in the first place.

Q: Do you sympathise with the anti-copyright movement, and if so, have any steps been made to unite your forces with those of prominent anti-copyright fighters? After all, their ideology, though far less complicated and metaphysical than yours, has striking similarities with National-Anarchism.

TS: We haven't approached the anti-copyright movement at this stage, but it's certainly an interesting idea and worth considering in the future. Personally, I oppose all forms of copyright and believe that, rather than seek to protect the artist concerned, copyright laws are simply there to take advantage of that which has been produced. This is achieved by taking it away from the artist altogether and limiting creative output in order to control the amount of alternative material that gets into the mainstream. As an Anarchist, I also believe that it's impossible to 'own' intellectual ideas because they are part of our

common development. I'm sure Pierre-Joseph Proudhon would have understood the logical connotations of this process, despite the fact that people often confuse his famous '*property is theft*' statement with the denial of individual – rather than private – property.

Q: Let us turn to the spiritual and esoteric side of your teaching. You have taken the long path from agnosticism and extreme Catholicism to heathen cults like Mithraism. How did your beliefs evolve, and what is your current spiritual system? Does your movement have an official religious position? Can a Christian or Hindu possibly join?

TS: I have never been an agnostic and always believed in some kind of god or higher intelligence. These days I would describe myself as a student of Primordial Tradition and don't embrace any kind of religious system. At the present time I am examining the work of Alan Watts, who was chiefly responsible for introducing Eastern philosophy to the West for the very first time. I have a lot of time for Hinduism, too, but at the moment I feel a growing affinity with Zen Buddhism. I don't care what spiritual outlook people have; I believe that it's a relatively private matter and National-Anarchism is about banding together with people of like mind and therefore I would find it far more conducive to spend my time with someone interested in spirituality or the occult than in material things.

Q: Did you ever have a teacher, a guru, who taught you any of the spiritual doctrines you were interested in, or did you pick them up in literary sources?

TS: I have never been under the guidance of a guru or holy man, although I do try to meet as many interesting and intelligent people as possible. I studied Theology & Religious Issues at university, so that helped put things into an historical and cultural perspective to some extent, but I do feel that I've reached the stage of my life where a more strenuous and disciplined approach is necessary for my own personal development. I have spent several years examining the various occult groups and weighing up the possibilities, but I'm not really the kind of person who would respect an authority unless I was convinced that it

was tied in to an initiatory source.

Q: Much of the spiritual energy of the Twentieth century has been hijacked by rather distasteful New Age movements. How can one objectively distinguish a Guénon from a Blavatsky, and is there actually a line separating true mysticism from occult parodies? If so, which category would you place Steiner, Gurdjieff and Serrano in?

TS: I have studied the personalities you mention above, as well as many others to whom people have given their spiritual allegiance, but I happen to believe that it's a case of gathering all the fragments together until we get a broad picture of the truth. I suppose it's the National-Anarchist in me. I have always been very suspicious of those who attempt to form personality cults around either themselves or others, in fact I prefer to observe from a distance and explore the information that is available. I do have a lot of respect for some of the main occult societies but, like most things in the twilight age of the *kali yuga*, many have become corrupt or detached from their origins. One development that interests me is the ongoing fusion of the New Right with various esoteric and Right-wing Anarchist groups on the Continent. There seems to be a genuine attempt to re-gather the lost wisdom of the past and then use this knowledge to cross the threshold between this world and the beginning of the next Cycle. As the *Vishnu Purana* explains:

[They] will then establish righteousness upon earth; and the minds of those who live at the end of the Kali age shall be awakened, and shall be as pellucid as crystal. The men who are thus changed by virtue of that particular time shall be as the seeds of [new] human beings, and shall give birth to a race who shall follow the laws of the Krita, or primordial age.^[1]

Q: Finally, please tell us how you view the possibilities of future co-operation between Russia and England in terms of revolutionary politics and culture. Do you think that our individualistic interests could be overcome in order to combine forces against a common enemy?

TS: Following obediently behind the coat-tails of her American ally, the British State will no doubt continue on her journey towards oblivion. But it remains to be seen whether this country will alienate itself from the rest of Europe or seek to unite Europe in the next logical step towards world government. This is why England plays such a vital role for American interests, a fifth column within Europe for the intended subjugation of the whole globe. Eurasianists rarely include Western Europe in their vision of a new future, unless, of course, it's in a very minor or peripheral role. But the Russia of the past, like France, was always known for her warm attitude towards political outcasts and revolutionaries, so perhaps Eurasianism will bring about a new alliance of minds and become the springboard for salvation. I have always deeply admired the long-suffering peoples of Russia, but I do find it rather unusual that National-Anarchism has yet to appear in the country which spawned the likes of Georgy Chulkov and Viacheslav Ivanov. Hopefully, this interview will go some way to changing that fact.

[\[1\]](#) *Vishnu Purana* 4:24.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

INTERVIEW: *NARODNI MYSLENKA* (CZECH REPUBLIC), CONDUCTED BY MILAN SPINKA (2005)

Q: Can you tell us your definition of ‘anarcho-nationalism’?

TS: Well, firstly, I don’t think National-Anarchism has much to do with Nationalism because this ideology often implies that one must recognise the present borders and boundaries of Europe or the world in general. We do believe in territorial demarcation, of course, but we do not support the concept of the nation-state. In other words, our vision is based on racial tribalism, autonomy and decentralisation.

Q: What is the most important difference between ‘classical’ Left Anarchism and National-Anarchism?

TS: I think the first problem with Left Anarchism is that it does not transcend the contrived Left-Right spectrum. Secondly, Leftists are notoriously dogmatic and over the last 50 years or so their rigid ideological principles have been conveniently tacked onto the coattails of Anarchism. Indeed, thinkers like Bakunin, Proudhon and Kropotkin would be rather alarmed to discover that Anarchism has now become little more than a vehicle for neo-Marxists and closet State-Capitalists. National-Anarchists, on the other hand, are quite different in that we do not have an ideology and believe that people should be free to pursue their own forms of separate development. Our vision, of course, is based on race and the Northern Tradition.

Q: I have read some economic articles from National-Anarchists and it seems to me that you prefer models of Distributism *à la* Hilaire Belloc or something which we can call ‘neofeudalism’. Can you clarify this question?

TS: Some of us were involved with Distributism and Guild Socialism in the past, but Catholic writers like Belloc and Chesterton – both of whom we still admire very much – were looking for solutions within the present economic system. As Anarchists, we support more radical alternatives such as local exchange trading systems and bartering, which cut out the mainstream economy altogether and thus

avoid taxation and the financial maintenance of the State.

Q: ‘Racial separatism’ is very often mentioned by your enemies when speaking about the programme of National-Anarchism. Is this idea realistic and how do you wish to achieve it?

TS: It’s a question of context. We certainly don’t think we stand any chance of getting the vast majority of people to establish mono-racial communities, but it is possible to do this with trusted friends and family members. We are also an elitist current and believe that only the best European men and women are capable of achieving such things. But we have no interest in the masses or in liberating or saving the so-called ‘White race’, we simply care about our own select people and others like us.

Q: Do you prefer the reign of the ‘masses’ or do you prefer a real elite and an organic state?

TS: We prefer neither. I like the word ‘organic’, but we have no intention to rule over vast swathes of the population or to set up governmental infrastructure. We want to create armed village communities, which are entirely separate from the State. In other words, whilst we believe in natural authority we are stateless.

Q: When speaking about political parties, C. Z. Codreanu quotes: ‘Their only real motivation is the religion of personal interest.’ Do you think that liberal democracy can drive the state in harmony with the interests of its inhabitants?

TS: No, I don’t. And I think Codreanu was correct. Here in the British Isles we have a three-party system, even though all three parties are completely indistinguishable from one another and controlled – at the root – by a grey government which can be described as the Establishment. This political and economic monolith has been in position for many centuries and unless people turn their backs on the whole process of parliamentarianism the people who secretly comprise this hidden ruling class will remain both unchallenged and unopposed.

Q: You are a member of the well-known Neo-classical music band, H.E.R.R. You point out that your music band is a cultural,

rather than political phenomenon. But I feel that the strong message when listening to your music and texts suggest a return to classical Europe, reminding people of the big events in our common history. Do you believe in a strict separation of culture and politics?

TS: Not necessarily, but I do also have to respect the wishes of the other band members. However, I believe that culture can act as an impetus for politics. Look at the way culture helped sweep the Nazis into power in 1930s Germany. Hitler and his friends managed to redirect – or, perhaps more accurately, misdirect – the youth and vitality that had been strong in Germany since the late nineteenth century. It's a pity the State ended up controlling and regulating everything, but this whole episode does prove how powerful culture can be in the shaping of a national character and destiny. We are committed identitarians who support the idea of a vast plethora of diverse cultures, although we only have an interest in propagating our own.

Q: Modern art is often considered to be a weapon of the 'progressive left'. But if we keep in our minds the famous names of the past (W. Lewis, E. Pound and T. E. Hulme for English speaking countries), we can recognize their efforts to change Western culture 'from the Right'. What do you think about modern art and its role in present society?

TS: I think modern art has been used as a weapon by left-wing intellectuals who are seeking to root out and destroy traditional forms of expression. Moreover, of course, whilst some modern art is very interesting – especially the very early forms such as Art Nouveau, Art Deco, Surrealism and Futurism, as well as the work of people like Henry Moore and Auguste Rodin – these people have managed to push all forms of subjectivity to one side and unleash a torrent of relativity in order to undermine that which constitutes true beauty. The real agenda is to redefine beauty itself and therefore promote weakness and degeneracy. I don't say this from a moralist perspective, but I do believe in certain standards that mark out the Apollonian from the Dionysian. In ancient Greek culture these principles were both very apparent and each was intertwined so that the latter was given substance by the former. But today everything that seeks to go upwards

towards the sun, is dragged down into the proverbial abyss and drowned in a sea of formlessness and visual repugnance.

Q: Do you believe in existence of any strictly ‘*entartete Kunst*’ trends which deserve only disdain?

TS: Well, yes, I think I’ve already discussed this above. If you come to London, make sure you pay a trip to the Tate Modern on the South Bank. That, for me, is where most of the material of the ‘*entartete Kunst*’ is housed. In fact don’t bother!

Q: Which music bands and music styles do you prefer?

TS: If I began listing bands I’d probably be here for several hours, but the styles I enjoy most include Classical, Neo-classical, Industrial, Dark Wave, Ambient, Neo-folk, Traditional Folk, Acid Folk, Psychedelic Folk, Psychedelia, Krautrock, Electronic, Post-Rock, Prog, Experimental, NWBHM, Black Metal and Viking Metal.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

INTERVIEW:

Q: Welcome! Tell us something about your e-zine, *SYNTHESIS*. Do you think that it has real power to change people's minds or to spread traditional ideas and values?

TS: Yes, I do. The website has had almost 130,000 hits in just a few years and the number of contributors and contacts is growing all the time. *SYNTHESIS*, in fact, was an undertaking that has really demonstrated just how much potential and impact cultural projects of this nature can have. I think that one of the main attractions on the website, apart from the sheer volume of literature which is offered by the resource itself, is the music reviews section. Music can attract people from diverse backgrounds and therefore can help to expose them to both traditionalist and National-Anarchist ideas for the very first time.

Q: Another part of your activity is H.E.R.R. Tell us something more about the music and the message of this group Do you think that H.E.R.R. is a part of the 'Neofolk/martial' scene or is it something unique, different from this movement?

TS: I think it has its roots in this genre, but in my personal opinion that's possibly because the five of us have each been inspired in some way by the music included within this particular field. Michiel Spape and myself, for example, are very appreciative of bands like Current 93, but at the same time I believe that we are developing a more Classical-based sound. Mich is a wonderful composer and an immense talent; so good, in fact, that many of his compositions – along with our help, of course – would sit comfortably on the shelf of any Classical section round at your local record shop. H.E.R.R., therefore, is almost like a bridge between neo-Classical and all-out Classical music. But I'd certainly like to think that we're unique, too, and that together we're able to come up with a wealth of ideas and suggestions that will hopefully make us even better in the future.

Q: What do you think about Von Thronstahl, Parzival, Kriegsfall

U, Lonsai Maikov etc? Do you think that you ‘fight together against the modern world’?

TS: I’m interested in a great many groups from this genre, as I explained above, and I do also believe that the whole thing is beginning to take the form of a recognisable current. Herein lies the secret of successful cultural warfare. Get everyone pulling in the same direction and expressing a common spirit and you’re halfway there. I think the single thing that possibly divides some of us on this matter, is that some people are clearly playing games whilst others are deadly serious.

Q: More than twenty years ago you participated in the skinhead movement. What do you think about this style today? Is there still something interesting in it?

TS: Well, it’s certainly interesting, that’s for sure. I became a skinhead at the tender age of fourteen, back in the days when Two Tone, Ska and Jamaican Reggae were becoming increasingly fashionable in England. The biggest influences were probably Madness, Bad Manners, Kilburn & the High Roads, and Ian Dury & the Blockheads. I also had a massive record collection in those days which I built up by visiting West Indian record labels and importers around the capital, and for a while I managed to earn my living as a DJ at pubs and clubs in the South London and North Kent area. I suppose the basic attraction was an interest in British patriotism and football hooliganism, as well as looking smart and acting tough. My involvement in the skinhead scene continued right through my politicisation in 1984-5, when I started listening to White Noise bands, and then on into the late-1980s. But I am very critical of the skinhead scene these days, not least because I was only one of a handful of people who emerged from that period whilst still managing to retain certain values. In other words, despite the great efforts that both Left- and Right-wing groups go to in order to recruit and educate this youth element, the number of people who take their politics seriously – at least in England – can probably be counted on the fingers of one hand. It’s a good laugh, I suppose, but that’s about it. Most skinheads are involved in an extremely hedonistic underworld, where the bands sing of unity and valour whilst they’re basically kicking the shit out of one

another after too many pints of lager. There is a big difference between cultic fashion and serious commitment. I think it's often a little different in the rest of Europe, but I can only really speak from my own experiences here in England. On the other hand, if any skinhead really takes his beliefs seriously, then that's perfectly fine with me. And I have that attitude towards all individuals, regardless of whether I happen to agree with them or not.

Q: Do you think that H.E.R.R., *SYNTHESIS* and the idea of National-Anarchism are something like Conservative Revolution? I mean: eternal, natural ideas packed in new forms...

TS: Well, two out of three can be included in your revolutionary conservative bracket, but I would like to stress that H.E.R.R. is not political in any way, shape or form. The group is more of a cultural phenomenon although, for me personally, there is no conflict between singing about the cultural traditions of Ancient Rome or recalling the lines of Fifteenth century Dutch literature on the one hand, and my overall views concerning what is fundamentally important with regard to Europe and the essentially political issues facing us today.

Q: There is a lot about industrial music in your magazine. Why are you interested in this genre? Do you agree that it is a 'looking glass' where we can see our civilisation with all its problems and pathologies?

TS: I think that's a fairly brief, but accurate summary. As Julius Evola points out in *Men Among the Ruins*, the nihilist also has an inevitable role to play in the grand scheme of things, and certain aspects of Industrial music – particularly that of Genesis P-Orridge and Throbbing Gristle – demonstrate the incredible extent to which we have been conditioned and brainwashed throughout our lives and the need for a process of deconstruction. I also believe that it's often necessary to take things to their logical conclusions in order to make people wake up. Extreme music does that very well indeed.

Q: Years ago you were a Roman Catholic. What do you think about Roman Catholicism now? Do you think that this religion still has a 'spirit of Tradition'?

TS: I still have a certain respect for Catholicism, but Christianity itself is something I no longer have any time for. For me, being a Catholic was all about according with what I perceived to be the core of spiritual truth. However, that search for truth eventually led me to discover that the roots of Catholicism are extremely pagan and once I began to doubt that it was a valid path I quite literally lost faith in it altogether. My detractors, on the other hand, regard my rejection of Catholicism as fickle, or claim that I have since become a ‘Satanist’. Both allegations are completely untrue. I spent ten years as a Traditional Catholic in the Society of St. Pius X and only left the Church once I was perfectly sure that it was a fraudulent means of spirituality that had simply borrowed immeasurably from that which it had supplanted and systematically replaced. There are many fascinating and admirable tenets within Catholicism, but unfortunately it has departed from tradition. Not merely with the establishment of Vatican II in the liberal haze of the mid-’60s, but also as a result of putting too much emphasis on what is exoteric, rather than esoteric. For me, all religions have their roots in a common tradition. Not in terms of being equally valid, but in the sense that to a greater or lesser extent they have moved away from the primordial essence.

Q: We asked you about Roman Catholicism. Now what about heathen (pagan) movements, rune magick, German cults and other things like that?

TS: I have a strong interest in Wodenism and rune magick, certainly, but since leaving the Church in 1998 I have not officially endorsed any ‘religion’ or ‘cult’. Life is a process of development, and even now I am still gleaning as much as I can about the spiritual roots of the Indo-European peoples. Ritual does play a part of my life, at least to some extent, and I do celebrate heathen festivals in the knowledge that I am continuing the traditions of our forefathers. Put it this way, I am more likely to take an interest in *The Wicker Man* than curl up with a copy of *The Imitation of Christ*.

Q: You describe yourself as a ‘National-Anarchist’. So, do you feel like an English nationalist?

TS: I used to be an English nationalist at one time, of course, but I'd like to think that I have gradually evolved and therefore moved away from the whole concept of the national state. England, as well as several other European countries, are about to become extinct. In order to keep going, the politicians will simply redefine them. This, of course, is quite ridiculous and when a people no longer looks and acts like its ancestors it spells the end of the nation itself. I believe that in order to survive, we Europeans must establish our own settlements in order to maintain and perpetuate our own kind. Not in terms of saving the so-called 'White race' or any other such nonsense, which I find extremely plebian and nonsensical, but as a means of developing a future elite. It's natural for like-minded people to do this, but we don't have to accept the relatively new borders and boundaries of the existing nation-states in order to do so. And neither are such ideas 'utopian', as some have claimed; there are literally thousands of anarchistic communities all over the world. Where there's a will, there's a way.

Q: Now is the time for the most important question. As you know, we are from Poland. Do you know anything about Poland and do you agree that we are part of Europe as much as, for example, Germany, England or any other country?

TS: Well, I know a little about Poland, and yes, of course, the Poles are just as European as the English, Germans, French or anyone else on the Continent. But as a country, of course, Poland itself is changing very quickly indeed and sadly a lot of young people are leaving to seek employment overseas. Take London, for example, where huge numbers of Polish immigrants can be found on building sites or doing menial work. The solution, as I've already explained, is for a small elite to safeguard its own future by getting together with others who share their aims and objectives. People simply need their own space in which to live according to their own distinct principles. Sadly, modern Europe does not share many of those principles.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

INTERVIEW:

AUTONOM is proud to make this interview with an important voice in alternative Europe. The Europe where identity and long-forgotten ideals find new forms based on reality, vision and innovation, cultural combat. Troy Southgate is a man of his time and beyond it, a kindred spirit in the struggle on his own for his own. As an instigator of the revitalisation of the New Right metapolitical movement, part of the Neo-classical group H.E.R.R., as well as a man that lives his principles, he presents more than just theory and intellectual speculation.

Q: Being a man who has been both a supporter and later a driving force in the European extra-parliamentary Nationalist movement for more than two decades, could you tell us your main reasons for devoting your life to politics and heritage, and what they are today?

TS: I was always very patriotic as a child, proud to be a South Londoner and to come from a solid working class family. Having a strong, localised identity – which was partly expressed as a hardcore football supporter – also helped to acquire an affinity for home and hearth, blood and soil. My father, on the other hand, was a supporter of the centre-left Labour Party and therefore in my teenage years I was greatly opposed to the Thatcherite government and influenced by the sense of social justice that Labour seemed to represent. We were both wrong in our assumptions, of course; my father no longer takes part in the electoral process, and I went on to join the National Front (NF) after discovering that it was not the party of race-hating dross that the pro-Zionist media regularly made it out to be. My father was extremely angry when he discovered that I was a regional organiser for the NF, but 20 years on he has come to realise that much of what we were saying about the threat of immigration and our loss of national identity was actually correct. But he was always a great supporter of the underdog and is therefore naturally suspicious of any movement or organisation that – allegedly, of course – seeks to attack or denigrate people from ethnic minorities. I suppose that he is like the majority of

people here in England, believing originally that multi-racialism was a noble concept and that it could bring people together, but the fact that he now spends most of his time abroad tells you how disillusioned he is with the present situation here in England. So I was influenced by my father to some extent, but these days I'm more inclined to believe that there is very little in England worth fighting for. The writing is on the wall, unfortunately; our small island is quickly descending into a coffee-coloured dumping ground for the economic migrants of the Third World. This position of weakness and frustration has encouraged me to look abroad to our fellow brothers and sisters in the rest of Europe, many of whom are suffering the same problems, in the hope that we can initiate a growing trend whereby the remnants of our Indo-European tradition and identity can be salvaged and expressed anew. Elsewhere, if necessary, because geographical considerations are less important to me than the revival and propagation of those values and principles themselves.

Q: Have your goals changed over the years or is it just your tactics that have changed?

TS: I am striving for the same ideals, certainly, but I've definitely moved away from certain political ideologies like nationalism and socialism. Previously, of course, I had promoted the revolutionary ideas of German workerists like Otto and Gregor Strasser, as well as Catholic distributists like G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc, and key British socialists like Robert Owen and Bob Blatchford. However, in the mid-90s I found myself becoming inspired by the work of Richard Hunt (Alternative Green) and thus became an anarchist. That is not to say that I don't continue to hold many socialists in high esteem, I do, but I feel that the role of the State has completely replaced that of the community and therefore my allegiance is with the latter. I have also come to believe that England as a nation is finished. It still exists in name, of course, but only because it is constantly being redefined to suit the multi-racialist and increasingly globalist agenda. The England of my generation, and that which came before it, is dead. I'm not suggesting that we should revive the comparatively idyllic trappings of my own childhood; on the contrary, the principles that I hold dear are

eternal and can reappear at any time. I don't see this happening in modern-day England, certainly, but regardless of the actual birthing-ground for the regeneration of our people, it is up to a new traditional elite to force its will upon the essentially linear and 'progressive' historical process.

Q: I would like you to comment on the recent founding of the New Right, as you recently held your second meeting in London with prominent speakers and attendants from different parts of Europe. The New Right is a term which is derived from the groups and personalities, G.R.E.C.E as the foremost proponent, mainly situated in France during the seventies. Is this a continuation of these efforts, or what is the main purpose of the New Right of 2005?

TS: When Jonothon Boulter and myself decided to form the New Right in January 2005, we had two main reasons for doing so. Firstly, whilst we had each been inspired by the work carried out by intellectual and cultural figures such as Alain de Benoist and others; we realised that the New Right had virtually run its course in mainland Europe and had hardly got off the ground in England at all. Michael Walker, for example, the Editor of *Scorpion* magazine, did some excellent work in the early part of the 1980s, but a combination of him moving abroad and the fact that by 1989 the 'Political Soldier' faction within the NF had been decimated by a series of ideological differences and personality clashes, Jonothon and I thought the time was right for a new intellectual and metapolitical current in the British Isles. Secondly, we hope that the recent progress made by the New Right in England – a country which is sadly dismissed by many people in Europe as the 51st State of America – will revitalise the increasingly stagnant New Right elsewhere. This is not intended as a criticism, incidentally; we just happen to believe that the revival of such ideas on 'virgin ground', so to speak, can provide new hope and a fresh impetus for our allies abroad. Our efforts also coincide with the release of Michael O'Meara's excellent *New Culture, New Right*.^[4] Indeed, the Twenty-first century brings with it new challenges and therefore we need to regather the most astute and counter-cultural minds in Europe and North America for the tasks that lie ahead. So yes, it is a continuation of past

efforts and a re-evaluation of where we stand today with regard to the future.

Q: Do you believe that such a network can make a difference politically and culturally on a national level indirectly or do you see it more as a select group that has chosen to withdraw from the contemporary squabble of everyday politics and sensationalism?

TS: I think both positions are equally valid. Some of us have chosen to withdraw from the contemporary world, at least to a certain degree, but we still have to live in it and therefore we feel that we can even change it to some extent by inspiring other people. On the other hand, of course, we are necessarily elitist and strongly believe that it is essential to win the battle of ideas and not to create a mass movement.

Q: Creating and forging an elite has been one of the main goals of the New Right and its heirs from the beginning, often opposed to political mass movements and populist parties of every political colour. Is it possible to create a cultural elite detached from the masses or, more specifically, the people? What is the purpose of an elite if not to set an example for the people and create and school a leadership which utilizes the positive elements and creative energy of the people?

TS: Yes, exactly. It is up to the minority to inspire the multitude, although this can take a variety of forms and work on a series of different levels. We certainly don't wish to gather together a self-important group of stuffy intellectuals with about as much chance of having an influence as a grain of sand in a bathtub. But people obviously have varying abilities and therefore it is a question of horses for courses. In other words, all metapolitical or philosophical ideas must ultimately lead to forms of positive action that have an effect on a broad and diverse assortment of cultural and identitarian issues. I also believe that an elite should be able to epitomise those elements which, by their very nature, should inevitably inspire others. Not by adopting positions of arrogance and self-delusion, but by simply getting on with their own lives and perhaps encouraging others to take on board at least some of the values they consider important. As these messages filter

out from the elite, they will find expression to an equal or lesser extent elsewhere. I believe that things happen for a reason; therefore anyone in tune with our ideas is naturally fulfilling a form of intuitive dharma. And that includes those who either reject or oppose us. They, too, have an important role to play in the coming struggle for hearts and minds. It is a war between the degenerative and the regenerative.

Q: Do you see the New Right as a potential autonomous think-tank for different organisations opposed to the New World Order of global capitalism, ethnic egalitarianism, Marxist-liberalist values, American cultural imperialism and parliamentarism?

TS: Indeed. This is how we expect our ideas to reach other people, be they university academics or political activists on the ground. These organisations and associations are the most effective way of spreading our ideas, and I also happen to believe that most of the people we wish to influence are already active in one way or another. The aim is to initiate a new current that transcends the outdated categories of Left and Right and which gets people moving in a similar direction.

Q: Could it be possible for the New Right to influence already established parties that work within the framework of contemporary mass-media and parliamentary democracy? If not, do we need yet another sect of self asserting egomaniacs detached from reality or do you consider the establishment of an exclusive elite to be a sort of nucleus for an autonomous, noble society, co-existing with the temporary world, yet detached from its rules, norms and values?

TS: I've answered this above, to a certain extent, but one only has to think of the example of Leo Strauss and the manner in which a relatively small group of Neoconservative thinkers and intellectuals had such a vast impact on the development of modern American politics. Compared to ours, their goals are obviously very negative, of course, but the strategy itself has resulted in a series of very dangerous implications for the entire world. Nevertheless, this example still demonstrates the sheer potential and power of an idea.

Q: Judging from the second meeting of the New Right held in

London, the diversity in beliefs both spiritual as well as cultural and political was apparent. Advocates of Orthodox Christianity as well as Nietzschean, anti-Christian vitalism made strong statements opposing each other, still respecting each others' faiths. Is this a diversity that you think the New Right should strive for, or is it just something that develops naturally?

TS: Both. It seems completely impossible or even ludicrous to try to reconcile a Nietzschean and a priest, but what is important are the points where each converge. In other words, those positions upon which people can agree. If we can avoid descending into religious, moral, political or ideological dogma, so much more can be achieved. Our task is to get everyone pulling in a similar direction. There will be plenty of time for the peculiarities of a certain position to find its own level afterwards. In the words of Lenin: 'March separately and strike together.'

Q. Is such a diversity a strength or should one strive for a more common ground, a sort of ultimate manifesto for the future? If so, what do you believe one of the credos should be?

TS: We do have a very broad platform but have also made a conscious effort to avoid being too rigid or dogmatic. Our main bugbears are democracy, egalitarianism and globalisation, which must ultimately be countered by elitism, natural hierarchy and an affirmation of our European heritage and identity.

Q. What we could call the Nationalist movement, understood as different organisations and people dedicated to preserving and developing the heritage of their own ethnic group, is as diverse as its adversaries, if not even more so. One difference of intense dispute is religion. Do you think that pre-Christian beliefs, existentialism, vitalism, Gnosticism and conservative Christianity could form a sort of eclectic choice of faith for regenerating European spirit where the different individual faiths could unite into a spiritual force able to ignite action on a political level?

TS: As Tomislav Sunic points out in *Against Democracy and Equality*,^[2] the reason Liberalism and Marxism have been so successful

is due to the fact that their core values – namely universalism, egalitarianism, totalitarianism and a belief in the linear interpretation of history – were, paradoxically, originally derived from the intolerant dualism and individual subjectivity found within Judeo-Christianity and then conveniently spread by way of the Roman Empire. Monotheistic religions are a major threat to both regional and cultural identity, not to mention spiritual diversity. Indeed, whilst I could accept Jesus Christ or Allah as localised deities, or even as part of a pantheon of gods, I dislike the way Christianity and Islam each seek to create their own metaphysical version of the New World Order. Likewise, whilst in reality ancient paganism is far more holistic, Muslims and Christians consider the rest of us to be heretics. At the same time, however, if people can put their liturgical, scriptural and doctrinal beliefs to one side in pursuit of an ideal through which several key principles can be ignited as one force, then it is possible to make progress. I think it's a case of using the correct language within a specific framework that everybody can feel comfortable with. So it's far more positive to encourage a forum that deals with the revival of European identity, for example, than one which finds itself preoccupied with the question of whether Jesus was really the son of God. People can work together, but only if they leave their divisive baggage at the door and enter forth in a spirit of open-mindedness.

Q. Is any faith better than no faith?

TS: I certainly have more respect for a Communist, for example, than for someone who simply goes through life in a haze of apathy or indifference. But in a religious sense, I think faith can also be very negative indeed. Pagans tend to look at existence in terms of the form it actually takes, which thus enables them to shape and interpret it accordingly. Monotheists, on the other hand, standardise everything in accordance with a universalist principle. A principle, of course, which is both highly subjective and framed by allegedly 'indisputable' truths.

Q. In what sense should the New Right work on a metapolitical level?

TS: The reason we have stated clearly that all New Right discourse

should take a metapolitical form, is because we do not want to get bogged down in meaningless party politics about whether we should support abortion or gay marriage, for example, or whether we should vote for a specific party or take up arms and overthrow the government of the day. Individually, of course, we each have our own political and socio-economic beliefs, but these should not interfere when it comes to discussing the eternal values that shape us as Europeans. This means, of course, that people from a variety of political backgrounds can attend our meetings and link up with other people who have similar opinions in specific areas.

Q. Is it at all possible to build a potent pan-European movement of some kind, or are we forever stuck in a National-chauvinist quagmire in the end, leaving the New Right as another beautiful paper utopia?

TS: I think we have enough movements in the world already, but in terms of creating a counter-culture and spreading intellectual ideas, I believe that we can have a major impact in a really practical sense.

Q. If the New Right is the intellectual and spiritual arm of a European movement, what should the active and practical component and consequence of that effort be?

TS: The first step is to network with like-minded people across Europe and throughout the world. The New Right e-group is simply the beginning and we are currently working on a new website. Getting people along to meetings is important, too, but due to the fact that some people seem intent on disrupting our activities we are always restricted somewhat and therefore attendance at this stage is by invitation only. Eventually, however, we wish to attract intellectuals and academics from a wide variety of backgrounds, be they scientists, historians, film directors, sociologists, poets, biologists, occultists, novelists, economists or anything else. The Revisionists in Europe and North America have done a great deal in this regard and it is up to us to emulate the way that they have managed to bring in fresh blood.

Q. Europe is not only in a ditch politically, to put it bluntly, but spiritually as well. Many nationalists see the conviction of Muslim

immigrants as the main threat to European culture and spirit. What is your opinion on the main threats to Europe?

TS: The prime dangers are Americanisation and multi-racialism. Here in the British Isles, for example, the degenerative effects of the Disney-Muckdonalds monster are plain for all to see. Our children are systematically brainwashed at a very tender age, becoming highly dependent on television and junk food. By the time they attend secondary school at the age of 11, the multi-racial agenda really kicks in and children begin talking and acting like Jamaican gangsters. And it's not simply a question of culture, either; the saturation of our major towns and cities – coupled with the cult of the celluloid soap opera which affects even the tiniest village – has led to disturbing behavioural trends that cause youngsters to swagger down the street like Neanderthals or affect a form of slang patois that is inevitably expressed in broken English. In other words, this global anti-culture has led to a serious identity crisis. But what else can we expect when children of European descent grow up in immigrant strongholds? Even the immigrants themselves are losing their identities in the face of this American cultural imperialism. In the 1970s many Blacks listened to reggae music and took pride in their African roots, but these days they stand shoulder to shoulder with their White and Asian contemporaries and have sold their souls to the over-rated rap stars of New York and Compton. The Muslims, on the other hand, remain vigorously opposed to this threat and seem far more aware of the danger that it represents. This makes them less susceptible than the average European and I have a lot of admiration for their inner strength. However, I don't support their presence in Europe and believe that Islam will present a serious challenge in the future once our central infrastructure and communities really begin to break down. We can work with Muslims against America, of course, but when it comes to Europe we have to put our own people first.

Q. Could Europe theoretically form a future alliance with Islamic countries, as well as other non-European cultures to counter the global war for global capitalism as instigated by the US and its allies?

TS: Absolutely. US foreign policy is a threat to the entire population of the planet and, therefore, is something which inevitably affects every single one of us. Francis Parker Yockey was a great example of someone who had rather similar ideas to our own and who forged useful ties with key figures both outside Europe and in the Third World. As mentioned above, Islam is a useful weapon against American globalisation, but only if its adherents don't attempt to set up a monotheistic stranglehold in its place.

Q. Can immigration, as a symptom of cultural and spiritual decay, be seen as an agent of European awakening in the face of obliteration, or will it inevitably lead to ultimate ethnic disaster?

TS: It could swing both ways. Some multi-racial communities are incredibly divided and there is a good chance that they will remain permanently unresolved in the same way that Catholics and Protestants in Ulster have been stubbornly entrenched for several decades. Elsewhere, of course, in places like London or Amsterdam there is far more apathy and tolerance and therefore cities such as these are becoming increasingly hybridised and, thus, less European.

Q. Do Europeans and people of European descent stand any chance in the long run against more prolific cultures and races?

TS: I don't think they want to. Thousands of British people are emigrating to Spain, Australia and New Zealand, so perhaps they will become new centres for a cultural regeneration. It is a fact, after all, that once people flee the cities and discover precisely the same things happening out in the rural areas, they tend to pack up and leave the country altogether. So in many parts of Europe the writing is already on the wall, but that doesn't mean that we can't continue to live in accordance with our values elsewhere.

Q. What actions ideally should be taken to preserve the European ethnicity?

TS: Running away from our problems will not ultimately prevent the advance of globalisation. We must therefore win the battle of ideas. That is obviously a job for thinkers and intellectuals, but at the next level down we need people who are good at reviving our diverse

European culture. So the basic ideas – themselves recurring constantly throughout countless millennia – must be tied to a healthy expression of cultural identity. It is not enough to think and to talk – we must live it. Every day. If you don't like liberal teachers, educate your children at home; if you don't like liberal values, stop watching television or following current trends; and if you want to be European, live among your fellow Europeans.

Q. You are also committed to National-Anarchism. Could you give a brief overview of what it is about and what the main goals are, if any such exist?

TS: National-Anarchists wish to see the establishment of autonomous, mono-racial communities in which people can occupy their own space in which to live according to their own values and principles. Not in a coercive sense, of course; National-Anarchism is a decidedly mutualist concept and has – to some extent – been influenced by the work of Richard Hunt and Hakim Bey.

Q. Will not such a loose network, based on autonomous cells, be forced by the foes of ethnic autonomy to unite in national and pan-national organisation(s) in order to counter the multitude of our adversaries, or else perish with the rest?

TS: I think it's possible to maintain ties with other National-Anarchist communities around the world and continue to retain the autonomy of a single community at the same time. Forming alliances, of course, does not mean that we have to implement a national infrastructure or compromise our approach towards decentralisation. One example that I've used before, is that of the Fellowship in Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings*. Whilst the various Hobbits, Men, Dwarves and Elves come together in order to defeat a totalitarian adversary, when the task is completed they each go their own separate ways. Unity in diversity.

Q. You are also involved in the musical/artistic project H.E.R.R. and currently re-releasing the album *The Winter of Constantinople*.

TS: H.E.R.R. is not a political entity and the remaining three members of the group are not involved in activities of this nature, but

given that our songs deal with the glory and tragedy of European history, my involvement is obviously fuelled by a need and a willingness to express my own cultural identity. Our latest album deals with the Fall of Constantinople in 1543 and the consequences that it represented for both Europe and the Holy Roman Empire. Meanwhile, our next project is based on the work of the Dutch playwright, Joost van den Vondel (1587-1679), author of *Lucifer*.

Q. What importance have music and artistic efforts and the struggle for what we could call a new Europe in balance with its past?

TS: I think that past, present and future can effectively be realised in a single moment. In other words, whenever something reflects the European spirit it immediately accords with the repetition of an eternal principle. So the past is often mirrored in the present and will be again and again in the future. The Rumanian author, Mircea Eliade, notes that whenever this process takes place it creates a new centre. It's the same with birth and ritual. Whilst it never happens in exactly the same way, an idea rips through the straight-jacket of linear time in a celebration of the perennial.

Q. Groups such as H.E.R.R. and others of the Neo-folk/Darkwave scene form a sub-culture. Do you see a possibility to evolve this into a vital counter-culture, appealing to a larger audience in defiance of the mindless pop industry?

TS: I don't think groups like H.E.R.R., Von Thronstahl, Puissance, Death in June or Sol Invictus will ever become mainstream, but they are part of an underground counter-culture that attracts tens of thousands of people across Europe and North America. The most important thing about this growing development, however, is that many of the concert audiences already contain a minority of people with views very similar to our own. They may not be politically-minded, but they do engage in a specific lifestyle that is both pro-European and anti-American. It's not the kind of attitude that one would find in the average Right-wing party, either; the people are more anarchistic but still retain their love of culture and identity. It's a meeting of the

revolutionary and the conservative.

Q. Being a married, full-time father of four children whom you tutor yourself, you set an impressive example for other parents who want to raise a family independent of the totalitarian egalitarianism. How did that come about and how do you cope with what, for most people today, would seem an overwhelming task?

TS: Home-schooling is not funded by the State and is still regarded in many circles as a rather bohemian and outlandish concept. There are well over a million home-educated families in North America, but in England the numbers are far smaller. My wife and I first thought seriously about home-schooling when she was still pregnant with our first child. At that time I was a Traditional Catholic and this form of alternative education was fairly popular amongst many of the parents in those circles. Coupled with the fact that England's educational standards are some of the worst in Europe, we decided to join Education Otherwise, a self-help group designed to help families interested in home-schooling. A decade later we find ourselves with four children who have been taught to a fairly high standard and, thus far, managed to avoid becoming caught up in the cycle of Americanisation and youth crime that infects a vast number of other children. Home-schooling is very hard work and you do have to be very committed, but I can't see any reason why all parents with our ideas can't teach their children at home. It's a question of reorganising one's priorities and of making sacrifices. Compared to most people we do have to live on a fairly low income, but the results are there for all to see. Our children, whilst still very young, are already very clued-up about the nature of the world and the direction in which it is heading. By avoiding local schools and liberal teaching methods, therefore, we have managed to instil in our children a sense of identity, self-expression, individuality, history and ecological awareness. Home-schooled children also find it easier to relate to people of varying ages, rather than being unnaturally confined to a classroom with other children of exactly the same age. And rather than being ignored in a class of 40 or 50 pupils, they also receive one-on-one tutoring. People often ask us how we deal with the social aspect, which always seems

very curious given that schools are supposedly designed to educate children and not to socialise them. In reality, of course, schools are indeed designed to ‘socialise’ children, inevitably preparing them for a life of uniformity, drudgery and wage-slavery. But our children participate in a whole variety of sports and belong to a number of clubs and organisations. That can involve a lot of time and money, but at least they do have friends outside of the home environment.

Q. What should the role of the family be in an ideal society?

TS: I see the family as the central part of an interconnecting chain that runs from the individual to the family and then from the family to the tribe. At the higher level, of course, we have the race itself, but it tends to become rather vague and abstract when people start talking about a ‘White race’ when there are so many diverse sub-categories involved. Needless to say, the family – along with the individual and the tribe – provides us with an identity and a point of reference. At the same time, of course, I don’t like the bourgeois interpretation of the family because some people are natural outcasts or tend to be rather misanthropic. People like that often have a higher purpose to fulfil; it’s not for everyone to settle down and have children.

Q. What will you, being involved in several activities and independent groups such as National-Anarchism, *SYNTHESIS*, the New Right and the music project H.E.R.R. (to mention but a few) focus on in the future? What are your plans and objectives for the coming year?

TS: My chief priority, at the moment at least, is to continue with the work that we have been doing with the New Right since January 2005. There will be more meetings and social events. But whilst I remain a National-Anarchist at the purely political level, I no longer spend my time propagandising or putting up posters and stickers. A new generation of young activists are slowly emerging from the woodwork of this beleaguered country, some of them influenced by the work we did back in the 1980s and 1990s with the English Nationalist Movement (ENM) and National Revolutionary Faction (NRF), not least the new English Peoples Party (EPP) and various other nationalistic and

cultural groupings. The fact that people such as this are struggling for the same cause at the grassroots level, enables me to concentrate my efforts on the more intellectual and esoteric currents. Elsewhere, of course, I shall be performing live with H.E.R.R. and writing more songs with the other members of the group, as well as organising a series of camps and hikes. There is so much going on behind the scenes here in England and it often takes an immense effort to keep up with it all.

Q. Finally, do you have any words of advice and inspiration for the independent, political, European freedom fighter?

TS: If you have strong beliefs and principles, try to make them become manifest throughout every day of your life. Make a calculated attempt to systematically avoid those things which could potentially damage or compromise your own values, whilst making an extra special effort to do those things that will make you stronger and more determined. In the meantime, I would like to offer my very best wishes to our friends and comrades in Norway. Keep up the good work.

^[1] 1stBooks, 2004.

^[2] Noontide Press, 2004.

PART VI:

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

THE WARRIOR'S REWARD

GOBS of rain that ride the wind, and sweep the City streets,
Through cars and buses and trains and bikes, a never-ending fleet,
Rushing bodies with stinging faces, assailed by a devilish drizzle,
A hundred odours plague my nose, as a thousand burgers sizzle.
Wherefore art thou, England? Must you remain a dream?
Of days of yore in tales of old, no visions can be seen.
Existing in pure drudgery, knee-deep I wade through slime,
Hustling, busting, rarely smiling – but hoping all the time.
Oh, to have a scabbard! With sword of gleaming steel!
That cultural turncoats by the score my bottled wrath would feel.
Through mists of thick pollution, 'neath skies of barely blue,
Coughing, spluttering, double-deckers that yield a motley crew.
Those cardiac-ridden commuters, devoid of all reaction,
A legion of headless bus-queues, the penalty for inaction.
My satiated, blood-red blade, that drips with Liberal gore,
Now thirsts for bloated usurers and bankers by the score.
My parched companion years, to Wapping we shall go,
But afore we slay the Gutter Press I seek the amber flow.
And then I saw my destiny, an inn that stood so proud,
An oasis in a hellish land, a sun behind a cloud.
I strode through that wooden door, that once was mighty oak,
And all at once beheld the fire that merry men did stoke.
My dry lips met the tankard; my peaceful heart was fanned,
By the sweet songs of happiness in this Bilbo Baggins land.

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

AN ODE TO APATHY

THE modern Saxons have no swords,
In suburbia they supremely reign,
They carry furled umbrellas,
And do the crossword on the train.
With polished brogues and patterned ties,
They read the Daily Pap,
A warrior race in days of old,
Now the battle-cry is: 'Mind the Gap!'
What happened to Olde England?
Are these modern Saxons free?
Their chief concern is coffee spilt,
Upon a pin-striped knee.
These fools have shown no courage,
Whilst a sinister plot was hatched,
Well, keep your shares and mortgages,
And your Surbiton semi-detached.
As you stare from office windows,
Looking for someone to blame,
Just take a look at history,
And wallow in your shame.
So lift up your hearts, ye faithful,
For we shall meet our fate,
We have no use for modern Saxons,
Let's hope their trains run late.

CHAPTER THIRTY

DIARY OF DESOLATION

Thursday 22nd July

Dear Diary,

I don't think that I can bear another day of this mind-numbing drudgery. Every morning it's the same: my fellow termites and I leap aboard the seven thirty-eight from Canterbury East to Victoria and stare blankly at one another for an hour and a half. No one utters a solitary word, but we are like brothers in our servitude, bound inextricably in a passive acceptance of life's eternal misery. Sometimes our very thoughts appear to hover momentarily above our heads, thrashing frantically as though imprisoned within a frustrating pool of inevitable non-fulfilment. Around the luggage racks they fly, seeking vainly the most vague and minute opportunities of expression amid the restraining boundaries of conformity and dull repetition. It's nice to dream. This morning I noticed an ugly, overweight man with a large grey moustache staring quite unashamedly at the legs of every female unfortunate enough to choose the same compartment. I suppose that even his desires – as grubby and repulsive as they may be – constitute a dream of some description. A passionate yearning for satisfaction and release, perhaps, or a lifelong quest for personal betterment and success. Isn't that what we all want? My own dreams are getting more frequent these days and, to be totally honest, dear Diary, I much prefer to lose myself amongst the pleasurable kingdoms of my own imagination than in the puzzling complexities of the London Underground system. Or, for that matter, in the endless corridors and drone-strewn hallways of Canary Wharf. Freedom! That's what I want. The freedom to have political, social and economic control over my own destiny. Ha! Some hope. Who the hell do I think I am? An idealist? An Utopian, even? Am I merely the proverbial angry young man, a lonely and isolated face in a flowing sea of economic units? The silent Raskolnikov of my age? Whilst my mind repeats the rhetorical verbiage of emancipation I, like all the other pin-striped insects, find that my body is leading me towards the escalators, the ticket barriers

and, ultimately, the office. My daily subservience to the Capitalist system is a reflection of my helplessness and despair. The helplessness and despair of society in general. How did we ever get into this mess? And, more importantly, how the hell are we going to get out of it?

Friday 23rd July

Dear Diary,

They say that only generals and virgins write diaries, but to my knowledge the likes of Samuel Johnson and James Boswell were neither. I wonder if they had this much trouble? At least Anne Frank had hers written for her. Attempting to describe the events of one's own life is hard enough, without the additional burden of having no life to write of. I do try to steer clear of the 'got-up-went-to-work-came-home-had-my-tea-and-went-to-bed' syndrome, but it's extremely tough without a regular variety of exciting footage at hand, I can tell you! Not that there is anything particularly false in that rather condensed and mundane statement, of course. Most days undoubtedly do contain those specific elements, but I still have my thoughts. What I think and how I live my life are two quite distinct opposites. Indeed, never was a polemic so absolutely polemical. Variety, we are reliably informed, is the spice of life. If truth be told, your humble narrator has a profound disadvantage which renders his earnest scribblings both invalid and irrelevant. 'What is it?', I hear you cry. Well, for one to recognise the tedious nature of human existence it is surely necessary to have previously experienced an alternative to life in its present form? In other words, without first having lived through a period of relative happiness and contentment it seems impossible to make a basic distinction between that and sufferance. That's the theoretical view, anyway. In a more practical sense I just know there has to be something far better and worth striving for. One of these days I'll find out what it is.

Saturday 24th July

Dear Diary,

The weekend. Surely the enemy of all businessmen? Hardly. The weekend is a useful tool for those who like to extract their profit from

the blood and sweat of the workforce. Two days that have become a recurring pressure-valve. A period when the cage door is thrown open and the beleaguered cogs in the economic machinery of the nation have a chance to stretch their legs. They also have the time in which to spend the money they have earned from their labours. And, in their ignorance, end up giving it back to the financial wizards from whom it all came in the first place. Every Saturday the deceived masses file into the shopping complexes, the department stores and the burger bars; the materialist playgrounds of the modern age. As I study these people they seem to resemble a scene from a macabre pilgrimage, where the high priests of the retail trade receive millions and millions of pounds in return for a hollow communion of plastic, pleasure and polystyrene. The faceless individuals at the top know precisely what they are doing. It is a form of manipulation and control which economic analysts like to describe as 'demand management'.

Even the bedraggled teenagers congregating in the town centres – the casuals, the punk rockers, the hippies and the New Age Travellers – they, too, have been systematically created or directed by those who call the tune. As they stand idly on the street corners or sunbathe drunkenly in the parks, bored out of their minds, they are under the misguided impression that they reflect the rebelliousness of society at large. Far from it. The capitalist entrepreneurs have the means to create an 'alternative' market and these so-called 'social outcasts' can be seen wearing the T-shirts, the leather jackets and the jeans of the big fashion conglomerates. The originality of man has become submerged beneath a barrage of commercial junk. There is no room for personal initiative and identity whilst the conveyor belts are churning out a meaningless pile of solidified hype. And, like an unspoken curfew, the busy streets are always purged of their bustling occupants shortly before the mystical tea-time benchmark. The bloated, satiated and fully-consumed fleet of carrier bags flocks homewards to watch Pamela Anderson's boobs, Jeremy Beadle and the National Lottery. And what a pitiful sight it is, too. I've seen them through the net curtains, silhouetted figures sat wide-eyed and dribbling in their armchairs, observing little coloured balls and dreaming of yet more shopping.

My own weekend, apart from the obvious social observances, was spent rather differently. I occupied myself with the small array of vegetables that I have grown on my little piece of English soil (or at least that which is currently mortgaged to the local high street bank). In a way I suppose that I was pretty confined myself – within an area measuring little more than thirty square feet, in fact – but at least I was able to feel the dark soil fall between my fingers and have the sun beat down upon my shoulders. I am one of the lucky ones. The pathetic inhabitants of a high-rise tower block in Bermondsey will never experience such simple pleasures. Today I tried to spare a thought for those worse off than myself. This individualistic society, however, is not renowned for its charity and when all is said and done most people are simply out for what they can get. Are these selfish, apathetic slugs really my people, my compatriots, or my brothers and sisters? Such people make me want to throw up. There must be others who, like me, care enough to want to bring this whole stinking system crashing to the ground. There has to be something.

Is there anybody out there . . . ?

CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE

THE BOOT ON THE OTHER FOOT

AD 2173, Tel Aviv

Israeli Prime Minister John Bull has expressed his deep regret at last Wednesday's disturbances in Tel Aviv. During yesterday's appearance as guest speaker at the annual conference of the board of Deputies of Israeli Englishmen, Mr. Bull attacked anti-English extremists for the violent demonstrations in which four people were killed.

Board spokesman, John Smith, took the opportunity to call a press conference and denounce the growing influence of the Jewish Nationalist Movement (JNM), something Mr Smith described as a 'racist phenomenon which threatens to undermine our whole democratic process'. He went on to compare the JNM with 'their ideological predecessors, jack-booted murderers responsible for the systematic genocide of six million English men, women and children'.

As a throng of demonstrators gathered outside the King David Hotel, where the conference was taking place, one leading JNM activist – Benjamin Goldberg – told assembled reporters that his organisation 'will not stand idly by whilst English settlers continue to exert their pernicious influence on the affairs of the Israeli nation'. Goldberg then attempted to justify his hatred of English settlers by claiming there 'is growing evidence of an English conspiracy that has managed to penetrate the upper echelons of political and economic power in Israel. Aply assisted by their co-racialists within the corridors of international bankerdom, English immigrants have now managed to supersede the indigenous population. In proportion to the tiny percentage of English men and women in Israel today, their involvement in the governing, judicial and legislative sectors of the State far outweighs that of we Jews'.

As demonstrators clashed with police, there were sixty-three arrests. Police superintendent Tom Brown described the events as 'violent in the extreme. We have no objections to people voicing their opinions but, given the opportunity, the JNM would deny exactly the same rights

to other people'. Some eyewitnesses claim JNM supporters were sporting Zionist armbands and selling copies of illegal publications like the Talmud, a virulent hate-sheet noted for its open encouragement of criminal activities of a blatant and perverse nature.

The JNM, formed three years ago in defiance of the 2170 English Supremacy Act and various other laws encouraging positive discrimination in favour of English minority groups, is rumoured to have a secretive cell-structure and links with other racist organisations around the world. In the wake of last November's bomb attack on the Centre for Merrie English Studies, nine JNM activists were arrested and charged. They are expected to be sentenced later this month.

The JNM's charismatic leader Gerry Kaufbaum, is currently serving four years in a labour camp on the outskirts of New Jerusalem. Earlier this year, Kaufbaum was found guilty of promoting Jewish culture, heritage and tradition. The revival of such anachronisms has been directly responsible for the current surge of extremism on the streets of Israel.

As the nation tries to come to terms with increasing tension between Jewish extremists and their victims, English lobbyists are beginning to call for the wholesale banning of the JNM and are planning to submit detailed evidence to the Select Committee investigating into escalating attacks on the ethnic community. In reality, this may be the only option available if we wish to preserve democracy in Israel.

CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO

THE END OF AN AGE

COME with me. Let me lead you through the dark alleyways of old London, where the rats and urban foxes battle it out over putrid scraps of shish kebab. And where filth-ridden pigeons nibble at choice morsels in a technicolour puddle of vomit and bile. Chip wrappers, dancing in the wind like flags of surrender, are streaked through with pram tracks, as a bawling inhabitant is shoved along by a teenage mother on Brixton crack and State benefit. Her pursed lips and scowling face carved in the tough backstreets of a council estate, old before their time and flanked by hooped earrings and a pink mobile phone. No education. No sense. No future. The doorways are littered with mouldy sleeping bags, as life stirs among wet blankets and scraps of cardboard. The psychos and the drug addicts nestle together like pieces of human refuse, waiting to die in an unsympathetic expression of biological garbage. A living tangle of inadvertent Dadaism. Unwanted sludge on the heel of a passer-by, far too busy to notice the flotsam and jetsam that has sunk right down to the very bottom of the septic tank that is modern society.

The City. A bastion of materialism where misery reigns supreme on a gilded throne of opulence and greed. Where degradation flirts with hopelessness and wealthy businessmen, with piggy eyes and sweaty palms, thrust knives of steel into the heart of a local community. Drugs and alcohol are the only escape from the madness of day to day living, where teenage girls have to sell their own bodies in order to survive. Hamburger cartons litter the streets where the homeless beg for money beside concrete playgrounds full of brainwashed children. Meanwhile, the oldest of the city-dwellers sit huddled and afraid. Too scared to venture out in case they are attacked or robbed by a nihilistic youth element. Preferring to die of hyperthermia in a rabbit hutch that has no central heating. The small trader struggles to survive as the monopolies gradually wear him down, day by day, hour by hour. Roving bands of youths, bored and frustrated, vent their fury on the property of others. Graffiti is scrawled on any available space, as though the city were a giant scrapbook in which to express the idle thoughts of a lost generation. Nothing artistic. Nothing cultural. Just the worthless

outpourings of an inferior mind where imagination and creativity – if they were ever present in the first place – are pushed aside by an imported American lifestyle. The polluted river, where fish once swam and thrived in plenty, has become like congealed jelly, full of chemical waste, used condoms and bobbing layers of thick scum. Row upon row of overcrowded tower blocks – where the closest identification with nature is found on a television screen or in a goldfish bowl – overlook hordes of pin-striped conformists, working nine to five before returning to the suburban shoe-boxes from where they came like obedient termites. A brick chimney stack blots the skyline. Here, the workers are controlled and exploited for a pittance by a smug man with a parasitical personality who puffs on fat cigars and drinks Perrier water. As the atmosphere is choked by streams of billowing smoke, the grey clouds gather like vultures and the acid rain begins to fall to earth. Miniature droplets creating their own liquid Hiroshima. Crouched beside the tell-tale green of an eroded statue, the ghost of Henry Mayhew is scribbling down his thoughts on remarkably preserved scraps of Victorian notepaper. Like a silent observer, he is here to witness ... the end of an age.

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