

Ancient Commentators on Aristotle

GENERAL EDITOR: RICHARD SORABJI

SIMPLICIUS: On Epictetus Handbook 1–26

Translated by
Charles Brittain & Tad Brennan

B L O O M S B U R Y



SIMPLICIUS

On Epictetus Handbook 1-26

SIMPLICIUS
On Epictetus
Handbook 1-26

Translated by
Charles Brittain & Tad Brennan

B L O O M S B U R Y
LONDON • NEW DELHI • NEW YORK • SYDNEY

Bloomsbury Academic

An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

50 Bedford Square
London
WC1B 3DP
UK

1385 Broadway
New York
NY 10018
USA

www.bloomsbury.com

Bloomsbury is a registered trade mark of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

First published in 2002 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.

Paperback edition first published 2014

© 2013 Charles Brittain and Tad Brennan

Charles Brittain and Tad Brennan have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Authors of this work.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.

No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury Academic or the author.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN HB: 978-0-7156-3068-6

PB: 978-1-4725-5806-0

ePDF: 978-1-4725-0194-3

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

The present translations have been made possible by generous and imaginative funding from the following sources: the National Endowment for the Humanities, Division of Research Programs, an independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme Trust; the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis Foundation; the Arts and Humanities Research Board of the British Academy; the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown Trust; Mr and Mrs N. Egon; the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO/GW). A special grant for the preparation of this volume was provided by the Council of Gresham College. The editor wishes to thank Brad Inwood, Christopher Gill, Doug Hutchinson and Teun Tieleman for their comments and Han Baltussen for preparing the volume for press.

Typeset by Ray Davies

Printed and bound in Great Britain

Contents

Preface	vii
Introduction	1
Textual Emendations	36
Translation	37
Notes	125
Bibliography	140
Concordance of Editions and Overview of Topics	143
English-Greek Glossary	145
Greek-English Index	152
Subject Index	175

Preface

The writings of Simplicius are now extant. His physical and metaphysical commentaries on Aristotle have passed away with the fashion of the times; but his moral interpretation of Epictetus is preserved in the library of nations, as a classic book, most excellently adapted to direct the will, to purify the heart, and to confirm the understanding, by a just confidence in the nature both of God and man (Edward Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, pt. V, ch. 40).

Gibbon's casual condemnation of the 'physical and metaphysical commentaries on Aristotle' – i.e. of most of the volumes in the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series that has given our own translation a home – now seems merely to illustrate the fashion of his times: translations of ancient commentaries on Aristotle's *Physics* or *Metaphysics* no longer need to justify their appearance in print. A translation of an ancient commentary on Epictetus' *Encheiridion*, however, perhaps does require a bit more justification than Gibbon's pious encomium, particularly when it is appearing in a series on the exegesis of Aristotle. Although it is not included in the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, we think that there are good reasons for the inclusion of this commentary in the series that will assure it of appropriate readers. For Simplicius was an ancient commentator on Aristotle, and this work tells us a great deal about him, the other ancient commentators on Aristotle, and the Platonist milieu in which they worked; and, though nominally devoted to a Stoic text, it is perhaps the most concise encapsulation of the Platonist vision of the world that survives. Thus, by including this volume, the series will eventually contain all of the extant commentaries by Simplicius, and a work that is extraordinarily informative about the larger intellectual project that underlay the commentaries on Aristotle that are its principal constituents.

Our translation is to a great extent the product of our predecessors: Johannes Schweighäuser, whose commentary on Simplicius' commentary is a model of philological and philosophical incisiveness; and Professor I. Hadot, whose dedication to Simplician studies is likely to remain unmatched, and from whose editions, books, and articles we have learned a great deal (and continue to learn: her second edition of

the first half of the commentary in the Budé series unfortunately reached us too late to be of use for this translation). Where our predecessors failed to enlighten us, a wealth of detailed comments were provided by the readers co-opted by Richard Sorabji, including Christopher Gill, Margaret Graver and Brad Inwood, as well as six others who remain anonymous. Susanne Bobzien and Tony Long gave us further necessary comments on Simplicius' logic and on the style of our translation, respectively. We have also received valuable editorial and indexical assistance from Han Baltussen, Eleni Vambouli, Andrew Chignell, and Kate Woolfitt. Richard Sorabji, the general editor of the series, assisted us at every stage; his willingness to include this volume in the series made it possible for us to focus on Simplicius without the distractions of a pressing press. We are honoured to have played our small part in his tireless efforts to inform the scholarly community about the philosophers of late antiquity. We are profoundly indebted to these scholars and friends. We also gratefully acknowledge a generous grant for collaborative research from the Society for Humanities at Cornell University and a grant from the Frederick W. Hilles Publication Fund of Yale University.

T.R.B. would like in addition to thank colleagues at King's College, London, where he began this work, as well as at Yale University, where he finished it. Richard Sorabji, M.M. McCabe, Sylvia Berryman, Michael Della Rocca, Shelly Kagan and Bob Adams deserve special mention. His children, Alexandra and Lincoln, lightened the difficult years; and, as always, his deepest thanks go to Liz Karns.

C.B. is indebted to Michael Frede for suggesting Simplicius' work as a text for a reading group, and to Stephen Menn, George Boys-Stones, Susanne Bobzien and his colleagues at Cornell, particularly Hayden Pellicia and Jeffrey Rusten, for their help and encouragement over the years. He is very grateful to Sophie and Helena, whose births punctuated the translation, and to his delightful copyeditor, Harriet Brittain.

New Haven & Ithaca

C.B.
T.R.B.

Introduction

1. The interest of the work

In [Simplicius' *Commentary on Epictetus*], you have clearly before you the whole philosophical scheme from which Christianity took its outlines, so that this book, written by a 'pagan' philosopher, makes the most Christian impression conceivable (setting aside the fact that the whole realm of Christian sentiment and pathology is absent, i.e. 'love' in the Pauline sense, 'fear of God', and so on). The betrayal of all reality through morality is here present in its fullest splendour – pitiful psychology, the philosopher reduced to a country parson. And Plato is to blame for all of it! He remains Europe's greatest misfortune!' (Nietzsche in a letter to Overbeck, 7 January 1887).

The Commentary on the Handbook of Epictetus is a valuable source for the history of Platonism. It contains a series of lengthy digressions on some of the central philosophical issues in Platonist ethics, treating the metaphysical structure of the world, the nature of evil and free will. These essays are particularly valuable because they are designed for novice philosophers – hence Nietzsche's 'country parson' jibe – and thus accessible in a way that most of our surviving evidence for late Platonism, which often seems obscure and unduly exuberant, is not. The work also provides useful information about the Platonists' theory of emotion, about their interpretive and pedagogical practices, and about Simplicius' own reaction to an increasingly hostile political order.

The commentary is equally informative on the history of ancient Stoicism. It is an extended epigraph on a school which had been dead for several hundred years, revealing that the Platonists were tacitly engaged in harmonising Plato and Zeno no less than Plato and Aristotle, by introducing their students to ethical virtue using a Stoic handbook. It thus provides a precise gauge for the degree of knowledge of Stoic ethics and psychology still current in the philosophical schools of the sixth century AD.

The commentary is also of some significance for the history of Christian theology. For despite its defiant enunciation of pagan principles, there is – as Nietzsche scornfully remarked – something eerily Christian

about the work. But Simplicius' arguments do not appear to require the positing of any Christian influence: his text is discernibly a systematic working out of a few Platonic dialogues supplemented with a Platonised exposition of Stoic ethics. The extraordinary coincidence in their end-products makes it hard to reject Nietzsche's conclusion that Christian theology is inextricably linked to this pagan milieu.

2. Biography and historical background

The author of this idiosyncratic work is fairly well known to us from a variety of sources, although some important details of his life remain controversial.¹ It is clear that Simplicius grew up in the Roman province of Cilicia, studied in Alexandria under Ammonius, and lived for some time in Athens as the intellectual heir and confidante of Damascius, the last Platonist 'scholarch' of the Academy.² He was certainly active in the 530s AD, and probably through at least the 540s and 550s.³ Of the other treatises he is known to have written, his commentaries on Aristotle's *de Caelo*, *Physics* and *Categories* survive; treatises on Euclid, Iamblichus and Hermogenes (the rhetorician) do not. A commentary on Aristotle's *de Anima* has also come down under his name, but its authorship is disputed; if scholarship eventually credits it to Simplicius, then we may also credit him with a commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which it mentions in passing.⁴ Rather surprisingly, Simplicius appears not to have written commentaries on any of Plato's dialogues.⁵

The *Commentary on the Encheiridion* (or 'Handbook') provides very little personal information about its author. Apart from telling us that he once saw a statue of the Stoic philosopher Cleanthes in the latter's hometown of Assos (Hadot 451 / Dübner 137,20), and suggesting that he had an interview with a leading Manichean (H325 / D71,48), Simplicius offers only a few hints about his life or times. The conclusion of the work notes that he writes in 'tyrannical circumstances' (H454 / D138,19) – i.e., it seems clear from an earlier comment (H257 / D35,34), a period during which anti-pagan laws were being effectively enforced. Accordingly, though he rarely attacks the Roman state or Christianity directly, several passages in the commentary are plausibly interpreted as indications of political dissent. Among these are his condemnations of currently popular theological misapprehensions (e.g. H219 / D15,51-16,03, on 'cheap' views of the divine, and H387 / D106,3-20, on 'forgiveness'), and his digressions on the role of philosophers in worthless states and on friendship (see Section 3 below).⁶

The controversial questions about Simplicius' life depend on whether any of these details can be used to assign a more precise date or provenance for this commentary or any of the others. It has long been thought that there is some relation between Justinian's order for the closure of the Athenian philosophical 'schools' in 529 and the voluntary exile of the leading Platonists of the time – Simplicius, Damascius,

Priscian and a few others – at the court of the learned Persian king Khusrau (or Chosroes), recorded in Agathias' *Histories* 2.30-1.⁷ Agathias reports that the philosophers quickly found that life under a barbarian philosopher-king was not to their liking, and returned to Roman territory, after cleverly securing a coda to the treaty being drawn up between Rome and Persia in 532, to the effect that they could 'return to their accustomed haunts and pass their lives without fear amongst themselves' (2.31).⁸ These episodes – Justinian's order and the trip to Persia – are clearly relevant to the circumstantial material in the commentary on Epictetus, but they do not obviously tell either way on the date or provenance: the remarks in the commentary might show why Simplicius had left Athens, or why he was going to leave.

In the last 20 years, however, Michel Tardieu has argued that the circumstantial evidence from Simplicius' commentaries, in combination with some recondite facts about Syria in the sixth century, point to the beguiling conclusion that Simplicius *et al.* settled in Harran (Roman Carrhae, on the Syrian border with Persia) in about 532, and there inspired a school of Platonist 'Sabians' that survived the Islamic invasion, and only closed in the eleventh century.⁹ On the basis of his research, Tardieu concludes that all the extant commentaries were written in Harran and after 532. His argument in the case of the *Encheiridion* commentary is simple: Harran was one of only two cities in the Roman East of the sixth century in which there was Manichee activity that we know of – the other was Byzantium, which is an unlikely place of refuge for a banned Platonist – and hence is the most likely place for Simplicius' interview with a Manichee 'wise man' (H325 / D71,48), and one where Simplicius' extended attack on Manichean dualism (in ch. 27) was appropriate.¹⁰ In support of this identification are various ingenious arguments drawn from the other commentaries – Simplicius' knowledge of the Harranian calendar, of Syrian methods of transportation by river, and of various Syrian place names and divinities – the indirect attestation of a Platonist Sabian sect in Harran by at least 717-20, and the implausibility of Simplicius' return to either Athens or Alexandria in the 530s.¹¹

Tardieu's thesis is learned and intriguing, and has had the beneficial effect of making the Eastern connexions of Simplicius and Damascius relatively well-known. But it suffers from several undeniable weaknesses. For the dating and provenance of the commentary on the *Encheiridion*, the problem is obvious: from the fact that we know of only two active communities of Manichees, we cannot infer that Simplicius' exposure to the sect was similarly limited.¹² Nor can we infer from the sarcastic and polemical tone of his attack on dualism that he expected his readers to be Harranian, or even familiar with Manichaeism: the attack on dualism is a set-piece of Platonist metaphysics, made entertaining by the absurdities of his unnamed opponents.¹³ His supporting arguments look equally insecure. First, the calendrical argument ap-

pears to rely on a misunderstanding of Simplicius' remark.¹⁴ Secondly, since we know that Simplicius accompanied Damascius to Persia (or its environs), and that Damascius came from North Syria, it is not unlikely that he gleaned his knowledge of the area from travelling through it with his teacher.¹⁵ Thirdly, the 'Platonist school' is not in fact attested until 200 years after Simplicius' trip to Persia: it is rash to infer from the silence of our extant and discovered sources that there were no subsequent Platonists who settled in Syria.¹⁶ And finally, we do not know enough about Athens (or other Greek cities) in the middle of the sixth century to be certain that Simplicius did not return there – or to his native Cilicia.

The precise provenance and date of the commentary thus remain unclear, though Harran in the 530s has not been ruled out.

3. Simplicius' interpretative methods

The choice of Epictetus' *Encheiridion* as a text-book for an introductory course on Platonist ethics strikes the modern historian of philosophy as rather strange, since it is a Stoic manual, and hence incompatible in obvious ways with Platonism. The strangeness of this choice is made very clear in Simplicius' general remarks on the nature of the text in the brief introduction to his commentary. For there he picks out various features that might recommend the *Encheiridion* as an ethical manual – it is emotionally powerful, consists of concise, but thematically organised 'precepts', and is aimed at the moral improvement of fairly ordinary people (H193 / D1,36-46) – and immediately sets them in a Platonist framework. The appropriate audience is defined by reference to the Plotinian-inspired theory of grades of virtue, in which the civic or political virtues instilled by Epictetus are not the ultimate goal (H195 / 2,30-3,2); and Epictetus' 'hypothesis' that a human person is a rational soul using a body is rapidly demonstrated by an argument from Plato's *First Alcibiades* (H196 / D3,3-54). (See Section 4 below.)

The external context of the commentary provides some explanation for Simplicius' choice of text. The *Encheiridion* was a popular work in late antiquity, excerpted at length in collections such as Stobaeus', and adapted several times by Christian writers.¹⁷ It was also known to many, perhaps even all, Simplicius' fellow-Platonists, including Hierocles, Proclus, Damascius and Olympiodorus.¹⁸ In his commentary on the *Gorgias*, for example, the latter cites precepts from the *Encheiridion* five times explicitly mentioning Epictetus, and on two other occasions repeats or paraphrases chapters from it.¹⁹ The general function of the *Encheiridion* for these Platonists was thus as a simple, but memorable, source for first-order ethical rules. But their ultimate motivation for adopting this text was the normal pedagogical one: it was the best course-book available to fit their curricular needs. For, as Hadot and others have shown, the late Platonist curriculum, in theory at least,

involved a strenuous programme of Aristotelian lectures, starting with the *Categories*, to be crowned by the detailed study of Platonic ethics, logic, physics and theology, starting with *First Alcibiades*, *Gorgias* and *Phaedo* (cf. *Anon. Prol.* 10).²⁰ But since the study of philosophy was conceived by the Platonists, as by most ancient philosophers, as an *ethical* search for wisdom or perfection, it wouldn't have done to set students onto the *Categories* without any moral guidance, for reasons set out in Plato's *Gorgias* (447-60). Hence, there was a need for introductory texts that gave useful advice in a memorable form, and thus supplied the true beliefs that the ethical part of the Platonic cycle of study would demonstrate and explain.

Even if this explains the basic motivation for using texts *like* the *Encheiridion*, however, it doesn't explain the choice of that *Stoic* text, with its inevitable 'false' doctrines. Simplicius tacitly allows as much in his introduction, when he notes that Epictetus' book has the 'surprising' feature that it inculcates virtue even on the (false) supposition that the soul is mortal (H194 / D1,47-2,14).²¹ Olympiodorus is more circumspect in this regard, since he keeps silent about the false doctrines in the *Encheiridion* throughout *in Gorg.* and only disavows Stoic materialism at *in Phd.* 6.2, i.e. towards the end of the first Platonic cycle. The general problem here is nicely illustrated by the vignette in Damascius' *Philosophical History* on Theosebius, a pupil of Hierocles.²² Theosebius is characterised as someone primarily interested in moral exhortation rather than 'scholarship' – we learn of an exorcism through the powers of Helios and the Jewish God, and of his wife's continence – who took 'much of what he said from the discourses of Epictetus', and also wrote his own Epictetan-inspired works. As a result, Damascius reports, Theosebius became 'the modern Epictetus, *but without the Stoic doctrines.*'

So why did Simplicius choose the *Encheiridion* rather than one of Theosebius' works, or the Pythagorean (and so Platonist) *Carmen Aureum*, which Theosebius' teacher Hierocles used for precisely the same introductory purpose? One possible answer is that Simplicius may not have fully understood the incompatibility between his and Epictetus' views in ethics (see Sections 4-5 below), perhaps because Plotinus had incorporated many Stoic doctrines and terms into Platonist ethics, or perhaps because Simplicius was an inveterate syncretiser.²³ But the commentary itself suggests a more interesting answer: that Simplicius used the *Encheiridion* because he thought it the most powerful text for his purpose, and one that could be pressed into the service of Platonism without damaging side-effects. To see how he might have thought this, it is necessary to examine the structure and methods of the commentary in a little more detail.

The *Encheiridion* consists of 53 chapters, which Simplicius divided into 71 lemmata for commentary, prefaced by a brief introduction and crowned with a final prayer (see the table on pp. 143-4). The chapters

are each discussed in a single lemma, except where they are too long or contain distinct sections (*Ench.* 1, 5, 13, 14, 19, 33), are absent from Simplicius' text (*Ench.* 29), or re-interpreted by him as a single chapter (*Ench.* 21-2).²⁴ Following up on his hint at an order behind Arrian's apparently loosely-structured selection of maxims (H194 / D2,19-24), Simplicius explicitly divides the text into four distinct sections:

I: What is up to us and not, and how to deal with external things: chs 1-21

- (a) chs 1-2: what is up to us and not and the consequences of choosing either;
- (b) chs 3-14: how to deal with external things (Epictetus reins the reader in from them);
- (c) chs 15-21: how to use external things correctly and without disturbance.

II: Advice for intermediate students: chs 22-8

- (a) chs 22-5: the problems of intermediate students;
- (b) chs 26-8: varia – the common conceptions, badness and shame.

III: Technical advice for the discovery of 'appropriate actions' (*kathêk-onta*): chs 30-3

- (a) ch. 30: appropriate actions towards other people;
- (b) ch. 31: appropriate actions towards God;
- (c) ch. 32: appropriate actions about divination;
- (d) ch. 33: appropriate actions towards oneself.
- (e) chs 34-47: various precepts on justice, not well related to each other by Simplicius.

IV: Conclusion on the practice of the precepts: chs 48-53

- (a) ch. 48: conclusion of Epictetus' advice and his division of kinds of people;
- (b) chs 49-52: the practice of the precepts;
- (c) ch. 53: quotations for memorisation.

The rationale behind the division between sections I and II is a set of distinctions of 'kinds of people' with respect to their progress in philosophy. The basis for these is set out lucidly by Epictetus in ch. 48, where the ordinary person and (perfect) philosopher are distinguished with respect to whom they anticipate harm or benefit from, and the progressor is assessed by his approximation to the philosopher's position, i.e. expecting good and bad only from himself. But Simplicius discerns a further subdivision of the category of progressors, into beginning and intermediate students (H441 / D132,32-4); and it is on the basis of this subdivision that he marks a new section of the *Encheiridion* in his comments on ch. 22 (H301 / D58,39).²⁵ Simplicius explains his subdivision as that between any human beings who want to improve themselves and (ordinary) 'philosophers', as we would call them, i.e. those actively engaged in the pursuit of philosophical knowledge; and he sees

his subdivision as marking two distinct kinds of advice Epictetus gives in the course of the work.²⁶

Section III is introduced as the section in which Epictetus gives, with admirable concision, ‘the technical method dealing with appropriate actions’, i.e. with the content of the precepts given in chs 1-28, (H346 / D83,4-29). Its initial four chapters are taken by Simplicius to present a systematic general theory of one’s duties, which he discusses at some length; the remaining chapters (34-47) are less clearly ordered, in his view, but sufficiently tied to the promotion of justice to be numbered in this part.²⁷ Simplicius plausibly takes section IV to be distinct from the rest of the text, since it exhorts us to enact the preceding guidance, and explains how to do it (H441 / D132,23). Such, in brief, are the ‘orderly relationship’ and ‘logical sequence’ of the precepts of the *Encheiridion*, that Simplicius discerned in his introduction (H194 / D2,17). On his account, the work presents the beginner with a carefully graded approach to the kind of life that befits an (ordinary) ‘philosopher’, which culminates in a systematic canon for the discovery of one’s duties and some exhortation to ethical practice.

Some insight into the way Simplicius uses the *Encheiridion* is provided by the features he praises in his commentary. Most prominent among these are four points he identifies in his introduction: its order (described above), concision, emotional power and practical applicability.²⁸ All four are conspicuously praised in ch. 30, where Simplicius compares traditional works on ‘appropriate actions’ – presumably by the Stoics, and figures like Theosebius, although he names only Nicolaus of Damascus – with Epictetus’ treatment ‘in a few lines using effective illustrations and soul-stirring vividness’ (H346 / D83,12).²⁹ The emotional power of the work is located by Simplicius in various elements. He admires its use of imagery: the analogies of the voyage (ch. 7), inn (ch. 11), banquet (chs 15, 36), acting in a play (chs 17, 37) stepping on a nail (ch. 38), shoes (ch. 39), and the two-handled jars (ch. 43).³⁰ He is impressed by Epictetus’ use of often trivial examples, that are ‘from life’ and hence familiar to, and effective on, the reader: the broken jug (ch. 3), the trip to the baths (chs 4, 45), Epictetus’ own lameness (ch. 9), the loss of a child (ch. 11), the price of a lettuce (ch. 25), etc.³¹ And he praises Epictetus’ use of exemplars, particularly Socrates (chs 5, 32, 33, 46, 51, 53), but also Diogenes and Heraclitus (ch. 15), and Zeno (ch. 34).³² The practicality of the work is proven through Epictetus’ emphasis on various techniques for self-improvement: for instance, his suggestion for distancing oneself from one’s impressions (ch. 1), his use of the phrase ‘Remember’ (ch. 2 *et passim*), and his stress on prior consideration of misfortunes (ch. 4).³³ In all these respects, Epictetus is a truly ‘admirable’ or ‘astonishing’ preceptor.³⁴

But a deeper insight into Simplicius’ use of the *Encheiridion* can be gained from the points at which Simplicius believed that Epictetus’

arguments require supplementation: the seven excursuses or essays, which provide the doctrinal framework for Simplicius' commentary.

1. ch. 1, H199 / D4,52-H217 / D15,2: on the soul, against various determinists.
2. ch. 8, H257 / D35,48-H272 / D44,22: that god is not the cause of the bad.
3. ch. 24, H313 / D64,53-H316 / D66,36: on the role of the philosopher in city-states.
4. ch. 27, H322 / D69,46-H342 / D81.18: on the derivative nature of the bad.
5. ch. 30, H346 / D83,30-H348 / D84,37: on the relations that reveal 'appropriate actions'.
6. ch. 30, H351 / D86,20-H357 / D89,28: on friendship.
7. ch. 31, H367 / D95,17-H392 / D109,6: on providence.

Two of the shorter essays, nos 3 and 6, concern political or ethical subjects that Epictetus ignores, but Simplicius finds important enough to discuss in some detail. The essay on the state is a diatribe drawing on *Republic* 6, and perhaps reflects Simplicius' own experience of voluntary exile (though if it does, it does so via Epictetus' move to Nicopolis to avoid Domitian's tyranny). The essay on friendship is more of an encomium, drawing on the *Symposium*, Aristotle and Pythagorean sources, and emphasising the divine favour that graces intellectual friendship (H354 / D88,2-8); but here too Simplicius stresses the disappearance of friendship in the present times (H357 / D89,25-8). It is notable that Simplicius does not suggest in either essay that Epictetus was remiss, though a more polemical commentator might well think that his omissions are the result of dubious Stoic doctrines.³⁵ The third short essay, no. 5 on 'relations', is still more revealing of the way in which the *Encheiridion* is treated by Simplicius, since it supplies the 'technical method' for discovering appropriate actions – a remarkable example of Simplician scholasticism – that its author ascribes to Epictetus.

The four longer essays, nos 1, 2, 4 and 7 (whose content is discussed in Section 4 below) make Simplicius' philosophical approach to the work explicit. A brief model for his technique in these essays is given in the introduction, where Simplicius frankly explains that Plato demonstrates in the *First Alcibiades* what Epictetus took as a 'hypothesis', that the rational soul is the true human being (H196-7 / D3, 3-54). The first essay thus justifies Epictetus' starting with the distinction between what is up to us and what is not by setting out the status of the soul in a Platonist theology, and arguing for its 'freedom' via a series of anti-determinist arguments drawn from Aristotle's *NE* 3.³⁶ The second essay demonstrates the Platonic thesis that 'god is not the cause of the bad' (cf. *Tim.* 42d3-4) through an examination of sublunary existents famil-

iar from Plotinus' and Proclus' treatises *de Providentia*. It is introduced explicitly as a defence of Epictetus' unargued thesis in ch. 8 (H257 / D35,48), and justified as an excursus necessary for both Epictetus' theodicy and his doctrine of the nature of the bad in ch. 27 (H272 / D44,19). The fourth essay, on ch. 27, spells out Proclus' version of the theological claims in ch. 8, in the form of an argument against Manichean dualism (with striking echoes of Augustine's Plotinian solution to 'the problem of evil' in *Confessions* 7). Simplicius justifies this excursus in a single sentence on its utility for a proper conception of divinity (H322 / D69,46). The final essay defends three Platonic theses from *Laws* 10 that Simplicius finds in ch. 33, that the gods exist, are providential, and are just; the first thesis is demonstrated via a series of Platonist 'ascents' to the first cause (subsequently codified by Aquinas); the second and third are demonstrated directly from *Laws* 901-4. (The argument for the third thesis contains his anti-Christian polemic against the notion of 'forgiveness', though Simplicius' own position is identical with e.g. Augustine's; see H389/D107.19-108.06.) Here again Simplicius justifies his excursus as a demonstration of theses that Epictetus merely assumes.³⁷

Even this brief review of Simplicius' supplementary essays – which constitute about one third of the commentary – is perhaps enough to make it clear why he was able to select a Stoic text for his introductory work for Platonist novices: the *arguments* for all the substantive metaphysical and meta-ethical theses in the commentary are Platonist arguments, not only where Simplicius and Epictetus disagree (e.g. on determinism and in their theologies), but also where they agree (e.g. on the nature of the bad and on providence).

Simplicius explains the purpose of his detailed comments on the content of each chapter of the *Encheiridion* in two remarks that frame the work (H194 / D2,24-9 and H454 / D138,15-21): by explicating the text in detail he hopes to assist its interpretation by students who are unaccustomed to such writing and to confirm his own grasp of the ethical truths they contain.³⁸ His typical approach to these tasks is straightforward: (i) he explains how the chapter or lemma in question relates to its context; (ii) he summarises its content; (iii) he remarks on any unusual vocabulary it contains; (iv) he corrects any misapprehensions students might be liable to concerning its claims; (v) he elucidates its content by formalising its argument or spelling out its metaphorical terms; (vi) he responds to objections he anticipates; and (vii) he concludes by remarking on its position within the overall argument of the work (by explaining how it fits into the four sections he has identified or for which kind of person it is primarily intended).³⁹ The results of this familiar approach are mixed. These procedures often yield valuable insights into the structure of the work ([i] & [vii]), for example;⁴⁰ or the level of literary or intellectual learning he expects to find in his students ([iii] & [vi]);⁴¹ or Simplicius' own understanding of the arguments ([iv]

& [v]).⁴² But their overall effect, particularly in stretches of the commentary that are not broken up by Simplicius' digressions, is frequently rather dry.⁴³ This result is hardly surprising in a serious text-book (ancient or modern), if unfortunate, since Simplicius chose Epictetus' *Encheiridion* for its concision and emotional power. But the contrast between a primary text praised for its vitality and a commentary that mutes the feature of the text it most admires by the exhaustive application of a scholastic methodology is one that has rarely been avoided in the Platonic tradition.⁴⁴

4. Simplicius' presentation of Platonism

Simplicius presents a systematic outline of Platonist metaphysics in the commentary, intended to introduce novices to the philosophical doctrines that are necessary for a rational understanding of ethics. The following paragraphs sketch Simplicius' treatments of theology, human psychology, freedom and determinism, the problem of evil, and theodicy.

4.1 God and the hierarchy of being

Simplicius outlines the basic contours of his theology in the first and last of his essays, on chs 1 and 31.⁴⁵ The views he presents are in general the orthodoxies of post-Plotinian Platonism, though some details remain more controversial.⁴⁶ He takes the visible world to be the base of a pyramidal structure whose apex is the highest divinity. That divinity, God or the One or the Good, is the fount and origin of all things, to whom all the traditional appellations of divinity apply: God is the greatest, the best, the wisest, the most-powerful, the creator.⁴⁷ Beneath God are a rank of primordial origins (*arkhai*) that are good in themselves, and stand as the unique simple paradigms (henads) of all the pluralities below them. (These henads are theoretical descendants of Platonic forms in the Platonism of Proclus.) Directly below this level are the highest kinds of souls, e.g. the World-soul of the *Timaeus*, and the souls of the heavenly bodies, which cause the rotation of the heavens, and are thus responsible for the workings of fate in the sublunary realm. Below this level of divine souls are the angelic and daimonic souls, and still further down are human souls.⁴⁸ Below human souls there are the souls of irrational animals and of plants, and at the very bottom is matter, which is completely lifeless and inert when considered in its own essence.

Every lower level is less good than the level above it, but only at the lowest four levels is the less good able to be bad. Thus, since all badness comes from the badness in material bodies, their effects on plants and animals, and the results of humankind's excessive preoccupation with these bodies, the cosmos would have had nothing bad in it, if God had stopped at the level above human souls.⁴⁹ Yet without these lowest

levels the universe would not have been as good as it could be for two reasons. First, the lower levels do contain some definite positive good, even though it is a lesser good than that contained above, and accordingly they do add some increment of goodness to the whole construct. Secondly, without these bottom levels the entire system would have been incomplete, since the higher levels would have been ‘impotent’ – i.e. lesser goods – had they not been higher than something else (H212 / D12,3, H333 / D76,1).

Simplicius sketches this pyramidal structure most explicitly in the course of four ‘ascents to the origin’ (H375 / D99,35), which are presented as demonstrative proofs of God’s existence. These ascents are reflections on the nature of origins or principles, as well as on the sorts of origins required to account for the causally posterior, moving, manifold, and changing world around us. The arguments occupy the following passages (though the boundaries are not completely clear):

1. cause: H369 / D96,5-H369 / D96,45
2. motion: H369/D96,45-H371 / D97,20
3. simplicity: H371 / D97,20-H374 / D99,5
4. change: H374 / D99,6-H375 / D99,34

The germs of these arguments can perhaps be traced to Plato, though their development owes more to Plotinus and Proclus.⁵⁰ Although Simplicius tells us that certain steps in his exposition of the ascent from lowest to highest have been omitted (H378 / D101,41), it seems unlikely that this indicates that he has suppressed references to some entity higher even than the One or the Good mentioned above, since he tells us on the same page that there is no origin higher than this one.⁵¹ The point seems rather to be only that he has passed over some of the intermediate subspecies of the lower orders, which tended to proliferate in triads in the fuller expositions of e.g. Proclus.⁵² If so, this may be a point at which Simplicius differs from his teacher Damascius, perhaps in deference to the more canonical presentation of Proclus, which he may have found more suitable for the audience of this work.

4.2 *The nature of God*

We learn several things about the highest God from the commentary. He is the cause of subsistence for all things, and the demiurgic Father of all (H193 / D1,23, H333 / D76,20, H215 / D13,40);⁵³ he is present as a whole with all his powers everywhere at once; and he enfolds all things in his providence (H383 / D104,10).⁵⁴ The operation of divine providence, however, is distinct from fate, or rather, is an overarching force in which fate is one element (primarily the element controlling the disposition of sublunary bodies).⁵⁵ Thus the human soul’s powers to resist the attractions of the material world are owed to providence (H276 / D45,53); but

souls that fail to use these powers are chastised by divine ‘punitive justice’ working through the consonance of their desires with the operations of fate (H264 / D39,30, H382/D103,40, H388 / D106,45). The purpose of ‘punitive justice’ both here and in Hades is the purification of the soul so that it can achieve virtue and knowledge (H390 / D108,10).⁵⁶

Simplicius emphasises the absolute transcendence of God by insisting on our inability to obtain adequate conceptions of the highest divinity (H375 / D99,40), and on the literal inadequacy of any positive characterisation (H378 / D101,30).⁵⁷ Yet the same God is also given a variety of more personal epithets, such as ‘Father’ (H193 / D1,23) and ‘Lord’ or ‘Master’ (H454 / D138,22), and made the addressee of a fervent concluding prayer.⁵⁸ Simplicius has two interesting proposals to make about how we should reconcile our belief in divinity’s transcendence with our need for something like personal interaction. The first is the suggestion that our rites of prayer, repentance and entreaty give us the illusion of bringing about changes in God, by producing genuine changes in ourselves (H390 / D107,45). The second is that those who have purified their souls through reason may also be able to partake in divine illumination through religious and theurgical rites (H364-6 / D93,30-94,33). If these reconciliations sit uneasily together, that is presumably because the late Platonist doctrine of ‘divine grace’ is as obscure to human reason as its Christian counterpart.⁵⁹

4.3 Human psychology

Simplicius begins his discussion of psychology and anthropology with a definition adopted from the *First Alcibiades*: a human being is a rational soul that uses the body as an instrument (H197 / D3,30).⁶⁰ Perhaps the most important effect of this definition is the exclusion of two competing pictures, according to which the human being simply is the body, or is composed of body and soul together. Were either of these other two pictures correct, our perfection as human beings would either amount to or at least include the perfection of our bodies, and bodily goods would have a claim to be goods simpliciter, i.e. goods for us qua human beings. By insisting that the human body is merely an instrument of the human being, Simplicius insists that our good is completely disjoint from its good.⁶¹ Since this is the central thesis on which the practical ethics of the work depends, the phrase ‘using the body as an instrument’ forms a leitmotif throughout the commentary

But the picture at the level of metaphysics is slightly less clear. The body that a human being uses is no part or constituent of the human being; and the compound of soul and body is a ‘mortal animal’ (H337 / D78,12). But is the soul’s *use* of the body essential to its being a human being, as the presence of the second clause in the definition would suggest? Does that soul cease to be a human being when it ceases to use

the body? Some passages suggest that a human being is simply a rational soul, whether using a body or not (e.g. H197 / D3,47). If we ask of two disincarnate rational souls what it is that makes one of them a human soul and one an angelic or more divine soul, Simplicius' response is that the human soul has a nature such that it is able to involve itself in the material world of bodies and generation in a more intimate way (H202 / D6,40, H336 / D77,40). The more divine soul has its attention and striving always directed upwards towards the Good; the human soul is capable of attending to the Good, but also capable of directing its attention downwards towards bodies (H340 / D80,8). The consequences of this view for responsibility and theodicy are considered below; here it suffices to say that this is probably the more accurate and deeper account of what a human being is. If so, the *Alcibiades* definition is an approximation suitable for beginners: a more scientific definition would assert that a human being is a rational soul that is *capable* of using a body as an instrument.

The rational soul, which in its disincarnate state is simple and without irrational emotion, animates an earthly body by projecting irrational 'lives' into it (H199 / D4,42, H208 / D10,5, H258 / D36,20, H337 / D78,10). From a functional perspective, these irrational 'lives of the body' can be construed as the various psychological sub-routines required for the employment and maintenance of an earthly body – e.g. the capacities for sight, ambulation, digestion, and so on, which are required to activate a creature fitted out with eyes, feet, and bowels. (In the materialist psychology of the Stoics, they are conceived as literal pneumatic conduits following the vessels and nerves, like an octopus' tentacles.) 'Lives' are thus quasi-autonomous capacities for animating particular portions of body; they represent the soul in its most mundane aspect. But Simplicius' ascription of 'lives' to the soul is complicated by his exegesis of the lower kinds of 'soul'. For he remarks that the souls of plants are more accurately described as 'lives' than as souls (H261 / D37,4); and his view that souls of the lowest kind simply follow the determination of their bodies, as shadows follow and are determined by the opacity that cast them, suggests a curious and inconsistent materialism. Even in his unequivocally dualist account of the souls of human beings, their irrational psychological elements are standardly described as 'lives of the body', i.e. as something attributable to the body, or at most to the soul's entanglement in body, rather than to the soul's intrinsic nature.

The ultimate sources of these apparently inconsistent views on 'lives' are Plato's superficially incompatible accounts of the nature and status of the 'parts' of the soul – i.e. the tripartite soul of *Republic* 4 and the unitary soul of the *Phaedo* and *Republic* 10. The Platonists discerned various hints in the dialogues pointing to Plato's own solution to this problem: *Republic* 518 and 612 suggested that the soul is simple in its own nature, and hence that its 'irrational parts' are a by-product of its

union with the body; and *Phaedo* 66, and more clearly *Timaeus* 42-3 and 77, suggested that the body itself might be a mortal living thing of some kind. The theories that the Platonists constructed to accommodate these Platonic insights, as well as embryological and other more strictly psychological data, are remarkable and complex; but since Simplicius does not elucidate his remarks on 'lives' much beyond noting that the 'living thing or body' is supplied to the rational soul by fate (H212 / D12,15-20), it is not clear to which he subscribed.⁶²

Having touched on the metaphysical status of the soul, we should now inspect its behavioural repertoire. Rational souls are self-movers and the causes of motion in the bodies they govern.⁶³ They move themselves, and the body, through such psychic motions as desire, aversion, impulse, choice, belief and knowledge. Simplicius sometimes appears to accept the Stoic analysis of these categories, according to which they are all reducible to assents to impressions, and certainly subscribes to the view that all actions for which we may be held responsible involve assent.⁶⁴ The way in which he prefers to express this, however, is by saying that all psychic motions involve 'choice' (*hairesis*).⁶⁵ Simplicius appears to consider this a merely terminological matter; but the shift from Stoic assent to Platonist choice is probably a central development in the evolution of a more familiar medieval concept of the will.⁶⁶

Yet Simplicius still takes it as an axiom of psychology that all desire is for the good or apparent good (H203 / D7,1, H271 / D43,25, H330 / D74,45). Accordingly, he tends to think of human error or badness as a failure of cognition rather than a perversion of the will. The general preference of embodied human souls for the lesser good of bodily preoccupation and pleasure over the greater good of contemplating God is thus not a contravention of the *sub specie boni* axiom; rather, human souls somehow forget what their good consists in, and mistake the good of the bodies for their own good (H262 / D38,35). This partial account of the origins of moral evil is far from clear or muddle-free (see below). But it aligns Simplicius with the Stoics in the rationalist tradition deriving from Plato's *Protagoras*: practical irrationality is essentially a failure of theoretical rationality, rather than a corruption in human desires or a brute perversity in the will, that makes us unable to be moved in the right way by even a clear-eyed view of the good.

Simplicius differs from the Stoics, however, in ascribing – at least in his practical ethical psychology – the irrational activities and motions of the 'mortal body' to the rational soul. Since these irrational motions are affected by factors external to the soul, they are not entirely self-determined.⁶⁷ Simplicius can thus allow both that irrational emotions are not *strictly* up to us (H199 / D4,45), and that we are responsible for them (H441 / D132,30), presumably because we are responsible for the dispositions that give rise to them.⁶⁸ Hence, he follows Aristotle in the non-Stoic view that there are degrees of responsibility, since one action can be more up-to-us than another, if it is less affected by irrational

emotions; and, like Plotinus, he considers actions to be fully free only when they are the products of pure reason, unsullied by sensual inclination.⁶⁹

The consequences of this disagreement with the Stoics are evident when we turn to Simplicius' theories of emotion and of virtue. The early Platonic tradition had criticised the Stoic view that virtue required '*apatheia*' or the eradication of emotions such as anger and fear (though the Stoics could point to Socrates in Plato's *Phaedo* as a model of what this might look like); and their view that virtue requires '*metriopatheia*' or moderated emotion that has been made tractable to reason was elaborated in Aristotle's theory of 'ethical' virtue. But Plotinus' resolution of Plato's apparent inconsistency on the nature of the soul allowed him to combine both theories by distinguishing between different grades of the virtues.⁷⁰ In Plotinus' view, Stoic *apatheia*, the life depicted in the *Phaedo*, characterises the 'cathartic' virtues of a rational soul that aims to transcend the body altogether, while Aristotelian *metriopatheia*, the life analysed in *Republic* books 1-4 and 8-9, characterises the 'political and ethical' virtues of a rational soul that is using its body to order the world. A soul that possesses only the latter kind of virtue will experience emotions as it responds to the affections of the 'mortal compound', but these emotions will be under the control of reason, and employed to make its bodily activities and interactions more efficient.⁷¹ Plotinus' reconciliation of *apatheia* and *metriopatheia* was subsequently codified by Porphyry and elaborated by Proclus and other late Platonists.⁷² Simplicius alludes to this theory (see H234 / D24,1), though since his work is directed at aspirants for the first grade of virtues, the mechanism by which he might reconcile Epictetus' inculcation of *apatheia* with his own advocacy of *metriopatheia* is rather hidden from view in the commentary.

4.4 Badness and theodicy

Simplicius' task in his comments on chapters 8 and 27 is to vindicate the claim of Plato's *Timaeus* 42d3-4, that God is not the cause of anything bad. But since he also holds that God is the cause of everything that exists, he can vindicate Plato only by defending the intuitively less plausible thesis that the bad does not exist. Simplicius employs two strategies to show that the bad does not exist. The first is to argue that alleged bads are in fact not bad, or that evil is an illusion. This strategy is most prominent in the commentary on ch. 8, and applies most successfully to the non-moral case – e.g. physical illness or bodily destruction.⁷³ His second strategy is to argue that bad things do not exist in the sense that they have an ontological status subordinate to existence: they do not *really* exist because they are not primary or *per se* subsistents: they have only a derivative subsistence (*parhupostasis*, H342 / D81,27). Neither strategy, however, can account for the case of human turning away from the good; but here Simplicius can plausibly

argue that God is not properly speaking the cause (H338 / D79,1-H342 / D81,20). For in this case God is responsible for the production of a class of self-determining substances, human souls, whose perfection in human virtue is a great good. The existence of such a good requires the possibility of human corruption, since God could not have brought about the conditions under which human virtue can exist, without at the same time creating the conditions under which human vice could exist (or subsist). When vice does exist, however, it is the fault of those human beings who themselves choose to use their self-determination to turn downwards (H272 / D44,1).

Simplicius' theodicy is thus remarkably close to more recent elaborations of the free-will defence. He explicitly endorses the three attributes of divinity that are standardly employed in setting out the problem of evil: omniscience, omnipotence and benevolence (H380 / D102,30). And his argument is no clearer than some of its contemporary descendants about whether the occasional fall is a necessary concomitant of God's creation of self-determining creatures of this sort or a contingent one. (It looks necessary at H339 / D79,35, which threatens to implicate God in a foreseeable evil; but elsewhere it looks as if he considers it possible that human beings could have had an eternally unactualised potential to fall, which threatens the intelligibility of his explanation of actualised badness in our world; see e.g. H272 / D44,5.) Nor does Simplicius show why God's decision to create souls of this sort is not open to the critical assessments of probability that he deploys against other agents. When a human agent in pursuit of the apparent good accepts a high probability of considerable badness in exchange for a low probability of a trivial good, Simplicius condemns him: this is the means by which the vicious choices of the adulterer and thief are analysed in the theory of the commentary (H331 / D74,50). Yet, when he applies this analysis to God's choice, he is content to assert the positive balance of the good without seriously attempting to weigh the costs of corruption as his criterion of assessment demands, despite his prior recognition of the magnitude of those costs (H257 / D35,25-47).

Simplicius sets out his views on badness partly in the context of an argument in ch. 27 against the Manichees that contains a good deal of material that is original to him (in comparison with rival Platonist and Christian polemics).⁷⁴ But their philosophical basis is not new: the same lines of argument are found earlier, both in Hierocles and subsequently in Proclus.⁷⁵ Since there are many literal echoes of Proclus' arguments, this seems to indicate something beyond the rare unanimity of late Platonists on this topic. The range of Simplicius' references to discrete works of Proclus, however, suggests that he may have followed a post-Proclan treatise, perhaps by Damascius or Ammonius.⁷⁶

4.5 Freedom and determinism

Since the apparent evils of natural decay and physical destruction are easy to dismiss as illusory, the core of the theodicy outlined above is Simplicius' attempt to show why human beings, rather than their creator, are responsible for moral evil. His views on human freedom and responsibility, however, are difficult to untangle, perhaps partly because their sources are so various. The basis of his theory seems to derive from Plotinus' reconciliation of Plato's exposition in *Laws* 10 with the Stoics' psychology of action and determinism. Plotinus distributed freedom to agents in accordance with their place in his scale of virtue (see above on the grades of virtue), so that real freedom is reserved for the One, and even ethically virtuous human action is constrained by circumstance or fate. But Simplicius' conflation in the commentary of an Aristotelian theory of deliberated choice and a Stoic theory of causal responsibility depending on assent appears to lead to confusions that are original to this work (see Section 5 below).

The nature of Simplicius' position can perhaps be illustrated briefly by comparison with a partisan sketch of what might be Augustine's temporal variant of it. In the *City of God*, the complete freedom of God is followed by the apparently indeterminist free choice of the angels, leading to the separation of the good from the fallen angels. This allows for the fall of man in Adam, which looks indeterminist but is qualified by the additional circumstances of embodiment and a temptor; the result is the current enfeebled capacity of choice of fallen humans. Humans who are saved by divine aid will eventually have the uniform freedom – currently possessed by the good angels – to choose only the good in heaven. Some points of similarity in Simplicius are:

1. The apparently indeterminist pre-embodied choice of the less good over the good.⁷⁷
2. The change in the nature of human choice that occurs after embodiment (including both a non-rational soul and the disappearance of the unaided ability to choose the good).⁷⁸
3. The claim that both fallen man and confirmed angels (and the saints in heaven) have 'free' choice, although the former choose between goods or apparent goods, and the latter have no choice but the good.⁷⁹
4. The claims that the soul is not determined by physically determining causes, while the body and hence much of human life and many actions are subject to fate or providence.⁸⁰

The heart of Simplicius' difficulty lies in the 'diversion' or 'turning away' (*paratropê*) of the disembodied rational soul from the Intellect.⁸¹ From a teleological perspective, this word describes a beneficial and desirable event: the human soul's fulfillment of its function as the 'bond between the things that always remain above, and the things that always remain

below' (H202 / D6,45). On this score human souls are the emissaries of divinity to the sublunary material world, bringing order, beauty, and goodness to matter, since it is through the human soul's intimate interaction with bodies that the lowest level of reality is made as beautiful or good as it can be; without our activity, all would be an ugly, lifeless chaos down below.

This teleological explanation for the 'turning away' of human souls does not require corruption or a fall, or that the bringing of order to bodies should also be the bringing of evil into the world. The need to explain the origins of moral evil, however, demands a different perspective, for which Simplicius requires a second sense of 'turning away', making it the source of all subsequent vice and depravity:

the soul keeps company with things that are being generated and perishing and are declining towards the privation of the good, and surrenders itself to them (H203 / D6,53) ... [when the soul] no longer treats [the body] as its instrument, but rather embraces it as a part of itself, or even as though it were itself, then the soul is made irrational by the body and shares affections with it. Then the soul believes that the desires of spirit and appetite are proper to it, and by being subservient to them, and finding means for getting what they desire, it becomes bad ... (H2262 / D38,20).

This second interpretation of the soul's 'turning away' raises two problems. First, it is unclear why the human soul cannot perform its teleological task without becoming corrupted, if, as Simplicius says, it has been 'graced' with powers to resist the temptations of bodies (H195 / D2,48-54). Secondly, it is unclear at which stage the corruption occurs – i.e. whether it is an unfortunate effect of excessive immersion in the material world, as the passage cited above suggests, or whether the fact of the soul's descent shows that it has already fallen prior to its incarnation. Simplicius unfortunately gives conflicting responses to these problems. Some texts emphasise human freedom and self-determination in order to exculpate God, and thereby suggest that bondage to sensory pleasure is not the inevitable price of acting as the bond between high and low: at H272/D44.15, for example, he claims that human beings can remain undiverted as long as they wish to (cf. H337 / D78,34). But elsewhere Simplicius suggests that the soul had somehow already fallen prior to incarnation (H226 / D19,42, H336 / D77,53); and in one passage he seems to claim that the very activity of engaging with matter makes the human soul incapable of maintaining its correct relation to the higher goods (H203 / D6,46).

But, on this score, Simplicius is not himself guilty of any original sins; he has either inherited incoherences already found in Plotinus, or has fallen victim on his own account to the twin temptations of the pre- and post-incarnate falls in Plato's *Phaedrus* and *Laws* 10.

5. Simplicius and Stoicism

5.1 Simplicius' knowledge of Epictetus

The opening pages of the commentary suggest that Simplicius may have read two important sources of information about Epictetus that are now lost to us. The first is a letter by Arrian describing his method of assembling the *Encheiridion*. Simplicius concluded from this letter that the *Encheiridion* was a selection by Arrian of material from his earlier compilation of speeches by Epictetus, the *Discourses* – a finding that tends to confirm the orthodox view of the authorship of these works.⁸² Secondly, it seems likely that Simplicius had access to parts of Epictetus' *Discourses* that are no longer extant. For Simplicius reports that 'practically all' the material in the *Encheiridion* may be found verbatim in the *Discourses*; but since this is no longer true, it suggests that he had more of the larger work than now survives.⁸³ Simplicius no doubt found the anecdote that Epictetus adopted a friend's child, and employed a nurse to look after it (H406 / D116,50), from one of these sources.⁸⁴

There is, however, some reason to doubt that Simplicius had the *Discourses* to hand as he wrote. For he never gives the impression that he is reading the longer work, either by telling us where a line from the *Encheiridion* can be found in it, or by supplying quotations or paraphrases from the context in the longer version; and there is at least one passage in the commentary where a broader familiarity with the *Discourses* would have resolved difficulties he finds in the *Encheiridion* (see H440 / D132,10 with note). A natural inference is that either Simplicius had read the *Discourses* at some earlier time and did not have it in front of him, or his information about that work comes from Arrian's letter. But since Simplicius' commentary was for beginners, it is also possible that the lack of scholarly reference reflects only the genre of his work.

5.2 Simplicius' knowledge of Stoic doctrine

Although Simplicius exhibits a fairly extensive knowledge of Stoic metaphysics in his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, the breadth of his reading in Stoic ethics is less manifest in his commentary on Epictetus. His comments on the soul's immortality in a brief parenthesis adverting to the Stoics' 'rather peculiar views' (H212 / D12,15), for example, suggest that he knew that some Stoics believed the soul to be perishable; but since he does not expand on his remark, it is difficult to judge how much he knew of the Stoic controversies on this issue (though here again he may have thought the details were irrelevant or unsuitable for a beginning audience). His more extended reports on 'appropriate actions' (notably in his comments on ch. 30) and the 'common conceptions' (chs 11, 26), two further subjects for which the commentary

is often regarded as a useful source for Stoic doctrines, present similar difficulties.⁸⁵ Since the correct way to inculcate ‘appropriate actions’ had been a topic for controversy amongst Platonic commentators from at least the second century AD, it seems quite likely that Simplicius’ information about Nicolaus of Damascus, and the detailed inventory of natural and prohairesis ‘relations’ with which he prefaces his discussion of ch. 30, are mediated by the Platonist tradition.⁸⁶ Simplicius’ intriguing remarks on the articulation of our ‘preconceptions’ about God, and on the role and content of the ‘common conceptions’, however, may represent more direct evidence for the Stoic use of these notions.⁸⁷ But here again the fact that Proclus appeals to rather similar ideas in analogous contexts at least gives reason to doubt the immediacy of his knowledge, if not its authenticity.⁸⁸

Some of Simplicius’ comments about Stoicism, however, especially concerning their logic, epistemology and moral psychology, suggest a surprising lack of knowledge. A notable example is furnished by his commentary on *Encheiridion* ch. 36 (H423 / D124,15 et seq.), where he confuses conjunctions with conditionals, statements with syllogisms, and propositions with first principles (see e.g. his gloss on the Stoic term ‘*axiōma*’ at H423 / D124,26-8). Although his mistakes here can be paralleled by other late authors on logic, and his version of the lemma differs from ours in ways that are related to his misguided interpretation, it appears that his knowledge of Stoic logic was very slim indeed.⁸⁹

A similar conclusion seems inevitable concerning his understanding of Stoic epistemology. In his comments on *Encheiridion* ch. 45, for instance, Simplicius equates ‘receiving’ a cataleptic impression with ‘grasping’ and ‘perceiving’ something, although the purpose of the chapter is to contrast the cataleptic impressions one ‘receives’ with the non-cataleptic impressions one assents to, and the Stoics take ‘grasping’ and ‘perceiving’ something to entail assent to a cataleptic impression (H435-6 / D129,44-130,20). Simplicius’ grasp of the Stoic conception of assent is put further in question elsewhere when he describes assent as if it were a speech-act, or a public, observable act of affirmation, rather than a private act that the Stoics thought was sometimes tacit or even obscure to its agent or subject.⁹⁰ The allusive comment at H216 / D14,3 equating assents with the ‘vital extension’ of the soul may, however, hint at a more sophisticated understanding of the psychological role of assent (see Section 4 above). For here Simplicius applies the Stoic term to the fundamental form of psychodynamic activity – i.e. the soul’s going for something, whether by taking an impression to be true or pursuing an object as desirable. His view that every desire (*orexis*) is an extension of this sort (H198 / D4,25) is thus parallel to, and perhaps identical with, the Stoics’ doctrine that desire and impulse are kinds of assent.⁹¹

Simplicius’ understanding of Stoic moral psychology is also questionable. In a puzzling passage starting at H198 / D4,30, Simplicius tries to make sense of the false Stoic view he takes to be asserted in

Encheiridion 1, that impulse comes before desire and aversion.⁹² But his question is misconceived, since none of the Stoics believed that impulse and desire were the names for sequential stages in a single psychological process. The early Stoa used ‘impulse’ (*hormê*) as the name for the genus of psychological motions to which desire, aversion and the emotions belong, so that anyone who is having a desire is *eo ipso* having an impulse; and Epictetus, for reasons that are obscure, observed a different terminological convention, so that ‘impulse’ is used in his works for what the early Stoa had called ‘selection’, which was a further and distinct species of the original genus of ‘impulse’ in the earlier schema.⁹³ Accordingly, Epictetus thinks of impulse – i.e. the ‘selection’ of indifferents in the early Stoic schema – as what one should employ *in place of* desire, which is directed at goods; but here again neither precedes the other in a single psychological process. Simplicius’ attempt to resolve the anomaly at H199 / D4,38 by suggesting that the Stoics ‘saw the motions of the soul that are prior to desire and aversion’, is perhaps a distant reminiscence of the Stoic doctrine of *propatheiai* – i.e. of psychological motions or events that do precede assent and so do precede impulse, selection or desire.⁹⁴ But if this was his intention, it reflects a further misunderstanding about assent, since when Epictetus enjoins us to use ‘impulse and counter-impulse’, he must be referring to psychological events that lead directly to action, and hence are assents, since we are supposed to do everything that ordinary life requires us to do merely by using them.

Underlying this apparently terminological confusion is the central point of difference between Simplicius and the Stoics: their disagreement over the sources of psychological events. The Stoics rejected the Platonic (and so Platonist) notion that rational adults have irreducibly ‘irrational’ desires or emotions that are ineliminable even in the state of virtue, and so insisted on the complete eradication of all emotions (*apatheia*) in their ‘sage’. But Simplicius, following the Platonic tradition elaborated by Aristotle, accepted the usefulness and necessity of moderated emotions (*metriopatheia*) for a politically virtuous life. The distance between his view and the Stoics’ on this issue can be gauged from his comment at H337 / D78,20, that no one, ‘particularly of the purer sort, would endure to spend so much time eating and excreting like an irrational animal if he weren’t provoked to it by irrational desire’. Thus, on his view, no matter how pure one is, one needs to employ irrational desires to motivate even the activities that maintain one in an embodied state: incarnation requires irrational desire.⁹⁵ The Stoics, however, denied that a virtuous person could ever be ‘provoked by irrational desire’; what motivates the sage to eat is not, in their view, irrational desire, but the rational judgement that it is reasonable to eat. The gulf between these views is palpable; but whether Simplicius was aware of this crucial difference between the psychological theory he

expounded in the commentary and the theory presupposed by the text he chose to comment on, is less clear.

5.3 *Prohairesis*

Simplicius' understanding of *prohairesis* is of particular interest in regard to his psychology and ethics. This term first became part of the philosophical vocabulary in Aristotle's ethical treatises, where it means, roughly, 'settled choice' or 'decision'. For Aristotle, it is the outcome of an antecedent process of deliberation, in which one considers the best means to attain a certain end, and it eventuates in action without the need for any further psychological steps on the agent's part (when the particular means to be employed are evident to perception). *Prohairesis* is of central importance in Aristotle's ethics as the cause of the actions for which we are most fully responsible, and the distillation of our antecedent deliberation, shaped by the ends we value, the means we are willing to employ, and the practical wisdom with which we accommodate each to each. Thus Aristotle calls virtue a 'prohairesis' (*EN* 2.6), because it is the state of one's soul – with respect to one's knowledge and emotions – through which one makes the concrete choices and decisions that add up to a virtuous life.

The word 'prohairesis' plays no special role in the early Stoa, and there is no reason to think that the Stoics were influenced by Aristotle's use of it.⁹⁶ The central influence on Stoic moral psychology was rather the cognitivist theory of emotion in Plato's early dialogues, which Aristotle had rejected in *EN* 7.2. As a result, the basic notion in Stoic psychology is 'impulse' (*hormē*), which covers 'irrational' emotions – i.e. false practical beliefs, such as fear, greed and lust – no less than the carefully deliberated rational desires of the virtuous person. The differences between Aristotelian *prohairesis* and Stoic impulse at this level of psychological theory are clear: Aristotle does not consider fear, greed and lust to be instances of *prohairesis*; and the Stoics make no particular connection between impulse and deliberation.⁹⁷

There is, however, considerable overlap between the roles of impulse in the Stoa and of *prohairesis* in Aristotle. For both Aristotelian *prohairesis* and Stoic impulse are thought of as the psychological event that correlates to and underlies the fully voluntary actions of a rational agent, because the agent's actions stem directly from *prohairesis* or impulse, and these in turn emerge from and express his or her character as an agent in the world. Hence, just as Aristotle said that virtue is a certain *prohairesis*, one might expect the Stoics to have said that virtue is a certain impulsive disposition – as they more or less did. But since their cognitivist view that impulses are occurrent evaluative *beliefs* implies that virtuous impulses just are perfected occurrent beliefs, the Stoics defined virtue not as an impulsive disposition, but as (dispositional) knowledge of value. Thus, while Aristotelian *prohairesis*

and Stoic impulse are the products of incompatible theories of emotion and desire, they play analogous abstract or meta-ethical roles in connecting up character, virtue, action and responsibility.

Epictetus' frequent use of *prohairesis* was probably an innovation in the Stoa, and is clearly different from, and perhaps completely unconnected to, Aristotle's. Its technical meaning is something like 'general disposition to assent', where this includes our dispositions to assent to ordinary, non-ethical impressions as well as the dispositions to assent to evaluative impressions that constitute the virtue of the sage and the vice of the rest of us. But since our dispositions to assent are equivalent to our dispositional beliefs, an agent's *prohairesis* also signifies the totality of his beliefs – i.e. his 'self' or (the governing part of his) rational soul. It seems that Epictetus arrived at this conception of *prohairesis* by focusing his ethical teaching on the correct 'use of impressions' rather than the ultimate goals of virtue or happiness. The process of developing the correct use of impressions depends entirely on one's habits of, or dispositions towards, assent and suspension of judgement: one starts off with false beliefs about value, but gradually learns to suspend judgement about them. But instead of taking this change as progress toward virtue, Epictetus invited his students to view it as a change in their pattern of assents. One advantage of this description is that it does not make any reference to vice or virtue, which are not useful measures of their progress in the employment of impressions, since students will be equally vicious throughout their training.⁹⁸ Even in the ideal case, when the training is completed, it is still possible to understand the change from virtue to vice entirely in terms of the patterns of assent. For even here the terminus is reached precisely when the student's dispositions to assent become fixed and harden into a psychic disposition that is incompatible with assenting to any non-cataleptic impression or any impulse that is not virtuous. Accordingly, Epictetus de-emphasised the distinction between virtue and vice, and found a term that applied equally to the vice of the vicious, and to the virtue of the virtuous, when both were considered as dispositions to assent to impressions: '*prohairesis*'. Using this term allowed him to stress the centrality of having the right beliefs – i.e. the right dispositions to assent to and suspend judgement about impressions – and thus keep students focused on the concrete task of using each of their impressions correctly.

With these sketches of their views in mind, we can now try to clarify the relation between Aristotelian and Epictetan *prohairesis*. An Aristotelian *prohairesis* is an event, a decision made at a particular time, rather than a disposition (although the agent's virtue or vice is the disposition from which an agent's individual acts of *prohairesis* arise). As the outcome of the agent's deliberation, it reflects the agent's non-evaluative beliefs, practical wisdom, and other cognitive capacities, although Aristotle is more concerned with the way that the *prohairesis* reflects the habituation and shaping of the agent's irrational desires. An

Epictetan prohairesis, however, is a disposition – or the set of the agent’s dispositions – to assent to impressions: it *is* the agent’s beliefs, or virtue or vice, or (the governing part of his or her) soul. Since every impulse is a belief, Epictetan prohairesis includes the agent’s disposition to have Aristotelian prohaireseis. An agent’s Epictetan prohairesis will give rise to the Aristotelian prohairesis to perform some deliberated action, but it will also give rise to rage, self-pity, true or mistaken perceptual or intellectual beliefs, etc., since they all involve the agent’s assent to impressions.

Simplicius clearly inherited the Aristotelian theory of prohairesis.⁹⁹ He was also the heir to the Epictetan theory, at least in his commentary on the *Encheiridion*. Unfortunately, he appears not to betray any awareness that the use of this word in Epictetus raises difficulties or requires comment by someone who also employs the Aristotelian notion.¹⁰⁰ Perhaps he had a theory about the relation between the two senses of the word something like the one we sketch above; and perhaps this theory, too, was judged too complicated, or insufficiently relevant, for the uses of beginners. But it is difficult not to suspect that he was unaware of the differences. The most charitable conclusion that we can draw is this: when the subject is narrowly ethical, so that the Epictetan prohairesis that is of interest is a disposition to assent to impulsive impressions about serious affairs requiring deliberation, the distinction between the two sense of prohairesis narrows to the distinction between potential (Epictetan disposition) and actual (Aristotelian choice), which to a Peripatetic is the nearest approach to unity that two distinct things can make.¹⁰¹

(Since the word is at once important and problematic, it is left untranslated in this translation. We hope that others will make a detailed study of Simplicius’ use of prohairesis, and either substantiate or supersede the tentative suggestions made here.)

As with the *Discourses*, so too with the remainder of the Stoic corpus: Simplicius does not cite Stoic views taken from other sources that might elucidate Epictetus.¹⁰² It is thus hard to believe that Simplicius had any Stoic text open in front of him other than the *Encheiridion* itself. Is Simplicius then of no use for understanding the Stoics? Perhaps his theological outlook provides a salutary corrective to the view of the Stoics that one tends to derive from more secular presentations such as that in Cicero’s *de Finibus*, which is designed to appeal to eclectics, and so emphasises the conventional and uncontroversial aspects of the system. Simplicius provides a rather different perspective, from which the Stoics are seen as theistic naturalists, another link between the Socrates of the *Phaedo* and the Platonists. If Simplicius perhaps misunderstands, and certainly misinterprets, some central views of Epictetus and of the earlier Stoics, his portrayal of Stoic ethics remains of considerable historical interest.

6. Remarks on the translation

Our translation follows, with a few exceptions noted below, the excellent text of Hadot's *editio maior*. Anyone who has used Schweighäuser's 1799 edition (or Dübner's reprinting of it) – the text available before 1996 – will appreciate how great an improvement Professor Hadot has made in the state of Simplician scholarship. Since we had already drafted roughly half of our translation from the Dübner text before Hadot's became available, we are acutely aware that the new manuscripts she used have restored words, phrases, and whole lines to the text in several dozen places. Her new witnesses also bore out many of the brilliant conjectures of Schweighäuser (whose commentary on Simplicius remains an invaluable tool). For ease of reference, however, particularly in connexion with electronic searches, we have retained the page and line numbers of Dübner's edition in our translation, as well as Hadot's page numbers.

The translation printed below diverges from all texts of Simplicius in one glaring respect: before each lemma and its accompanying commentary, we have inserted translations of the entire chapter of the *Encheiridion* on which Simplicius is commenting, along with the more meagre lemmata that appear in the manuscripts. The utility of having before one's eyes the entire text that Simplicius himself is referring to will be evident to the reader. It brings out forcibly the degree to which his vocabulary and turns of phrase are influenced by Epictetus: long stretches of the commentary may be seen to echo key phrases from the *Encheiridion* that would not appear in a translation of the lemma alone, or might be hidden from the reader who consulted a separate translation of Epictetus. Our text for the *Encheiridion* was Schenkl's edition; where it disagrees with the lemma printed in the manuscripts of Simplicius we have noted this and sometimes discussed it.

Our method of working was thoroughly collaborative. Each of us produced a first draft of roughly half the *Commentary*; after a first revision by the collaborator, a second revision fixed a common vocabulary and level of diction and the construal of particularly recalcitrant stretches. This draft was sent to nine anonymous readers by Richard Sorabji, and the readers' often extremely detailed comments were incorporated into a fourth draft. The final version was revised again for consistency and smoothness. Thus neither of us can now say which parts we worked on at any stage, though every part has been worked over several times by each.

Our aim has been to produce a work that reads like contemporary philosophical English and reproduces the philosophical content of the *Commentary* with as little distraction as possible. Since few things are as distracting as the constant awareness that one is reading a translation, we saw it as our job, as translators hoping to bring Simplicius to a wider audience, not to represent his Greek, but rather to represent his

sense, and to deliver it to the reader in an easy, smooth, and uninterrupted flow. (An extremely faithful representation of Simplicius' Greek may be found in Hadot 1996.) Accordingly, we have not hesitated to divide up straggling sentences, to reorder their parts if doing so produced in English the logical sequence and rhetorical emphasis that we found in the Greek, or to put a passive construction into the active and supply a person for an impersonal Greek verb if it read more smoothly. Some ambiguities in the Greek are not preserved in our text; some passages which we first translated with trepidation now present an innocent appearance to the unwary; and anyone who delves into the original text will find that we made questionable or controversial interpretive choices. But we hope that the result is throughout a translation rather than a paraphrase; where we have diverged from the literal, our principle has been to make the philosophical content as transparent as possible.¹⁰³

So much by way of apologia. Some of any translator's choices inevitably prompt reflection; a handful of terms forever evade happy translations, but offer equally strong (or weak) alternatives. Among the latter in this translation are the Greek word *eurrhoia* and its cognates. Etymologically, this clearly means 'a good flow', but Zeno and Epictetus used it to describe the condition of happiness enjoyed by the Stoic sage, and Simplicius sometimes used it in this sense as well. So a translation guided by etymology leads to the claim that 'virtue produces a good flow', thus promising regular elimination as the reward for good conduct. But a translation guided by the concept's philosophical application yields 'happiness', which conflicts with a better candidate for that English term – *eudaimonia* – and disguises the fact that *eurrhoia* was a characteristically Stoic technical term, where 'happiness' is not. We settled dyspeptically for the second set of defects.

A more significant set of interpretive questions is exemplified by the word *hamartia*. In Christian theological texts, this word is naturally translated as 'sin'; but in most pre-Christian contexts it means something closer to 'error', since it often has no connotations of culpability, much less the particular cluster of doctrines suggested by the word 'sin'. Thus it seems best to avoid 'sin' altogether in pagan philosophical contexts, and stick with 'error'. However, Simplicius presents a special problem in this regard for two reasons. First, since he lived in a world that was increasingly Christianised, for much of his audience the central meaning of *hamartia* was probably closer to the Christian 'sin' than the rationalist 'error'. Secondly, Simplicius himself has a view of the soul's choice of good and bad that seems to presuppose some of the peculiar doctrines that underwrite a notion of 'sin'. So when one reads his description of the soul's fall from God through its willful choice of sensual pleasures, the word 'sin' does not appear out of place. Nevertheless, we decided to err on the side of caution, by avoiding 'sin', in deference to the non-Christian context.

Finally, there is the case of *prohairesis*. As noted above, it proved impossible to choose an English word that would usefully represent this word; so we did not.

Notes

1. In the Introduction and Notes we refer to the text of Simplicius' commentary by means of a double numeration, for reasons explained in Section 6 below. A reference such as '(H357 / D89,27)' directs the reader to the text that appears on p. 89, line 27, of Dübner's reprinting of Schweighäuser's text, which is located on p. 357 of Hadot's 1996 text. Hadot's edition also includes Dübner's line numbers, so that readers who have only the Hadot text will still find the Dübner line indicated on the Hadot page given.

2. The principal external source for Simplicius' life is Agathias *Hist.* 2.30-1, on which see below. His Cilician origin is noted by Agathias at 2.30; his study with Ammonius in Alexandria is evident from his citations of Ammonius in his *Physics* commentary, and made explicit in his *de Caelo* commentary at p. 462.20 Heiberg; his relations to Damascius are evident from his comments in his *in Phys.*, Suida II 3.28 (*sub* Damascius), and Agathias 2.30-1.

3. Since his *Physics* commentary names Damascius (18 times) and criticises him gently, it presumably post-dates the latter's death, which is placed after AD 538 by a dated epigraph from Hims in Syria ascribed to him in the *Palatine Anthology* (VII.553); see Hoffman 1994 section 10.

4. Against Simplicius' authorship of the *de Anima* commentary, see C. Steel in Huby and Steel 1997, 105-40; more or less in favour, see Hadot in Sorabji 1990, 290-4 (= Hadot 1987, 223-7), which slightly corrects Hadot 1978, 193-202; agnosticism is perhaps appropriate until the work – and its relation to Simplicius' other works, such as this one – has been studied in more detail, as Blumenthal concluded in his 2000, 1-6. There may be traces of Simplicius' commentary on the *Metaphysics* in a few late scholia, as Hadot argues in her 1987, 225-45.

5. Two cross-references, however, may suggest a work on the *Phaedo*, or parts of it concerning the immortality of the soul, as Hadot 1996, 6 n. 17 argues – cf. *in de Caelo* 369,4-6 and *in Ench.* H212 / D12,15. But even if these references are to a work by Simplicius rather than one of his teachers, they may well come from his commentary on Iamblichus' work on the Pythagorean sect.

6. Simplicius is very enthusiastic about friendship (H357 / D89,27), and even recounts his own experience of the value of friends who looked after his family when he was away (H354 / D87,40), though unfortunately he does not tell us where he or they were.

7. See e.g. Cameron 1969 and Glucker 1978, 322-9. On Khusrau, see Tardieu 1994.

8. On the controversial final clause, we follow Foulkes 1992, who argues that it demands only that the philosophers should be able to practise their 'religion' privately (*contra* Hadot 1987, 7-10 = Sorabji 1990, 278-90).

9. Tardieu 1986, 1987, 1990, 1994, followed with less or greater enthusiasm by Hadot 1987, 1990 (see previous note); 1996, 28-50; 2001, xiii-xxxiii.

10. Tardieu 1986, 24-5 n. 106; Hadot 1987, 17-21; 1990, 286-9; 1996; 2001, xiv-xviii.

11. Tardieu's arguments are usefully summarised by Theil's *Simplikios* 1999 and in Hadot's various accounts.

12. Simplicius may have met his Manichee source at any time and anywhere

on any of his travels. Augustine's report of his long wait for the Manichee 'bishop' Faustus in *Conf.* 5.10-12 suggests that such figures were or might be peripatetic (though this is evidence from the West and 100 years earlier).

13. Tardieu 1987, 24-5 and Hadot e.g. 2001, xiv-xviii note that Simplicius' anti-Manichee predecessors – such as Alexander of Lycopolis and Titus of Bostra (both in Migne's *PG* 18) – as well as the anti-dualist arguments of Plotinus *Enn.* 2.9.10 – though not obviously of Proclus *de Malorum Subsistentia* – seem to have had in mind specific audiences affected by Manichees or dualists. But Simplicius' commentary does not seem to have any particularly situated audience in mind, unlike these figures, whose audiences are known, unless one presupposes that he was writing in Harran. And if the expected audience were Harranian, one might expect that Simplicius' comments on the life of a would-be philosopher would reflect it in other ways too.

14. See Van Riet 1991 and Foulkes 1992.

15. Damascius' epigraph (n. 3 above) was found in Hims, not in Harran; there is no reason not to suppose that he went home to Damascus, at least temporarily.

16. Our historical grasp of the intellectual life of this period is just as likely to be confounded by surprising new epigraphic evidence as our predecessors' understanding of Epicureanism was by the new evidence from Diogenes of Oenoanda; the recent discoveries concerning Empedocles and Posidippus suggest that there may be more to come even on paper or papyrus.

17. See Boter 1999 for an excellent new edition of the *Encheiridion* and its three Christian versions. Boter gives an extremely valuable conspectus of the ancient authors who cited or paraphrased the *Ench.* on his pp. 432-3.

18. See Boter 1999. Hierocles alludes to *Ench.* 9 and 11 at *in Carm. Aur.* 11, pp. 42 and 44 Koehler; Proclus to *Ench.* 5a and 5b at *in Alc.* pp. 288.8-10 and 287.3-9 Segonds; and Olympiodorus to *Ench.* 1.5 at *in Phd.* 6.2, p. 99 Westerink, and to *Ench.* 1-2, 3, 5b, 17, 21 (and 11), 30 (and 43), 33, and 47 at *in Gorg.* pp. 198, 144, 131, 97, 252, 130, 96 (and 98), and 99 Westerink, respectively. (Boter also detects a probable allusion to *Ench.* 17 at Plotinus *Enn.* 3.2.17 lines 18-19.)

19. The two uses not marked as Epictetan are of *Ench.* 1-2 at p. 198,9-18 and *Ench.* 30 and 43 at p. 130,17-21; the latter is remarkable, since a reader unfamiliar with Epictetus would infer from the context in Olympiodorus that it is a citation from Plato's *Laws*.

20. See the excellent introduction to Westerink 1990, and Hadot 1978 ch. 7.5 (= Hadot 2001, ch. 3.5).

21. Cf. H212 / D12,13-15. Simplicius does not point out other Stoic errors explicitly in the commentary, though he mentions minor points of interpretation, e.g. at H204-5 / D7,53-8,6 on the scope of Epictetus' division of existent things into those up to us and those not up to us. He never alludes, for instance, to the Stoics' determinism, or allows that their psychological theory is inconsistent with his Aristotelian and Plotinian framework (see Sections 4-5 below).

22. Fr. 45-6 Athanassiadi = 106 and 109 Zintzen.

23. The first alternative is perhaps the view of Hadot 1978, ch. 7.1-4 (= Hadot 2001, ch. 3.1-4, cf. ch. 4). In favour of the second alternative is Simplicius' status as the most prominent exponent of the 'harmony' of Plato and Aristotle, and his implausibly Platonist interpretations of the Presocratics.

24. Simplicius argues that *Ench.* 21 and 22 form a single unit because ch. 22 explains how to deal with the problems of ch. 21; he suggests supplying an 'and' to link the two syntactically (H300 / D58,14). He argues in the same fashion for chs 5a and 5b (in Boter's edition), suggesting an additional 'for' in that case (H246 / D30,6).

25. Simplicius presumably took ch. 22 as his dividing point since it is there that the student begins to worry about being mocked for being a philosopher. If so, he probably misinterprets Epictetus' notion of a 'philosopher' – i.e. someone interested in ethical progress – for his own – i.e. someone sufficiently interested in philosophy to attend a pagan philosophical 'school' or 'circle'. But his division is not the pure fancy Hadot 1996, ch. 6 takes it to be (and requires less special pleading than her favoured model for the partition of the *Ench.*)

26. Simplicius notes various differences between the two groups. Most important is that the beginner should not attempt to select external things even as incidental to their progress, while the (ordinary) philosopher may do so (H233 / D22,34, H254 / D34,2-8). He also explains and contrasts *Ench.* chs 23 and 24 with chs 13 and 12 respectively, on the grounds that the former are appropriate for beginners, and the latter for intermediate students (H303-4 / D60.34-49, H306 / D61.15-27).

27. At H346 / D83,15 Simplicius discerns four categories of 'appropriate action': [a] relating to other people; [b] to our superiors; [c] to our inferiors; and [d] to ourselves. He treats [a] in his comments on ch. 30, [b] in 31 (H361 / D91,24-6), [d] in 33 (H397 / D111,46), and takes ch. 32 on divination to be a category intermediate between [b] and [d] (H392 / D109,7-11); he may have considered divination to concern [c], since it is consulted for advice on external things. Simplicius links the remaining chs to justice at H425 / D125,21 (ch. 36), H426 / D125,41 (ch. 37), H429 / D127,10 (ch. 39), and H436 / D130,20 (ch. 45); and at H431 / D127,48 he notes that ch. 41 explains 'the just distribution of our appropriate actions' with respect to bodily functions, thus showing that he considers all of chs 30-47 to be concerned with both (Stoic) 'appropriate actions' and (Aristotelian, specific) 'justice'.

28. See H194 / D2,15-17, H193 / D1,30-5, and H194 / D2,19-29, respectively.

29. Simplicius praises Epictetus' concision at H253 / D33,32, H297 / D56,33, H 367 / D95,19, H397 / D112,10, and H398 / D112,34; cf. Epictetus' own advice, mentioned at H451 / D137,11-17.

30. See e.g. H254-5 / D34,9-35 on ch. 7, and H293-4 / D54,46-55.4 on chs 15 and 17.

31. See e.g. H236-7 / D24,55-25,45 on ch. 3, H241 / D27,25-43 on ch. 4, H275 / D45,34-45 on ch. 9, H280 / D48,11-15 on ch. 11, and H319 / D68,9-18 on ch. 25.

32. Simplicius comments on Socrates at H243-4 / D28,14 (on ch. 5); H395 / D110,48 (on ch. 32); H397 / D112,5, H405 / D115,47, H415-17 / D120,45-121,50 (all on ch. 33); H438 / D131,6 (on ch. 46); H449 / D136,8 (on ch. 51); H453 / D137,48-138,14 (on ch. 53).

33. See H227-8 / D20,2-46 on 'harsh impressions', H226 / D19,38-46 on 'Remember', and H239-40 / D26,9-27.24 on 'prior consideration'.

34. See H264 / D39,44, H305 / D60,51, H367 / D95,17 and H406 / D116,48.

35. The Stoics seem to have rejected Aristotle's theoretical emphasis on the value of friendship for philosophical and moral progress, in favour of the older Socratic and Platonic model of an erotic and unequal relation between a mature lover and a naive beloved; see *SVF* 3.625-35 and 716-26. A familiar modern criticism of Epictetus' (and Seneca's) universalist conception of personal ethical progress is that it is apolitical or even reactionary; something of this sort can perhaps be gleaned from the charges levelled by Plutarch against the early Stoics in *St. Rep.* chs 5-6.

36. Simplicius explains his motives for this excursus at H199 / D4,52-5,3, H204-5 / D7,50-8,16, and H217 / D14,54-15,5.

37. See H367 / D95,17, H368 / D95,47, H379 / D101,38-46 and H391 / D108,38-45.

38. Since Simplicius ties his own profit from the study of Epictetus to the 'tyrannical circumstances' in which he wrote in the second passage (H454 / D138,15-21), it seems plausible to interpret both as intimating his own need to confirm the priority of 'internal freedom' over external circumstances. Neither passage suggests that the practice of writing commentaries, or this commentary in particular, was seen by Simplicius as a 'spiritual exercise' as such (*contra* Hadot 1978; 1996): as Epictetus points out (chs 49, 52), what matters for moral improvement is not interpreting texts but putting them into action.

39. Two examples that give the flavour of Simplicius' interpretative methods are lemma ix on ch. 4 and lemma lxvi on ch. 48. The former goes through stages (i), (ii), (v) – though the formal argument for ch. 4 is actually given in ch. 5, Simplicius thinks –, (vi) and (iv); the latter progresses through stages (i), (ii), (v), (iv), (vii), and terminates at (iii).

40. See e.g. the passages mentioned in nn. 25-7 above.

41. The range of references that the readers are expected to be familiar with does not seem very broad; the most frequent references of this kind are to Euripides' *Medea* (H225 / D18,49, H247 / D30,37, H252 / D33,20) and Demosthenes (H239-40 / D26,1-49, H444 / D134,1).

42. See e.g. his comments on the balance of Epictetus' division of existent things (H204-5 / D7,50-8,6), his note on the contribution of the soul towards gaining external things (H218 / D15,26), and his reconstructions of Epictetus' argument about the nature of the bad in ch. 27 (H342-4 / D81,19-82,19).

43. Notable examples are Simplicius' scholastic divisions of people into 'fortunate' / 'of good fortune' and 'unfortunate' / 'ill-fortuned' in lemma vii on ch. 2, and of types of things people enjoy in lemma viii on ch. 3, etc. The acme of scholasticism in the work is his division of 'relations' at H346-8 / D83,30-84,37.

44. As Sedley 1999, 134-40 notes, the Platonist commentators had a long tradition of attacking the Stoics for their dull presentation of 'appropriate actions' via rules rather than dramatically as Plato represented them in his dialogues. They do not seem to have noticed the context of their criticisms in their own works.

45. H199 / D4,50-H217 / D15,1 (on ch. 1) and H367 / D95,10-H392 / D109,1 (on ch. 31).

46. One controversy that now seems happily dead concerned the alleged distinction between 'Alexandrian' Platonism, supposedly exhibited in Simplicius' *in Ench.* and Hierocles' *in Carmen Aureum*, and the 'Athenian' Platonism of e.g. Proclus' commentaries and *ET*. Hadot 1978 and 1982 has shown that this distinction, presented in Praechter 1927, rests on a misunderstanding of the genre of these introductory works, as well as misapprehensions about the relative simplicity of their doctrines.

47. See H376 / D99,34-49 and the caveats at H378 / D101,17-28, discussed below.

48. On angelic and daimonic souls, see H270 / D42,53, H276 / D45,55, H340 / D80,7. The passages containing the hierarchy of beings are set out in tabular form in Hadot 1978, 168-73.

49. H333 / D76,16

50. For simplicity, see *Parmenides* 157c and Plotinus *Enn.* 6.9.1, 5.6.3, Proclus *ET* 1 and *Th. Pl.* 2.1. For motion, see *Laws* 894b-895b, and Aristotle's *Phys.* 8.5, Proclus *ET* 14, *El. Phys.* 2.19, and *in Tim.* 3.9. For cause, see *Philebus* 27b, Plotinus *Enn.* 5.4.1, 5.5.3, Proclus *ET* 7, and *in Tim.* 1.259. (See Dodds' edition of Proclus' *ET* ad loc. for these and further references.)

51. See H378 / D101,27, *contra* Hadot 1978, 62-5.

52. See e.g. Proclus, *ET* 64, though the instance itself could be multiplied.

53. Specifically, he gives human souls their subsistence (H271 / D43,35), and hence like one's parents, God is the cause of our subsistence and goodness (H351 / D86,19).

54. God's pervasive control of the universe is expounded with reference to human beings in various Epictetan similes: he is pilot of the universe (H253 / D33,40, H254 / D34,16); director of the play we are in (H294 / D55,1), and so on.

55. The distinction between providence and fate is central in both so-called 'Middle' and 'Neo' Platonist accounts of freedom and determinism (though it is not observed in Alcinoüs) – see e.g. ps-Plutarch *de Fato* 572-573. Apuleius *de Platone* 1.12 and Nemesius *de Natura Hominis* 36-7, as well as Plotinus *Enn.* 3.3.5 and Proclus *de Providentia* 13.

56. God wants the human soul to see the truth for itself (H395 / D110,50), and become virtuous 'not through fear but by choice' (H264 / D39,30).

57. In the latter passage (H378 / D101,30), however, Simplicius resists criticisms that might tend towards advocating a method of negative theology.

58. The final prayer seems to allude to the three kinds of virtue that Simplicius mentions elsewhere in the commentary (e.g. H195 / D2,35): first he prays for purification from the body, so as to acquire ethical and political virtue; second he prays for the correction of his reason so that he can acquire cathartic virtue; third, he prays for the complete removal of the 'mist' before his psychic eyes so that he can acquire theoretical virtue. Note that the *Iliad* quotation in the third prayer comes from a prayer to Athena, the goddess of wisdom, i.e. the goddess who controls the philosophical path to wisdom: there is no reference to theurgic *virtues* here or elsewhere in the commentary (despite the mention of theurgic practices at H364-6 / D93,30-94,33).

59. Simplicius uses the terminology of 'divine grace' only at H195 / D2,51; like Plotinus and Augustine, he favours the language of 'illumination' instead – see the passage cited above, and H354 / D88,2-8, on the power of friendship. (The exactness of the parallel in the latter passage makes it clear that Simplicius is not interested in highlighting theurgy.) For Platonist theories of 'grace', see Plotinus *Enn.* 5.5.8 and Augustine *CD* 10.29 on Porphyry's recognition of 'grace', and the comments of Smith 1974, 102-21.

60. Since the *First Alcibiades* was usually the first Platonic dialogue students were given to read (cf. *Anon. Prol.* 26), Simplicius' assumption that his students have not yet read it (H196 / D3,13) is a good indication of their status as absolute beginners.

61. The conception of the 'real' self as a rational soul also goes some way towards explaining the attraction of a Stoic text like the *Encheiridion* for Platonists like Simplicius, since the Stoics thought that there was no more to an adult human soul than 'reason'.

62. See e.g. Plotinus *Enn.* 4.3-4, Porphyry *ad Gaurum*, and Smith 1974. The Platonists' various theories of the soul's 'astral body' or bodies – see e.g. Proclus *ET* 198, 206-11, and Smith 1974, appendix 2 – are designed to accommodate some of these insights. Another route was the theory that the soul is a 'double entelechy' in e.g. ps-Simplicius *Commentary on the de Anima* – see Blumenthal 1996, chs 7-8 and Steel in Huby and Steel 1997, 117-18.

63. See e.g. H215 / D13,50, H271 / D43,37, H336 / D78,5, H372 / D98,5.

64. At H216 / D14,5 he equates assent with 'vital extension', a phrase common in Damascius; see Section 5 below.

65. Simplicius construes choice as the genus of the other psychological motions through such phrases as 'our desires or aversions, or in general our choices', e.g. at H206 / D8,38, or H208 / D9,41. For choice as the mechanism for responsibility or 'what is up to us', see e.g. H338 / D78,52.

66. See Bobzien 1998, 396-412.

67. See H199 / D4,40-52 and H260-1 / D37,32-38,6 on animals.

68. More precisely, we are responsible for the dispositions of ourselves or rational souls that give rise to our false beliefs that the motions of the 'mortal animal' are our own – see e.g. H261-2 / D38,6-44. Simplicius' basic strategy for vindicating responsibility follows Aristotle in *NE* 3.1-5.

69. See H204 / D7,20, and Simplicius' remarks on the higher kinds of being than the rational soul, at H202 / D6,30-40 and H211 / D11,42.

70. See Plotinus *Enn.* 1.2, and Dillon 1990.

71. Plotinus' view that the 'cathartic' person *also* has the ethical virtues, and thus can combine *apatheia* and *metriopatheia*, is problematic. But this is not a problem Simplicius deals with, since his commentary is only directed at aspirants for the first grade of virtues.

72. Porphyry *Sent.* 32, Proclus *Vita Marini* 3-22; see Schissel von Fleschenberg 1929.

73. See H258/D36.25-H260/D37.30 & H334/D76.30-H335/D77.28.

74. On Simplicius' report on Manichee cosmology, see Hadot 1996.

75. See e.g. Proclus *de Decem Dubitationibus* 5.26-32, *de Malorum Subsistentia* 2.11-4.57, *de Providentia* 2.3, 4.10, 4.24, 6.35, and in *Tim.* 1.373.22-376.15 – cf. Hierocles *de Providentia* at Photius *Bibliotheca* cod. 251, 460.b.22-466.b.24. Some of the twenty or thirty exact parallels between Simplicius and Proclus on this topic are specified in the notes.

76. See previous note; Hadot 1996, 88-102 and 2001, lviii argue for Damascius.

77. See H336 / D77,53 and the remarks below on Simplicius' conflicting accounts of the fall of rational souls.

78. See H214 / D13,10, where Simplicius explains our general dispositions or characters as the result of the choices of our previous lives, and hence as 'up to us' only over the course of more than one incarnation.

79. For the uniform choice of the goods-in-themselves and angelic souls, see H202 / D6,30-40, H211 / D11,42.

80. See H212 / D12,20, H215 / D13,25 (cf. H261 / D37,40).

81. See H270 / D43, 1, H332 / D75,44, H333 / D76,14, H340 / D80,6 et seq.

82. Dobbin 1998, xx-xxii argues that Arrian did not transcribe speeches given orally by Epictetus, as the standard view has it; rather, Epictetus wrote the *Discourses* himself, as a literary work, and fathered their composition on Arrian. The veracity of Simplicius' report of the dedicatory letter is supported by Gellius *NA* 1.2.6 and 19.1.14, which rely on the evidence of Epictetus' contemporaries.

83. The extant books of the *Discourses* provide more or less direct parallels for less than half of the chapters of the *Encheiridion*; see Boter 1999, xiii. Evidence that the *Discourses* were once more extensive is supplied by Aulus Gellius, who refers to 'the fifth book of Epictetus' *Dialexeis*' at *NA* 19.1.14.

84. Simplicius gives further information on Epictetus' life at H274 / D44,53-4 (he was lame); H275 / D45,35-40 (he was lame, a slave, and ill), cf. H295 / D55,30; and at H314 / D65,35 (he moved to Nicopolis from Rome to escape Domitian's tyranny). But he is the unique source only for the story of his adopted child.

85. See H346-8 / D83,4-84,37, H279 / D47,36-43, H319-21 / D68,19-69,45.

86. See Sedley 1999, 134-40; Proclus in *Tim.* 1.18-19 shows that Porphyry wrote extensively on 'appropriate actions' in Plato.

87. See the passages cited in n. 85 above. Simplicius' first example of a common conception in H319 / D68,19-25, concerning the relation between goodness and benefit, appears to trace back to a Stoic source – cf. Diogenes

Laertius 7.94 (SVF 3.74), Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.69 (SVF 3.76), and Sextus *M* 11.22-7 (SVF 3.75). However, even here, there may be a connection to Porphyry, whose views on ‘common conceptions’ Simplicius cites at *in Cat.* 213,8-28. The ‘articulation’ of our preconceptions about God is mentioned at H368 / D95,40.49, H391 / D108,42, and connected to the common conceptions at H368 / D95,30, H379 / D102,11 (cf. H335 / D77,8 on badness).

88. See e.g. Proclus *de Decem Dubitationibus* 1, where he ties ‘preceptiones communium conceptuum’ to the ‘common Mercury’; cf. H441 / D132,40, and the passages cited in the notes above.

89. Susanne Bobzien is preparing a monograph on the history of propositional logic in antiquity which will shed a great deal of light on the question of the knowledge of Stoic logic among the Platonists. The comments above reflect some of her preliminary observations, though the summary judgement is our own.

90. Simplicius gives a related, non-Stoic usage of ‘assent’ at H424 / D124,40, where he remarks that ‘two negations make an assent’.

91. Cf. e.g. H210 / D10,43, H210 / D10,50, H231 / D22,22, H218 / D15,12.

92. Simplicius contradicts the claim he misascribes to the Stoics both here at H198 / D4,30 and again at H232 / D22,32-4.

93. See Inwood 1985, 115-19.

94. On the early Stoic theories of *propatheiai*, the Posedonian doctrine of *pathetikai holkai*, and Seneca’s doctrine of ‘first movements’, see Graver 2000, Cooper 1998, Sorabji 2000, 66-75.

95. Hence Simplicius is able to vary his usual leitmotif, that political virtue requires us to ‘use the body as an instrument’ (a sentiment with which the Stoics did not disagree), by saying at H194 / D2,4 and H454 / D138,26 that we use the body *and* its emotions (*pathē*) as instruments.

96. There is an obscure and isolated use of it in Stobaeus’ list of *eupatheiai* in *Ec.* 2.87 (SVF 3.173), which indicates that it was one of the impulses that a Sage might experience. But any such experience that was restricted to the perfectly virtuous could not be much like an Aristotelian prohairesis; see Inwood 1985, 240-2.

97. The Stoic account of deliberation seems drastically underdeveloped, if it has not been lost in transmission; see Brennan 2002a, 2002b, and the response in Barney 2002.

98. A second advantage is that it is not beneficial for students to dwell on their own vice and virtue, because even the sincere desire for virtue, when felt intensely by aspiring students, can have the counterproductive effect of inducing emotional disturbances, and thus interfere with their ability to accept the dictates of nature and fate. The path to virtue seems to lie in the complete disregard of any explicit assessment of one’s virtue (hence advanced students can turn into sages without even being aware of the transition). See Cicero’s *Disp. Tusc.* 3.77 for the story of Alcibiades, discussed in Brennan 1998.

99. See e.g. H202 / D6,38, H216-17 / D14,25-53, H338-9 / D79,2-24, H348-9 / D84,14-85,2. Although he does not seem to have written any commentaries on Aristotle’s ethical writings, the commentary on Epictetus shows that he was thoroughly versed in their doctrines.

100. H277 / D46,46 shows one unmistakably Epictetan usage, but otherwise his typical usage tends towards the Peripatetic, esp. where he equates prohairesis with haireisis (choice) as at H202 / D6,38, H204 / D7,25-H206 / D8,40.

101. *de Anima* 412b6-9.

102. He does tell us, what we would otherwise learn from Seneca, that the trimeter lines in the last chapter of the *Encheiridion* are a quotation from

Cleanthes, but it seems clear that he did not have any other access to the poem itself (H451-2 / D137,17-30).

103. In the first sentence of the commentary, for instance, we learn that Arrian compiled the *Discourses* of Epictetus '*en polustikhōis bibliois*'. A literal translation might be 'in books of many lines'; but the reader who encounters this phrase will be meeting something that seldom occurs in English and raises a distracting question in his or her mind. Having raised the question, a footnote might explain how ancient book-rolls were quantified by counting lines of writing, but at the cost of multiplying the obstacles to the reader's easy progress through the prose, for the sake of a trivial and irrelevant historical point.

Simplicius
On Epictetus
Handbook 1-26

Translation

Textual Emendations

References at the start of each entry are to Dübner pages (given in the margin of the translation).

- 5,18 Keeping *auto arkhê* from the uncorrected A instead of the corrector's *autoarkhê* which Hadot adopts (n. 18)
- 12,10 Perhaps read *praxeis* with Schweighäuser for the odd *taxeis* (n. 42)
- 15,24 Perhaps read *autois* (i.e. 'within these things') of manuscript B instead of the *heautois* ('within us') that Hadot prints (n. 56)
- 20,23 Perhaps read *diakrisis* (suggested by Schweighäuser) for the strange *diathesis* here (n. 75)
- 35,10 Perhaps read *endous* <ti> *têi tôn* to give the verb an object (n. 116)
- 37,44 Reading *kata tên axian*, <kai> *kat' ekeina te kai met'ekinôn* (n. 142)
- 38,45 Reading *aniara* <toutois>, *eis ha neneuken autê[i],prospherôn* for *aniara tauta, eis ha neneuken, autêi prosperôn* (n. 154)
- 40,35 Reading *elaphrotera pôs eisi, kathoti* ... instead of *elaphrotera pôs eisi, kai hoti* (n. 160)
- 45,53 Reading *prostattomena* with Schweighäuser for *prostatometha* (n. 199)
- 46,49 Perhaps omit *prophanôs* ... *pseudês* with MS A (n. 206)
- 60,49 Preferring *tetagmenon* (all other MSS) to *tetagmenôn* (Ms A, Hadot) (n. 257)

Simplicius' Commentary on the Handbook of Epictetus

Introduction¹

192 Epictetus' life and death have been described by Arrian, who compiled the 'Discourses' of Epictetus in several long volumes. The same source provides information about the sort of man Epictetus was in his life. This book, 'The Handbook of Epictetus', was also compiled by Arrian. In his letter to Messalenus (to whom Arrian dedicated this collection, because he was a very close friend of his, and had the greatest admiration for Epictetus), he described it as a selection from Epictetus' speeches containing those which are 'most timely and most essential to philosophy, and which most stir the soul'.² Practically all the material can be found in the same words at various points in Arrian's 'Discourses of Epictetus'. 1,1
10

The aim of the book – if it meets with people who are persuaded by it, and do not merely read it but are actually affected by the speeches and bring **193** them into effect – is to make our soul free, as the Demiurge and Father, its maker and generator, intended it to be:³ not fearing anything, or distressed at anything, or mastered by anything inferior to it. It is entitled 'The Handbook', because it ought always to be to hand or ready for those who want to live well (just as a soldier's 'hand-sword' should always be to hand for its user). The speeches are very effective and stirring, so that anyone not totally deadened would be goaded by them, become aware of his own afflictions,⁴ and be roused to correct them. Some are affected more and some less; but someone who is not affected by these speeches could only be corrected by the courts of Hades. 20
30

His teaching is directed towards human beings as having their essence in accordance with a rational soul and using the body as an instrument.⁵ For this reason he permits both marriage and childraising, and the enjoyment of the other choice-worthy things in life. But at every point he wants the rational soul to keep itself unenslaved by the body and the irrational emotions, by referring even their use towards its proper good. And while he allows the measured enjoyment of the external things that seem to be goods, provided that they are consistent with the genuine good, he enjoins a thoroughgoing abstinence from those which are inconsistent with it. **194** 40

One feature of these speeches that may be surprising is that they render the people who believe them and put them into practice

2,1 blessed and happy without the need to be promised the rewards of
 virtue after death – even if these rewards always do follow too.⁶ For
 something which uses its body and its irrational emotions as instru-
 ments has an essence altogether and wholly separated from them,
 and persisting after their destruction – and its perfection obviously
 persists as well, since it is coordinate with its essence. But even if it
 were supposed that the soul is mortal, and that it is destroyed along
 with the body, still, in that case anyone who lived according to these
 precepts would be genuinely happy and blessed, since he would
 10 achieve his own perfection, and reach the good proper to him. For
 even the human body, although it is mortal, reaches its proper good
 if it achieves its own perfection in accordance with its nature, and no
 longer needs anything in addition to this.

The speeches are pithy and gnomic, in the form the Pythagoreans
 called ‘precepts’. But practically all of them have a certain orderly
 relationship to one another and a logical sequence, as we shall see as
 we proceed. And, although the chapters were written separately, they
 20 all aim at one art – the art which rectifies human life. The speeches
 are also all directed towards one goal – rousing the rational soul to
 the maintenance of its proper value, and to the use, in accordance
 with nature, of its proper activities. And while the speeches are clear,
 it will perhaps do no harm to explicate them insofar as possible. For
 the writer will become at once more sensitive to them and more
 perceptive of their truth, and students who are less accustomed to
 such speeches will perhaps receive some assistance from their inter-
 pretation.

30 But first of all, as I said, we must distinguish the sort of human
 being these speeches were intended for, and the sort of human life **195**
 they lead someone who is convinced by them to be virtuous in. Well,
 they are not directed towards someone who is capable of living
 cathartically: such a person wants, in so far as possible, to flee from
 the body and from the bodily emotions, and to withdraw into himself.⁷
 Even less are they meant for the theoretical person: such a person,
 rising above even his rational life, wants to be wholly one of our
 superiors. Rather, the speeches suit those who have their essence in
 40 accordance with a rational life, which uses the body as an instrument,
 and doesn’t consider the body to be a part of the soul, or it to be a part
 of the body, or believe that the soul along with the body completes the
 human being (as though it were constituted by two parts, the soul and
 the body). Most people have such beliefs, since they are embroiled in
 the realm of generation⁸ and oppressed by it, and are no more rational
 than irrational animals, and for this reason not even properly called
 human. But someone who wants to be a genuine human being, and is
 50 eager to regain the nobility of his ancestry, with which God has graced
 humans beyond the irrational animals – someone like this is eager for
 his rational soul to live as it is by nature, ruling the body and

transcending it, using it not as a coordinate part but as an instrument. And it is to someone like this that ethical and political virtues – the virtues promoted by these speeches – belong. 3,1

But that someone who has his essence in accordance with a rational soul is the real and true human being, **196** was demonstrated primarily by Plato – or rather the Platonic Socrates – in his dialogue with Alcibiades the fair, the son of Kleinias. Epictetus' argument, however, takes this as a hypothesis, and teaches people who believe it the sort of life and deeds by which it is possible to perfect oneself as a human being of this kind. (For just as the body is exercised by intensifying its natural motions, and made stronger, so too the soul gets its essence into its natural condition through its natural activities.) But perhaps it is no hindrance to the study of the speeches (indeed, perhaps it is even necessary to it) to give a preliminary articulation and proof of what Epictetus took as a hypothesis, before turning to the exegesis of the individual parts of the work – i.e. that the genuine human being is the rational soul, which uses its body as an instrument. For by putting before our eyes activities that are fitting and proper to just such a human being, Epictetus encourages and incites people convinced by him to recognise these activities accurately and to put them into practice, in order that, as I said, we may perfect our proper essence through them. But, as I said, he does not demonstrate, but only takes it as a hypothesis, that this is the real human being. 10 20

Socrates took as his <first> premise the evident fact that a human being uses his hand for work in the same way that he might use a scalpel.⁹ His second premise was that what uses something, is distinct from the thing it makes use of as an instrument. And he concluded that what uses its body as an instrument is a human being. But what uses the body as an instrument, both in the crafts and in other activities, is nothing other than the rational soul. So that is the **197** human being: the rational soul, which uses the body as an instrument. Next, assuming from the premises already given that what uses the body also universally rules the thing it makes use of, he propounds an argument on the basis of a division, asserting that it is necessary that the human being be either the body, or the soul, or the combination of both of them. If, then, the human being rules the body, but the body does not rule itself, it is clear that the body is not the human being. But neither is the combination, for the same reason: if the human being is the ruler of the body, and the body does not rule, then the combination won't be the ruler either. And the same conclusion follows quite generally: if [1] the body is unmoving in itself and a corpse, and [2] the soul is the mover, and [3] we see in the case of the crafts as well that it is the craftsman who moves, and what is moved are the instruments of the craft, then [4] it is clear that the body has the status of an instrument in relation to the soul. So this (the soul) is the human being. Hence anyone who wants to care for a 30 40

50 human being, should care for the rational soul, and be engaged with the goods which are proper to it. For someone who cares for the body is not caring for a human being, or even for something which is really ours, but only for an instrument. And someone who is concerned with money and that sort of thing is not caring for a human being, or even the instrument of a human being, but only for the instruments of an instrument.

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 1 (= Lemmata i-vi): Of existent things, some are up to us, some are not up to us. Up to us are belief, impulse, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever is our work. Not up to us are the body, possessions, reputation, political power, and, in a word, whatever is not our work. And the things that are up to us are by nature free, unhindered, and unimpeded; whereas the things that are not up to us are weak, servile, hindered, and not our own. Remember then that if you think things that are servile by nature are free, and think that things that are not our own are our own, you will be impeded, and grieve, and be disturbed; and you will blame both the gods and human beings. But if you consider only what is yours to be yours, and consider what is not yours just as it is, i.e. not yours, then no one will ever compel you, no one will ever hinder you, you will blame no one, you will accuse no one, you won't do a single thing against your will, you won't have an enemy, and no one will harm you, because you won't suffer any harm.

Striving for such great things, remember that you should not be moderately moved when you engage in them; instead, some of them you should get rid of entirely, and others you should defer for the present. But if you wish for these things, as well as wishing to have political power and be wealthy – well, there's a good chance that you won't get the power and wealth, because you'll be striving for the former things, too. But it is completely certain that you will fail to attain the former things; and it is only through them that freedom and happiness come about.

Make it your practice, then, with every harsh impression, to recite to it straightaway 'You are an impression, and not necessarily its object.' Next, investigate it, and test it with the criteria you have – first and foremost, whether it is up to us or not up to us. And if it is an impression of something that is not up to us, then you should have ready to hand 'This is nothing to me.'¹⁰]

i: Of existent things, some are up to us, some are not up to us.

[Commentary on Chapter 1, Lemma i]

4,1 By 'up to us' he means those things which we are in control of and over which we have authority. After all, we say that those things are 'up

to' each person which he does not have from someone else, and which cannot be impeded by anyone else. The **198** motions of the soul, which arise internally from itself according to its judgment and choice, are like this. For choice can't be moved from outside. Rather, even if the object of choice is external, the choice itself and the motion towards the object of choice are internal. Having a belief of one sort or another about things – for instance, that wealth or death or something else is good or bad or indifferent – is also like this. Even if we form a judgment this way or that way about it after we've heard someone else, providing we do form a judgment, rather than speaking like trained birds (which say 'I drink spiced wine' without knowing what they are saying), this opinion or belief is our own movement; it may sometimes be provoked from the outside or elicited by someone teaching us, but it is not implanted by him. Impulse towards something is also like this, since it too is internal. Even if the object of our impulse is external, and even if our impulse has some origin, still the impulse itself is wholly internal. Our motion isn't like that of people moved externally by being shoved by someone else, but instead like that of people who wake up in accordance with their vital force. Desire is also like this since it is a stretching of the soul towards the object of desire; and aversion (the opposite of desire) too, since it is a turning away and flight from the object of aversion. 10

It is clear that what comes first¹¹ is belief, which is a sort of rational knowledge, and fitting for human beings. And whenever the belief concerns our own good or bad, whether real or apparent, then either aversion or desire is always set in motion, and impulse follows on them. For one must first desire or be displeased, and only on that basis have the impulse to go towards the object of desire, or turn away from the object of aversion (which is the opposite of the object of desire). But the Stoics **199** put impulse and counter-impulse before desire and aversion, because they saw the motions of the soul that are prior to desire and aversion.¹² 30

Now the irrational desires, i.e. spirit and appetite, are to a large extent moved externally, since they are contiguous to the body and are lives¹³ of the body, and so seem to spring up from the composition of the bodies. Thus these desires, even though they too are internal movements, are no longer straightforwardly self-determined, or strictly up to the persons who have them. But as for the rational soul, when it surrenders itself to bodies and to irrational and bodily movements, it too is pulled about like a marionette and shoved, and it no longer has its motions readily up to it.¹⁴ Whereas when it acts in accordance with its own nature and nobility, it is moved internally from itself,¹⁵ freely and self-determinately. And in a soul of this sort, the fact that it is up to us is clearly seen and indisputable. 40 50

But to learn more accurately what it is for something to be 'up to us', the things it is found in, and that it is the root and origin of every 5,1

sort of good or wretched life for human beings, we must start again from a higher level. The fountain and origin of all beings is the Good.¹⁶ For what everything strives for, and what everything stretches up towards, is the origin and goal of all things.¹⁷ The Good produces everything from itself, both the first things, and the intermediate things, and the lowest things. But it produces the first things contiguous to it and like itself. One Goodness produces many goodnesses, one Simplicity produces many simplicities, one Henad above all henads produces many **200** henads, and one Origin produces many origins. For the same thing is One, and Origin, and Good, and God, since God is the first thing, and the cause of everything. But it is necessary that what is first must also be most simple, because what is composite in any way and has plurality is secondary to the one, from which the composite things and plurality come. (Things that are not good strive for the Good, since it is above them, and whatever is not itself an origin must in every case come from an origin.¹⁸) It is also necessary that it should have the highest power, and all power.¹⁹ Superabundance of power means that in producing everything from itself it produces the things that are like it before the things that are unlike it. Thus the One Origin produces contiguous to itself many origins, many simplicities, and many goodnesses. For all of the beings, which are differentiated from one another and are pluralised by their own proper differentia, are referred back each to their own single origin. (For instance, all beautiful things, whether in intellects, souls or bodies, are referred back to one fountain of beauty. Likewise for the many symmetrical things and the many true things.) And all the origins, insofar as they are origins and fountains and goodnesses, are in a way of the same nature as the First Origin, in the degree appropriate to their level of descent.²⁰ Just as the One Origin stands to all beings, so too each origin stands to the plurality contained by its particularity. For each plurality distinguished by some differentia cannot but stretch up towards its proper origin, which illuminates²¹ the oneness in all of it with respect to this same form. The one leads every plurality, and every particularity shared by many things comes to the many from one.

So all of the partial origins are situated in the Whole and are contained by it, not dimensionally or spatially, but as the parts **201** in a whole, or the plurality in the one, or number in the monad. For it is all things before all things, and around the One Origin the many origins are pluralised, and in the One Goodness the many goodnesses take their foundation. And this is not just an origin like each of the other origins (one of them being the origin of beauty, another of truth, a third of symmetry, or something else).²² Rather, it is simply Origin – not the origin simply of beings, but rather the Origin of origins. For this quality of being an origin, just like the rest, must not take its

origin from a plurality, but instead must be brought to a head in a single monad, the Origin of origins.

Well then, the first of the things produced by the First Good, because they are similar in nature to it, did not deviate from goodness. Unmovable and unchangeable, having their foundation in the same eternal blessedness, they are not deficient in goodness, because they are goodnesses-in-themselves. But everything else produced by the one Good and the many goodnesses has the good by participation, because it falls short of being good-in-itself and of being established unmovably in the existence of the divine goodness. The lowest things, however, which are moved by other things (for instance bodies), have their good from outside, just as they also have their substance and motion from outside. (They cannot give themselves their own form of existence because they are divided and unstable, and hence cannot apply themselves to themselves as wholes to wholes so that each of them as a whole could be a cause to itself as a whole.²³ And they cannot move themselves, because in themselves they are corpses and devoid of spirit.) The intermediate things, on the other hand, have descended from the immovable nature which is always in the same state and condition, but since they are superior²⁴ to the lowest things that are moved by other things, although the intermediate things *are* moved, they are moved by themselves, and not by other external things, as bodies are. Souls are like this; they move themselves and **202** bodies. This is why we call bodies that are moved from within ‘animate’, but those that are moved only from without ‘inanimate’ – because the soul moves bodies by moving itself. For if the soul in the body moved it by being moved by some other, external thing, then it’s clear that the body would not be said to be moved from the inside, since strictly speaking it would have been moved by the thing which moved the soul. 10

So because this self-moving substance has descended from the unmoving and is made good by participation, although it *does* move (i.e. towards the good), it is moved by itself, and not by another, in its striving and intense desire for the good. (The motions that are peculiar to souls are these: striving, desire, impulse, and choice.) But the first souls desire the good connately and inseparably, and have their choice uniformly directed towards the good, and never decline towards the inferior. (They were produced contiguously by the goods-in-themselves and so are congenital with them, even if they stand at a somewhat lower level of descent than them, in that they are not goods-in-themselves, but only desire the good.) And given that ‘prohairesis’ means the choice of one thing instead of another, i.e. the better instead of the worse, then perhaps there won’t be prohairesis in these souls (unless one were to call it pro-hairesis because it is a choice of pre-eminent goods).²⁵ 20

Human souls, however, are given their form of existence so that 40

they can be a bond between the things that always remain above, and the things that always remain below; and this is why it is in their nature to turn both towards the higher and towards the lower. When they incline their whole selves towards the higher things, their desires and choices are simple and unconflicted.²⁶ But sometimes they are incapable of this upward turning, because they wish to activate their turning towards the things below. This turning is also something they have in virtue of the soul's essence; **203** its purpose is to animate and move bodies, which are per se inanimate and moved by other things, and to put in order the things that by nature share in the good only when moved by other things. (For things of this sort are by nature able to share in the good through soul, which uses its own motion to move things that are moved by other things.) Then, because the soul keeps company with things that are being generated and perishing and are declining towards the privation of the good, and surrenders itself to them, its choice is no longer unconflicted. Or rather it is always borne towards its object of choice and good, but 'good' in the sense either of what is genuinely a good, or in the sense of a deceptive good that entices us through some pleasure that accompanies it.²⁷

For the true pleasure accompanies the true good; but when the soul perceives a pleasure (a shadow-tracing of the good), and does not judge whether it is a true pleasure and akin to the true good, or a deceptive pleasure and falsely named²⁸ shadow of the good, it runs after it as after the good, without attending to the fact that it contains many times as much pain. <For pain accompanies pleasure in three ways>:

[1] Pleasure is always preceded by pain.²⁹ For no one takes pleasure in eating unless they were experiencing the pain of hunger previously, nor does anyone take pleasure in drinking unless they were thirsty previously.

[2] Pleasure is always accompanied by pain. Hence if you were to stop someone right in the middle of taking pleasure in drinking, you would see the thirst still present in them. And the pleasure exists only so long as the pain is present along with it; for when the hunger ceases, or the thirst or chill or that sort of thing, then their opposites are no longer pleasurable – indeed, they may even seem tedious.

[3] In most cases, pleasure is followed by pain, when people are carried away by pleasure into immoderation.

20 It is through the choice of pleasure as good that all of our errors arise, just as it is through the choice of the genuine good that all of our right actions **204** come about. It is after all through choice and prohairesis that we achieve the good and its opposite. For when the choice is unconstrained³⁰ and pure – i.e. is the choice of the rational soul itself,

according to which we have our essence – it is moved towards what is genuinely and truly the object of choice. Hence the proper good of the soul is called ‘virtue’, because it is the object of choice³¹ strictly speaking, and comes about according to genuine choice. But when the soul desires along with the irrational emotions, and considers their good to be proper to it, its choice is falsely named, since the object of choice is also falsely named, in that a non-good is being chosen as a good. And this is what is up to us: our choice and prohairesis. For belief and impulse and desire and aversion are all referred to choice and prohairesis, since they are all internal motions of the soul, and not external shoves; hence the soul is in control of them. This is the reason why God as well as the laws and sensible people distinguish errors and right actions by looking at choice and prohairesis as what is up to us, rather than by looking at the actions themselves.³² For actions are not up to us, and they get their form from choices and prohairesis. Even killing, when it is involuntary, is forgiven as not occurring by choice, and not having come about through what is up to us and our own authority; while someone who kills according to desert and justice is actually praised. In this way actions do not have their goodness or badness in themselves, but rather get their form from the choice or prohairesis, which are up to us.

So Epictetus was right to make this³³ the beginning of his instruction; and he advises us to refer everything back to this, since it is according to this that we partake of the good and its opposite. But when he says ‘of existent things some are up to us and some are not up to us’, he is not making a **205** division of all existent things, but only of the things that are in us and around us. For if someone were to oppose all existent things, both those outside of the cosmos and those inside the cosmos, to the division of the things up to us, the antithesis would not have the equilibration which divisions should have.³⁴

But some people raise objections, not wanting there to be anything up to us. Instead, some believe [1] that all of our activities and affections come about of necessity, whereas others think [2] that they come about spontaneously, and that we are borne about randomly and haphazardly, like cylinders. We have already said enough about the position among existent things of what is up to us, choice and prohairesis and about their necessary form of existence; but perhaps there is nothing to prevent our constructing an argument specifically against those who rule out what is up to us.

[2a] If by ‘spontaneously’, ‘not up to us’, and ‘haphazard’ they mean that we act without any per se target,³⁵ then the objection is not true, nor if it were true, would it hold true for all of our actions. For all crafts and natures alike set themselves a sort of target and goal, and regulate all of their activities by it, from the beginning right up to the end. And in general every motion and activity of animate things is

brought to completion for the sake of some good, whether real or apparent (for even flight away from harmful things occurs for the sake of the good and because it is beneficial).

30 [2b] But if one means by ‘random’ and ‘haphazard’ that the object of desire is impossible³⁶ or harmful (as we say that someone’s administration of a drug was random and haphazard if it could not help or if it was sometimes even harmful), then the person arguing this way does not rule out what is up to us. For we do not say that desire and aversion **206** are up to us only in the case of possible and beneficial things, but equally in the case of the impossible and harmful. And this is why not only our right actions are up to us, but our erroneous ones as well.

[1] Some people say that belief and desire, and in general choice and prohairesis, are compelled and are neither self-determined nor 40 up to us, since they are moved by other things and are not produced by us from within.

[1a] Some of these people say that deficiency is the cause. For is there anyone hungry or thirsty or shivering who does not desire food and drink and warmth, whether they wish to or not? Is there anyone ill who does not desire health?

[1b] Others say that the object of belief or the object of desire or 50 flight itself moves us towards it whether we are willing or unwilling. For is there anyone who has learnt anything about counting but wouldn’t believe that twice two is four? And how is it up to us to form that belief, and not rather up to the nature of the object of belief? And doesn’t anyone who perceives some good or beautiful thing, or one of their opposites, desire the first and avoid the second, because they are moved by the objects? The best natural philosophers also say that ‘what primarily moves is the object of desire’.³⁷ And how could something moved quite necessarily by something else be up to us?

9,1 [1c] Others take the disposition of the desiring agent to be responsible, since it is necessarily moved towards whatever is natural to it, and it is not up to it not to desire as it does. People with prudent states of character³⁸ desire prudent deeds and activities, and licentious people desire licentious things, and in neither case **207** is it up to them, even should they want to, not to desire as they do. (At any rate some people who are annoyed by their own desires, and want them not to be moved, are nevertheless shoved by their state of character and habits towards the objects of desire that belong to these states, and are dragged along by them as though they were moved by something else and it was not up to them not to desire in this way.) 10 And the wise have true beliefs about things, while the ignorant form false ones; and it is not possible for them to do otherwise. For it is not up to the wise to believe something false, nor is it always up to the ignorant to believe something true. Nor is it even up to the ignorant to have false beliefs, or up to the wise to have true beliefs (since the

ignorant would not have chosen to have a false belief if it were up to them). And if it were up to the virtuous person to form true beliefs, then forming false beliefs would also be up to him. But it is impossible for him to form false beliefs, even if we suppose that he really wanted to. For just as in the case of sense-objects it is impossible for those who have their senses in good order to misperceive, so too in the case of things grasped by reasoning. These are the things that some would say who do not allow that what is up to us exists. 20

[1d] The great majority of people, however, say that it is the fated revolution that causes our desires and beliefs and choices quite generally, just as it is the cause of everything else. And they cite as evidence the astrologers, who predict from the position of the stars at the time of begetting that this person will be a pleasure-lover and this person will be a money-lover and someone else a lover of culture and a philosopher. Clearly what they are predicting are the desires **208** that these people will manifest when they have come of age. So given that their predictions are true, it is absolutely necessary for us to manifest the desires given to us by fate, and it is not up to us to manifest others in their place. How, then, will it any longer be up to us to have this or that desire, if it is absolutely necessary, whether we want to or not, for us to be directed uniformly towards this or that object of desire? These, then, and others like them, are the sorts of objections that are made against what is up to us, denying that our desires or aversions, or in general our choices, are up to us. 30 40

But we ought to respond to the objection from deficiency [1a], that deficiency does not implant desire. At any rate, many things that are wholly inanimate, like rocks and wood, as well as many animate things that do not have perception, like plants, can also be deficient in some quality, for instance, moisture, or dryness, or warmth or coolness; and yet they do not desire, because they are not capable of desire. For things that desire must necessarily both perceive the object of desire and move towards it. So deficiency does not implant desire. Rather, what is capable of desiring, when it becomes deficient in something, manifests its desire in order to help with the deficiency. In the same way, the disposition to itch does not implant hands in us; rather, they help with it when it arises. Nor do the requirements of life implant the crafts in us; rather the soul discovers and manifests crafts to help with them. For every desire is an internal motion of the desiring soul, stretching outwards from the soul, and not implanted in it from outside. Of course the irrational life of irrational animals, since it is bodily and has almost nothing that transcends bodies, manifests desires that are uniformly directed towards the deficiencies of the body, taking them as its own deficiencies. This is why they seem compelled **209** and not self-determined. But the rational soul of human beings, because of its intermediate status, has three relations: 10,1 10 towards the worse (i.e. bodily and irrational things), towards itself,

and towards the better. Hence it manifests three kinds of life and three kinds of desire. When it surrenders itself to bodies, and to the irrational lives of the body, it believes that their deficiency is its own, and it desires along with them as though necessitated. This is the desire of the soul in which its self-determination is a matter of dispute. But when it lives its own life or the better life, the desire that it manifests is also the one which is proper to these lives, since it is striving for the good that belongs to them. So a soul of this kind is
 20 genuinely in control of desiring these things or those, since it is of such a nature as to manifest several forms of desire, some worse and some better. And it is made vicious by its worse desires, and made virtuous by its better desires (because a choice in accordance with better desires is genuinely choice). This is why when the body is in a state of deficiency and is hungry and desires food, a soul like this often manifests a desire for fasting, either because of a rule enjoining this, or owing to some concern for the soul itself or for its body. It is clear that it had the authority to desire along with the body (which is what
 30 most souls do) but it manifested the other desire, thinking it to be for a greater good. So since it is this rational soul to which he is referring, Epictetus reasonably says that it is up to it to desire in this or that way.

But those who object that it is the object of desire that moves the soul towards desire [1b] say something true, but not as much as they think. For the object moves the soul to desire as a self-mover (and not as if the soul were moved externally), by presenting a suitable receptacle by which it calls forth anything whose nature it is to stretch out for it. Similarly, an object of perception doesn't implant perception
 40 **210** in the perceiver; nor is it its nature to drag the perceiver towards itself as if the perceiver were moved externally; rather it presents itself as something commensurate³⁹ with anything whose nature it is to conform to it. In the same way, an object of desire calls forth the stretching towards itself of a soul suitably related to it by presenting its suitability to a soul of that kind. This is why some people do and others do not desire the same objects of desire when they are set in front of them. And yet, if the object of desire had such a nature as to compel the desirer, and if the motion were implanted from it, then everything capable of desire would necessarily desire it (albeit to a greater or lesser extent). Something of this sort would not even be
 50 desire, but rather a shoving or violent dragging, of the sort that is seen in bodies. For desire is a sort of stretching forth of the soul while the desiring thing itself remains stationary and does not get up and move, just as we stretch forth our hands while not changing place.

So, desire, belief and the like are internal motions, which arise
 11,1 from us. But sometimes the motion manifested is suitable to the nature of the object of desire or belief, and sometimes it misses it, when we seem to be drawn towards an object of desire but, although

it seems to be desirable, it contains more that is undesirable. Although its superficial appearance – which is what calls forth our desire – is of something desirable, it conceals something worth shunning, whose presence in it we don't notice owing to our excitement at the image of the object of desire. For the thief is drawn to a image of financial ease, as if to an object of desire, but neither knows about nor takes precautions against the features of this sort of financial ease which should be shunned, the most important of which is that it makes the soul unjust. (As for the possibility of his apprehension and punishment by human beings – which he considers to be the only way that this kind of impulse can miscarry – he disdains this owing to the ebullience and ferment of his desire, citing the fact that the majority of those who do such things avoid detection.) So it is up to us to interrogate the object of desire so as to discover whether it really is one, **211** or whether it has merely been painted over with the image of an object of desire, as in the example of financial ease mentioned above. And it is still more up to us to educate our desire and to teach it to desire the things that are strictly desirable, and not to wander astray among images. 10

[1c] A third group say that the desire of the person desiring, or the belief of the person believing, is drawn by nature towards its own proper object of desire or belief, and that it is not up to that person to desire or believe in this or the opposite way. Likewise, they say, it is not up to a clod of earth to be carried downwards, for otherwise motion upwards would equally be up to it. Against this group, then, we should reply that there are two kinds of necessity, and while one is incompatible with self-determination, the other co-exists with it. Now external necessity rules out self-determination: no one externally compelled to do or not do something is said to act in a self-determined way. But internal necessity, which compels everything to act in accordance with its own nature, in fact protects self-determination. Even a self-mover is moved necessarily, in that it is necessarily moved by itself, in accordance with its nature as a self-mover. But this doesn't mean that it is something which is moved by another, because the necessity isn't external, but rather follows its nature as a self-mover, preserves it, and promotes its proper activities. 20

And if the soul is also itself its own cause, through its good or bad education, of its better or worse character and disposition, it should obviously be held to be responsible for the activities arising from its character and disposition too. However, we should not in every case judge what is self-determined and up to us by the ability to do the opposite as well. For the souls that are always attached to the good and always choose it both have self-determined choice (since what is compelled isn't choice) and also have their choice always directed towards the good (since they are never **212** drawn down towards the opposite). But our souls desire good things when they are good and 30 40

50 desire bad things when they become vicious. They change from vice
to virtue when they take care of themselves, and from virtue to vice
when they are negligent of themselves. And in either case they act
according to their own choice, not according to necessity; for we don't
12,1 call someone who acts according to necessity (i.e. without choice) good
or bad. Hence God is not the cause of any kind of vice.⁴⁰ God made the
soul capable by nature of becoming vicious, because he produced not
only the first things, but also the middle and the lowest things, so that
the universe would be completed to perfection, and the first things
would remain genuinely first and not become the lowest and unpro-
ductive, impotent and material.⁴¹ So this is the reason that God, who
is good, also made a soul capable by nature of becoming vicious,
through the wealth of his own goodness. But he did not allow it to
become vicious unless the soul itself wishes it.

10 [1d] A fourth group objects that the fated revolution compels not
only our stations⁴² but also our choices, and leaves nothing up to us,
so that what is up to us is a mere name. We should reply to this group
that the rational soul is ungenerated and indestructible (and for now
let this be granted as a hypothesis, since it has been demonstrated
elsewhere, even if the Stoics have rather peculiar views about it). If,
then, the rational soul is ungenerated and indestructible, it shouldn't
be said to be given its subsistence by the moving causes.⁴³ Its instru-
ment (i.e. the animal, which is the body that participates in life),
20 however, *is* produced by them. For the **213** moving causes give
subsistence to different things at different times, according to their
variable relation to the things here, and the instrument is produced
so as to be suitable to the soul which uses it. Now, it is possible to
discern the craftsmen who use them from the difference between
instruments of different trades, i.e. to tell that this set belongs to a
carpenter, that set to a housebuilder, and another set to a bronze-
smith; and this is not all one can tell: it's also possible to diagnose
from their instruments the habits of the craftsmen who use them, and
the desires involved in the craft, and its products (because people who
30 have any skill in their crafts also use their instruments more accu-
rately). In the same way, therefore, people who are clever at astrology
make conjectures concerning the state of the soul that uses its instru-
ment, by perceiving the nature of the instrument from the difference
of the causes; and in many cases they hit on the right answer. This is
because most souls, especially those in the worthless republics in
which souls weighed down⁴⁴ as a result of their former value are
collected, surrender themselves in an excessive way to their instru-
ments so that they no longer use them as instruments but as parts
belonging to themselves, and hence manifest the corresponding desi-
res as well. Furthermore, the fated revolution is always consonant
40 with the manifestation by which souls enter the realm of generation
in accordance with the revolution, and it does not compel souls to

desire these things or those, but rather is consonant with the desires that they have. Now, while holy occasions and places in cities collect the more God-fearing and virtuous people together, occasions and places suitable for vulgar pleasures gather together people who live in a worse and less orderly way, and⁴⁵ it is possible to make conjectures about **214** the desires and habits of the people who come together on the basis of those occasions and times. In the same way, therefore, it is possible to make pronouncements about the souls who come into existence together, consonantly with the fated revolution, on the basis of the occasions and places in the revolution. For when the relation of fate to a particular place is appropriate for the punitive form of divine goodness, souls in need of punishment are sent down to that place. Similarity and appropriateness are everywhere associative.⁴⁶

So fate does not compel the desires of the souls, nor does it rule out what is up to us; rather it is the souls that are consonant at one time with this fate and at another time with a different fate. And since the souls are moulded together with instruments prepared according to their value, as I said earlier,⁴⁷ it is reasonable that it is known from the fated revolution what sort of desires the souls will have. Further, although the souls choose their lives according to the value and condition of their prior lives,⁴⁸ still the authority rests with them to use these lives well or badly.⁴⁹ Hence even people who choose a life of commerce often live well, while those who appear to be philosophers make a mess of it. So the form of their lives (e.g. an agricultural or commercial or cultured life), is chosen by the souls themselves according to their prior condition, and the Universe reserves it for them according to their value. But the quality of the life is added by the souls from themselves; hence they receive both praise and blame in respect of their various prohaireseis.

But nothing bad is granted from fate, as some people dare to say because they become unscrupulous or pederasts or adulterers. Even if some of the astrologers are sometimes correct when they predict these things, this is because our reception of the individual quality that comes from fate **215** is either moderate or immoderate. For even practical wisdom can turn into unscrupulousness through a minor alteration; and the moderate reception of even the pederastic quality can generate saviours and benefactors of youth, although when it is immoderate it generates youth's destroyers and corrupters. (After all, you can be injured and blinded by staring at the sun immoderately too, although the sun is the giver of light and the cause of seeing and being seen.) So how do astrologers know who will partake moderately and who immoderately, and so predict who will be practically wise and who unscrupulous? Is it⁵⁰ perhaps possible that there are indications of these things in the charts that they draw (some of which – e.g. the position of the sun in Cancer – are clear signs of our partaking

40 rather immoderately, whereas some are unclear to those who do not know the craft of astrology)? Anyhow, it is absolutely clear that the things that always remain in accordance with nature and preserve their demiurgic nature and have the highest power, have only good wishes and are never the cause of badness.⁵¹ For every sort of badness comes about through lack of power, given that power is a good thing. However, immoderate partaking, even of good things, often becomes harmful. So, let that be our response to those who attempt to use fate in order to rule out what is up to us.

50 But now let us make the general point against all these objectors that people who rule out what is up to us don't understand the self-determination of the soul, and hence destroy its essence. First, they rule out its self-motive power, which is its most essential property. For either it is a self-mover, and hence it rouses itself internally
 14,1 from itself to desires and impulses, and is not dragged or shoved around from some external source like bodies; or it is moved from the outside, and hence is not a self-mover. **216** Secondly, people ruling out what is up to us don't take into account the vital extension⁵² of the soul, and its assent and refusal. But doesn't everyone have an awareness of being willing and unwilling, and of choosing and avoiding, and of assenting and refusing? Yet all of these are internal motions of the soul itself, not external shovings or draggings of some sort, as is the case with inanimate things. For it is by their internal motion that
 10 animate bodies are distinguished from inanimate bodies. But if this is true, then what moves animate bodies is a self-mover, and not something moved from outside. For if the self-moved soul were moved from outside, then the body too would be moved in the first instance by that external thing, as I said earlier,⁵³ and thus the body would no longer be moved from within but externally, like other inanimate things, and would itself be inanimate. Thirdly, by ruling out what is up to us (as well as willing and not willing, choice and decision, desire and aversion, impulse and assent, etc.), they also rule out the distinction
 20 between the virtue and vice in souls. Hence they leave no room for merited praise and blame, and overturn the laws quite properly established to cover these things – and think what human life would be like if the laws were abolished: no different from the life of beasts!

'But so what?' someone may object. 'Aren't we often compelled by tyrants, or by our own emotions, sympathies, or antipathies, and so choose to do something (or have something done to us) even though we don't want to? How are what is up to us and self-determination going to be found in such cases?' In reply, I say again that even in
 30 these cases choice is self-determined. For even if the thing towards which we are drawn was not choiceworthy per se, still, it does seem choiceworthy **217** in comparison to something worse, and we do choose it. It is impossible to do anything without previously giving one's consent to doing it: anyone who seems to do something without

choosing, e.g. someone who unwillingly collides with another because of being shoved by someone else, is acting like an inanimate thing, and hence should not be said to act, strictly speaking, but rather to be acted on. So even if we act involuntarily, still we do nevertheless choose and only then act. This is why when the same compulsion is brought to bear on them, some people choose to perform what was commanded, through fear of something worse, while others choose not to, judging that to perform what was commanded is itself worse than what was threatened for those who do not perform it. So in this way what is up to us and self-determination are preserved, even in those who seem to be doing something involuntarily. For the voluntary is not identical with what is up to us. Rather, the voluntary is what is choiceworthy per se, while what is up to us is that over which we have the authority to choose, whether on its merits per se or owing to our flight from something worse. And there are even times when the voluntary is mixed with the involuntary, when the object of choice is not purely choiceworthy, but instead participates in the unchoiceworthy as well. Homer indicated the mixture of the voluntary and involuntary in the soul rather well in his line 'willingly, with an unwilling spirit'.⁵⁴

I chose to treat these issues at length, because practically the whole work we are treating depends on the division between what is up to us and what is not up to us. Since it is educational,⁵⁵ the work sets out, rightly and right from the start, to teach us where we ought to place our good and bad – i.e. to explain to us that, because we are self-movers, they are in our activities. For things that are moved by another have their good and bad from an external source, according to the affection arising in them from outside, just as they have their existence from an external source. But because self-movers are the cause of their own motions and activities, they have their own good and bad in those activities as well. Their own activities are, strictly speaking, with respect to cognition, their beliefs about what exists, and, with respect to animation and desire, their desires, aversions and impulses. Hence, when we have correct beliefs and desire and avoid as we ought, we possess our own good and our natural perfection; and when we do not, we possess their opposites. These acts belong to us because they are performed in accordance with our own choice and through our sole agency. For actions concerned with external objects, whether involving the crafts or the requirements of life, or teaching and learning, or even something more important than that (if it exists), require a great deal of co-operation. But belief and choice are our own proper acts, lying within our own authority. Hence our good and bad also lie within us,⁵⁶ since no one can be corrected for things over which they have no control.

ii: Not up to us are the body, possessions, reputation, power, and, in a word, whatever is not our work.

[Commentary on Chapter 1, Lemma ii]

When Epictetus says that external things are not up to us, it is not because the soul contributes nothing towards them. (After all, the body and our possessions are in better condition when the soul exercises forethought about them, and in worse condition when it neglects them. The soul also gives the initial impetus towards having a good reputation, and procures political power by the earnestness proper to it. Indeed, it wouldn't rule at all, especially under current constitutions, unless it chose to itself.) Rather, they⁵⁷ say that these things are not up to us because the soul is not in control of them by itself, but instead many other things must co-operate with the soul **219** for them to come about. Even the body needs not just vigorous seeds and a healthy constitution in the first place, but also good nourishment, exercise, temperate places and airs, and good waters.

And it's in the power of anyone stronger than us to do what he wants with all these things: with none of them are we in permanent and absolute control of their possession or absence. (At least, at the onset of a stronger enemy army, we would like to become invisible, and when we are ill we would like to get healthy again at once – but it doesn't happen!) It's the same for possessions, too: many things are needed to get them, and our losing them is subject to many more powerful forces. And again, the opinion in which we are held is not up to us, even if we furnish a certain initial impetus for it ourselves. It is

rather up to those whose opinion it is, since it is up to them to believe whatever they want. That's why people who are impious about the divine often consider themselves to be pious, and are believed to be so by others as well, while, at the opposite extreme, others who have more reverent and elevated beliefs about the divine, and avoid saying human and cheap things about it,⁵⁸ are supposed by some to be impious. (Again, some people think that temperate people are simple-minded.) So a good or bad reputation is not up to us, but up to those who choose to have this or that sort of opinion about us. Political power also requires subjects to be ruled and people to cooperate in ruling. (In states where political power is for sale and distributed for large amounts of money, someone at a loss for funds can't come into power, even if he really wants to.) So everything like this belongs to what is not up to us, since it is not our work. **220** And he puts the body first⁵⁹ in the division of what is not up to us because it is on account of this that we have been reduced to needing things that are not up to us. 'All wars are on account of money, which we are compelled to acquire to care for our bodies.'⁶⁰

iii: And the things that are up to us are by nature free ...

[Commentary on Chapter 1, Lemma iii]

He has told us what is up to us and what is not up to us; next, he shows us what sort of thing each of these is. What is up to us is free because it can't be compelled to occur by others and isn't hindered by others, and because no one else has authority over its use. (This is what it means to be free: to be self-determined, and in control of its own use.) What is not up to us is subject to those who are able to provide it or hinder it, and hence has these people as its masters, and is enslaved to them. Further, what is up to us is also strong, since it is sufficient in itself; but what is not up to us is weak and lacking, since it has need of others. Again, what is up to us is unhindered, because self-determined. (Who could hinder our believing thus or thus, or desiring something, or being displeased by it?) But what is not up to us, since its nature is to be provided and taken away by others, is often also hindered by them, so that it does not occur, or is taken away. 20

It is clear then, that what is up to us is our own (because it is our action), while what is not up to us is not our own (because it lies in the power of others). So good and bad things that are up to us – e.g. believing truly or falsely, or desiring correctly or discordantly – are our goods or bads; but those that are not up to us, are not ours: the goods of the body are instead the goods of a tool of ours, while the goods of our petty reputation are the goods of something still more distant from us. 30

iv: Remember then that if you think things that are servile by nature are free ...

[Commentary on Chapter 1, Lemma iv]

221 He has told us what is up to us and what is not up to us, what sort of thing each of these is, and what relation it has to us (i.e. that what is up to us is our own and that what is not up to us is not our own). He continues by advising us to conduct ourselves in these matters consistently with their nature, rather than out of step, because they are the causes of our happiness and unhappiness. For attaining goods and encountering nothing bad makes us happy, while failing to attain goods and benefits or encountering harmful things makes us unhappy. 40

So if our good is in desiring and avoiding in accordance with nature, and these are things up to us, we should search for the good in these, so that we always attain both what we are searching for (because we have the power to attain it, given that we are in control of desiring and avoiding in accordance with nature) and our own good. But if we desire what is not up to us, and search for the good in this, we will 50 17,1

inevitably fail to attain it in two ways. First, absolutely and always, because even if we succeed in attaining something not up to us, it won't be our own good that we attain; and secondly, because it is inevitable that someone searching for what is not his own as though it were his own, and desiring something like this, which is in the authority of others, will usually fail to attain it as well. So the result in these cases is that his impulses are hindered and disturbed, because they do not have a straight path, and he is altogether distressed and laments. Just as we are pleased when we attain what we choose, and avoid things that aren't choiceworthy, so **222** when we fail to attain the objects of our choice or encounter the things we avoid, we will inevitably be distressed, and blame those we take to have caused them – sometimes people, and sometimes those who control the universe.⁶¹ We also suffer another terrible effect, because when someone takes something not up to us away, our sympathy with it makes us destroy something which is up to us (something that other person could not have taken away): our desiring and avoiding correctly.

After reporting the bad consequences of being out of step, he says that if we distinguish properly what is and is not our own, and if we cling to our own goods (which are up to us) rather than those that are not our own – i.e. if we desire and avoid in accordance with nature – , it is clear that no one will ever hinder or otherwise compel us from desiring or avoiding like this, given that these things are up to us. If this is right, then we will never be grieved either, because what grieves us is nothing but one of the following: not attaining what we want, or encountering what we are earnest to avoid. But when we have put our earnestness into what is up to us, we won't fail to attain anything we desire or encounter anything we are avoiding, so we will never be frightened of anything either, given that we fear people who harm us or who hinder our benefits. Again, no one is strong enough to force our desires or aversions (the loci of the good and bad for someone living according to reason). So we won't have any enemies either, since it is the person who harms us who is considered an enemy, and no one is harmful to someone who can't be harmed by anyone else. So someone like this won't blame anyone either, or criticise anyone, or ever act unwillingly. Hence the life of someone like this – someone living in a good emotional state and with pleasure – will be without grief, without fear, free, and genuinely happy.⁶² **223**

And notice how Epictetus too (just like Plato) shows that the life of the good person is not only more beneficial, but also more pleasant.⁶³ Every animal by nature clings to the pleasant and shuns the painful, but some pleasures accompany what is good and beneficial for us, and others what is harmful. Thus here too we must be sober, so that we choose beneficial pleasures and accustom ourselves to them. But the fact that many of the wicked change into temperate people, while

people who are temperate with reason and wisdom never change to licentiousness, makes it clear that temperance seems more pleasant to the good person than licentiousness to the wicked. (After all, if such a life were not exceptionally pleasant to the temperate, they would not willingly and contentedly embrace it.) So he shows that the life of the good person is also more pleasant because only the way of life of those who locate their good and bad in what is up to us is unimpeded, unhindered, and voluntary. 18,1

v: Striving for such great things, remember that you should not be moderately moved when you engage in them ...

[Commentary on Chapter 1, Lemma v]

He has shown that the locus of our good is in what is up to us, and what sort of life there will be for those who wish to obtain it from there, rather than from what is external and not up to us. It is unimpeded with respect to the attainment of goods, and altogether unhindered, and **224** invulnerable from harm, because it provides no entry-point for harmful things; and it is not just beneficial, but also pleasant, because it is not impeded in desire, and does not encounter anything it avoids, but is (to put it simply) a blessed and happy life. Next he exhorts and rouses the reader to show a worthy eagerness for these precepts, not only by not treating their earnestness for such things as a task incidental to something else, but by not taking on any other task incidental to it. Hence he demands that we completely get rid of the external things that are inconsistent with the natural life of the rational soul – such as luxuries, bodily pleasures, impure wealth, dynasties, and tyrannies – on the grounds that it is not possible to strive for these and to maintain oneself in accordance with nature as well. As for the rest, the external things that can be put to use without impeding the goods of the soul – such as the possession of a house and servants, lawful marriage, upright child-rearing, just rule, and, on occasion, even concern for what is useful – he advises students to put aside all these and such things for the present. And reasonably so: they must be absolutely undistracted from the practice of education, if they are to master it completely. 10 20 30

But those who are going to do this must not conduct themselves in the vulgar way, but like good persons; they must possess the wisdom which discriminates the beneficial from the harmful; and they must have their irrational desires under the control of reason and not in rebellion⁶⁴ against it. (Their irrational desires must be moved towards objects of desire as reason commands, and must be stirred when and to the extent that it commands them to, in the measure it determines for them.) For errors occur either through reason's not defining what should be done, owing to a lack of wisdom; or when reason does see what is necessary to do (even if not intently⁶⁵), but the irrational 40

desires, through their lack of education, **225** tyrannically rebel against the slackened judgement of reason. An example of this is the tragedy representing Medea saying :

50 I understand how bad what I am about to do is,
 but my spirit is stronger than my deliberations.⁶⁶

19,1 So someone who is going to live without error in their use of external things needs to prepare wisdom and the moderation of their irrational desires (or their obedience to reason). In this way, as if fortified with unbreakable weapons, they may take up such externals at the appropriate times. For this reason he advises students to defer for the present time⁶⁷ even external things which can be consistent with virtue, until they have acquired through undistracted practice the virtue to use them: there is nothing good about going off to war without weapons, or taking up actions without wisdom and a moderate emotional state.

10 He shows students that earnestness for external things is not just untimely, but also ineffectual. People who desire or avoid what is not up to us must inevitably fail to attain a proper education and the rationalised desires and aversions which are the only source of freedom and happiness for human beings. They will inevitably be enslaved to their irrational desires, as if to savage and raging masters,⁶⁸ as well as to the people who provide the objects of their desire, and to people who can hinder them (in the hope that they won't hinder them), and likewise to people who can induce the objects of their aversion. Further, by taking us away from our leisure for concern with what is our own, earnestness for external things makes us absolutely fail to attain our own goods. People who desire both sorts of thing, and are earnest for both, don't discriminate goods from **226** things which are not goods; nor do they allot the appropriate earnestness to their own goods – and, because they are not earnest for them in the right way, they won't be able to attain them. Most of the time they will fail to attain the external things as well, because they don't busy themselves with just these, but in one way or another desire their own goods as well, and thus don't choose unrestrainedly to do (or have done to them) everything they can to attain the external things, but are sometimes constrained by a certain shame. Now such a life is less wretched than that of someone straightforwardly directed towards external things, but it is arduous, and more unpleasant than that life, because it strives to interweave what cannot be interwoven, and so is always constrained by reversals and regret, and fails to attain either by aiming at both. (It is also a life which is painful and undesirable.)

40 It is worth noting that in what follows Epictetus continually uses the phrase 'Remember'.⁶⁹ He addresses it to the rational soul, which,

though it has the accounts of the real existents joined to its essence (since the truth about them is innate in it), is sometimes lacking in the intensity⁷⁰ required for pure vision owing to the pull of its power to engage with becoming.⁷¹ Hence it is degraded to forgetfulness – the cause of everything bad in it – and needs to hear continually the phrase ‘Remember’.

But when he says that a person striving for such great things should not be ‘moderately moved’ to attain them, he isn’t using ‘moderately’ in its proper sense (of what is measured or unmeasured), but catachrestically for ‘deficiently’.⁷² For **227** as Pindar remarked, ‘the great danger’ of losing our own proper goods ‘does not admit a cowardly man’.⁷³

50

vi: Make it your practice, then, with every harsh impression, to recite to it straightaway ‘You are an impression, and not necessarily its object.’

[Commentary on Chapter 1, Lemma vi]

He has said that it is necessary for someone who intends to attain his own proper goods and to create his own proper happiness to keep himself undistracted by external things. But because impressions that we should desire something external or that we should avoid something unchoiceworthy often occur even to people who are taking care of themselves, he teaches us now how such a person, while using these sorts of impression, may remain unharmed by them. He called such impressions ‘harsh’, on the grounds that they are irrational and maddening, and genuinely make life harsh by the inconsistency and irregularity of their motions. In the sequel⁷⁴ he advises us more clearly that we should not be immediately seized by an impression (whether of desire or aversion) as it occurs; now he says that we must **228** immediately stand up against it once it has come about, and dissolve its vehemence by the thought that it is an impression.

20,1

10

Impressions are sometimes revelatory of truths, and of what is truly beneficial or pleasant, but are sometimes idle dream-fictions. So just by our being disposed to keep in mind straightaway that the object of the impression is not always such as it appears, the intensity of the impression is relaxed. As a result, it doesn’t impede the judgement of reason, which Epictetus recommends us to apply to the impression as soon as it has been calmed down and been relieved of its harshness, in order to discern⁷⁵ the object of the impression accurately.

20

There are many rules for discriminating such impressions. Some are taken from the very nature of their objects: whether they refer to goods of the soul, or bodily goods, or to something external; and whether they tend to some benefit or merely to pleasure; and further, whether they are altogether possible, or impossible. There is also a

30 rule from the judgement and eagerness applied to them by wise and foolish people, and even more from divine judgement. For what seems to be pleasing to God and to the wise ought to be worthy of eagerness for someone who is to be saved; what seems displeasing to them, shunned. (No one is so thoughtless or impassioned as to think that licentiousness or injustice please God.)

40 Although there are thus many rules for discriminating the differences between the objects of our impressions, one rule is unique and proper to human beings as human beings: the one from the distinction of what is up to us and what is not up to us. We should use this rule generally for all our impressions. So if any of the objects of our impressions (whether of desire or aversion) is not up to us, it is good to recognise this, and immediately say of it 'This is nothing to us.' For it cannot be our good or bad, if it is not up to us, since self-determination is the defining characteristic of the human essence. Once such a nature took its place amongst existent things, its good and bad was bound to be self-chosen.

Encheiridion Chapter 2 (= Lemma vii): Remember that the promise of desire is the attainment of what you desire, and the promise of aversion is that you will not encounter what you avoid. The person who fails in his desire is unfortunate, and the person who encounters what he avoids is ill-fortuned. So if you avoid only what is contrary to nature among the things that are up to you, you will not encounter anything that you are avoiding. But if you avoid disease or death or poverty, you will be ill-fortuned. So remove your aversion from everything not up to us, and transfer it to what is contrary to nature among the things that are up to us.

But as for desire, for the present you must completely do away with it. If you desire one of the things that is not up to us, you will inevitably be unfortunate, while of the things that are up to us which it is noble to desire, none is available to you yet. Employ nothing but impulse and counter-impulse – lightly, however, and with reservation and in a relaxed manner.] 229

vii: Remember that the promise of desire is the attainment of what you desire ...

[Commentary on Chapter 2, Lemma vii]

50 This chapter is also continuous with what goes before. It contains a demonstration that apparent objects of desire and aversion render us fortunate and blessed if they are judged by the standard of what is up to us and what is not up to us, but unfortunate, ill-fortuned and wretched if they are not. First he defines which people we call 'fortunate' and 'of good fortune', and which 'unfortunate' and 'ill-for-

tuned'.⁷⁶ The promise and goal of desire is the attainment of what is desired, and the 'fortunate' are those who attain this. The promise and goal of aversion is that you will not encounter what you flee from, and this (i.e. not encountering it) is being 'of good fortune'. Similarly, not attaining the object of your desire is 'unfortunate' (because you didn't attain it), while encountering the object of your aversion is 'ill-fortuned' – the contrary of good fortune – (because you attained something, but what you attained was bad). 21,1

Once he has correctly distinguished these cases, he introduces the consequences. Namely, that if you avoid only what is contrary to nature among the things that are up to you – for instance, licentiousness and injustice and the like – then, because avoiding them is up to you, you won't encounter anything that you are avoiding, so you will never be ill-fortuned. But if you avoid disease or poverty or something not up to us, then, since escaping from these things is not up to you, at some point you will inevitably encounter one of them and become ill-fortuned. Similarly if you desire things that are not up to you, you will inevitably often be **230** unfortunate, whenever you don't attain the object of your desire. But if your desire and aversion come to be in things that are up to us, the result will never be that you are unfortunate or ill-fortuned; rather, you will always be fortunate and of good fortune. The conclusion of the argument is roughly as follows: anyone who puts their desire and aversion in things that are not up to us will often fail to attain the objects of their desire and encounter things they are avoiding, because the authority over them is up to others. But it has been agreed that someone like this is unfortunate and ill-fortuned, and so also wretched and unhappy. 10 20

Note how Socratic this argument is, and how accommodating, since it leads us from the very things we are eager for, on up to nobler things. For everyone, both those who live virtuously and those who live viciously, supposes that their happiness lies in the attainment of what they desire and strive for, and in not encountering the unchoice-worthy things they avoid. But they differ in that virtuous people desire the beneficial things which are really and purely the goods proper to us, and avoid the really harmful and bad things, because what judges in them is reason, and because their irrational desires have been habituated by them to follow reason and to consider pleasant what reason considers to be so. But the majority of human beings – because their reason is lazy and uncared for, while their irrational desires have been exercised by continual motion – judge the objects of their desire by pleasure rather than by what is beneficial. Thus they often encounter pleasures that are mixed with pains many times as great (because they are not even properly speaking pleasures but rather like a kind of shadow or hint of pleasure). Even so, everyone, as I was saying, supposes that being fortunate and of good fortune depend on attaining the objects of their desire and not expe- 30 40

50 riencing the objects of their aversion. So this argument points out to the wicked, too, that if they don't want to fail to attain when desiring or to encounter when avoiding, they ought to place the objects of their desire and aversion among the things that are up to us. For if they
 50 desire and avoid things that are not up to us **231** they will inevitably be unfortunate and ill-fortuned – which is something they also hold to be an object of aversion.

22,1 'So remove your aversion from everything not up to us, and transfer it to what is contrary to nature among the things that are up to us.' Because if you avoid disease or poverty, since fleeing from them is not completely up to us (because even if we have a power which sometimes helps us escape them, still it won't always hold good, or do so entirely), you will inevitably be ill-fortuned when you encounter those states (which we tend to avoid). But if we are persuaded by him, and transfer our aversion to what is contrary to nature among things that are up to us – for instance, avoiding false beliefs about existent things and obstacles to a way of life in accordance with nature and in line with reason – then we will never encounter what we are avoiding. (After all, escaping from such things is up to us, in as much as the
 10 only thing we need for it is aversion, and this is up to us.)

This much is clear. But what does he mean by advising us to do away with *every* desire completely for the present? So far as the desire for things that are not up to us goes, doing away with it has an obvious benefit (since when we do not attain them we shall be unfortunate and live unpleasantly; and even if we do sometimes attain them, we are attaining something that is neither beneficial to us nor our proper good). But what is his reason for prohibiting the opposite as well, the
 20 desire for things that are up to us? Because, he says, of the things which it is noble to desire, none is available to you yet.

And yet:⁷⁷

[1] If they were present, then perhaps that would no longer be the time to desire it. For desire is a sort of stretching out of the desirer towards the object of desire, as not being present.

[2] Who could actually acquire the good without desire for it?

[3] In general, if our good is not in actions, but in desires and aversions that are in accordance with nature, how can he bid us completely do away with desire for the present?

[4] How **232** can one continue to be a human being without desire?

30 [5] This seems to be just opposite to what was said a little earlier,⁷⁸ when he said 'Striving for such great things, remember that you should not be moderately moved when you engage in them.' He wasn't indicating a bodily movement, but rather a movement of eagerness and desire.

[6] How is it even possible to have an impulse without desire? It is

necessary first to have had the desire, and only then to have the impulse.

Perhaps, then, this speech is directed towards those whose education is just underway, for whom it is altogether unsafe to desire before learning what they ought to desire. Should we then have impulses and counter-impulses in virtue of an impulse that *precedes* desire and aversion? So perhaps he is also speaking to those whose education is already underway, and does not advise them to do away with absolutely every desire for the goods that are up to us (as he seems to be saying), but rather rejects *vehemence* in desires? (And not only in desires but in aversions as well, which seem to be a kind of striving.) For he recommends having impulses and counter-impulses lightly and in a relaxed manner. But it is clear that we have an impulse after we have had a desire, and that we have a counter-impulse after we have had an aversion, because the desire precedes the impulse, and the aversion precedes the counter-impulse. So earlier, when he said ‘Striving for such things, remember that you should not be moderately moved when you engage in them,’ he wasn’t advising us to manifest vehement desires, but rather the very point that he introduces next, i.e. ‘some of them you should get rid of entirely, and others you should defer for the present’.

But he quite reasonably rejects vehemence in the impulses and desires and counter-impulses and aversions of those whose education is underway, so that they don’t leap too far, and ‘stretch their foot across the threshold’⁷⁹ through excessive eagerness. For in most cases this **233** dissolves the tenor of the soul, and destroys the body as well. Indeed, many people who applied an inopportune and immoderate eagerness to their exercise have already suffered this. There are few natures, whether of body or of soul, that can summarily make the transition from worse conditions to pure goods – although such a nature did belong to Diogenes, Crates, Zeno and people like that. But most of us are by nature of a kind to decline little by little, and be roused little by little, in matters of the soul just as much as of the body. The road of moderation is more secure and freer from danger, maintaining and supporting the soul’s power and eagerness, and augmenting it little by little. That’s why he recommends having impulse and counter-impulse lightly and in a relaxed way, and with reservation, i.e. yielding or conceding a little, and not intensifying to the utmost your impulse and desire or counter-impulse and aversion. For someone whose life is disordered, who is habituating himself to self-control, should not leap immediately to the height of simplicity and fasting, but ought rather to remove himself little by little from his former habits and, as the author of the Golden Verses says, ‘one should flee from such things by yielding’.⁸⁰ Likewise in the case of knowledge: those whose education is just underway shouldn’t turn

what appears to them into firm beliefs, so they can change docilely any belief they may need to change.

30 But if it benefits those whose education is underway to act lightly and in a relaxed way towards both desire and aversion, why does he recommend transferring one's aversion to what is contrary to nature among the things that are up to us, but completely doing away with
 40 desire for the present? Perhaps it is because people beginning the transition from a vicious way of life to a better one must first of all vomit out the poison of their bad style of life, and only then nourish themselves with the goods of a good life. This is what the remarkable **234** Hippocrates says about bodies: 'the more you feed impure bodies, the more you harm them'⁸¹ – and it is even more true in the case of souls. For their pre-existing viciousness destroys anything useful as it enters, and considers it unpleasant or harmful, and sometimes even
 50 condemns it as useless or impossible. Meanwhile their viciousness grows more acute, now despising better things after having tried them (as it supposes); and at the same time it becomes incurable, and later will not accept what at one time it could have experienced from better words and deeds (just as someone who finds honey bitter while suffering from jaundice will thereafter be unable to endure even the taste of honey). Accordingly, the order required for a good style of life is first to avoid what is contrary to nature, and only then to desire what is in accordance with nature. That's why he is quite right to recommend to a person of this sort to do away with desire for the present, until he is purified by aversion from what is contrary to nature, and becomes suitably prepared for the reception of a proper education.

24,1 However, this speech also prepares those whose education is just underway to lead their life in an undistressed, fearless and free way, and so pleasantly as well, which is what every animal most clings to. It is a noble thing to desire freedom from disturbance, and a way of life that accords with nature and is appropriate to reason, but beginners should be content if they have moderate feeling (and sometimes they will fall and rise up again). So for this sort of people it is not possible to reach as far as the 'things which it is noble to desire' (that is what he means by 'they are not yet available to you'); and if you desire things that you cannot yet reach, you will inevitably be unfortunate and distressed, and sometimes weaken in your intensity and give up. **235** People who desire larger things incommensurately, always utterly despise commensurate things and spit on them in comparing them to the larger things. And yet they say that it is
 10 impossible to have a share of the bigger before the small or to achieve the larger before the commensurate with us.

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 3 (= Lemma viii): Whatever it is that you enjoy or find useful or treasure, remember to reflect on the kind of thing it is, beginning with the smallest things. So if you treasure a pot, say 'It's a pot that I treasure,' and when it breaks you won't be disturbed. And if you love your child or wife, reflect that it is a human being that you love, and when it dies you won't be disturbed.]

viii: Whatever it is that you enjoy or find useful or treasure ...

[Commentary on Chapter 3, Lemma viii]

He has distinguished what is up to us and what is not up to us, and told us that we ought to consider the former our own, the latter not our own, and how we should deal with the things up to us (namely that we must avoid those that are contrary to nature, and suspend our desires for the present, perhaps for the reasons that I gave).⁸² But since it is also often necessary to make use of things that are not up to us, he teaches us how to deal with these things as well, so that we can live with them without disturbance or distress, even though they are not up to us. He divides these into three classes: those that provide mere pleasure without benefit (things 'you enjoy' are examples of this class), those that are useful and beneficial, and those that are held in affection through familiarity even if they don't provide any use or benefit. For these three – pleasure, utility and the affection that is a necessary part of our nature – rivet the soul to mortal unpleasantness.⁸³

20

Different people enjoy different things: some enjoy tragedies and comedies, others athletic competitions and horse races etc., and yet others dancing, magic and comic mimes. Some enjoy pleasant **236** sights, whether natural (like people who are thrilled to see the beauty of peacocks or fighting-cocks, or of meadows and groves etc.) or artificial (like people who are eager to see pictures and statues and buildings and the beautiful products of other crafts). Others are given over to beautiful sounds, like people who welcome beautiful voices and the noise of musical instruments – and still more so, those who delight in histories and mythical narratives as pleasures. (These are also sources of enjoyment; that's why we are all lovers of myth from our childhood on.) There are also differences between useful things: some tend toward the benefit of the soul (e.g. teachers, good companions, educational books etc.), others toward the benefit of the body (e.g. food, clothing and exercise), and others toward the benefit of external things (such as political power, honors, possessions, money, etc.). Things that are treasured through familiarity even if they don't provide any utility are children, spouses, relations, friends, and fellow citizens.

30

40

So it is with reference to all of these things that he says: remember, and keep ready to hand⁸⁴ the nature of the thing – i.e. that it is perishable, easily taken away, not up to us. Continually remembering their nature is a preparation for their being taken away. This preparation, by producing a sort of habituation, prevents us from being distressed when they decay, since, just as in other cases, anything habitual is bearable for the body and for the soul (even if it is something extremely unpleasant). He is right both here and in what follows to advise us to start with small things – and not merely with small things, but with the very smallest – so that we don't 'practise **237** potting on *pithoi*'.⁸⁵ Someone who starts from larger things is easily defeated and is unfortunate and ill-fortuned; by losing his intensity, he becomes weaker and despairs. But someone who starts off with the smallest things masters them at once, and so becomes little by little more robust, and at the same time more confident and better than he was. In this way he comes to master things his equal easily, and soon may apply himself to slightly larger things with less risk. Take someone who eats four times in a day: if he starts off fasting the whole day, he'll disturb his body by this sudden change and have a miserable and unpleasant time of it. Progress of that sort is both hazardous and uncertain. But if instead of four times he undertakes to eat three times for a while, and accustoms himself to this, then he will make the transition to eating twice quite easily, and to eating once with still more ease; and it will be less hazardous and more certain. Similarly in the case of the things useful or treasured: one should start with things that are small and not much cherished, and accustom oneself to bear in mind the nature of the things and to anticipate the ease with which they can be taken away. (E.g. in the case of a pot loved for its utility, one should bear in mind that it is breakable – and what could be more inexpensive than a pot?) Someone proceeding little by little, and strengthening himself, will come to be strong enough, even when it is his own child that he is kissing, not just to say the words or be struck by a bare impression, but to be disposed in his whole life to bear in mind that it is a human being he is kissing, a perishable sort of thing, and something easily taken away. And being disposed and habituated in this way, he will not be disturbed when it is taken away.

Notice how this sensible and technical treatment of things employs what is up to us so that we can use even those that are not up to us as though they were up to us. For it is not up to us that the child should not die. But someone who bears in mind the nature of the child (and so has equal expectations that the child should die or live) will not be disturbed if it does die, but will rather be in the same state as if it had not even died. And this fact renders the child's not dying, which is not up to us, a matter **238** that is up to us, given that someone like that is in a position to say 'For me, the child has not died', or more

truly ‘Even if it did die, I keep myself undisturbed as if it had not died.’ 40
 (It was clever of him to present examples only of useful and treasured things; that way, he shows that things some people pursue purely for enjoyment ought to be easily despised even by people only just starting to make progress.)

[Encheiridion Chapter 4 (= Lemma ix): When you are intending to undertake a work, remind yourself what kind of work it is. If you are going off to bathe, think about what happens in the bath-house – people splashing, jostling, hurling insults, stealing. This is how you can undertake the work more securely: by reflecting, and saying ‘I want to bathe myself, *and* I want to maintain my prohairesis in its natural state.’ (And likewise for any other work). That way, if something happens that gets in the way of your bathing, you’ll have the reflection ready that ‘That wasn’t the only thing I wanted; I also wanted to maintain my prohairesis in its natural state, and I won’t maintain it if I get vexed at what is happening.’]

ix: When you are intending to undertake a work, remind yourself what kind of work it is ...

[Commentary on Chapter 4, Lemma ix]

He has said what our attitude should be towards the external things we are concerned about (by which he clearly means the things we enjoy, use or treasure); now he continues with how we must be prepared to deal with daily actions, which include much that is not up to us. Here too we should consider in advance the nature of these actions and the kinds of incidental consequences they have, and not find it unexpected that they are just as likely to happen. Thus, if the incidental consequences are usually unpleasant, and if the work is not necessary, don’t attempt it in the first place. (The Roman Cato the Elder used to say that one of his mistakes in life had been choosing to sail to his exile, when he could also have made the journey by land.⁸⁶ For even if nothing unpleasant results, it is still an error to attempt an action which by its nature often has unpleasant consequences 239 when no necessity requires it. And when it is possible to undertake a more secure road, it is an error to choose the more dangerous road simply because many people have come through safely on it too.) If, however, it is absolutely necessary to take up the work – e.g. when sailing to an island, or away from it, or standing by your father or a friend in danger, or even fighting for your country, are absolutely necessary – then we should not shun the work, but, after considering its nature and usual consequences, undertake it in such a way that we are not disturbed when they do result, because we have become accustomed to them through this prior consideration. Someone pre- 26,1 10

pared in this way is cheerful if they do not result (since he escapes events which have pretty much already happened in virtue of his prior consideration), and even if they sometimes do result, he accepts them without disturbance or danger, because he expected them.

But someone will object, first, that people who continually think of the unfortunate results of actions become inactive and lacking in daring; and, secondly, that the thought of something upsetting actually happening is painful, and it is more painful yet, when, as is sometimes the case when the work is prolonged, the thought is present over a long period. So an objector like this would say that Demosthenes gave better advice when he recommended 'always undertaking every fine deed with good expectations, but bearing nobly whatever God gives'.⁸⁷ But, my good man, if Demosthenes means by 'good expectations' the expectation one has in the undertaking of good actions, whatever may come of them, he is saying the same as Epictetus, except that he fails to add the method showing us how to bear nobly whatever God gives, if that **240** should prove unpleasant. Whereas Epictetus recommends providing oneself with the ability to bear up, by examining the nature of the work in advance, and ascertaining that it befits us and that it sometimes has certain unpleasant consequences, which thereby become easy to bear (i.e. both because the nature of the work involving occasional unpleasantness is beneficial and fitting, and because its unpleasant aspects have been considered in advance so they don't strike us unexpectedly). If, however, Demosthenes means by 'having good expectations', the expectation of complete safety and escape from danger, it will be troublesome, I think, or rather impossible, for someone always having the expectation of safety to bear unpleasant consequences well. For neither the body nor the soul endures sudden changes without disturbance. (After all, the changes of the seasons – which are not sudden, but rather occur gradually – most often tend to breed diseases.)

Nor does prior consideration of the frequently unpleasant corollaries of actions make one lacking in daring or inactive, or make one's life painful. If reason dictates that the action is something good and beneficial for the soul (i.e. for the human being),⁸⁸ even if one must run a risk in performing it, then striving for the good will always make one be daring and act. Further, believing in right reason when it tells us that the work must be chosen even if one must run a risk in performing it, encourages the thought that one must also sometimes run a risk. For the danger and the harm concern the body and external things, and are not bad for us – not for the real 'us' (if we are sober). But the benefit or the good of choosing the good action with its dangers, since it is a good of the **241** soul, that is, for us – the real 'us' – counterbalances a great deal of pain, punishment, exile and dishonour; or rather, it outweighs them, and encourages us by the excess of the good. (Every human being chooses the greater good together with

the lesser evil.) But if the good appears as ours, the bad as not ours – and it is not just one’s spoken word which says this, or a bare thought, but one’s reason which is connate with truth, and the life which is aware of the difference between the two – how will anyone be lacking in daring or pained at the expectation of occasional unpleasant results in their good undertakings? Moreover, this very thing, choosing the good with its dangers (not carelessly, but being prepared to die for it) itself signifies the greatest joy for people in a natural state. (Examples like Menoeceus, and others who have chosen to die for their country, demonstrate this.) 20

Now Epictetus centers his teaching on the trivial case of taking a bath. In this way he makes his argument more familiar by using examples which happen a lot and to many people, and stirs the awareness of his readers, and, at the same time, as he himself said, advises beginners to start their training in lesser matters for the reasons given. But it is possible to transfer them to greater actions also, which are often followed by greater dangers. In these cases as well one must consider what the nature of the work is, and whether it befits us, and what unpleasant consequences it often has, and determine beforehand to bear even these, if they occur, with moderation. In this way a person will maintain himself in a natural state, by reaping the good of the action and not 242 being disturbed by its consequences. For if he is disturbed, and thinks that something bad has happened to him, either he judged badly in the first place in deciding to attempt the work, or, if he judged well at first, then it is through lack of nobility and cowardice that he is now disturbed and reconsidering. Neither of these is in accordance with nature. 40

[Encheiridion Chapter 5 (= Lemmata x-xi): What disturbs people is not the things, but their beliefs about the things. For instance, death is nothing terrible – otherwise it would have seemed like that to Socrates as well – rather it is the belief about death (the belief that it is terrible) that is terrible. Whenever, then, we are impeded, or disturbed, or distressed, we should never blame someone else, but rather ourselves (that is, our own beliefs). It is the work of an uneducated person to accuse others in cases in which he himself does badly. It is the work of a person whose education is underway to accuse himself. And it is the work of an educated person to blame neither someone else nor himself.]

x: What disturbs people is not the things, but their beliefs about the things ...

[Commentary on Chapter 5, Lemma x]

He has explained how it is possible to remain undisturbed by the often unpleasant consequences of our actions, if we consider them in ad-

vance as their corollaries and decide to choose the action along with them. Now he gives another reason for remaining undisturbed (following the one based on prior consideration): a proof from the nature of the very things which are thought unpleasant and disturb us. Here he no longer uses a negligible example, but the greatest of the sources of our disturbance, death. If the thesis can be shown for this case, it will be that much the more proven for things thought less terrible than death.

28,1 He says, then, that the things which are thought to be terrible when they happen to us, and hence disturb us on the grounds that something terrible is happening to us, are neither terrible themselves, nor in reality the causes of our disturbance; rather it is our belief about these things (the belief that they are terrible) which disturbs us. He shows that what is thought the most terrible of all terrible things, a premature death at the hands of human beings, is not terrible. He proves this briefly, but accurately and demonstratively, by the following argument:

[1] Anything terrible by nature is thought to be **243** terrible by all (just as anything hot or cold or fine etc. by nature is thought to be such by all, and particularly by those in a natural state and by the more intelligent).

[2] But death is not thought to be terrible by all (it wasn't thought to be terrible by Socrates, who, although he had the power to escape from it, endured it undisturbed, spending the whole of that day revealing the truth about the soul to his friends, and teaching them the nature of the cathartic⁸⁹ life of philosophers).

The conclusion drawn from these premises is clear:

20 [3] Death is not terrible by its own nature.

So it is not death that disturbs us, given that it is not by nature the kind of thing to do so; rather it is the belief about it (the belief that death is terrible) that disturbs us. For example, honey is not bitter, but someone with jaundice is disturbed as if by a bitterness of the honey, because he has a bitter disposition with respect to honey, owing to the excess of a bitter humour in him – and that humour must be purged before we can perceive its natural qualities. In the present case, likewise, our beliefs about things must be corrected, so that we judge our good and bad by the criterion of what is up to us and not up to us, and of what is our own and not our own. Thus if death is not something up to us, but is instead something that is not up to us, it is not bad. (Even if it were bad, it is not bad for the soul; and if it is not bad for the soul, but for the body, then it is not a bad for us.) But Plato and Plato's Socrates reveal not only that it is good but even that it is superior to the life with the body, and not good or superior for **244** some and not for others, but simpliciter, for all. So Socrates says in

the *Phaedo*:⁹⁰ ‘Perhaps it seems incredible to you if this alone among everything else is simple, and it is never true for a person in this case, as it is for everything else, that it is better to be dead than to live?’ In the *Laws* Plato himself, speaking in his own persona, extends this, saying: ‘The union of the soul and body is not superior to its dissolution – so I would say, speaking in earnest.’⁹¹ 40

Now Epictetus based his proof on death because it is thought to be the most terrible of all things. But each of us considers anything unpleasant we encounter to be more terrible than death: sometimes we are quick to call on death in the course of a not particularly severe pain, and if we happen to be poor, we consider poverty to be worse than death. It is thus possible to use the same method of proof Epictetus used for the case of death for these cases as well. Some people (even ordinary people) choose very severe pains when they are ill, giving themselves up to doctors to burn them and cut off parts, and paying them a fee. It is true that they may do this in order to live, because they consider death worse; but these cases show that it is possible to bear such pains undisturbed, if it is thought to be beneficial. Again, Spartan youths⁹² used to undergo that fearful flogging of theirs merely for the love of honour, displaying their endurance 245 almost to the point of death. It is clear that they bore it lightly, and with pleasure – otherwise they wouldn’t have entered into such a contest willingly. But their attitude towards that pain was such that, although they were, of course, experiencing pain, they probably felt it 10 less than untrained and soft people would, because they had the belief that the pain was not terrible, but rather noble and profitable for people who endured it bravely and without disturbance. Nor is poverty something terrible, Epictetus could say; otherwise it would have seemed like that to Crates the Theban as well, when he handed over his possessions to the city and said:

Crates deprives Crates of his possessions.⁹³

He thought that he was emancipated at that moment, and he put on a crown as if in celebration of his freedom, because he had exchanged his riches for poverty. So, in this way, none of these things is terrible by nature or unbearable as we think they are. Instead, they are sometimes actually more beneficial than their opposites, when we refer our use of them to ourselves (that is, to our rational soul). 20

So if someone is not going to be disturbed by such things, he must have correct beliefs about them. And since this is up to us, it is also up to us not to be disturbed by them, by not considering them terrible (even if suffering them is not up to us). A great result for those who are persuaded will be that they will use even things that are not up to us as though they were up to us. For even if being dishonoured or having my possessions taken or being struck is not up to me, still 30

having the correct belief about them (the belief that they are not terrible but often even beneficial) is up to me. A belief of this sort is sufficient to make one think that they did not even happen, or to consider what happened as not harmful, and sometimes even as beneficial. In my view, at least, every right thinking person will consider it to be more noble for us (that is, for the soul) to be undisturbed in unpleasant circumstances, than not to meet with **246** unpleasantness; and consider it more noble, the more unpleasant and
 40 harsh they are. For just as more vehement bodily motions do more to exercise the bodies engaged in them and to produce health and strength and quickness, so too with the motions of the soul. So there is one thing we need: to bear things as lightly and with as little disturbance as possible. Now this comes about through two things: first, by having correct beliefs about them, and having prepared oneself for them through a fairly gruelling⁹⁴ training of the body. (This is useful for every eventuality, and something owing to which many
 50 people, even wicked people, spit on blows and things that seem to us painful.) And secondly, by prior consideration and expectation of them. All of these are up to us. Now, if neither death nor any of these
 30,1 sorts of things is terrible, it is clear that neither these nor what induces them are the causes of our disturbance; rather we, and our beliefs, cause them for ourselves. So we must never hold someone else to be responsible for our disturbance or distress or fear or anything else of this sort, but rather ourselves and our beliefs.

xi: It is the work of an uneducated person to accuse others in cases in which he himself does badly ...

[Commentary on Chapter 5, Lemma xi]

This part is continuous with what went before. If it had contained the conjunction 'for', so as to read, 'For it is the work of an uneducated person to accuse others in cases in which he himself does badly,' it would have expressed very well the reason why one must not accuse
 10 others of the things at which we are disturbed or frightened or distressed or in general **247** consider ourselves to be in a bad situation. For we suffer this through lack of education. It was clever of him to go on from the disposition of the person uneducated about these things to the dispositions of the person whose education is underway and of the educated person. The educated person never considers himself to be in a bad situation or holds anyone to be responsible as the cause of his doing badly, because he lives in accordance with nature and never fails to attain what he desires or encounters what he avoids. But the person whose education is under-
 20 way does occasionally fail to attain what he desires and does encounter what he avoids, because on those occasions he is acting in line with his irrational emotions. But because he is inspired by the division of

what is up to us and what is not up to us, he knows that he himself, and no one else, is the cause of his own failures and mis-encounters on the occasions in which he considers our good or bad to have their locus in things that are not up to us.

But why is it, someone might ask, that, even though the person whose education is underway knows that our good and bad are up to us (he wouldn't have accused himself if he didn't know this), he nevertheless errs, and hence is brought to accuse himself? Isn't the answer that knowledge of good and bad comes first, because this is the activity of our reason, but our irrational emotions do not always immediately become measured and harmonious and subordinated to reason? This is especially so when, through the laziness and lethargy of reason and the continuous motion of irrationality, the emotions have become muscular and tyrannical. This is the sort of disposition of soul that belonged to the woman in the tragedy who says:

30

I understand how bad what I am about to do is,
but my spirit is stronger than my deliberations.⁹⁵

40

248 So one should be content if over the course of time reason makes the emotions in harmony with itself, by applying force to some of them and singing charms to others. At this stage reason's knowledge also becomes clearer, and scientific, and perfectly free from doubt. So it is perfectly plausible that people whose education is underway should occasionally err in some matters, because their emotions are not yet conquered, and their reason is not yet acting in accordance with knowledge. But they accuse themselves, rather than others, because they have accepted to some degree the division of what is not up to us and what is up to us.

People who are completely uneducated, however, also make many errors, owing to the irrational emotions throbbing within them and the ignorance of their reason, which doesn't yet distinguish the genuinely good and bad, and hasn't dragged itself away from irrationality, not even to the extent of having a bare conception of it. But why should I say 'from irrationality', when we consider the body to be ourselves and our own essence (and those of us who are money lovers even think that they are their money)? When we are uneducated, we err for these reasons. And because we suppose that our good and bad lie in external things, and are completely ignorant of our genuine good and bad and their sources, we take either those who deprive us of one of the external things we think good or desirable, or those who put us into one of the situations we avoid, to be the causes of our bad circumstances. Yet, whether they are considered good or bad, the nature of external things is not always what it is taken to be; in fact, there are even occasions in which each class has the opposite condition. This is why uneducated youths hate their teachers as if they

50

31,1

10

were the causes of bad things for them, but love people who summon them to pleasures as if they were their benefactors.⁹⁶

In a few words, Epictetus has given us clear tokens by which to identify educated and uneducated people, and those whose education is underway. The first sort, who are perfectly free from error owing to the perfection of their reason and the harmonisation and submission to reason of their irrationality, never accuse anyone of causing anything bad for them. They never get into any situation that is bad for them (properly speaking), either through their own doing – given that they have been educated – or through others – because they do not locate their bad in external things. The uneducated, however, are in error in both respects: they are badly disposed (both in their reason and in their irrationality) and they attribute their own badness to others, because they see it in external things. (It is easy and pleasant, and quite typical of uneducated people, to hold others responsible for their own errors.) People whose education is underway and who have the beginnings of salvation, even if they err and sometimes get into bad situations, still know where the bad is, as well as its source and the cause of its growth; hence this is also what they blame. I don't think that anyone who applies these criteria sensibly will ever be mistaken in distinguishing accurately the conditions of people who are educated, uneducated, and whose education is underway.

Education is strictly speaking the correction of the child⁹⁷ in us by the teacher in us. The irrationality within us is a child: it does not see the beneficial, but is only directed towards pleasure, like children. Our reason is a teacher: it constantly instils harmony and measure into the irrational desires in us, and directs them towards the beneficial. Hence, because they live heedlessly⁹⁸ in accordance with the child's desire, uneducated people err in many matters, without realising it (owing to their heedlessness) or blaming themselves. But people whose education is underway have their teacher already in some sense **250** standing at their side, and their child beginning to obey. Hence, even if they err in some matters, they perceive who is in error, and hold that person responsible and no one else. Educated people, however, have a teacher who is sober and has already taken charge of the child, and a child who has come to its senses and has attained its own perfection through being subordinated to the teacher and in agreement with him (which is the virtue of a child).

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 6 (= Lemma xii): Do not be elated at any superiority that is not your own. If a horse in its elation said 'I am beautiful', it would be bearable. But when you are elated in saying 'I have a beautiful horse', you should know that you are elated at the horse's good. So what is your good? The use of impressions. So when you keep yourself in your natural state in

the use of your impressions, that is the time to be elated. Then you are elated at your own good.]

xii: Do not be elated at any superiority that is not your own.

[Commentary on Chapter 6, Lemma xii]

He has taught how it is possible to continue undisturbed and undistressed and fearless in the face of fearful things that happen to us from outside. Now he also teaches how we ought to behave in the face of external things that are thought to be choiceworthy. He calls these ‘goods that are not our own’, in accordance with his initial division, in which he said that what is not up to us is ‘weak, servile, hindered, and not our own’.⁹⁹ He says that one ought not to be elated over any of the external things thought to be goods. I don’t think that ‘elation’ means triviality, madness or boastfulness here, in the way we often use the word of a bad person – if it did, he wouldn’t have counselled us to be elated even over our own, genuine goods. Rather, I take it that ‘elation’ here means a belief that one has been enlarged somehow and become mature by the acquisition of some good. So he says that we should not consider ourselves to be enlarged, or to have come into a position of superiority on the basis of goods that are not our own. For each **251** good is the good of the thing in which it has its subsistence (which its good puts into its natural disposition), not of some other thing. Hence, the good of a horse belongs to the horse itself; it is not ours. If it is spirited or a good runner or responsive, it has the virtue of a horse; this is not our virtue, so it is not our good either (nor does it expand or perfect us).

‘But,’ someone might say, ‘isn’t the virtue of possessions and tools referred to their possessors and users, and isn’t it their good?’ No; the virtue of an adze is not referred to the carpenter himself, nor does it make the carpenter himself good if he wasn’t already. The virtue of an adze, which depends on its shape and sharpness, is one thing; the virtue of a carpenter, which depends on his technical knowledge, is another. But its sharpness and well-formed shape are the good of the adze itself: they contribute to its serviceableness, and to the product bought about by the adze (which is the virtue of a tool). They do not, however, contribute to the perfection of the carpenter, since he has his own proper good in technical reasoning (even if the external product turns out badly owing to the matter or the tools or some other impediment).

So what is our good, Epictetus asks, towards which we ought to be disposed as though we have been enlarged and perfected? Earlier, in the first passage, he said ‘true belief about existent things’.¹⁰⁰ Now he says ‘the natural use of beliefs’ (what he there called a ‘belief’ he now calls an ‘impression’). For things strike us (and are believed and thought by us) as being of this or that nature, sometimes correctly and

sometimes erroneously. So a natural use of impressions would be for things to strike us as **252** they in fact are and not to alter their character when we combine them (e.g. when we judge that licentiousness is good and temperance bad). But in the strictest sense, the natural use of impressions is the desire and aversion for goods and bads, when they occur in accordance with nature – i.e. not just the recognition that this is good and this is bad, but the desire for what struck us as good and the aversion from what struck us as bad. (After all, we do not have authority over actions, but over desiring and avoiding in accordance with nature.)

Perhaps Epictetus indicated something else as well by ‘the natural use of impressions’, namely that our deeds should be consonant with true beliefs and desires.¹⁰¹ Thus we shouldn’t just consider temperance to be good, we should also be temperate and exhibit deeds that are consonant with our correct beliefs and desires. Nor should we just consider justice to be a good and desire it faintly (since anything thought to be a good is also an object of desire), but act unjustly. This is what happens to weak-willed people, when a different desire for pleasure conquers their desire for the good, though their reason still sees what it ought to do, albeit faintly, and even fights for it up to a point. Desires and aversions that are correct but faint are stirred up, but the irrational emotions overpower their reason and turn it around and compel it to do what they desire. This is what the woman in the tragedy expresses, as I said before:¹⁰²

I understand how bad what I am about to do is,
but my spirit is stronger than my deliberations.¹⁰³

253 So we shouldn’t have just correct opinions and superficial desires and aversions; we must also exhibit deeds that are consonant with our correct beliefs. And perhaps this too is ‘the natural use of impressions’, which we must believe is our good, rather than any of the external things. Similarly, the good of a carpenter qua carpenter is *activity* in accordance with technical *reasoning*, where the latter depends on his concepts, but the former also on his external actions.

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 7 (= Lemma xiii): Just as on a sailing-trip, if the ship anchors and you disembark to find water, you can collect a shell-fish or tuber as incidental to your journey, but you must direct your mind to the ship and keep turning back towards it, in case the pilot calls; and if he calls, then you must drop all those things, so as not to be thrown on board trussed-up like sheep. So too in life, if instead of a shell-fish or tuber you are given a little wife or little child, that won’t hinder you at all. But if the Pilot calls, then run aboard ship, dropping all those things without even turning back. And if you are an old man, then don’t

even separate yourself far from the ship at any time, in case He calls and you are left behind.]

xiii: Just as on a sailing-trip, if the ship anchors and you disembark to find water ...

[Commentary on Chapter 7, Lemma xiii]

He has reined us in concisely and in such a way as to turn us back¹⁰⁴ from the external things that are thought to be good, by showing that they all belong to something else and that none of them is our good. Next, in case anyone supposes that he completely forbids marriage, having children, or any sort of possession or participation in external things, he teaches which of them we ought to participate in, and how we ought to do it. We must make everything dependent on our turning back to God, the Pilot of the universe;¹⁰⁵ and we must engage with other things according to their rank, holding fast to God. First, we should engage with things that are necessary to life, without which it is impossible to live – i.e. things pertaining to food, clothing, and shelter (indicated by ‘finding water’) – of the kind and to the extent sufficient for people who are living without extravagance. So we should direct some effort even towards these things, in a secondary degree. As for things **254** that are not necessary but are otherwise useful for life, for instance a wife, children, possessions, and suchlike, these are, he says, incidental to our journey,¹⁰⁶ and given by the Universe in a third degree. We should accept them for the time they are given, as long as we are always aiming at the primary object of striving. But as for luxuries, wealth, political power, and other such meddling¹⁰⁷ in things that belong to others, he does not allow us to pursue these even as incidental to our journey, because they are not consistent with a natural life. (These are the things that he earlier said one must completely put aside.)¹⁰⁸ But with regard to marriage and child-rearing and the like, while he advised people whose education is only just underway to postpone them for the time being so that their initial education can acquire some solidity,¹⁰⁹ he permits those who have already made enough progress to be able to handle such things without harm to engage with these as incidental to their journey as well.

In my view, he has produced a very aptly-designed illustration. The *sea* is heavy, drenching, and changing in every respect, and suffocates people who sink into it; hence the ancient myth-makers used to say that the sea is a symbol of the realm of generation on the basis these similarities with it.¹¹⁰ The *ship* would be whatever conveys souls into the realm of generation, whether this is destiny or fate or whatever else one should call it. The *pilot* of the ship would be God, because through his providence he steers the universe as well as the descent of souls into the realm of generation, directing them towards what is

40

50

34,1

10

20 needed and accords with their merits. The *anchoring* of the ship would be the stationing of the souls in a suitable place, nation, and family. (It is by this stationing that some souls are brought to generation in this place and nation, and by this family and by these parents, and others souls by others.)¹¹¹ The *disembarkation* for watering is our concern for things necessary in life, without which **255** it is impossible to live. (After all, what is more necessary than water for the nourishment and drink of people in the realm of generation?) As for the *collection* of a shell-fish or tuber as incidental to the journey, Epictetus himself expounded this consistently <with my interpretation>: a wife and children and possessions and similar things given
30 by the Universe should be accepted, but not as primarily choice-worthy or as our own goods. (Our primary good is permanent attention to and turning back towards the Pilot.) But we should not be concerned for these things as if they were necessary, like watering; rather we should accept them as things that are really incidental, and otherwise merely useful for life.

‘But if the Pilot calls us’ on board the ship, recalling us from here to him, to the true homeland from which we came, then ‘run on board the ship’, he says, ‘dropping all of those things here without even turning back’. That is, make haste to follow your recall from here willingly, by releasing the bonds that hold you to things here,¹¹² and by dropping everything that attaches you to the realm of generation here, and follow the one who calls, without even turning back to these things at all. Otherwise, even if you are released physically, you will remain here in your prohairesis. For if you don’t follow willingly and eagerly, leaving everything here behind, you will be ‘thrown into the ship, trussed up as sheep are’ – i.e. you will leave your life here unwillingly, bewailing yourself and the people around you, like mindless or sheepish human beings.

50 But if you do become involved, as incidental to your journey, with marriage and child-rearing and the like, you must involve yourself at the opportune time, so that when you have received a commensurate satiety you can depart from here unencumbered by attachments,¹¹³ and eagerly obey the Pilot when he calls. But ‘if you are an old man’, and are already near the end, then **256** do not bind yourself with any of these bonds, but instead direct your whole self to your return and separation from here. Otherwise, when the moment for the departure
35,1 impends and you are called, you will be found a dawdler, someone dragged down by your bonds and lamenting your newly-wedded wife and infant children. And in any case, departing is more appropriate for an old man than concern for putting down roots here.

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 8 (= Lemma xiv): Don’t seek for what happens to happen as you wish, but wish for it to happen as it happens; and you will be happy.¹¹⁴]

xiv: Don't seek for what happens to happen as you wish, but wish for it to happen as it happens; and you will be happy.

[Commentary on Chapter 8, Lemma xiv]

He has told us both which external things we should partake of (those that are necessary or otherwise useful for life) and how we should partake of them (we should partake of the necessary things as necessary, and of others as 'incidental to the journey', and of none of them as a primary¹¹⁵ target). So having conceded¹¹⁶ the use of external things in these respects, he now explains the ways in which it is possible to use them contentedly, without being harmed or disturbed. 10

If we are not to live a life of frustration, being displeased by the things that happen, it is necessary that either the Universe should always do what pleases us, or we should be pleased by whatever we are allotted by the Universe: it is not possible to 'be happy' in any other way.¹¹⁷ But it is impossible for us to compel the Universe to do what pleases us, and not even always to our advantage, because we are pleased by many things that are actually disadvantageous to us, either through our ignorance of their nature or when we run away with our irrational desires. So if we are to 'be happy', it is necessary that we should so dispose ourselves as to be pleased by what happens through the agency of the Universe. 257 20

But perhaps this injunction to 'wish for it to happen as it happens' will seem to some people to be harsh and impossible. What right-thinking human being wishes for the occurrence of the widespread bad effects resulting from the universe – for instance, earthquakes, deluges, conflagrations, plagues, famine and the destruction of all sorts of animals and crops? Or the impious deeds performed by some human beings on others – the sacking of cities, taking prisoners of war, unjust killings, piracy, kidnapping, licentiousness, and tyrannical force, culminating in compelled acts¹¹⁸ of impiety? Still less the loss of culture and philosophy, of all virtue and friendship, and of faith in one another? As for all the crafts and sciences discovered and made secure through long ages, some of them have completely disappeared, so that only their names are remembered, and there are only shadows and figments left behind of many of the arts given by the gods for our assistance in life (e.g. medicine, housebuilding, carpentry and the like). These things and others of this sort – of which there has been an excess in our own lifetime – who would want to hear of them, let alone see them, take part in them or 'wish them to happen as they happen', except a malevolent person and a hater of all that is fine? 30

Such, then, are the difficulties, troubling not only to the masses but to people of greater refinement as well, which must be resolved, if Epictetus' saying is to appear above correction, and the governance of the demiurgic God is to appear beyond reproach. For wherever we locate our advantage, we also locate our reverence, as Epictetus 50

36,1 himself will teach us a little later.¹¹⁹ What I mean is **258** that if these events really are bad, as the argument raising these difficulties puts it so tragically, and bad in the way we think they are, then no one who was content with these bad things would be good, and the governor of affairs down here could not avoid being the cause of bad things. And if we do think him to be the cause of the bad, it is not possible for us to honor, love, or revere him, even if we swear on it thousands and thousands of times, because every animal, as Epictetus himself will say,¹²⁰ shuns and turns aside from things harmful to it (and their causes), but goes after and holds in awe the things beneficial to it (and their causes). However, if it should become apparent that these events are not bad, as we believe,¹²¹ but rather good, because they contribute to great goods and happen for their sake (and if there is any bad, this is not at all in the events, but rather in our desires and impulses), then the person who ‘wishes what happens to happen as it happens’ won’t be bad, and the governor of affairs down here won’t be the cause of the bad.¹²²

20 Now, these apparent bads, which happen in the realm of generation and destruction, occur either in bodies or in souls.¹²³ Of the latter, some are non-rational souls: their nature is united to bodies, and they have almost nothing that transcends the bodies, but are rather lives¹²⁴ of the bodies, and are moved with them and in accordance with them. Others are rational: they are self-moving, transcend the bodies, and are in control of prohairesis and impulse.

30 The first class, bodies, are completely moved by other things, and receive their whole being¹²⁵ from an external source, and hence are generated and destroyed and changed in all their various changes primarily by the celestial movements, but proximately, and in a more material way, by one another. After all, it makes sense that things that are generated and destroyed should strictly be said to get their subsistence from eternal things, and things moved by other things should get their subsistence from things that are self-moving, and things contained from the things that contain them. This is the order and justice of the Universe, that the former should follow on the latter, since they do not have in themselves an origin of motion or choice, and do not have control over **259** impulse; nor does their value differ according to their prohairesis, but rather it follows the disposition of their causes. (Just as the shadows of bodies are not turned and disposed in this way or that according to prohairesis, but instead follow the condition of their causes, and always have the same value.)¹²⁶

40 But change is not bad for the bodies that are being changed, whether they are composite bodies or simple bodies.¹²⁷ First, <change isn’t bad for bodies> because this is the sort of nature that they have, and it is impossible for them to be otherwise. (After all, ignorance and a life according to irrational desire wouldn’t be bad for rational souls

either, were it not in their nature to know the truth and rule the irrational desires and be superior to them.)¹²⁸ Secondly, [change isn't bad for composite bodies] because composite bodies are composed of opposites, which war against one another, are not in their proper places,¹²⁹ and attempt to get the better of one another through diseases. Sometimes the composite bodies recover by eliminating the destructive factors in the disease. At other times they proceed towards destruction, so that the composite bodies themselves find relief from their toil and long-suffering¹³⁰ and from the competition of the opposites in them, while each of the simple bodies in them is given back to its elemental mass¹³¹ for renewal and recovery from the weakness that arises in them through their opposites.¹³² (For when any of them acts on its opposite, it is in turn always acted on by that opposite.) And <thirdly, change isn't bad for simple bodies because> when the simple bodies change into one another through the change of opposite qualities, they become again what they were before. (Water changes to air, from which it had been generated earlier, and air changes to fire, out of which it had been generated.) **260**

There is nothing bad in all this, I think, even if the simple bodies bring about deluges and conflagrations and even more wholesale changes, through the equilibration of the elements in the universe, or if diseases or earthquakes decompose the composite bodies. And if these things actually make a contribution through the unending recirculation of what is generated (because the destruction of one thing is the generation of another), how can the destruction of a part be bad, if it profits the whole?¹³³ After all, in the case of individual¹³⁴ animals nature is also observed to disdain the part on account of the whole, when it sends the fluids out from the vital organs¹³⁵ (heart, stomach, liver and brain) to the tips of the feet and hands, pushing them out to the skin through pimples and eruptions and the like, and producing discharges which are destructive of the parts, for the sake of the preservation of the whole. And for that matter, the medical art, imitating nature, also foment abscesses,¹³⁶ cuts, burns, applies traction, and cuts off parts in order to save the whole. No one denounces this as though it was a bad thing to happen. So if bodies kept to themselves, and nothing that happened to them were in any way relayed to human souls, then I don't think that anything connected with their changes would be considered bad.

But since there are also souls in the bodies, we must show that there is nothing bad for them either.¹³⁷ Some souls are irrational, and since their nature is united to bodies, as I have said,¹³⁸ and they are lives¹³⁹ of the bodies, they have their essence and power and activity in them and along with them. Other souls are rational, and since they transcend the bodies by their nature and¹⁴⁰ are completely separated from them, they are self-moving, possessed of prohairesis **261** and have control over impulse and desire, as was demonstrated earlier.

As for the irrational souls, if they have no share of self-motion – not
 40 even a trace – and no desire or any sort of motion coming from within,
 but are instead completely lives¹⁴¹ of bodies, then it is clear that they
 get their essence from fate along with their bodies, according to their
 value, which is determined according to their bodies and along with
 them, and is jointly disposed along with their movements, as has been
 said about shadows.¹⁴² But this is more a description of the lives of
 plants (that's why they are rooted¹⁴³ and deprived of perception and
 motion, the concomitants of the soul's desire and impulse). Yet the
 50 irrational animals have this aspect too; so it's plausible that since
 they are intermediate between lives rooted in bodies and those that
 are completely free by nature and self-moving, the souls of non-ra-
 tional animals have some trace of desire and impulse, aroused from
 within them. This trace sometimes moves in accordance with the
 38,1 nature of the species, as when the lion has spirit which is commensu-
 rate with his species; and at other times it boils over, or is deficient.
 And it is according to these <capacities> that they have both different
 values and dissimilar lives, over and above the disposition according
 to fate which they have qua something moved from outside. For it is
 necessary that intermediates should in some way have something in
 common with each of the extremes.¹⁴⁴

The rational soul, however, has its value in accordance with its
 prohairesis, since it is self-moved, and is completely in control of
 desire and impulse, though since it uses the body, it also gets the
 10 body's affections relayed¹⁴⁵ back to it. Now when it lives in accordance
 with nature by using the body as an instrument,¹⁴⁶ transcending it
 and being superior to it, then damage to the body may impede the **262**
 activities of the soul carried out through the body, but it does not
 transmit anything terrible to the soul. (As the divine Socrates said,
 the pain stays in the leg.)¹⁴⁷ But when the soul becomes more famil-
 iar¹⁴⁸ with the body than it should be, and no longer treats it as its
 instrument, but rather embraces it as a part of itself, or even as
 though it were itself, then the soul is made irrational by the body and
 shares affections with it. Then the soul believes that the desires of
 20 spirit and appetite are proper to it, and by being subservient to them,
 and finding means for getting what they desire, it becomes bad in all
 these respects. Now it is ill with the disease of the soul and needs
 medical treatment to be relieved of it; and since opposites are the
 cures for opposites,¹⁴⁹ the soul that has become bad through its desire
 for pleasure and indulgence¹⁵⁰ must be chastised and cured of its
 sympathy for the body and possessions (and honours and political
 power and the like as well) by the distress of failing to attain these
 things. (Especially in the case of the affections of the body, since the
 30 body is closer to the soul,¹⁵¹ and the pains in it and with it are more
 perceptible.)

After all, once the soul has stood apart¹⁵² from its superiors and

itself, surrendered itself wholly to the body and external things, judged them to be itself, and sought for its own good in them, and is accordingly sickened and vitiated, how else could it come to be able to look down on these things and its inclination towards them, despise them, turn around towards itself and its superiors, and seek the good in them, if it had not experienced these things as painful, as well as harmful? After all, it inclines towards these things for the sake of pleasure, since it attains pleasure in and with these things; and so long as **263** it enjoys pleasure in them, it is riveted and welded to them. 'There is no rivet so forceful for nailing together and gluing as pleasure', and the enticement that comes from it.¹⁵³ 40

Accordingly, the good doctor causes the soul to turn away from the things towards which it had inclined¹⁵⁴ by applying irritants to them, just as women who wish to wean their children anoint their nipples with something bitter. To start with, the souls choose death and the separation from the body over bodily pain and the exigencies of life, as if they were choosing the lighter of two bad things¹⁵⁵ (which would not have happened to them had they been happy¹⁵⁶ in their bodily concerns). All the same, they become accustomed to hating the pleasures down here and turn their back on them, keeping themselves away from them by the fear of a distress many times greater coming from it, just as children, at the beginning, are kept from harmful things by fear. Similarly, someone who takes pleasure in a harmful food or drink, but frequently experiences pain and a sharp distress from it, abstains from it through the fear of encountering them. And yet if they could use them without distress, who would turn their back on pleasures, even if they happened to be genuinely harmful? 50
39,1

Abstaining from pleasures on account of the fear of a greater distress is not in itself a liberation from emotion.¹⁵⁷ It is more of an exchange; we get the pleasure of being free from distress in exchange for the pleasure of enjoyment which had been accompanied by the additional emotion of fear. Nevertheless, in the beginning, when we're childish and senseless in our dispositions, this does contribute a starting point for resentment and suspicion of the things with which we had felt this intense sympathy. And later, **264** when we learn their nature (i.e. that in addition to being harmful they also bring pains many times greater than the pleasure), and turn to ourselves and find that the good is inside us, and not in the body or in external things, and furthermore perceive our likeness to what is superior, and revere that likeness, then we no longer choose the life in accordance with nature through fear, but through knowledge and virtue. After all, children also avoid or do things through fear; but later, when they come to their senses, do the same things thereafter by choice. 10
20

This is the aim of the God that looks after us: that the rational soul should not be welded to the body and external things, and that it should abstain from them, not through fear but by choice, since it is

30 in choice and aversion that our good and bad are located. And this is the end towards which the medical treatment of Providence is hastening: the elevation and return of the soul to the choice of the natural life. It is like the best doctors, who provide bodies with a natural condition by means of cutting and burning and the like, so that the bodies may perform their natural activities. Justice is the art of curing wickedness, and the apparently bad things around us have the same function as the things we're displeased with when our doctors use cuttings and burnings and painful remedies. (This is why childish
40 and senseless people are displeased at these things too.) Anyone who attempts to pay attention to the events that happen to himself and to other people, and keeps watch on the resultant dispositions of their soul, will agree readily, I think, that these displeasing things furnish the soul with a great starting point for disdain for the body and external things, or, as the wondrous Epictetus would say, for the things that are not up to us.

The medical art involved with bodies has one part that is **265** therapeutic, which uses opposites to correct diseased bodies, and another part that is hygienic, which uses regimen and exercise to bring healthy bodies to a more stable and perfect degree of health
50 (and some of these exercises are extremely arduous, and bearable only by those who are courageous and enduring). Similarly, the Assistant of souls does not merely treat diseased souls by means of the unpleasant things in life, but also exercises those that are
40,1 healthy, renders them more healthy and courageous, and displays their virtue to make it more evident to others for imitation. For it is clear that even good human souls are in need of exercise, just as healthy bodies are, because 'Motion strengthens, idleness emaciates,' as Hippocrates says.¹⁵⁸ Why? Because while things that always have their own perfection and are always engaged in their own natural activities, have their activities ready to hand and prepared, those that are not always active require exercise in order to imitate eternal motion; otherwise, when the occasion calls they fall short of what is
10 needed, because they have become forgetful and deadened through the idleness of their activities. For what is only intermittently active because of its lack of intensity needs to regain its strength through activity.

All exercise is accomplished through the same things as the primary¹⁵⁹ activity for the sake of which we exercise. At any rate the exercise for wrestling is constant wrestling; and the exercise for boxing is constant boxing and accustoming oneself to blows. Similarly
20 in the exercise for war, the people drilling together imitate warriors; and the bigger and stronger their sparring partners are, the more the exercise accomplishes its own goal. So if one is exercising against pleasure **266** in order to gain control over it, then one must come to grips with pleasant things, and accustom oneself to despise them; and

if against distress, then one must partake of distress; and if against fear, then one must plunge oneself into fearful things; and if against pain, then one must be eager for the ordeal by flogging which noble Spartan youths practised, as well as for all the painful exercises preparatory to that ordeal (or for what our Sallustius¹⁶⁰ did, placing a burning ember on his bare thigh and blowing on it, in order to test how far he could endure). For the exercises do not differ at all in species from the primary activities; they differ only by being somehow less onerous, in as much as¹⁶¹ it is up to us to stop whenever we wish. 30

So since God sent human souls down into the realm of generation provided with powers through which they can make use of the snares and distractions in that realm without being harmed by them, and transcend them, God sets frequent contests for souls, and sets exercises for these powers so that they don't grow slack or lose intensity through idleness, and come to grief when the occasion calls for their use. Heracles, Theseus, Diogenes and Socrates would not have become such as they were, nor would the greatness of human virtue have been revealed or the extremes through which it can pass, had God not challenged the first two to struggle against the most fearsome of the beasts and wrong-doers among men, or propelled the second two to the extremes of simplicity and the natural life. It should also be perfectly clear, I think, to anyone who attends to it, that those who perform well in special circumstances will come out more courageously 267 the rest of the time. For if habituation renders contests with the most fearsome things mere child's play, so that some people choose them for the sake of a little cash, how in more moderate cases could exercise fail to prepare us to despise the things that seem unpleasant to those who are unexercised? 40 50 41,1

So whether these apparently unpleasant and arduous things are applied to the souls as therapy for those who are diseased or as exercise for those who are healthy, in either case they wouldn't be bad for them. If we called them bad, we would be saying that medical treatment and exercise are bad for bodies, because *they* are arduous. But since they happen completely in accordance with their value – the value of nature and of prohairesis¹⁶² – they wouldn't be bad, because what is according to things' value is just, and what is just is good. Yet even for bodies, given that qua bodies they are insensate, being cut and burned is not bad, since dissolution into simple components is not bad for the composite. So if we don't say that medical treatment of bodies is bad, when it exercises them and burns and applies traction and cuts off parts, and does the same things that humans do when they inflict unsparing punishments – if we rather say that it is good, and reward the medical practitioners with gratitude and remuneration – then why do we not love the medical treatment of God? For God does none of these things from anger, or vengefully, or contrary to our value, or to our harm, but rather medicinally and solicitously and in 20

a paternal way, and to our greatest benefit; or, as it would be sufficient to say, 'according to divine goodness'.

God's medical treatment comes in many forms: he treats some people with diseases, poverty, or dishonour; others with famines, plagues, earthquakes, inundations, shipwrecks, wars, or man-made punishments. Hence these are not bad things, but rather goods, given that receiving medical treatment is a good thing. But if someone doesn't think it is right to call these things 'goods', on the grounds that they are not desirable per se as goods strictly speaking must be, then
 30 let the objector not immediately¹⁶³ call them 'bads', but rather 'necessary for the acquisition of what is genuinely good'. We choose them for its sake, since of necessity we need them for it. After all, no one chooses medical cuttings and burnings and the 268 like per se either: we choose them because we are striving for health, and it is necessary to obtain it through them. The wise have rightly called these things 'necessary', since it is wholly necessary to accept them in advance, if the good is going to make its appearance. Nonetheless, they are also
 40 goods themselves, given that they contribute towards the good (some towards bodily health, others towards the health of souls).¹⁶⁴ But they are at a lower level of descent¹⁶⁵ than the primary¹⁶⁶ goods; and it is by comparison to these that the vulgar consider them to be bad; but they are thinking about these things wrongly,¹⁶⁷ in my opinion, given that it is necessary for us to acquire the good through these things.

If, therefore, the objections put forward by the argument¹⁶⁸ raising difficulties have been resolved, and everything that happens, happens according to value (either of nature or of prohairesis), and everything happens through the agency of God with the aim of benefit, then it is clear that every right-thinking person will both
 50 'wish for it to happen as it happens' (given that he does not resent the things done in the dispensation of justice and medical treatment¹⁶⁹), and will also revere, honour, and nobly love a Doctor of this sort, and define him as a benefactor.

But someone might concede, I imagine, that these events which are unpleasant to people are medical treatments of a sort, and that to
 42,1 receive medical treatment, whether for the soul or body, is good for those who are in need of it. Still (this person might object), who would judge the very fact of being diseased, whether in soul or body, and of being in need of such arduous and painful medical treatment, to be a good instead of something bad; and who would not judge its cause to be the cause of something bad? Must we say the same things over again? The disease of the body is not something bad for the body itself, given that it has a nature of that sort, and the disease has in view the dissolution of the composite, and the return of the simples to their
 10 proper elemental masses, and their deliverance and freedom from their sojourn in a place that is not their own, and from the conflict of contraries. Neither is bodily disease bad for the soul, given that it is

a medical treatment for the soul, as has been demonstrated, and as is frequently obvious.¹⁷⁰ And even if the disease and destruction of the body had been bad for the **269** individual body, still, if it was manifestly beneficial for the soul of the person using it and for the constitution of the universe (i.e. the proper balance of the elements in it and the unending cycle of generation, which proceeds in this way to infinity, because the destruction of one thing is the generation of another), then even the best governor would have despised the part perishable by nature and a partial and inferior destruction, for the sake of the superior and the whole, and for the uninterrupted continuity of generation.¹⁷¹ 20

But the disease of the soul, someone might say, is neither good for the diseased soul itself, nor profits the whole in any way, so that its cause seems to be the cause of something bad; and anyone who ‘wishes for’¹⁷² it to become bad and diseased would be bad: so the same problem seems to persist. Well, what is the cause of the disease and vice of the soul? Let us recall it from our earlier discussions about what is up to us and what is not up to us.¹⁷³ We said that the good of the soul lies in its desiring and avoiding according to nature, and its bad in desiring and avoiding contrary to nature. But it has been demonstrated, I think, that desire and aversion are up to us; so we ourselves are the causes of our own virtue and vice. This is why the virtuous are praised, because they have the good through their own choice (and it is for this reason that it is called ‘virtue’¹⁷⁴), and the wicked are blamed, because they are in control of their not being that way, but instead have become wicked through laziness. Hence if these things were implanted from outside, prohairesis would no longer be good or bad, but rather a sort of chance and necessity¹⁷⁵; so even in this case God would not be the cause of anything bad.¹⁷⁶ 30 40

But perhaps even the disease of the soul, i.e. ‘vice’ or ‘badness’ as it is called,¹⁷⁷ is not bad simpliciter; perhaps even it contains something necessary for the subsistence¹⁷⁸ of human virtue. After all, the health of bodies here¹⁷⁹ wouldn’t **270** be the same health if it were not also¹⁸⁰ natural for these bodies to be diseased; it would instead be a sort of unmixed disposition, not opposed to disease, of the kind the celestial bodies have. In the same way, the virtues of the human soul – temperance, justice, wisdom and all the rest of the chorus of virtues¹⁸¹ – wouldn’t be the same, if it were not also natural to souls to become bad. Rather, human souls would have some sort of angelic or divine virtues, but certainly not human ones. For human souls are such in their nature as also to be diverted into vice. If, however, human virtues and bodily health are good; and if it was necessary that not only the primary and unmixed goods should come into subsistence from the Source of the good, but also the intermediate goods and the lowest goods, which are capable of being diverted; then it was necessary that diversions of those goods should – not ‘subsist’, 43,1

for they do not have primary¹⁸² subsistence, but rather – ‘subsist derivatively’ on the things that do exist.¹⁸³

10 And notice the superabundance of divine goodness: He made the disease and destruction of the body (which follows along as a necessary consequence of the motion of the causes¹⁸⁴ in the manner of a shadow, as I said¹⁸⁵) good, [1] for the diseased and perishing bodies themselves (because of the simplification into elemental masses and their renewal), [2] for the souls that use the bodies and receive medical treatment through them, and [3] for the infinite persistence of the whole created cosmos, as has been said.¹⁸⁶ Whereas he emptied himself from the vice of souls, which is the only thing that appears to be bad in any way; first, because it was not qua bad, but qua necessary to the good 271 that he granted it a subsistence derivative from existent things; and secondly, because he ordered that even this should wholly follow the desire¹⁸⁷ of the soul, and never come among beings unless the soul should wish it. (This is why involuntary acts are forgiven, by God and by the laws, as not being bad.)

20

Indeed, even for the soul, the bad is involuntary in a way; for it is never qua bad that the soul chooses the bad. Rather, it chooses qua desiring good things (sometimes possessions, sometimes bodily enjoyments, or political power, or honour) and either completely fails to notice the harmful element that accompanies these things, or turns

30 its back on it, compelled by the desire for the objects just mentioned. Accordingly, the perfectly bad has been utterly cast out from every kind of existent thing, and it would sooner be the case that something that in no way exists should exist, than that something perfectly and solely bad should exist.¹⁸⁸ But this qualified bad, of whatever sort it is, has a subsistence which is derivative on the self-determination of the human soul.

But if someone supposes that God is the cause of the bad because he gave subsistence to the self-determining soul, and it is the soul’s failure that constitutes badness, then we make this reply. If the self-moving and self-determining essence of souls is bad, then it is necessary to say that whoever gave subsistence to this is the cause of something bad. But if it is a good, and indeed a greater and more honourable good than many goods in the cosmos, then how could the agent who gave subsistence to this good be the cause of something bad? Since whatever is naturally an object of choice and striving is a good, what human being who is aware of human virtue would choose to be a plant or any of the irrational animals, rather than a human being?¹⁸⁹ And yet we say that both plants and irrational animals are good things, having a position in the ordering of the good, and in the descent in relation to one another of all the definite things.¹⁹⁰ So if it is up to us to be good or bad, and we do have authority over this, and

40

50 nothing can either compel or hinder our choice and aversion, then this

essence of the soul and this self-determining capability is an awe-inspiring thing, it seems to me, something **272** magnificent and originative,¹⁹¹ and the agent who gave it subsistence is good and capable. If at times through its own doing it is carried away, despite having the authority not to be carried away, then what could rightly be said to be the cause of this but the soul itself, since it is an origin and cause of its good and of the diversion of its good? And it *is* also from the soul that the diversion takes its origin, since the cause that gave the soul subsistence did not make it capable of being diverted simpliciter, but capable of being self-determinately diverted or of remaining undiverted, if it should wish. So if wishing belongs to the soul itself, and is a kind of internal motion, then the soul will be the cause of its own diversion. 44,1

And notice the artful contrivance of God: since it was necessary that in between the things that are always above and the things that are always below, there should come into being certain intermediate things which liken themselves sometimes to the things above and sometimes to the things below and bind together the extremities for the perfection of the whole; and since the inclination towards the things below has a diversion which merely subsists parasitically; God gave to these intermediate things a power of such a sort that they can remain undiverted so long as they want, so he himself would ‘not be the cause of’ any sort of ‘badness’¹⁹² from any perspective. 10

But these points, on which I have expatiated at length, are relevant not only to Epictetus’ current argument, but also to his argument concerning the subsistence of the bad, which he will explain a little later.¹⁹³ For the present purpose, I think it is sufficient to say that when Epictetus says ‘wish for it to happen as it happens’, he is not speaking about the vice of the soul (he would not have said that those who are complacent about their own and others’ vice **273** ‘are happy’), but rather about the things that happen to the body and to externals.¹⁹⁴ It is these, whatever sort they may be, that the educated person can use well, and benefit from them all the more, the harsher they may be. For these are ‘what happens’ – the events which, through lack of education, we seek to conform to our own desires and aversions. That phrase does not refer to the desires and aversions themselves, in which are found our own good and bad, because these are up to us, as we wish. It’s rather the things that are not up to us which he is counseling us not to seek to ‘happen as we wish’, because we are neither in control of them, nor do we always seek them to our advantage, since we frequently seek for pleasant things to happen even if they turn out to be harmful, and deprecate harsher things even if they are applied as medical treatments. 20 30

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 9 (= Lemma xv): Disease is an impediment of the body, but not of prohairesis, unless prohairesis itself wishes it. Lameness is an impediment of the leg, but not of prohairesis. Repeat this for each thing you encounter. For you will find that it is an impediment of something else, but not of you.]

xv: Disease is an impediment of the body, but not of prohairesis, unless prohairesis itself wishes it.

[Commentary on Chapter 9, Lemma xv]

40 He has said that anyone who wants to be happy¹⁹⁵ must not ‘seek for what happens to happen as they wish, but wish for it to happen as it happens’. Now in this chapter he does two things: he demonstrates what he had set out to prove, that one should bear lightly the difficulties we encounter from external things; and at the same time resolves, I think, an objection.

The demonstration seems to go like this: if the difficulties we encounter from the outside were ours, then we would have to bear them easily, no matter how difficult they might be, if they were beneficial. But if they are not ours, and instead each of them belongs to some other thing, then why should we get upset about things that

50 are not ours?

‘Disease **274** is an impediment of the body.’ He is right to say ‘impediment’, not ‘bad’, because disease, and even perishing, are not bad for the body, as was demonstrated earlier,¹⁹⁶ but rather impediments to its activities. ‘Lameness’ – which Epictetus himself suffered, so that he speaks not merely from the tongue, but from his life as well – lameness is also ‘an impediment of the body’. And poverty is an impediment to expenditure. ‘But not of prohairesis, unless prohairesis itself wishes it.’ If we were bodies, or legs, or possessions, these things would have been impediments of ours. But if instead we are none of these things, but a rational soul that uses the body as an instrument¹⁹⁷ and uses external things for our assistance, then we have our good and bad in our own prohairesis. And if the prohairesis that does not wish to be impeded by these things is not impeded, then it is clear that we are not impeded either. Nor is anything we encounter from the outside an impediment of ours; rather, it is an impediment to some other thing that is not the same as us. So we shouldn’t get upset about these things as though they were our own, because if we do, then by getting upset about bad things that are not its own, the prohairesis will suffer a bad that really is its own, namely getting upset. That, I think, is how the claim is demonstrated.

10

The objection I think he resolves is one based on what is advanta-

geous (which is raised by clever rhetoricians). Someone might say that neither being ill nor being impoverished are advantageous: after all, who can perform their natural activities when they are ill? And who can avoid being compelled to labor for the provision of necessities when they are very poor? Well, he resolves this objection by pointing out that disease and poverty and other circumstances of this sort are not impediments of prohairesis – and this is what a human being takes its essence from, and so also its good and evil. After all, who can prevent someone who is ill from choosing the things that are according to nature, or avoiding the things that are contrary to nature? What could even the extremes of poverty compel someone to do, that is not befitting a noble and good man? Wasn't it exactly when they exchanged the height of financial ease for a complete lack of possessions that Diogenes, 275 Crates and Zeno genuinely philosophised, and displayed (to those able to see it) the natural life that suits¹⁹⁸ human beings, and the wealth that lies in simplicity? (For¹⁹⁹ everyone loves to provide for people like that, knowing that it is better to receive thanks than to give it.²⁰⁰)

But there is no need of further examples, when the very person who says these things, Epictetus, was a slave, ailing in body, lame from a young age, and practiced the most rigorous poverty, so that his dwelling in Rome never needed a lock because there was nothing inside except the bed of straw or rushes on which he slept. This is the man who says to us 'Lameness is an impediment of the leg, but not of prohairesis, unless prohairesis itself wishes it.' His arguments come from life, not just from eagerness to say whatever seems likely to earn praise, as most of ours do. This is a further reason why the arguments of this great man are so effective²⁰¹ on well-endowed souls.

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 10 (= Lemma xvi): With each thing you encounter, remember to turn back towards yourself and seek what power you have for using it. If you see a beautiful boy or woman, you will find self-control as your power for using them. If labour approaches, you will find endurance. If insults, you will find forbearance. And if you are habituated in this way, your impressions won't grab you.]

xvi: With each thing you encounter, remember to turn back towards yourself and seek what power you have for using it ...

[Commentary on Chapter 10, Lemma xvi]

He has proposed some very significant theses, which will seem impossible to most people – for instance, that we should spit on disease of the body as a bad that is not our own; that we should 'wish for what happens to happen as it happens'; and that we should neither be enticed by the pleasant things we encounter from outside nor hum-

50 bled by **276** the painful ones. So now, as one might expect, he proposes
 to demonstrate that these things are possible, and that we²⁰² are not
 enjoining impossibilities. He shows that God – who gave the human
 46,1 soul a nature such that it does not always remain above (as do the
 angelic souls, and even prior to them the divine souls) but sometimes
 descends into the realm of generation and associates with things of
 that sort – gave the human soul powers for each thing, by means of
 which the soul can remain unharmed by such things and transcend
 them.

[1] For things that seem pleasant, God gave the soul self-control.
 Epictetus did not say ‘temperance’, but rather ‘self-control’ because
 this advice is directed to those who are still being educated. In their
 case, the emotions are still aroused and in dispute with reason,
 although they are worsted by it when the education is effectual. This
 10 is the self-controlled form of life; whereas when reason does not
 control the emotion and is itself worsted, we call the disposition
 ‘un-self-controlled’. In the case of those who are completely educated,
 the emotional part of the soul (which is the childish part in us²⁰³) is
 completely subjected to reason, and never disputes with it. Accord-
 20 ingly, it is roused only by the emotions that reason enjoins it to be
 roused by, and only when and to whatever extent reason enjoins. This
 is temperance, i.e. the preservation and superiority of that in us
 which thinks.²⁰⁴ (For when the thinking part is subjected to the
 emotions, it is divided²⁰⁵ and torn apart by them; but when it trans-
 scends²⁰⁶ the passions then it remains safe and whole.)

[2] For arduous and painful things, in the case of educated peo-
 20 ple,²⁰⁷ there is courage, which will not even consent to permit distress
 inside of the outer doors of the soul, and instead labours onward
 without being distressed or oppressed, treating every arduous thing
 as though it were a gymnastic exercise proffered to it. But in the case
 of those who are still being educated, there is endurance, which nobly
 stands up against the painful events, and **277** prevents the soul from
 flagging, and makes it fight and ward off the blows of distress. The
 intense opposition of endurance brings it about that reason is victori-
 ous and emotion is worsted; and when this happens frequently along
 30 with practical wisdom, the emotion becomes accustomed to obeying
 reason and not resisting, and is fully educated. Then there is no
 longer any need for the educated person to endure anything, because
 someone in this condition is no longer distressed: he neither desires
 anything he fails to attain, nor avoids anything he encounters – and
 all distress results from these cases.

[3] For insults, he says that you will find ‘forbearance’ as a means
 of defence against it. For it is not through their own nature that
 insults induce pain and oppression in those who are insulted, rather
 it is the belief within us (which is a product of our vanity or our
 40 spirited part). In themselves, insults only have the effect of making

us condemn the person insulting us; but in order for this condemnation to come about without any emotion on our own part, we must recognise the viciousness of the person insulting us (if he either speaks falsely, or because of some hatred), while ‘putting up with’²⁰⁸ their vice as something that does not harm us in anyway. Or perhaps what we should do is ‘put up with’ the viciousness of the person insulting us, by keeping in mind that he himself is the one who has been harmed, because he has made his own prohairesis bad (which is to say, he has made himself bad). But as for the insult itself, we should actually benefit from it, in every case. It is obvious that we benefit from the insult, if it is false;²⁰⁹ but even if it is true it benefits us, because it reveals one of our vices, whether this was unknown to us, or we knew about it but believed that it was hidden from others. After all, it is sufficient for those whose education is just beginning to be diverted from vice, even if they are not yet doing it for the good alone, but are controlling their more sordid emotions through the love of honour. For the love of honour is useful for the correction of the other emotions, **278** and this is why the love of honour is also called the ‘last tunic of the emotions’,²¹⁰ because it works together with the soul as the soul takes off each of the other emotions. The soul removes love of honour last of all, finally baring itself to the good itself.²¹¹ 50

So with each external thing we encounter that drags us towards the outside, we mustn’t be grabbed immediately by an impression saying that it is good or bad, or immediately rouse our desire or aversion. Instead we should discover the ally that is in us²¹² and invoke its aid, and then together with it and through it we must ward off the thing we encounter. 47,1 10

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 11 (= Lemma xvii): Never say of anything ‘I have lost it’; instead, say ‘I have given it back’. Has your child died? It has been given back. Has your wife died? She has been given back. ‘I’ve had my land taken away!’ Well then, this too has been given back. ‘But the person who took it is bad.’ What does it matter to you whether the person who gave it demands it back through one person or another? While He gives it, you must take care of it as you would a thing that belongs to someone else, in the way that travellers treat a hotel.]

xvii: Never say of anything ‘I have lost it’; instead, say ‘I have given it back’.

[Commentary on Chapter 11, Lemma xvii]

He has spoken about the acquisition of external things, and about encounters with them, and how we should take them, and how we should make use of the pleasant and painful things we encounter

from outside. Now he speaks about losing them, and how one should be disposed to their loss.

Someone who believes that he has lost possessions belonging to himself cannot help but be distressed and blame the person who takes them back; whereas someone who gives back another's possessions (unless he is thoroughly inconsiderate) is neither distressed nor blames the person who recovers their own things. But external things are not ours (that is why they are not up to us); the only things that are ours are desire and impulse and aversion, and it is in these things that our good and bad reside. **279** Thus we should securely be disposed to external things as things that are not our own, and have ready to hand the distinction between what is up to us and what is not up to us. This will be ready to hand if we are disposed to them as things that are not our own even with respect to the names that we apply to them, and accustom ourselves even to that extent. So if someone groans when their child dies, and says that it is utterly destroyed, they make it clear that before its death they were disposed to their child as their own possession – that is why they call its removal a 'loss', and get upset about it. It is clear that if they could, someone like this would even be willing to retaliate against the person who takes it back!²¹³ But someone who judges that something that was not their own has been given back is neither oppressed nor holds the giver responsible for taking it back.

Note how Epictetus here shows us that it is not only the conception that imparts its disposition to the words that are uttered from it; the words also shape the way the conceptions are disposed. Thus he says that even in our choice of words we should *refer* to externals as things that are not our own, so that we can *disposed* to them as things that are not our own, and furthermore *use* them as things that are not our own, by always having this conception of them. So since our attention and concern augment our sympathy with these things, he says that we should also perform them and be concerned about them (since it would not be fitting to be idle) as things that are not our own. We should certainly not treat them as our own, or as things that are inalienable, but rather 'in the way travellers treat a hotel' – i.e. believing that it belongs to someone else, and expecting to leave it before long, but, so long as it is there, attending to its serviceableness insofar as they can. (He puts it well when he says 'so long as it is given', so it will be ready to hand that it has been given by someone else, i.e. by the person who also takes it away.²¹⁴) **280**

Some people declare tragically that the manner of the removal is a further addition to their distress. ('Why was it taken from me in this or that way? Why did my child or wife die in this way?' No doubt they wanted them to die of fever instead of convulsions.) So he says that this is the same as getting upset about why the person who gave me something took it back through this means rather than that; and yet

it is fitting that the person who gave it in the manner they wished should take it back as they wish as well.

Epictetus himself constructs his argument using examples that move our sympathies in the highest degree (children and spouses), in comparison with which even an average person would disdain all the rest. But as he himself has said before and will say again in what follows, we should begin with little things.²¹⁵ Someone steals your money, or your servant or household is taken, or later your belongings are publicly confiscated as well. Don't say 'I lost them' but rather 'I gave them back'.

10

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 12 (= Lemma xviii): If you wish to make progress, get rid of reflections like this: 'If I neglect my affairs, I shall have nothing to live on.' 'If I don't punish my slave-boy, he will turn out bad.' For it is better to die of hunger, but be free from distress and fear, than it is to live in abundance while being disturbed; and it is better that your slave-boy should turn out bad, than that you should become miserable. So begin with little things: your oil is spilled, or your wine is stolen. Reflect as follows: 'That is the price of freedom from emotions.' 'That is the price of freedom from disturbance.' 'Nothing comes for free.' And when you call your slave-boy, keep in mind that he may not answer you, or may answer and not do what you wish. But he is not so well off that it is up to him whether or not you are disturbed.]

xviii: If you wish to make progress, get rid of reflections like this ...

[Commentary on Chapter 12, Lemma xviii]

Epictetus has said that we should be concerned for externals as though they are not our own, in the way travellers treat a hotel. Now he hears certain people responding to this and saying 'But if I neglect my affairs, I shall have nothing to live on.' 'If I don't punish my slave-boy, he will turn out bad.' He answers them by maintaining the guiding principle of the work right from its start, which locates our good and bad in the things that are up to us, not in our body or externals. The work is addressed to people whose education is still underway, and are not yet in the sort of condition that would allow them to be concerned simultaneously with what belongs to them and with external things without suffering harm. **281** Educated people do have this condition, because they have established themselves in a position of security and subordinated the irrationality within them to reason. Hence they no longer fear that by inclining outwards they will be swept away by the irrational emotions towards the external things and take in the disorderliness and disturbance of those things, be-

20

30

cause they remain within themselves, and render the external things orderly through the order that is in themselves. But with those in whom the irrational is still throbbing, there is something to fear in letting them direct themselves towards external things. For the irrational desires are akin to the externals,²¹⁶ and since they are not yet measured or subordinated to reason they drag a person like this down and plunge him into external things, and he cannot yet take hold of the appropriate rudders.²¹⁷

40 So what should be done to keep the student from being at a loss for their necessary nourishment? It was open to Epictetus to say that one can do a fine job of coping with the reduction in possessions that results from their neglect, if one employs the simple life-style of students, and is satisfied with little – which pertained to him above all others. And if they can't put up with these things, there will be no lack of people who will choose to nourish those who are satisfied with little, and who disdain possessions in virtue of their concern with themselves.²¹⁸ It was open to him, then, as I said, to use arguments of this kind on them, and they are true. But Epictetus rejected them as enfeebling, since they relax the tension²¹⁹ of virtue and pollute its purity (if it always has an additional need of external things). Rather, he raised the comparison to its limit, saying 'It is better to die of hunger, but be free from distress and fear', and attain your own
49,1 perfection, 'than it is to live in abundance while being disturbed'. For what use is there in an abundance of externals for someone whose disposition is contrary to nature, **282** and who is, if anything, harmed by them? What use is there in costly and complicated dishes for someone who, owing to a disease, is unable to use them without being harmed? 'And it is better,' he says, 'that your slave-boy should turn out bad, than that you should become miserable.' Were it possible to attend to the slave-boy while saving yourself, that would be better. But since that is impossible, it is better in the end to leave him to his own vices, and be concerned with ourselves. This is for two reasons:
10 first, because an uneducated person cannot educate someone else; and secondly, because you would not benefit the slave-boy, while you would be seriously harmed yourself.

So that is how he encourages the student, straining for the highest things: by advising him to choose death by starvation rather than remaining uneducated owing to his occupation with externals; and to permit his slave-boy to turn out bad, if it is necessary, rather than himself wretched. But as far as actual practice goes, he advises him to 'begin with little things', correctly estimating the abilities of a student. For exercise and gymnastics through commensurate means is both safe and effective; but if someone disdains commensurate means (e.g. taking his exercise from the spilling of oil or the theft of wine) as trivial, and leaps up to incommensurate ones, then he won't be able to manage the latter because he did not ascend to them by
20

degrees, or to make further progress through the former, in as much as he disdains them. Imagine someone who does not exercise with little things, but instead imitates Crates²²⁰ and disposes of all of their possessions all at once. It is inevitable that he will swiftly repent of it, and end up seeking to recover his former prosperity. Crates or Diogenes or Zeno or someone else may have leapt all at once to the limit of simplicity and a life according to nature, but this type of case is rare, and it is not safe to compare oneself to rare cases when one is not oneself rare, but instead sometimes one of the many. **283** 30

He has said how we should exercise, beginning with little things, in order to disdain the reduction in our money and possessions, for the sake of our own progress. Now he introduces the example of servants, showing how if we begin with little things we can exercise ourselves to disdain their unhelpfulness without being disturbed by it. He says that we should sketch out in advance the impression that 'when the slave-boy is called he may not answer, or may answer but not do' what he was ordered. And we should possess in advance the conception that 'he is not so well off' (i.e. he does not hold such sway over our own judgment) that my being disturbed is up to him. For it is mostly sudden and unexpected things that disturb students in the beginning and drive them out of themselves and make them forget their ethical disposition. Whereas considering things in advance makes us sober and remember,²²¹ and prepares us through habituation for difficulties in our impressions and expectations. It is clear to everyone how great a difference there is between how these things are received by someone who has been prepared and someone unprepared. This applies not only to painful things but also to pleasant things that we encounter unexpectedly. The painful ones all at once compress and contract our impressions, and along with them the compound of body and spirit.²²² The pleasant ones all at once diffuse and divert and dissipate our tension,²²³ so that in both cases, even though they are opposites, in a way the same symptoms follow: fainting, chills and frequently exhaustion that verges on death. 50

Those parts are clear. But Epictetus exhorts us to repeat *after* the reduction of our other possessions 'That is the price of freedom from emotions.' 'That is the price of freedom from disturbance.' 'Nothing comes for free.' **284** Whereas in the case of the servants, he exhorts us to 'keep in mind *in advance*', while calling the servant, that he won't always answer you, or may answer and not do what was ordered. So here it is right to understand both injunctions as applying to both cases. For you should also sketch the reduction of your possessions in advance, and expect it in advance; and, after the servant has failed to answer you, or to do what you ordered, you should also repeat 'That is the price of freedom from emotions.' 'That is the price of freedom from disturbance.' 'Nothing comes for free.' But perhaps it was because he used as his example a rather trivial thing, 50,1 10

20 i.e. the spilling of oil or theft of wine, that he thought these would not require advance preparation, and that speaking after the fact would be sufficient. Perhaps too because he thought that, because it involves small things, the comparison is adequate to move the soul, given that for the price of cheap cast-off oil and wine it is possible for anyone who wishes to, to get freedom from emotions and disturbance – and not just a one-time freedom, but the sort of freedom that is a state – provided that one conducts the purchase well. After all, who wouldn't trade 'bronze for gold', like Homer's Diomedes?²²⁴ What sensible person wouldn't purchase the soul's greatest goods by casting off
30 externals, or sometimes not casting them off, when it suffices to be prepared to cast them off with indifference?

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 13 (= Lemmata xix-xx): If you wish to make progress, get used to seeming foolish and silly in your attitude to external things: don't want to seem to understand anything. And should you seem to some people to be someone, distrust yourself. For you must understand that it is not easy to preserve your prohairesis in accordance with nature, as well as keeping watch over external things: in fact it is absolutely inevitable that anyone concerned with one neglects the other.]

xix: If you wish to make progress, get used to seeming foolish and silly in your attitude to external things ...

[Commentary on Chapter 13, Lemma xix]

Many of us are seriously concerned with external things not just for the sake of providing necessities, but also so as not to seem **285** to others to be someone inactive or foolish. So he opposes this impression, too, by advising the student who wishes to make progress not to give himself over to external things, having neglected the internal, on its account. After all, it is surely a ridiculous thing to be found genuinely foolish for the sake of not being thought foolish by foolish people. And
40 this practice – accustoming ourselves not to want to live by what the foolish think, and not to pay attention to how they are disposed toward us, but instead to govern our own affairs by looking to right reason and following the judgment of those who live in accordance with it²²⁵ – this practice contributes greatly to the creation of a life in accordance with nature, a life that befits a rational animal: the human being in us.

xx: Don't want to seem to understand anything. And should you seem to some people to be someone, distrust yourself.

[Commentary on Chapter 13, Lemma xx]

There is much talk in Epictetus of turning the soul of the student into itself at the most appropriate time in his education. So, since it is not

just concern with external things that drags the soul towards them, but even more so excitement over vain reputation (which even disturbs more sophisticated people who have made a degree of progress), he admonishes us to cut this out at its roots. When he says 'Don't want to seem to understand anything', he is not obstructing our pursuit of understanding, but choking off the desire for seeming to understand. For this desire weakens the soul and **286** drags it towards external things: it not only prepares the soul to live for the many rather than for itself, but also prevents a soul satisfied by their appraisal from journeying towards the simplicity of understanding. 50
51,1

He was right not to say 'Don't seem to understand anything', but rather 'Don't want to seem to understand anything', because the reputation we have is not our own, or up to us, whereas wanting is our own work. Hence, since we often have a reputation among some people even if we don't want to, on these occasions, he says, 'Distrust yourself.' For this helps us not to direct ourselves by the judgment of the many, and not to obstruct our progress by our satisfaction with that judgment. But it is clear that distrust of yourself over fine beliefs about you is fitting for people who are still students: a person who has understanding doesn't need to distrust himself because he is able to judge himself carefully and correctly. (One may get a reputation not just for 'understanding', but also for being temperate or just or brave, or for having wisdom, or in general any virtue or political power or extraordinary honour among men. He includes all these and other such sources of reputation in the simple noun 'someone' when he says 'And should you seem to some people to be *someone*.') 10
20

Finally, in what remains, he adduces a conclusion from both what he says here and what he said previously about concern for externals: that it is not easy for the student both to maintain his prohairesis in accordance with nature and to strive after external things, such as money or possessions or reputation.²²⁶ For the preservation of prohairesis in its state in accordance with nature consists in serious concern for what is up to us and contempt for what is not up to us, while concentration on external things induces the opposite. So it's not easy for the student to do both. (He was careful not to say 'it is impossible' but 'it is not easy', owing to the rare natures and activities of souls capable of great deeds.)²²⁷ 'In fact,' he says, 'it is inevitable that' if you perform right actions in one area, you will completely 'neglect the other.' 30

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 14 (= Lemmata xxi-xxii): If you wish your children and your wife and your friends to live forever, you're a fool because you wish things that aren't up to you to be up to you and alien things to be your own. Likewise, if you wish your slave not to go wrong, you're an idiot because you wish vice

not to be vice but something else. But if you wish not to fail to attain what you desire, this you can do. So practise what you can do.

Whoever has the power to bring about or remove what is wished or not wished by someone is the controller of that person. So anyone who wants to be free should not wish for or shun anything that's up to other people. Otherwise he will inevitably be a slave.] **287**

xxi: If you wish your children and your wife and your friends to live²²⁸, you're a fool ...

[Commentary on Chapter 14, Lemma xxi]

The things that are worth serious concern are, first, those that can be correctly performed (since anyone concerned with those that can't be is foolish), and, secondly, what pertains to the person concerned (since busying oneself with what is not our own is pointless). And a third thing worth serious concern is that the things one pursues have a certain value and possess security and firmness. Who in his right mind is seriously concerned with trivial things not worth concern, with rotten things? So since he wants to turn the student away from serious concern with external things, he demonstrates that they are alien as well by means of the division between what is up to us and not up to us, which he introduced in the beginning of the work. For he has shown that anything that is not our own is not up to us. But someone who wants his children and wife and friends to live, wants and is seriously concerned for one of the things that are not up to us, something which, by the same token, we are unable to bring about completely by ourselves. (We cannot bring about completely by ourselves things we do not control, because giving it to us belongs to those who control it.) External things, then, are by nature trivial, rotten, and easily lost. After all, mortal things necessarily perish when their fate arrives.

Likewise, someone who occasionally demands that his servant be better than himself (something which often happens to those of us who get upset at the errors of our servants) is an idiot, he says, for wishing for the impossible. **288** For it is impossible for a soul living in accordance with what is irrational in itself (the vice of the soul) not to act disorderly or to produce the activities appropriate to vice. So anyone seriously concerned with what is impossible, not our own, easily lost, and insecure will inevitably fail to attain it, and be distressed and complain in their failure. So if we want not to fail, our concern must be for what is up to us – and what is up to us is to desire what is appropriate to us in accordance with our nature. So we should expend our concern on this, and not on external things.

xxii: Whoever has the power to bring about or remove what is wished or not wished by someone is the controller of that person ...

[Commentary on Chapter 14, Lemma xxii]

This sentence is another condemnation of external things and of the attraction of souls towards them. We don't just suffer and complain on that account (when we fail to attain what we desire or encounter what we avoid), we are also forcibly enslaved – and not just to one, but to many and sometimes bitter masters. As he says, the controller and master of each person is whoever has the power to bring about or remove what that person wishes or desires. For we are subservient, subordinate and minister slavishly to those who are able to provide desirable things, to get them to provide us with them; and we flatter in fear those able to remove what we have. We tremble at and fawn on anyone as a master if he has the power to induce what we are avoiding, **289** (to stop him inducing it), or if he is able to remove what we have (to stop him removing it). It is clear, then, that everything others have the power to bring about or remove is external and alien to us. For we ourselves are the controllers of our own things – and *they* are up to us. So if freedom is good and we want to be free rather than slaves, we should neither desire any of the things up to other people nor avoid them. 'Otherwise we will inevitably be slaves' in various ways, in our efforts to attain what we desire and not be deprived of it, and in our efforts to avoid what we shun and not encounter it. 20
30
40

Notice that in each case we have two masters, one of them internal and one external. For when irrational desire vanquishes reason – that is, ourselves,²²⁹ the human beings whose essence is in accordance with it – and takes it as a prisoner of war, reason is thereafter enslaved along with it to the external master, with the result that *we* are not just slaves, but slaves of slaves. Further, the other slaves are sometimes separated from their masters, if only in their dreams, and get some let-up from them; but we minister to the unlicensed, unjust and savage commands of these harsh masters even in our dreams, and have no let-up at all when we submit to them – rather, we are stung by them, sometimes in our deeds, sometimes in our words, sometimes in our impressions.²³⁰ And what is still worse is that slaves of the more moderate sort minister with reluctance to the bizarre instructions of their masters, whereas we join in their pleasure and contrive means for obtaining or avoiding what they can never order without harm or disaster. 50
53,1

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 15 (= Lemma xxiii): Remember that you must behave as if you were at a dinner-party. Something passed around comes to you: hold out your hand and take it politely. It

goes past you: don't hold onto it. It hasn't yet reached you: don't project your desire, but wait until it comes to you. Behave like this towards your children, towards your wife, towards political office, towards wealth, and you will be fit to dine with the gods some day. If you don't even take what is offered to you, but disdain it, you won't just be a fellow-diner with the gods then, but a fellow-ruler. It was by acting like this that Diogenes and Heraclitus and their likes were rightly called divine, and were so.] **290**

xxiii: Remember that you must behave as if you were at a dinner-party. Something passed around ...

[Commentary on Chapter 15, Lemma xxiii]

Now he has reined in his students' inclination towards external things in many ways, he tells us which of them we should partake of and how, to prevent us thinking that he was warning us off them entirely. Earlier²³¹ he had said that we should partake of necessities and things that are useful in other ways for life as incidental to the journey and always subordinate to the sailing; now, he says that it is right to take politely those we are given – both children and political office and wealth and other such things – but not to reach out for them with desire. Rather, if the things we get are taken away (this is what 'It goes past you' indicates, I think), 'don't hold onto it', he says – i.e. don't try to force them to remain or get upset at their removal. But if 'it hasn't reached you' yet, don't desire them or become wholly fixated on them in your passionate desires and impressions, forgetting both yourself and your own progress. And when they are given to you, don't reach out for them exultantly and raveningly with your whole self, but partake of them in a polite and measured way, with your finger tip, as they say,²³² so that you can rule over them and use them as you ought: as someone who transcends them and is not overwhelmed by them.

He compared the collecting of the people brought together by God²³³ in the same place to a dinner party, **291** with Him as host, and them as guests partaking of each of the dishes distributed by Him according to their own desires. One of them does so politely, in accordance with both his own nature and the intention of the host, so that he really seems to be a fellow-diner of the host;²³⁴ another partakes indiscriminately and carelessly, in a manner both unsuitable for himself and inappropriate to the host.

But, he says, 'if you don't take' one of the external things treasured by most people, even when it is offered, 'but disdain it', as Crates did, and Diogenes – (after all, when Alexander asked the latter 'What do you want?', he said 'You to stand out of the way of the sun!' because he was sunbathing at the time. Alexander was so impressed by the

man's greatness of spirit that he prayed to become like Diogenes if it was possible, and if not, to remain Alexander).²³⁵ – Well, he says that anyone who doesn't take them, even when they are offered, but disdains them and ascends to an exalted life that transcends the realm of generation, becomes 'not just a fellow-diner with the gods but also a fellow-ruler'. For the forethought of the gods for the realm of generation makes those who dwell in it in accordance with their intention part of their own household: their very transcendence and superiority to the whole (since what rules properly speaking transcends what is ruled) invites the souls that imitate them to rule along with the gods. Then they 'circle the heavens',²³⁶ joining in the governance of the universe without being subordinated within it. For this reason he says that those who disdain these things, 'Heraclitus and Diogenes, were, and were rightly called, divine.' For people who conduct their lives in accordance with what is highest and transcendent in them are indeed divine, since the highest in every respect is divine (because God is the summit of everything).

50

54,1

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 16 (= Lemma xxiv): When you see someone weeping in grief because their child is away or they have lost their possessions, be careful not to be grabbed by the impression that these external situations he is in are bad. Rather, have immediately ready the thought that 'What is crushing him isn't the event (since it doesn't crush another) but his belief about it.' But, within reason, don't hesitate to be carried along with him, or even groan along with him, if it comes to that. Just be careful that you don't groan from inside yourself.] **292**

xxiv: When you see someone weeping in grief because their child is away or they have lost their possessions, be careful not to be grabbed by the impression that these external situations he is in are bad ...

[Commentary on Chapter 16, Lemma xxiv]

In the case of external things that seem choice-worthy, you should not be eager for them or desire them; you should realise that, whatever they may be like, our good is not in them. Likewise, you must be careful with external things that seem worth avoiding, since what is bad for us does not lie in external things either. Hence, he says, 'when you see someone weeping, either because his child' is dead or 'away, or his possessions are lost', don't let the impression that he is in a bad external situation grab you. What is bad for us is not in external things, just as what is good for us is not in external things either. So how could the event be crushing this person, who is weeping as though it were bad? The event is not like that in its nature, since otherwise it would crush everyone to whom it happened, just as fire,

10

20 which is hot by nature, heats everyone who touches it. When Anaxagoras heard that his son had died, he said calmly and with great spirit, ‘I knew that I had given birth to a mortal.’²³⁷ So what is it that crushes this person? It is his belief that the event is bad: that is what crushes him. But belief belongs to us; so what crushes him is something genuinely bad, though this is not in the external things, but in what is up to us: having this or that belief about events.

But now what follows? Is a reasonable person supposed to be unsympathetic to people feeling crushed, and to ignore them because he condemns their belief? Not at all; **293** rather, he is supposed to go
30 along with them and be accommodating²³⁸ to a certain degree by both speaking a sympathetic word, and even groaning along with him if it is necessary, not pretending to – for pretence is not fitting for the reasonable person – but groaning at human weakness (the kind of thing he considers worth groaning about). But he must be careful how far his accommodation goes, lest he too be led in his sympathy to groan at the event from inside himself; otherwise he won’t be able to help the griever any more. For someone who intends to help with the emotion and drag the griever back from it must be accommodating to
40 a certain degree, while remaining securely anchored himself. After all, someone remaining entirely on his own ground won’t be able to snatch up a person being swept away by a flood, any more than someone who is completely caught up in it along with him. The one who stands completely aloof won’t persuade the person suffering the emotion, because he seems to be unsympathetic; while the other one needs help himself, because he too is worsted by the emotion.

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 17 (= Lemma xxv): Remember that you are an actor in a play whose script is whatever the director wishes: if he wishes it short, your play is short; if long, long; if he wishes you to act a beggar, remember to act even this part appropriately; so too the part of a lame man, a ruler, a private citizen. Your job is to act the part given to you well; selecting it is someone else’s.]

xxv: Remember that you are an actor in a play whose script is whatever the director wishes ...

[Commentary on Chapter 17, Lemma xxv]

Earlier²³⁹ he likened our behaviour here and our partaking in externals to a dinner-party, and he took the God who offers them to be our host. This refers to the times when we are in control of taking or not
50 taking what is offered: through this image he educated both our desire (by showing what state it should be in) and our choice with respect to present, past and future externals, because in **294** dinner-

parties as well each person partakes or doesn't partake of what he is offered in accordance with his own choice.

But now he likens life to a stage, and the people who dwell in it to the actors in a play, and indicates that God is the director and producer of the play, referring to the times when taking or not taking what we are assigned is not up to us. Many of the things that come from fate are such that one must simply take them, of necessity. Even if it is up to us not to take wealth, it's still not completely up to us to avoid poverty or illness; and even if it is up to us not to be masters or rulers, it's still not up to us not to be enslaved or ruled. So for these things it's their use that is up to us: our good or bad in these things is not in having desired them or not, or taking them or not, as he was saying earlier, but rather our good or bad disposition consists in our use of them, which is up to us. For being ill well, or being poor well, and, quite generally our use of things, is up to us, whether we took them in accordance with choice or accepted them by necessity. On the stage, it is the function of the director of the play to select each of the actors for a suitable role in the play – for a king or slave or madman like Orestes – when he has examined the character of its roles and of the actors, while acting his assigned role well is the function of the actor selected for it. For this reason a slave or beggar or madman in a play is often well-received, and a wealthy man or general or king poorly received, when the former act their given roles well, and the latter badly – because one group has performed what was up to them well, the other badly. It's just like this in life, too. After all, wasn't Epictetus, the poor, lame slave, **295** preferred over most of the rich, the healthy and kings, both by God, the director and writer, and by the spectators in life, because he acted his given role well and in accordance with the intention of the writer? For he governed what was up to him well – and this is what the human good and bad consists in, and what is praised and blamed by sensible people.

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 18 (= Lemma xxvi): When a crow croaks inauspiciously, don't let the impression grab you. Instead, make this distinction for yourself right away, saying: 'None of these cries signifies anything for me, but only for my little body or my little possessions or my little reputation or my children or my wife. Everything is a sign of something auspicious for me, if I wish it, because whatever results from these cries, it's up to me to be benefited by it.']

xxvi: When a crow croaks inauspiciously, don't let the impression grab you ...

[Commentary on Chapter 18, Lemma xxvi]

I think this chapter would have been in the appropriate position if it had been placed before what has just been said, but after the chapter

40 before that (beginning ‘When you see someone weeping in grief’).²⁴⁰ For he said in the latter chapter that one shouldn’t join in the emotion of people who think that they are in a bad situation owing to the removal of some external thing, or, as a result of being caught up with them, think that such a person is in a bad situation, given that the existence of our good and bad depends on what is up to us. Now he says, even if a bird or sign or prophecy of some sort seems to signify bad things for you, don’t be caught up in this way either, but instead realise that your good and bad is up to you, by distinguishing yourself from your body and external things. So if you don’t wish to be in a bad situation, the bad things signified won’t be signified for you, but only for your little body or petty reputation, or wealth, or children or wife. Whereas everything is a sign of something auspicious for you, if you wish it, because your good and bad is up to you. At any rate, it is possible for you to be benefited from bad-seeming situations concerning external things; and **296** the worse they seem, the more you can be benefited from them, if you behave well in them. And yet, if these things were bad for you, they would have harmed you rather than benefited you. So if it is possible for you to benefit from them, and if nothing bad will happen to you, if you don’t wish it, then the things signified as bad for you are not bad for you either, if you wish it so, but only for one of the things connected to you.

50

56,1

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 19 (= Lemmata xxvii-xxviii): You can be unbeatable if you never descend to a competition that is not up to you to win. See to it that when you see someone being honoured or enjoying great power or esteem, you don’t congratulate them, grabbed by this impression. For if the existence of the good is really in what is up to us, there is no room for jealousy or envy. And as for you, you don’t wish to be a general or senator or consul, but to be free. But there is only one road to this: contempt for what is not up to us.]

xxvii: You can be unbeatable if you never descend to a competition that is not up to you to win ...

[Commentary on Chapter 19, Lemma xxvii]

10 He has said that nothing is a sign of anything bad for you if you don’t wish it to be, so that it is up to you not to be in a bad situation. I think he hints at the cause and proof of this in the part that he now adds on.²⁴¹ It is up to you never to take a chance on external things and compete, either by desiring or avoiding them (and those are the things where you will inevitably be worsted at some point, either by not attaining what you desire or by encountering what you avoid). Instead, you can occupy yourself only with things that are up to you (and these are where you control never failing in your desires or aversions),

which is the same as saying that you are never worsted but always unbeatable. Given this, it's clear that it is also up to you never to be in a bad situation. For the person who gets into a bad situation is worsted by the bad. But if it is up to you never to get into a bad situation, it will be up to you never to have anything bad signified for you. So it was correctly said that nothing bad is signified for you, unless you wish it so, that is, unless you descend to a competition that is not up to you to win – i.e., unless you define your good and bad by external things. **297**

20

xxviii: See to it that when you see someone being honoured or enjoying great power or esteem, you don't congratulate them, grabbed by this impression.

[Commentary on Chapter 19, Lemma xxviii]

He has said that the person who does not descend to competition over what is not up to us is unbeatable. Since the thing that most of all attracts us to such competitions is the example of those who seem to be happy²⁴² in them, along with our envy and jealousy towards those people, he now gives a concise proof that no one seeking the human good is ever jealous or envious towards them. For if the human good consists in things that are up to us, but people who have honour or power or reputation amongst the many have something that is not up to us, it's clear that such people don't have any good befitting a human being. So what kind of room could there be for jealousy or envy towards such people? After all, jealousy is distress at another's good, while envy is a seething wish²⁴³ for becoming equal to someone who is regarded as good. These emotions arise from the fact that all human beings by nature have a desire to be honoured and not to fall below their peers. For this reason, those who lack intensity in their nature and don't have the power to make progress themselves want to equal or surpass their neighbours by pulling them down, and are grieved at their neighbours' doing well – which is jealousy. For 'jealousy creeps towards people doing well'²⁴⁴ or seeming to do well, and happens most of all among close peers, whether in noble ancestry or career or fortune. (No one is jealous of anyone who is very superior or very inferior to themselves, because no one even competes with such people.) Those who have a degree of intensity,²⁴⁵ on the other hand, are hotly stirred towards becoming **298** equal or even surpassing the people with whom they are competing, by dint of their own progress. For this reason jealousy is always a base emotion, while envy is good and akin to love of the good when its object is virtue, but bad and co-ordinate with jealousy when its object is an external thing.

30

40

50

57,1

If, then, jealousy and envy are directed toward things qua good, but honour and power and reputation – the things that seem good to the many – are not goods, given that the good is in what is up to us, it is

10 clear that there is no room at all for jealousy and envy aimed at these things. In that case, the student shouldn't locate his good in such things by being jealous or envying people who are happy in them, because he should desire freedom, the freedom from the emotions within himself (which are irrational children),²⁴⁶ not something external. But only one road leads to freedom, he says: contempt for what is not up to us. Among the latter are found slavery and being worsted, since it is in these that we fail to attain what we desire and encounter what we avoid; these are the objects of desire of our irrational emotions, and it's from these objects that the emotions gain their tyranny
20 over us. Thus our contempt for externals also has the effect of depriving these desires of their allies (since the desires are akin to their external objects),²⁴⁷ and in that way we subordinate the desires to reason.

[*Encheiridion* Chapters 20 & 21 (= Lemma xxix): Remember that it isn't the person insulting you, or the person hitting you, that abuses you, but the belief that these people are abusing you. So when someone provokes you, you should realise that it is your belief that has provoked you. Therefore make it your first effort not to be grabbed by that impression; for should you once find time and practice, you will easily master yourself.

[21] Let death and exile and everything that appears terrible be before your eyes every day (death above all), and you will never have any humiliating thoughts or desire anything too much.]

xxix: Remember that it isn't the person insulting you, or the person hitting you, that abuses you, but your belief about these people, that they are abusing you ...

[Commentary on Chapters 20 & 21, Lemma xxix]

After ridiculing the goods thought to be in the externals again, and saying that the only road to freedom is contempt for what is not up to us, **299** he dissolves an objection to these views, whether expressed in words or just thoroughly disturbing the conceptions of beginning students, taking as his starting point the very principles of their education. The objection states that by despising externals and on
30 that account remaining trivial and powerless, we will suffer many bad things at the hands of those who are superior to us (i.e. if we neither have power nor choose to flatter those who do). For they insult us and hit us and abuse us in every way, and take away what we have and exile us and in the end sometimes even kill us. But in answer to this he says that none of these things is terrible – otherwise they would have appeared terrible to everyone –, but that what is terrible is our
40 belief that they are terrible. The result is that it isn't their doing these

things that abuses us either, but our belief that we are abused. But the belief or supposition about this is our own doing – so we abuse ourselves. Whereas abuse itself is neither terrible nor worth getting upset about, as is clear from the following fact: it is either true or false. And if it is true, what is there to get upset about when we are hearing the truth? Why do we get upset at hearing about these things, but not when we do them? And if it's false, it's the liar who is harmed.

So what should we do against this? Don't get grabbed, he says, by the impression that you have been abused, and cry out or moan because you think you are in a bad situation, but rather give yourself the opportunity to investigate what kind of event it is. For should you find some time and practice, you won't be grabbed by the unexpected; you will be undisturbed and also have the opportunity to deploy the principles of your education, by distinguishing whether the event is something up to us or something not up to us. And if you find that it is something not up to us, you will conclude that it is neither a good nor a bad of ours, and that it is up to us to use it as a good and be benefited by it, by spitting **300** on it with great spirit. But in addition to not being grabbed by it, what helps the most is to get accustomed to being silent when something of this kind happens until we perceive that our seething inside has calmed down and the dog within us no longer barks.²⁴⁸ At any rate, it is said that even Socrates, if he ever did become angry, would be completely silent.²⁴⁹

What follows ought to be joined to these words, I think; and perhaps we should even understand a connective particle joining them, reading: 'And let death and exile and everything that appears terrible be before your eyes every day', etc. For first he gave a general argument about everything external that befalls us and seems terrible, showing that none of these things is terrible or abusive or harmful, but that it is our belief about them that abuses and harms us. Then he added this helpful method against insulting words and blows and such things (to prevent our being angered by them or becoming dispirited because of them): not getting grabbed by the impression. Then he provides another helpful method against exile and death and the more terrible of such circumstances: not to ignore such things, but rather to expect them continually as things that will happen some time. For if reason proves that the externals are neither good nor bad, while practice with the impression in some way gives us a nature to be disposed towards them as we are towards ordinary events, we won't quail at what seems terrible or have excessive desires for what seems pleasant.

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 22 (= Lemma xxx): If you desire philosophy, then start getting ready to be laughed at and mocked by lots of people. They will say 'All of a sudden he has turned philosopher

on us,' and 'Where did that profound look come from?' Well, don't try to look profound. But as for what appears best to you, you should stick to this as tightly as if you were assigned to that position by God. And remember that if you stick with the same views, the people who formerly laughed at you will later admire you, while if you are worsted by them, you will attract their laughter twice over.] **301**

xxx: If you desire philosophy, then start getting ready to be laughed at ...

[Commentary on Chapter 22, Lemma xxx]

Throughout all the various advice we have seen so far, he has been addressing every human being, just in so far as they are human beings, and exhorting them to stand aside from external things and foolish excitement over them, as alien properties, and to seek for the good and bad in themselves, as is fitting for self-determined animals that are in control of their choice and impulses. But from this point on, he talks mostly as if addressing people who desire philosophy and have already made a degree of progress. And he immediately makes
 40 secure the first stage of their desire, by enumerating the things which usually happen to such people in the first stage so these things don't disturb or undermine their ethical disposition²⁵⁰ by occurring unexpectedly. For most people tend to take offence at those who want to turn their backs on the normal way of life. Sometimes they laugh at them and ridicule them because they don't realise that they themselves are worse off – and this is particularly so with close acquaintances – , but sometimes they even reproach them for being
 50 undeservedly elated, both because they are angry with them, and because, being jealous, they want to stamp out their enthusiasm. And indeed, many students are worsted by such laughter, mockery and reproaches, and so leave the ranks,²⁵¹ turning back to their previous habits. ('Mockery' is turning up one's nose, or the disparagement
 59,1 achieved by that sort of expression.²⁵²) For other students, matters go so far as to include not just laughter, mockery and reproaches **302** but also danger and threats, both to themselves and to those who work with them for a proper education: some at the hands of their family, owing to their sympathetic concern that they will be useless in life, others from outsiders, whether because they are jealous at the superiority of their better life, or because they are angry at the disdain shown for them and for their style of life.

It does actually happen that some of the people who have caught
 10 the desire for philosophy and the good life owing to some natural talent and good fortune, but who have not yet been possessed by it, but are merely at the stage of having an expectation of it and the impression of its superiority with respect to other ways of life, become

elated as though they already have it – which is the result of their not having it!²⁵³ For nothing is so alien to philosophy and the good life as ‘looking profound’ and that empty elation which fails to consider the admonition of the God, ‘Know thyself!’ – which is the beginning and the end of all philosophy and good living. So people who become elated immediately appear unworthy of these achievements. Their elation doesn’t come from the magnitude of their soul, but is a vain swelling, both bursting out contrary to nature towards external things and pushing aside internal things. Whereas the healthy magnitude of soul, as in the case of the body, follows the natural disposition of the internal things; hence it both arises evenly through the whole, and continually preserves the comparison of external to internal things. 20

So he advises those who desire philosophy to guard against this emotion as something hated by men and as well as an easy and deserved cause of attacks on its possessors. And he advises them, while purifying themselves of it, not to pay attention to the laughter, mockery and reproaches of people who don’t know what a human being is or what is fitting for such a nature, but instead **303** to stick firmly with their choice of the better life, as if they were assigned to this life by God.²⁵⁴ Philosophy is after all the greatest of the gifts from God to men.²⁵⁵ Indeed, the people who laugh at us themselves make this plain when they say ‘All of a sudden he has turned philosopher on us’: it’s because they have a great conception of philosophy that they ridicule us as unworthy of it. They will make it even more plain if we preserve our ethical disposition²⁵⁶ in its gentle and measured state to the end: for the very same people will admire the beauty and magnitude of philosophy when they see it in the person they previously laughed at. 40

But if you are worsted by their laughter, he says, and so undo your ethical disposition and return to your former ways, you will then ‘attract twice as much laughter’. For if you had made progress and become admired by the people who laughed at you, then the original laughter would have been nothing to you, and it would have turned back on those who laughed at you. But if you are worsted by them, you now become worthy of their earlier laughter too, by attempting to take up the ‘club along with the dancing-shoe’²⁵⁷ – i.e. to approach philosophy along with a trivial and negligent style of life. And, in deserting the post to which you were assigned, you deservedly draw upon yourself the second round of laughter, since you were driven from your post by such pathetic enemies – by laughter, and mockery and things of that sort. So anyone who is worsted by the laughter of the unjust and foolish really will attract twice as much laughter – and this laughter will be justified and pleasing to sensible people – even though it would have been nothing to him, **304** had he preserved his ethical disposition. But since he didn’t preserve it, he drew upon himself laughter which is now deserved and sensible. 50, 60, 1

10 These precepts are sufficient to help souls that are not entirely enervated to guard their better dispositions²⁵⁸ in every way. For he makes even our desire for honour with respect to fine things our souls' ally, and this adds sufficient tension²⁵⁹ to reason and is purified for it when we don't love honour and those who honour us simply for their own sakes, setting it up as an external good, but make it a sign of our possession of something good and worthy of honour. For this reason one shouldn't accept honour from just any old person, but only from sensible people, in whose testimony it is safe to trust.

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 23 (= Lemma xxxi): If you ever happen to have turned yourself outward towards desiring to please someone, you must realise that you have lost your disposition. So be satisfied with being a philosopher in all circumstances; and if you also want to seem one, appear one to yourself and you will be able to do it.]

xxxi: If you ever happen to have turned yourself outward towards desiring to please someone, you must realise that you have lost your disposition ...

[Commentary on Chapter 23, Lemma xxxi]

20 He has said that you must stick to what seems best as if you²⁶⁰ were assigned to that position by God, and that if you stick with what you rightly decided, the very people who previously laughed at you will admire you, but if you are worsted, you will attract twice as much laughter. Here he adds to this the more general point that turning away from oneself towards what is outside in order to please someone undoes the philosophical disposition (the disposition that aims to turn to oneself and the superior beings). 'So be satisfied', he says, 'with being a philosopher in all circumstances', that is, with being a good person. But if just being it does not satisfy you, but you also want your good to become evident – given that real goods and beauties shine out, and someone would have greater confidence that he is good if **305** his goodness should also be manifest – even in that case, he says, don't reach out for the external or the many (who aren't anyhow worthy judges of such things), but 'appear one to yourself', and that is sufficient.²⁶¹ For if you are already a philosopher – and it is to such people that he's making this point – you will preserve your ethical disposition by having turned to yourself, and also have in yourself a better judge of yourself than the many.

40 Notice the difference between the point of this sort he made earlier to the beginning student and the one he makes now to someone who already has the desire to be a philosopher. For there²⁶² he said 'don't want to seem to understand anything' at all, since that student wanted at all costs to seem knowledgeable to people outside, because

he was excited by that kind of reputation and not yet a trustworthy judge of himself. Whereas here, since this student is more ready to turn towards himself and desires to seem good as a sign of being good, he said accordingly: 'Be satisfied with being' it. But if you also wish to seem it and are moreover able to be the judge of yourself, 'appear one to yourself', he says, and that is sufficient.

Perhaps this chapter has another function too? For this wonderful man seems to me to use his words so carefully that when he says something that can be misconstrued, he immediately corrects the misconstruction. Earlier on he had said 'If you stick with the same views, the people who formerly laughed at you will later admire you, while if you are worsted by them, you will attract twice as much laughter.'²⁶³ This made it seem that he had made the reader dependent on external judgements, so he therefore reins him in from externals and from appraisal at the hands of people outside, which drags the soul outside and sullies it, **306** and he leads him back to his own appraisal of himself, which is purer and no longer pointless, but rather provides some use. For to seem to be good to sensible judges really is sufficient evidence of being good. And it was with a view to this, I think, that he said 'appear one to yourself, and that is sufficient'. 50
61,1
10

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 24 (= Lemma xxxii):

(§1) Don't let these reflections oppress you: 'I will live without honour, and be no one at all.' Look, if lack of honour is bad, you can't be in a bad situation on account of someone else, any more than in a shameful one. So perhaps it's your job to achieve power or to be invited to a banquet? Not at all. In that case, how is this still a lack of honour? And how will you be no one at all, when you should be someone only in what is up to you, where you can be someone of the greatest worth?

(§2) But your friends will go without your help, you say? What do you mean 'without your help'? They won't get any small change from you; and you won't make them Roman citizens. But who told you that these things are up to us rather than other people's work? And who can give to someone else what he doesn't have himself?

(§3) 'In that case you should get rich,' your friend says, 'so that we can have some money!' If I can get it while keeping myself respectful, trustworthy, and great-spirited, show me the way and I will get it. But if you think it's right that I should lose my own goods so that you will be provided with things that aren't goods, look how unfair and inconsiderate you are being! What do you want more – money or a trustworthy and respectful friend? Then help me towards this instead, and stop thinking it

right for me to do what will lose me these goods.

(§4) ‘But the country,’ he says, ‘will be without help so far as depends on me.’ Again, what kind of help is this? It won’t have a portico on your account, or baths, you say? And so what? It doesn’t have shoes on account on the blacksmith or weapons on account of the cobbler either. But it’s sufficient if each person fulfills his own job. And if you provided it with another trustworthy and respectful citizen, wouldn’t you be benefiting it at all? ‘Yes.’ So you wouldn’t be useless to it yourself, then, either. ‘Then what place will I have in the city?’ The one you can achieve while keeping that trustworthy and respectful person around. But if you throw away these goods in your desire to benefit it, what use would you be to it when you’ve become shameless and untrustworthy?]

xxxii: Don’t let these reflections oppress you: ‘I will live without honour, and be no one at all.’²⁶⁴

[Commentary on Chapter 24, Lemma xxxii]

Among those who are turning towards the care of themselves, different groups are distracted²⁶⁵ by different things, and make objections on these grounds to themselves and the people exhorting them to something better. Students only now starting to be educated, because they are still in a low and worthless condition, say: ‘If I neglect my affairs, I shall have nothing to live on; if I don’t punish my slave-boy, he will turn out bad.’²⁶⁶ But students who have already made some degree of progress spit on such thoughts as petty: they have confidence that they won’t be so useless for every job that they will perish from starvation. Instead, they are distracted by the thought that it is both good and honorable to fulfill one’s appropriate actions.²⁶⁷ What these people desire is honour (of a purer sort), and they avoid lack of honour, and want to help their friends and country. So it’s on these grounds that they bring the objections which Epictetus now dissolves by going through them all properly. **307**

He starts by addressing the common objection derived from lack of honour, which says that by withdrawing from externals and the market-place (in which, as Homer puts it, ‘men become excellent’)²⁶⁸ ‘I will live without honour, and be no one at all’. He resolves it by arguing, in effect, like this. Lack of honour is bad. What is bad is up to us, just as the good is. What is up to us couldn’t be in us on account of or by means of someone else, or it would no longer be called ‘up to us’. So lack of honour, when it exists, is up to us and in us, whether people outside fail to honour us or not; so we shouldn’t fear lack of honour from other people, or consider it a lack of honour at all, given that lacking honour, because it is bad, is up to us.

But let’s look now at the truth of the premisses assumed here. Lack

of honour, he says, is bad. For if the good is honourable, as we all agree, then what is without honour, and lack of honour, will be bad – since if it were good it would be honourable rather than without honour. Further, if honour is good, given that it befits all the good (for honour, qua good, befits both God and superior beings and good human beings), it is clear that lack of honour will be bad – for if the opposite quality belongs to one of two opposite things, its opposite will belong to the other. But lack of honour is opposite to honour, and bad to good. Now, since we are self-determined, our good and bad is up to us and our prohairesis, and nothing that doesn't come about according to our prohairesis is a good or bad of ours – that has already been shown before, I think, and there's no need to repeat it here.²⁶⁹ So if lack of honour is up to us and in us when it exists, we won't be without honour on account of **308** externals, even if we utterly disdain them. For if achieving power or being invited to council or to a banquet isn't up to us, not achieving these things won't be bad for us – and so it won't be a lack of honour, either, given that lacking honour is bad. 50 62,1 10

But what does he mean by saying 'you can't be in a bad situation on account of someone else, any more than a shameful one'? This little point is certainly expressed in a rather difficult way. But it looks like he wants to prove that one can't be in a bad situation on account of someone else, from the fact that one can't be in a shameful situation on account of someone else, taking the latter to be more obvious. For just as the fine is more obvious than the good (although the fine arises from its hidden unity²⁷⁰ with the good), and hence the fine charms, entices and invites people towards it, and implants in everyone the love of turning towards it – so the shameful is also more obvious and evident than the bad.²⁷¹ Now, by 'shameful' is meant making use of pleasure beyond what is fitting; and this happens in accordance with our prohairesis and not on account of someone else, since feeling pleasure is a motion of our own. So it's clear that one can't be in a shameful situation on account of someone else.²⁷² So if: 20

[1] one can't be in a shameful situation on account of someone else, and yet:

[2] one can no more be in a bad situation on account of someone else than a shameful one on account of someone else;
then it's clear that:

[3] it's not possible to be in a bad situation on account of someone else either, since this applies no more to a bad situation than to a shameful one. For the bad too is up to us, just like the shameful. **309** 30

But perhaps the argument would be more clearly expressed if we transposed the negative particle, so it reads 'more not-possible than a shameful one'.²⁷³ Then it would say that it is not possible to be in a bad situation on account of someone else, and that this is *more*

not-possible than being in a shameful situation on account of someone else. In that case, the form of the argument would be derived from the comparative.²⁷⁴ This argument would have a measure of truth, if we bear in mind that while rhetoricians characterise the fine and shameful as what is praiseworthy or blameworthy, thus making it depend on the judgement of the many, they say that the advantageous and disadvantageous – that is to say, the beneficial and the harmful, or the good and bad – exist not by some human convention or judgement, but by nature.²⁷⁵ So on the hypothesis that something's being shameful depends on the judgement of those who do the censuring, it actually is more impossible to be in a bad situation on account of someone else than to be in a shameful one. So if it's not possible to be in a shameful situation on account of someone else, as was said earlier, but it's more impossible to be in a bad situation on account of someone else than to be in a shameful situation, it's clear that it's completely impossible to be in a bad situation on account of someone else.

40
50
63,1
10
20

'And how will you be no one at all', he says, 'if you don't have political office? Have you forgotten that this is not the place where the human good and bad are, but rather in your desires and aversions, and generally, in what is up to you, where you can be of great worth, if you are willing to conduct yourself naturally in your desires and aversions? And since you have the place of the good in yourself, and are able to be of great worth in it, why do you say that you will be no one at all? Clearly because you have so far put the good in external things, which the genuine philosopher must disdain.' 'But even if I am able to be of great worth in myself', the student says, 'if I am silent then my friends will go without my help.' This is the speech of someone who has made a degree of progress. For a student like this often disdains external things, to the extent that they regard himself, but he desires to help his friends because he thinks that is good and fine. And for this reason he **310** desires money as well, and sometimes even political power – in order not to be useless to his own friends. He resolves this difficulty too, by appealing to what is up to us and to the fact that someone who shows himself trustworthy in friendship is a more useful friend than someone who provides money or power. The appeal to what is up to us points out that money and political honors and powers are not up to us. For if any philosopher happened to have any of these, he would give it eagerly, thinking it better to receive thanks for it than to give thanks;²⁷⁶ but if he doesn't have any, he does no injustice to their friendship. For 'who can give to someone else what he doesn't have himself?'

[ad §3] 'In that case,' your friends say, 'you should get rich so that we can have some money too!'²⁷⁷ 'Well, if it is possible for me to get rich while remaining both a trustworthy friend to you and purified of all that brings shame to a philosopher, show me the way, and I will

get it.' Indeed, it seems that this man concedes that you may sometimes make money for your friends and pursue political power, provided that it is possible to procure and possess these things while preserving the style of life that befits your own nature. But if it's impossible – as this usually is – and by wanting to supply these objects you inevitably lose the ethical disposition that constitutes your appropriate good, it's clear that the people saying 'In that case, you should get rich so that we can have some money too!' are asking you to lose your own good (that is, the good of the rational soul) in order that they be supplied with what are not their own goods. For what they are seeking are not the goods of the rational soul (in virtue of which human beings are human beings), but the objects of the irrational desires. So these people really are inconsiderate and unfair: unfair **311** both because they are unfriendly – for friendship is equality, as the Pythagoreans said²⁷⁸ – and because it is unfair to choose to cast a friend into the worst of evils in order to satisfy their own irrational desire; and inconsiderate, both because they demand such things of someone who is yielding himself in going along with them, and because they aren't able to tell the difference between what their friend loses if he obeys them, and what they will be supplied with – i.e. that the former is his greatest good, while the latter is not merely not their own good, it is sometimes even bad. Perhaps he also calls them inconsiderate²⁷⁹ and stupid owing to what comes next: they prefer money to a trustworthy and respectful friend. With this point he also makes it clearer that such a person won't be useless to his friends, but rather more useful than providers of cash. After all, if even in the case of servants it is the trustworthy and respectful ones who are more useful than skilled or productive ones, and more honoured by their masters, won't this apply even more to the case of friends, and won't friends of that sort be more honoured by sensible people than those who provide money? For these trustworthy friends, who are never at odds with their friends, are shown to be more useful for fellowship and advice, and for preserving what their friends most love and honour, through danger and disease, and after their deaths. So if they are real friends, they will help their friend remain trustworthy and respectful, even if they are considering what is more useful to themselves; and they won't ask him to do things that will also have the effect of destroying the friend who is trustworthy and useful to his friends.

[ad §4] **312** 'But the country,' he says, 'will be without help so far as depends on me', if I am persuaded by you and disdain external things as to me. He could have resolved this objection too by the same thought, that you are in control of what is up to you: 'Who told you that supplying the country with porticos or baths was up to you? And who can give to someone else what he doesn't have himself?' (If you also understood 'In that case, you should get rich, so the country can

20 have some money too', it would re-introduce the earlier points.) But leaving these points they have in common for us to notice, he made a more specific and appropriate response to the objection concerning the country, one which is very vivid and vigorous. 'What is it to you if the country doesn't have porticos or baths on account of you? It doesn't have shoes on account of the blacksmith either, but rather on account of the shoe-maker; nor does it have weapons on account of the cobbler, but rather on account of the armourer.' For every city is governed to its own advantage and justly whenever each of its inhabitants, by working at his own job, refrains from meddling, so the blacksmith and each of the other craftsmen provides his own useful product to the city.²⁸⁰ 'What about me?' a philosopher might say: 'How can I be useful to it?' It's in response to this person that he rightly replies:²⁸¹ 'If you provide it with another trustworthy and respectful citizen, won't you have furnished it with something more needful than the blacksmith? This is especially the case if you also provide it with other people of this kind, by giving advice and teaching, and by becoming an example to others of a fine and good citizen. **313** But even if you don't do that, by just providing it with yourself as such a person, what you provide to the country is more useful than what the others provide.'

40 'Then what place will I have in the city,' the student says, 'like all the others have, one of them ruling, another fighting, another producing something useful for life?' Epictetus gives a general reply to this, saying 'Have the one you can achieve while keeping that trustworthy and respectful person around. If you lose your trustworthy and respectful character by wanting to benefit it with money or baths or porticos, you may not even benefit it with them, once you've become shameless and untrustworthy. What is better for it: to have trustworthy and respectful citizens or porticos and baths?'

50 But we should investigate which place the philosopher will take in the city. Isn't it most of all the human-producing one, the one that crafts trustworthy and respectful citizens? For his job will be none other than to purify himself and the others for the life in accordance with nature fitting for a human being. He will be both father and teacher to them all in common, their corrector, advisor and guardian, presenting himself to everyone as a helper in every good, by being pleased along with people who are feeling cheerful, and joining in their hardship and encouraging people who are grieving. And, in a word, he will do exactly what someone would do who believes that his specific²⁸² job and place in the city is to have a beneficial concern for all human beings, to the extent he can.

65,1 But if you want to see him having recourse to some particular pursuit in the city as well, in good states he will certainly be chosen as ruler, because **314** he surpasses the rest and has the relation to them of shepherd to sheep, and as advisor, because he is sensible, and as general if he happens to be expert in the affairs of war, because he

is braver than the rest, and better at deliberating. (After all, Socrates won the prize for valor in the battle at Delium, and they say that no one dared to pursue him as he retreated alone through the enemy ranks, because they were all struck by the man's presence of mind. And Xenophon, too, saved those 10,000 men, after he was chosen as their general, by conveying them on that great journey through so many tribes to Greece.²⁸³) This person will also be an unbribable judge, a worthy elder-statesman, and trustworthy guardian of what needs guarding. So such a person will have many places in a city of this kind. 20

In worthless states, however, he will abstain from public affairs, because he doesn't like badly-governed citizens, and isn't liked by them either, and he can't serve the rulers of such people while keeping 'that trustworthy and respectful person around'. Hence, since he declines to give advice about matters that are beyond cure, he will emigrate to another, better state, if he can, as Epictetus himself did, moving from Rome to Nicopolis in condemnation of Domitian's tyranny.²⁸⁴ If he can't, he will crouch under a little wall,²⁸⁵ as it were, avoiding the cloud of dust, having concern for the well-being of himself and of as many others as he can, on the look-out at all times day and night for any good action happening at any time which needs his help, out of fellowship with his friends and all the citizens. Many actions will be found even in these states which need some advice and trustworthy help, or sympathy and encouragement, or even a companion in danger on occasions when the appropriate action dictates this as well. And should 315 things go well for him as they flow by, he will give thanks to God for his calm amidst the storm; but if in the undeclared war of unnatural people against those in accordance with nature, or of the drunk against the sober, he encounters difficulties – well, those who are cowed and undo their ethical disposition show themselves worthy of a bad political system, and their disdain for it is proven vain; while those who use them as a training-ground and wrestle more eagerly with tougher opponents, so that they even given thanks to the training-master for these opportunities, such people will be crowned like Olympic victors, but with the fullness of the good life and truth rather than a wreath of olive. 40 50 66,1

In such states, where many are jealous of anyone who wants to live in accordance with nature, it is also fine to present yourself as moderate or as enjoying the smaller share (especially in honour, but also in the other external things), so that their jealousy is moderated to the extent possible (although I am not unaware that even moderation often attracts bitter jealousy). It is also fine to keep far away from offending people in power and from tasteless frankness in these circumstances, so that if something difficult happens, it's not the reasonable person that caused the irritation of a wild beast at rest, but rather the irrational and insane element of the beast itself.²⁸⁶ It 10

20 is clear that one must make it gentle, but without being abject or betraying one's own freedom or attaching oneself to flatterers either in any word or deed. For anyone who experiences any of these conditions has lost his ethical disposition and been expelled from the Olympic contest.²⁸⁷

30 You must realise, however, that the more worthless states are, as a whole, harmful to souls, and especially suppress divine **316** illumination, dishonour finer pursuits, and extinguish examples of the good life. Hence they form an impediment quite generally, both to the origination of well-being in the souls and to its stability in them.²⁸⁸ If, however, in a political system of this kind a soul is discovered that was made muscular by 'divine lot',²⁸⁹ and has now been thoroughly exercised in it, it is shown to be more perfect in virtue. So it's true that for the good person every chance and every circumstance, both the smooth and the rough, contributes the good for their benefit in every event, because he supplies it through his sensible selection.²⁹⁰

Encheiridion Chapter 25 (= Lemma xxxiii): Has someone been preferred to you in an invitation-list or a greeting or in being summoned for advice? If these are good, you should be glad that he got them; if bad, don't be annoyed that you didn't get them. Rather, remember that if you don't do the same things to get what is not up to us, you can't be thought to deserve the same amount. For how can someone who doesn't frequent a person's door have the same as someone who does? Someone who is an escort, as someone who isn't? Someone who doesn't praise as someone who does? So you will be unjust and rapacious if you want to take things for free without paying the price for which they are sold. What's the price of lettuce? An obol, say. So if someone pays the obol and takes the lettuce, and you don't pay and don't take it, you shouldn't think that you have less than the person who took it. For just as he has the lettuce, you have the obol you didn't give. It's the same way here, too. You weren't invited to someone's party? Clearly, you didn't give the inviter the price his dinner sells for: he sells it for praise, sells it for attention. So give him the difference (the price it's sold for), if it profits you. But if you want not to pay the former and to take the latter, you're rapacious and simple. So you don't have anything to make up for missing the dinner? You will, you will have not having praised the person you didn't want to, not having put up with his doormen.]

xxxiii: If someone has been preferred to you in an invitation-list or a greeting ...

[Commentary on Chapter 25, Lemma xxxiii]

This chapter again seems to be part of the last one, since it meets the remaining objections put forward by people in the same condition. For someone who turns towards himself, leaving external things to other people and disdaining to serve those in power, seems to live without honour, while many are preferred to him in invitations and greetings, and are summoned to give advice instead of him. And here too he could have resolved the objection by appealing to what is up to us and not up to us (for if our goods are up to us, but these things are not up to us, they won't be goods of ours). But he omitted this kind of solution because it is general and has already been offered, and instead used one that was more specific to the subject, and reveals another **317** more significant benefit from such things for those who use them well. 40 50

He says that these things, in which others are preferred over people choosing the better life, are definitely either good or bad. (We can add 'or indifferent' to make the division complete, since many things are of that status too. But if they are indifferent, they are no more honourable than dishonourable²⁹¹ – which is why he disdained this part of the division. So they are either good or bad.) Well, 'if these are good,' he says, 'you should be glad that he got them', that is, you should use the power²⁹² in you that wants good things for everyone and shares in the joy of those who participate in them. 67,1

Now notice how great a good he has revealed, hidden in that seeming lack of honour. For what this really is, is a likening of oneself to God, than which there is no greater good for His dependents. For God has the strongest power – since he is the cause of every power – and the best desire – 'he desired everything to be good, and nothing bad',²⁹³ as far as it is possible; and since his power is equal to his desire, he makes everything good, to the extent that each thing can participate in His goodness. The human soul is unable to have the highest power (it is lesser in power than many of the other creatures stationed after God), but it has received from God self-determined desire, of a nature to want good things for everyone when it chooses this. So given this, it is reasonable that the soul is most like God when it is acting in accordance with that desire.²⁹⁴ It can't make everything **318** good as God can, but if it makes things good to the limit of its powers, then it will have succeeded in making everything that is up to it good, and everything it desires. For desire is genuine and perfect desire when every power of the person who desires cooperates with the desire, since we are in control of what is up to us, and wanting good things for everyone is up to us. And the good man wants all men to do well, and he extends his desire not just to them, but even to irrational animals and plants, and as far as inanimate objects. Nevertheless, he can't do everything he wants, because while the desire is up to us, the power is not up to us, but rather requires many other causes, some of which are superior to us. And for this reason we have our good in the desire, because it is up to us. So much for this point. 10 20 30

40 But, he says, if they (the things the chapter is about) are bad, 'don't be annoyed', but rather rejoice again 'that you didn't get them'. In this way the good man won't think it a lack of honour not to get these things, but will rather be cheerful that someone else got them, if they are goods, and that he didn't get them, if they are bad. So he resolved their annoyance at not getting the things under discussion in this manner, on the basis of advantage: if they are goods, he has shown anyone who wants it a greater good from not getting them (likeness to God); and if they are bad, not getting bad things is good.

50 Next he makes his argument on the basis of possibility, and after that, on the basis of justice. On the basis of possibility, because it is impossible for someone who doesn't dance attendance on the inviter to get the same things from him as those who do attend him get.
68,1 Attention to such people means frequenting their doors, escorting them in the market-place, praising the things they say or do, whatever they are. So it's impossible for you who don't do these things **319** (given that you want to be a philosopher) to get the same things as those who do them get. But it's also unjust and 'rapacious' to wish to take the dinner without giving him the price he sells it for: it's unjust to passionately desire what is not our own, and rapacious to wish to take the dinner without giving the price it's sold for. Next he gives a vivid demonstration that the person who doesn't dine won't have something of less value than the person who does, using the example with the lettuce. For while he has the dinner, he says, you have what is more honourable than the dinner: your freedom, i.e. 'not praising someone you don't want to, not putting up with his doormen'. But if you want to have these and the dinner as well, you are unjust and rapacious, and, given these qualities, 'simple', because you won't have any ground of comparison that would show that you are better than he.
10

[*Encheiridion* Chapter 26 (= Lemma xxxiv): The will of nature can be learned from situations where we don't differ from one another. For example, when a slave-boy breaks someone else's wine-glass, you're immediately ready to say 'It's one of those things' You should realise then that when the slave-boy breaks yours as well, you ought to react in the same way you did when he broke the other person's. Apply this to greater things too. Someone else's child has died, or his wife: everyone will say 'It's the human condition.' But when someone's own child dies, it's immediately 'Poor me, I am wretched.' We should have remembered what we feel when we hear the same thing happening to someone else.]

xxxiv: The will of nature can be learned from situations where we don't differ ...

[Commentary on Chapter 26, Lemma xxxiv]

The common conceptions human beings have about the nature of things, are those with respect to which we human beings don't differ, but rather concur with one another – for instance, that the good is beneficial and the beneficial good, that everything strives for the good, that what is equal neither exceeds nor is exceeded, and that two times two is four. So, because these conceptions and others of this kind have arisen in us in accordance with right reason and have been tested for a long time, they are true and fit the nature of things. But the individual conceptions each person has are often erroneous, whether their source is deceived perception (e.g. that the **320** moon is equal to the sun in size) or irrational desire (e.g. the thought that every pleasure is good) or unwarranted reasoning or invalid assumptions (e.g. the thought that there are two principles of all things, or the conception of the soul as a body). So these conceptions and others of this kind, with respect to which we differ, are not always true, but sometimes conflict with the common conceptions; and it's not safe for us to learn the nature of things (what he called the will of nature) from them. 20 30

A sign of the insecurity of individual judgements and the security of common judgements is the fact that the same person takes the same experience differently if he experiences it himself – when he takes it rather more emotionally and irrationally – and when he watches it happening to someone else. In the latter case, he sees it less emotionally, more truly, and more in accordance with the rest of mankind who are not experiencing it and are not judging it by their emotion, but by reason. Epictetus established this with a simple example: the breaking of a wine-glass. When someone else's slave breaks a wine-glass, we are ready to say, along with everyone else judging dispassionately, 'It's one of those things ...' and 'The boy was unsteady then and bumped or dropped it, and the glass was broken when it was bumped or dropped.' But when our glass is broken, we get annoyed, as if something quite new was happening to us. And yet we ought to have noticed on that occasion too that 'it's one of those things'. So apply this to greater things too, he says. If someone else's child dies, or his wife, everyone will say that what happened is the human condition, since they judge the occurrence in accordance with the common conceptions, which agree with nature. That humans die is the human condition; it fits the nature of mortal human beings. But when someone's own child dies, it's immediately 'Poor me, I am wretched!', and laments and tragedies, as if something had happened that applied only to us, and was contrary to nature. We should have remembered our attitude when someone else was **321** lamenting – 40 50 69,1 10

that we rightly noticed then that it wasn't the thing that disturbed him (it's natural, after all, and necessarily happens), but the emotion he experienced about the thing. This experience has two parts: the irrational and inappropriately great sympathy of an immortal rational soul for a mortal body (that of the child or wife), and the failure to realise that the child's nature was mortal and hence that it was likely to die (instead he lived with it as if it would always be there). And what makes it especially shocking and alarming to him is the fact that it comes on him unexpectedly; if he had prepared for it and habituated himself to it in his thoughts, it wouldn't have disturbed or grieved him in this way. A clear sign of this, I think, is the fact that even people who had a very emotional attitude to such things become calm after a little time, as if nothing happened, owing to its familiarity; and at that point they cite what people say in accordance with the common conceptions: 'It's the human condition', 'What is mortal must die', 'It will soon befall us too.' But if we can bear it easily after the event because of our habituation to the separation, then I think if we're habituated to the separation in anticipation before the event, we will no longer take it so emotionally.

One reason why people don't habituate themselves to such events by having them constantly before their eyes is that most people's souls are shaped always by what is present (so that when they are doing well they think they will always do well, and when something painful happens, they expect never to get rid of it). Another reason, no less important than that one, is the great and immoderate sympathy they have for such events, which makes even the thought of separation most painful to them: no one spends time willingly on painful things. So our sympathy must be very much measured, and we must judge correctly what it is that sympathises and what it sympathises with (i.e. something foreign to us); we should deprecate most familiarity and contamination; and we should keep away from words that increase our sympathy, and even more so from deeds.

Notes

1. Numbers in bold indicate pagination in Hadot's edition (editio maior Brill 1996); numbers in the margin refer to pages and lines in Dübner's edition. References to Epictetus' text are abbreviated 'cap. X §Y.Z' where X is the number of the *Encheiridion* chapter in question, Y the number of a paragraph within that chapter, Z the number of the line in the paragraph. References to Simplicius' commentary are by Hadot page and Dübner page and line (H / D); more general references to Simplicius are abbreviated 'in cap. X', i.e. Simplicius' comments on *Encheiridion* ch. X.

2. Arrian's *Letter to Messalenus*, and the other sources for Epictetus' life Simplicius mentions, are no longer extant.

3. *Timaeus* 47a7, *Politicus* 273b1. *Proballein*, here rendered as 'intend' is also a technical term for the metaphysical process of 'emanation'; the clause could be read 'as ... <God> sent it down to be'.

4. *pathê* usually refers to emotions, but here the medical sense predominates (sc. pathological conditions).

5. cf. H195 / D2,35 et seq. The various ways in which human beings can 'have their essence' (as rational souls using the body, as rational souls separated from the body, or as intellects transcending their rational souls) correspond to the Platonist grades of virtue (the civic, cathartic and theoretical virtues) originally identified in Plotinus *Ennead* 1.2. (See n. 7.)

6. Cf. H212 / D12,15. Some Stoics believed that souls persist after death (though no Stoic took them to be immortal), but our evidence does not suggest that they used the prospect of post-mortem rewards or punishments to promote virtue (cf. *SVF* 2.809-23). The surprise Simplicius anticipates thus indicates the ignorance of Stoic doctrine he expects in his audience. However, cf. Hierocles in *CA* 10.20.3-7 (p. 40 Koehler), who claims that we would not pursue virtue unless we were assured of immortality. The sentence after the next does not claim that a life according to Epictetus' precepts is the height of happiness for human souls as they actually are constituted, i.e. as immortal souls. Given that we are in fact immortal, our highest happiness is to be found in disembodied contemplation, and we cannot achieve our perfection merely by following ethical precepts. Rather, the claim is that if souls were mortal (the hypothesis under consideration), then our highest blessedness and happiness would also be restricted to the mortal sphere, and so perfected by following Epictetus' precepts. This is then illustrated by the case of the body, which is in fact mortal and thus has a mortal perfection.

7. On the cathartic life, cf. H243,20-3 / D28,15, on Plato's *Phaedo*; for its development in the Platonist tradition, see Porphyry *Sent.* 32 (Lamberz), Marinus *Vita Procli* 19-21, and Anon *Proleg. to Plato's Philosophy* §26.

8. H254 / D34,10, H291 / D53,45, H351 / D86,5, Hierocles in *CA* X 25.6 and XXV 10.2, and cf. *Phaedo* 66b5.

9. Plato, *Alc.* I.129c7 et seq.

10. Here as at the beginning of each new chapter of the *Encheiridion*, we print a translation of the passage from the *Encheiridion* itself. Since the manuscripts of Simplicius in general contain only slim excerpts from Epictetus, having the *Encheiridion* ready to hand in our translation of it will help the reader note places in the commentary where Simplicius is echoing a phrase in Epictetus that is not in the relevant lemma. (Our translation follows Schenkl's standard modern text of the *Encheiridion*; where this diverges significantly from the text of the *Encheiridion* in Simplicius' lemmata, we comment on it.)

11. This assertion of the psychological priority of belief might also be read as an allusion to Epictetus' (correct) ordering of the soul's motions. Cf. H220,34-7 / D16,15.

12. This general claim about the Stoics is false. Two points about Epictetus may help to explain Simplicius' mistake. The first is the trivial one, that Epictetus does put impulse before desire and aversion in the order of the list in cap. 1. More substantive, though, is the fact that in cap. 2, Epictetus advises us not to use desire and aversion for the present, and instead only to use impulse and counter-impulse. This might have struck Simplicius as strong evidence that impulse and counter-impulse are independent of and prior to desire and aversion.

13. This is the first instance of the peculiar Platonist use of *zôê* to refer to the lowest level of soul that arises from the interaction of souls with bodies. The barbarism 'vitalities' might capture the technical sense of these 'lives' – the connected adjective *zôtikos* is translated by 'vital' at e.g. H216 / D14,3. Simplicius gives further information on 'lives' at H208,258-61 / D10,5, and at H337,358-73 / D78,10-30. Cf. Plotinus *Enn.* IV.4.29 and Proclus *de Providentia* IV.16 (*vite species*). Porphyry prefers 'vital activities' (*zôtikai energeiai*), but the 'life' formulation is found even in Augustine (e.g. *CD* 22.29).

14. *Laws* 644e.

15. cf. Origen on the *ap' autês*, *SVF* II.988 = LS 53A.

16. 'fountain and origin' is a loose reminiscence of *Phaedrus* 245c9.

17. *EN* 1094a3.

18. Keeping *auto arkhê* from the uncorrected A, instead of the corrector's *autoarkhê* which Hadot adopts.

19. *dunamis*.

20. *huphesis*; cf. H202 / D6,32, H268 / D41,40, H271 / D43,48, H323 / D70,25, H335 / D77,25.

21. *epilampein*, a rare word which, as with many rare words in Simplicius, is found seldom elsewhere except Damascius (see LSJ).

22. cf. *Philebus* 65a.

23. cf. H372 / D97,40, Damascius *de Princ.* ii.138. Note that the 'substance' of the lowest things is their 'form of existence'.

24. cf. Hierocles in *CA* I 11 on *huperokhê* and *hupobasis*.

25. A sort of pun; *prohairesis* is the *haireisis* (choice) of *prôta*, (pre-eminent) goods.

26. cf. Damascius *de Princ.* i.47.14. Simplicius later finds it difficult to reconcile this notion of 'freedom' (in the lesser Gods) with his apparently general view that self-determination involves a two-sided possibility (cf. H211 / D11,40).

27. *Timaeus* 69d1.

28. cf. *Rep.* 583b5, Damascius *de Princ.* ii.249.25.

29. Simplicius probably does not mean to include in this general claim the genuine pleasures related to genuine goods (above) – cf. H223 / D17,40 below, and, arguably, *Rep.* IX.583-7.

30. *eulotos* – easily dissolved or untied, i.e. not vehemently committed to its objects.

31. There is a pun here on ‘*aretê*’, virtue, and ‘*hairêtê*’, object of choice; cf. *Cratylus* 415d4-5

32. Similarly at H328 / D79,10.

33. sc. the division between what is up to us and what is not up to us, mentioned in the lemma.

34. Simplicius does not believe that the division is exhaustive, presumably because e.g. other people, numbers and Forms are not up to us, and yet cannot be characterised as ‘weak, servile, and subject to hindrance’. Because a third, implicit disjunct, ‘and some are neither up to us nor not up to us’, is unlikely (given that the division is constructed using a property and its negation), Simplicius suggests instead that Epictetus was using implicitly restricted quantification, i.e. ‘All things (all those that are in us and around us) are either up to us or not up to us.’ The general principle, that a division ought to have *exisasmos*, appears to be unparalleled (but cf. Sextus *AM* 11.15 et seq., contra *Politicus* 262d).

35. *proêgoumenos skopos*: the end we envision, rather than the result we happen to attain *per accidens*.

36. i.e., impossible to attain by the means employed.

37. Aristotle *MA* 700b24, *DA* 433b10.

38. Simplicius seems to treat *diathesis* (disposition) and *hexis* (state) as near synonyms here.

39. cf. H215,406-23 / D13,25-45.

40. *Rep.* 379b5, 617e5, and *Timaeus* 42d3.

41. See the parallel passage at H333 / D75,50. Proclus makes the material impotent (*adranês*) at *Dec. Dub.* §10.12, in *Alc.* §164.15.

42. *taxeis* (‘stations’) is odd; Schweighäuser printed *praxeis* (‘actions’).

43. ‘the moving causes’ here are the celestial movers, who control the motion of the heavens, and are themselves moved by the unmoved mover. (When Aristotle discusses moving causes in general, he usually uses the active (*kinousa aitia*, to *kinoun*), not the middle which Simplicius does here, presumably to point out that these are the first of the moving causes that are themselves moved.)

44. *Phaedrus* 248c6.

45. Hadot reads *gar* on the basis of MS *Apc* only, at 213 line 381. We omit it, since the point of the comparison is that the possibility of making conjectures of about people who gather together in one place (the clause following her *gar*) is explained by their desires (the clause preceding her *gar*).

46. cf. in cap. 30 H347 / D83,40, on associative ‘relations’ of similars (but also of dissimilars).

47. H213,360 / D12,20.

48. lit. ‘the prior value and character of their life’; perhaps because for a strict metempsychotic like Simplicius the prior incarnation was not a different ‘life’, but just a different phase of the soul’s one, eternal life. (See H365,120 / D94,10, which looks like evidence that *zôê* means ‘eternal life’ as opposed to ‘single incarnation’.)

49. *Rep.* 614, *Laws* 903-4.

50. This question, marked by *ê* (‘or’), seems to introduce Simplicius’ *lusis* of the *aporia*, but it isn’t clear what that resolution is. Simplicius appears to have made a disastrous concession, that the astrologers are in fact able to predict not only what *eidos* of life we will have, but even how we will use it and take part in it. No doubt the common belief in antiquity that astrologers were able to predict

that so and so would be unscrupulous was a phenomenon that Simplicius thought he had to account for; but the way that he accounts for it seems to undermine his defense of the *eph' hemin*. Schweighäuser usefully contrasts lines 23-6, noting that *touto sumbainei* ('this is because') probably carries the imputation that even when the astrologers get their predictions right this happens by chance (cf. *stokhazontai* in H213 / D12,31-4).

51. The 'things which always remain ...' is presumably a reference to the astral deities who constitute 'the fated revolution' (and the 'moved causes'). These divinities will be 'the first souls' of H202 / D6,30. The thought is perhaps that, since they never desire the bad, and since the action their uniform desire causes is the revolution of their bodies, and since this revolution is our fate, fate is never responsible for anything bad. But see Simplicius' more extensive discussion in cap. 8.

52. The vital extension (*ekteneia*) of the soul is its essential activity, manifested in its desires; cf. H198 / D4,25, H208 / D10,3 and H209 / D10,37ff., etc., where other forms from the root *teneisthai* are translated by 'stretch'. For the unusual sense of the noun *ekteneia* Simplicius uses here to mark his technical employment of this word family, see Damascius, e.g. in *Prm.* §65 or Hermias in *Phdr.* 115.

53. Probably a reference to H196,104 / D3,30, as Hadot suggests.

54. *Iliad* 4.43.

55. Hierocles in *CA* p. 441.

56. There is something to be said for the *autois* (i.e. 'within these things') of manuscript B instead of the *heautois* ('within us') that Hadot prints. Then the point would be that our good and bad lie within the things that are up to us, as opposed to lying in things over which we have no control.

57. Presumably the Stoics in general.

58. The 'human and cheap things' may be a reference to the Christian doctrines of divine incarnation, or a reference to Manichees (see in cap. 27).

59. An explicit reference to the order of the items in Epictetus' list. Simplicius takes it that its order is not random, but reflects a thematic order, and hence takes pains to follow it in the commentary.

60. *Phaedo* 66c, paraphrased. (Note that Plato made it explicit there that 'care for our bodies' was a form of slavery.)

61. Simplicius already has in mind the four-fold division of attaining / not attaining what one desires, and encountering / not encountering what one avoids, on which he will expatiate in his commentary on cap. 2 below.

62. 'good emotional state': *eupatheia*. The use of this term seems to indicate some knowledge of Stoicism. Reference to 'pleasure' is not strictly orthodox – for Stoics, *hêdonê* is the name of a vicious emotion – but as the next paragraph shows, Simplicius accepts the Platonic / Peripatetic view that some pleasures are consistent with virtue.

63. *Laws* 733-4; *Rep.* 581d et seq. Cap. 1 does not in fact say that your life will be more pleasant, which is why Simp. needs to provide an argument to infer this from what cap. 1 does say, namely that it will be unimpeded, unhindered, and so on. The key premiss, which Stoics would reject on a normal reading of 'pleasure', is the one contained in the parenthesis at H223 / D18,03.

64. 'rebellion': *katexanastasis*; see Iamblichus *Vita Pythagorica* 16.69 and 31.88.

65. Without *tonos*; cf. H281 / D48,49. A distinctly non-Stoic account.

66. *Medea* 1078-9.

67. 'for the present time': *pros to paron*. This looks like a mistaken interpretation of Epictetus' injunction, in cap. 2 §2.4, to 'do away with desire for the

present' (*epi tou parontos*). See Simplicius' later discussion on H231 / D22,12. Here too we suspect that Simplicius is wrong to think that Epictetus is telling us to defer our desire for externals; rather it is a desire for virtue, happiness, etc. that Epictetus has in mind.

68. cf. *Rep.* 329b.

69. e.g. cap. 2 §1.1; cap. 15.1; cap. 17.1; cap. 20.1; cap. 22.6; cap. 25 §1.5; cap. 32 §1.1; cap. 32 §2.11; cap. 36.6; cap. 46 §1.4; cap. 51 §2.14.

70. See nn. 52 and 65 above on 'intently'.

71. See H202,117-H203,131 / D6,40-7,5 for a fuller description of this power (its *genesiourgos dunamis*).

72. It is not clear what Epictetus did mean here. Simplicius is worried by the apparent recommendation to forgo the virtue of moderation; perhaps he should have remembered that 'virtue is an extreme'?

73. *Olympian* I.130, 'the great danger does not admit a cowardly man'.

74. i.e. cap. 19, cap. 20, cap. 34.

75. *diathesis* here is very strange, and only partly explained by *diatethênai* two lines above. It is tempting to emend to *diakrisis* (*diastasis* and *diairesis* are among Schweighauser's other suggestions).

76. 'fortunate' (*epitukhes*): acquiring what you desire; 'of good fortune' (*eutukhes*): successfully avoiding what you flee; 'unfortunate' (*atukhes*): not acquiring what you desire; 'ill-fortuned' (*dustukhes*): encountering or acquiring what you flee. Epictetus uses both the negative terms, but the pedantic scholasticism which mars Simplicius' exposition is alien to the Stoic's clear and forceful style.

77. Here Simplicius considers six objections that someone might make to what Epictetus says.

78. cap. 1 § 4.

79. *Chaldaean Oracles* 176 p. 108 Des Places.

80. *Carmen Aureum* v. 60.

81. *Aphorisms* 2,10, t. 4 p. 472 Littré; t. 4 p. 110 Jones.

82. See H233 / D23,30 et seq.

83. *Phaedo* 83d1.

84. The verb *prokheirizô*, a reminiscence of the phrase *prokheiron estô* and the like in caps 1, 4, 16, 26, 52, 53.

85. i.e. pots whose great size renders them difficult to manufacture. cf. *Paroemiographi Graeci*, 1851, p. 28.

86. Plutarch *Cato Maior* 9.

87. Demosthenes *de Corona* § 97.

88. cf. *First Alcibiades* 130d-e.

89. i.e. in the *Phaedo*. On the cathartic life, see also H195 / D2,33.

90. *Phaedo* 62a2-5. Simplicius mistakes what Socrates means by the 'this alone' (its referent is clearly the impermissibility of suicide, not the preferability of life to death), and hence misconstrues Socrates' premise that life is not always preferable as an affirmation that life is never preferable. Cf. Olympiodorus *in Phaed.* I.19.

91. *Laws* 828d4. Note the assumption that the Athenian Stranger is Plato.

92. cf. *Diss.* 1.2.2.

93. A famous verse, well attested in later authors, and sometimes continued by a second 'lest they [sc. the possessions] be stronger and possess their possessor'. Another verse, possibly from the same poem, which seems known to Simplicius but is only quoted elsewhere, is 'Crates liberates Crates the Theban', cf. Diehl *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca* vol. 1, p. 125. Proclus quotes a variant of this line in a similar context in *de Decem Dubitationibus* VI.36.

94. A rare word; see the noun *tlêpatheia* in Hierocles *in CA XI* 24.8.

95. *Medea* 1078-9.

96. A reminiscence of the *Gorgias* 521e-22b.

97. There is a pun on 'education', or as we might say 'child-rearing' (*paideia*) [from 'child' (*país*)], and on 'teacher', or as we might say 'child-minder' (*paidagôgos*). The phrase 'the child within us' comes from Plato's *Phaedo* 77e, and frequently recurs to Simplicius' mind.

98. *anepistrophôs*. Epictetus uses the very similar adverb *anepistreptôs* at *Diss.* 2.9.4, and the verb *anepistrepteô* in 2.5.9 (in this case actually in commendation, of the appropriately magnanimous attitude towards external indifferents). How much does Simplicius' use of the related word derive from Epictetus, and how much from the Neoplatonic doctrine of *epistrophê*?

99. cap. 1 §2.6.

100. cap. 1 §1.2.

101. This paragraph is a necessary 'additional indication' for Simplicius, because, unlike Epictetus and the Stoics, he believes that a correct belief and the desire for the good will be insufficient for action if one's irrational emotions are not properly trained.

102. H225 / D18,50, H247 / D30,40.

103. *Medea* 1078-9.

104. *epistreptikôs*: Epictetus used the verb in *Ench.* 7 above; see Damascius in *Princ.* §221; 'in such a way as to encourage our *epistrophê* (turning back to God)', and Sophokles' *Glossary*, for Christian parallels meaning 'in such a way as to promote conversion'.

105. *Politicus* 272e3-4.

106. *hodou parergon*: LSJ gives the phrase first to Euripides *Electra* 509, translating 'a secondary purpose of my journey'.

107. Plato *Rep.* 444b; Proclus in *Alc.* 14C; the verb is used below at H287 / D51,41, H399 / D113,16.

108. cf. cap. 1 §4, 15-16.

109. cf. cap. 48 §3.1; H316 / D66,30.

110. cf. Porphyry *On the Cave of the Nymphs* 10, citing Numenius citing the Egyptians, Heraclitus and Homer.

111. *Laws* 903-4.

112. Hadot suggests a reminiscence of *Rep.* 514a.

113. *skheseis*, lit. 'relations' – cf. H255,52 / D34,45, and for the topic of relations and the appropriate actions they entail see in cap. 30 passim.

114. *eurhoein*. Literally 'to flow well', but translated as 'be happy' in part because the philosophical usage of this term stems from Zeno the Stoic's claim that happiness is a 'good flow' of life (*SVF* 1.184), and partly because of Simplicius' willingness to contrast *eurhoein* directly with the word for unhappiness, *kakodaimonia*, e.g. at H385 / D105,13.

115. As often, *proêgoumenos* might also be rendered 'intrinsic': one should not treat external things as though they have intrinsic value.

116. In order to give the verb an object we might write *endous* <ti> *têi tôn ...* (cf. H233 / D23,16 *endidonai ti*). On this use of *endidonai*, see also H193 / D1,40, H310 / D63,27, H341 / D80,27, H429 / D127,13; it is different from the sense translated as 'surrendering'.

117. The argument is not: 'if the universe and our desires are always to coincide, then either it must always do what we want, or we must always do what it wants', which would involve a fallacy of scope. Rather, the point is that if we want coincidence, and the universe does not *always* do as we wish, then *at least sometimes* we shall have to be pleased etc.

118. Here and in the following references to the destruction of philosophy one

might find support for the conjecture that this commentary was written after the Emperor Justinian had ordered the end of all non-Christian worship in AD 529, and with it the closing of the schools of pagan philosophy.

119. cap. 31.

120. cap. 31.

121. The addition of an alpha (*hōsper nomizomen<a> all'*) would give 'as they're believed to be'.

122. *Timaeus* 42d3-4; *Rep.* 379b, 617e.

123. This introduces a long argument that there is no bad – cf. Proclus *de Malorum Subsistentia* IV.50-7. The section on bodies runs from H258,59 / D36,25 to H260,106 / D37,30. The section on souls runs from H260,106 / D37,30 to H268,290 / D41,45.

124. *zōai*, cf. in cap. 1 H199 / D4,40, in cap. 27 H337 / D78,40.

125. *ousia*.

126. Almost surely 'same' here means 'shadows have the same value as the causes of shadows' not 'shadow 1 has the same value as shadow 2'.

127. i.e. Aristotelian elements.

128. This would be a very poor argument if directed to showing that no change, e.g. getting sick, is bad for bodies, since in any sense in which it is natural for bodies to get sick, it is also natural for souls to be vicious, and any sense in which it is natural for souls to know the truth, it is natural for bodies to be healthy. But the conclusion is the more modest one, that change per se, i.e. the mere fact of changing, is not bad for bodies. This is consistent with saying that certain kinds of change, e.g. disease, *are* bad for bodies, though bad qua this particular change, not qua change in general. The general premiss is that if being F is bad for x's, it must be possible for the x's to be not-F. Thus being diseased may be bad, inasmuch as it is possible to be healthy; but merely being changed, qua change, cannot be bad, inasmuch as it is impossible for the body not to undergo some change or another. The premiss needs careful specification, esp. vis-à-vis the specification of the class of x's, in order to render it consistent with Simplicius' own views on determination and moral assessment in ch. 1.

129. cf. Aristotle *GC* 331a.

130. *talaipōria*, a rather unusual phrase – cf. Democritus DK B223.

131. *holotes* seems to mean the whole assemblage of all the portions of one elemental type, e.g. all the water, or all the earth, etc., considered as a mass.

132. The idea seems to be that the water (e.g.) in my body, because it is constantly being assaulted by fire, earth, and air, is also constantly losing its defining qualities, and becoming weaker and weaker in respect of being water; it gets dried out and warmed up. And by its action, conversely, the water is diluting the fieriness of the fire in me, and so for the other two. Only by being rejoined with the whole mass of its parent element can the portions of the elements in me regain the full strength of their defining qualities. And this requires my death, so that the earth can go to earth and so on.

133. cf. Marcus Aurelius 2.3.1, 3.2.3, 5.8.4, 6.45.1, 7.19.1, 10.6.1, 12.23.1.

134. We assume that 'individual' implies a contrast with the cosmic animal, the whole that has just been mentioned. The comparison of partial cosmic destruction benefiting the whole cosmos to partial destruction benefiting the whole animal is not merely an analogy, if the cosmos really is (as the *Timaeus* has it) a genuine animal.

135. *koinoerga*, lit. 'commonly functioning', a hapax, but presumably it refers to the fact that each of them works for the whole of the body, and any more specialised organ (e.g. a hand) functions only with their aid.

136. cf. the theory of 'laudable' pus.

137. The subsection on souls is divided into sections on irrational souls, running from H261,12 / D37,40 to H261,130 / D38,5, and rational souls, running from H261,130 / D38,5 to H268,290 / D41,45.

138. H258 / D36,15.

139. *zôai*, cf. in cap. 1 H199 / D4,40.

140. cf. H199,35 / D4,45 et seq.

141. *zôai*, cf. in cap. 1 H199 / D4,40.

142. H261,116 / D37,44 reading *kata tên axian*, <*kai*> *kat' ekeina te kai met'ekinôn*. Cf. Proclus *de Decem Dubitationibus* VII.43-5; 47 (*nihil suum habere, sed idem pati cum umbra ...*).

143. cf. *Timaeus* 71c.

144. There is much overlap between the commentary here and in cap. 27. Simplicius treats irrational souls as just a combination of the bodies and autokinetic souls they are the intermediate between. He has already said there is no bad among bodies, he is about to say that there is no bad among autokinetic souls, so it follows that there is no bad for irrational souls either.

145. cf. H260,5 / D37,9.

146. *First Alcibiades* 129d.

147. *Phaedo* 60c6.

148. *oikeiôsetai*. One might also say 'identifies itself with the body'.

149. Hippocrates *de Flatibus* 1,5 p. 104,11 Littré. The medical parallel developed from here to H269 / D42,42 is a common one: cf. *Gorgias* 477-9, also applied to providential justice by Proclus *de Decem Dubitationibus* VIII.51 (*animarum sanatio dika appellata*).

150. cf. *Laws* 635c.

151. i.e. than are the external objects of desire like wealth, reputation, and political power.

152. *apostasa*, i.e. 'commits apostasy'.

153. Nearly verbal reminiscences of *Phaedo* 83d1 and *Timaeus* 69d.

154. Changing *aniara tauta, eis ha neneuken, autêi prospherôn* to *aniara <toutois>, eis ha neneuken autê[i], prosperôn*.

155. *Phaedo* 68d8-13.

156. *eurhoein*.

157. *Phaedo* 69a6. Bodily 'affections' have now become psychological 'emotions'; Simplicius uses *pathos* for both.

158. Hippocrates *de Off. Med.* §20, p. 324 Littré. The argument that the 'hygienic' part of providential medicine exercises good souls with external 'evils' to exhibit virtue for imitation by others is also found in Proclus *de Decem Dubitationibus* VI.34.

159. *proëgoumenê* means 'antecedent' or 'primary'. It is primary in the sense that the primary point of our ambulatory capacity is not exercise, but locomotion. It is antecedent in the sense that we did not begin with the desire to exercise, but the desire to locomote, and only later formulated the desire for exercise.

160. The identity of this Sallustius is disputed; Schweighäuser thinks it is the author of the *Peri Theôn kai Kosmou* (*On the Gods and the World Order*); Nock denies that it can be, on the grounds that the author is a Neoplatonist, while Simplicius' example is apparently a Cynic. This is not a good reason, given how little we know about Neoplatonic asceticism. The identification is doomed on chronological grounds if *eph' hêmôn* means 'our contemporary', but this too is open to doubt.

161. Instead of ... *elaphrotera pôs eisi, kai hoti eph' hêmîn ...*, we read ... *kathoti ...* Cf. e.g. Simplicius *in Cat.* 8.177.23, Marcus Aurelius 10.38.

162. Presumably the value of nature for bodies, and the value of *prohairesis* for souls.

163. Simplicius imagines someone objecting that they are not goods, because they are not 'per se' intrinsic goods. He does not concede this claim here; his point is merely to block the further move from 'not intrinsic goods' to 'bads'; then he can turn a few lines later to blocking the inference from 'not intrinsic goods' to 'not goods'.

164. Simplicius' objective at H258 / D36,10 was to demonstrate that 'these things which happen are not bad, as we believe, but rather good things, since they contribute to great goods'. The renaming of such things as 'necessary' – i.e. necessary for the production of intrinsic goods – is also demanded by Proclus in *Rem.* 1.37.20-38.40.

165. *huphesis*, cf. H200 / D5.31.

166. Again (cf. above nn. 115, 163) this might be translated 'intrinsic', to distinguish it from the merely instrumental goods that seem to the vulgar to be evils.

167. Simplicius puns on *kaka* and *kakôs*; in thinking they are 'bads', the people think 'badly'.

168. The text says only 'the thing that raises objections', which could even refer to a human opponent. But we learned earlier that it is an argument (H258 / D36,1). 'Adde vel intellege *ho logos*', as Schweighäuser says.

169. It is unclear whether the objects of resentment are people (i.e. 'since he does not resent those who dispense justice or medical treatments') in which case the middle voice of the verbs is somewhat unusual, or things done (taking them as passive). We translate the latter, but there is little to choose for sense.

170. The suggested contrast is between those things that are evident in themselves, and those that are not evident in themselves and therefore require demonstration. That every disease of the body is medicinal for the soul is not clear and has been demonstrated; but in some cases the fact that a disease of the body is good for the soul is perfectly evident even without demonstration.

171. Even the best imaginable governor would have chosen this way; so the fact that the actual governor did choose this way is no derogation of his excellence.

172. Again a reference to the passage of the *Encheiridion* being explicated; if we are enjoined to wish for whatever happens, then it seems we ought to wish for the vicious to be vicious (and indeed cap. 14 says, at any rate, that we are foolish to wish that the vicious were *not* vicious) cf. H273 / D44,30.

173. Hadot suggests H202-204 / D6,20-7,50.

174. The same pun on *aretê* and *hairêtê* that was more fully given at H204 / D7,29.

175. The translation retains an ambiguity of the original. Are 'chance and necessity' the predicates, with *prohairesis* as subject, or are they the subject, with 'good or bad' as predicate?

176. *Timaeus* 42d3-4; *Rep.* 379b, 617e.

177. *kakia*, the noun we most often translate 'vice', is also the abstract noun of the adjective 'bad'.

178. *hupostasis*.

179. i.e. sublunary bodies as opposed to celestial ones.

180. Most manuscripts read *kai mallon*: 'if it were not actually *more* natural'.

181. *Rep.* 490c2-11.

182. *proëgoumenê*: 'primary' or 'per se'.

183. Simplicius is about to conclude that the existence of vice is necessary for

the overall maximum goodness of the universe (cf. *Theaet.* 176a), when he restrains himself with the thought that evil has no real existence, nor even any real subsistence, but only a very diluted sort of status, *parhupostasis* or derivative subsistence; cf. Proclus *de Malorum Subsistentia* IV.50-7, esp. 54, citing *Theaet.* 176a.

184. The motions of the heavens, as above.

185. H259 / D36,40.

186. H259 / D36,40; H268 / D42,10-20.

187. *boulêsis*: this might easily be translated as 'will' here.

188. cf. H328-H329 / D73,30-73,45. This obscure summation of Proclus' theory of the bad as a *parhupostasis* is elucidated in the latter's *in Tim.* 1.374.13-20.

189. Two arguments that the human soul is a good have got rather jumbled together. First: whatever is an object of natural (i.e. non-depraved) choice is a good; human beings, even when not depraved, choose to have human souls; so the human soul is a good. Second, whatever is chosen in preference to a good is a good; but human souls are chosen in preference to plant and animal souls, and those are good; so the human soul is a good.

190. The last clause is an uncertain translation from an uncertain text. 'Descent' = *huphesis* again; cf. H200 / D5,31. The metaphor is drawn from ladders, it seems; there is a sort of scale of goods, with definite intervals between the rungs, descending from the Good itself, down through different grades of self-moving souls, to the irrational animals, and below them still to plants.

191. *arkhikos*, cf. H201 / D5,50, H323 / D70,15, H337 / D78,40.

192. *Timaeus* 42d3-4; *Rep.* 379b, 617e.

193. cf. cap. 27.

194. cf. H269 / D42,30 Simplicius is almost certainly wrong here about Epictetus' views on the proper attitudes towards others' vice – cf. cap. 14 on the right attitude to a bad slave-boy. There is some reason to think he is equally wrong about the case of one's own vice; see cap. 2 on not desiring the things that are up to us that it is noble to desire, which would presumably include one's virtue.

195. *eurhoein*: see n. 114.

196. Hadot suggests H262,135 / D38,10-20.

197. cf. *First Alcibiades* 129d-130c5, and Simplicius' long discussion of it in the preface of this commentary, H196 / D3,5.

198. Schweighäuser notes that the meaning of *hêkein* here must be the same as *proshêkein*, or *anêkein* as in DL 7.9. One also naturally thinks of *kathêkon* and the etymology given to it by Zeno (DL 7.108).

199. The connection of thought here is somewhat unclear. How does a tendency towards generosity, and the particular inclination to display it towards figures of admiration like Diogenes and Crates, show that the rhetoricians' objection is harmless? Perhaps the missing thought is that virtuous but destitute figures will not, as the objection alleges, be required to waste their time in the provision of necessities, because their necessities will be provided for them by a willing pool of less destitute (and less philosophical?) donors.

200. This is a difficult phrase given ambiguities surrounding *kharis* and associated verbal phrases: is it better to get gratitude than receive it, or better to get a benefit than receive it? Repeated nearly *verbatim* below at H310 / D63,20.

201. *dêktikos*, which means literally 'biting'.

202. There is something slightly odd about the first person here, since it is rather Epictetus who enjoins these things than Simplicius. Accordingly, various

conjectures have been proposed; Schweighäuser records proposals to change *prostatometha* ('we are enjoining') to *hôs oiometha* ('and not impossibilities, as we suppose'), or *hôs tattometha* ('and not impossibilities, as we categorise them'). He adds his own suggestion of *prostattomena* ('and that the things enjoined are not impossibilities'). We agree with him, both that it is superior to the other suggestions, and also that the text should be left unmolested.

203. Again a reference to *Phaedo* 77e; see above H29 / D31,40 – the pun on *paideia* and *pais* is carried on here.

204. Another etymological pun, carried out over several sentences, this one derived from *Cratylus* 411e: temperance (*sôphrosunê*) is the preservation (*sôte-ria*) of what thinks (*phronein*). Cf. *EN* 1140b12.

205. There may be some reminiscence of *Timaeus* 35a on the soul that is divided about the bodies.

206. Proclus *in Alc.* 137c, *in Prm.* 663S.

207. i.e. people who have completed their education. So courage (*andρεία*) stands to endurance (*karteria*) as temperance (*sôphrosunê*) stands to self-control (*enkrateia*); the first members are the perfected virtues, belonging to those who have completed their education, while the second members are the imperfect forms belonging to those still being educated.

208. 'put up with' = *anekhesthai* – the verbal root of the word translated 'forbearance' (*anexikakia*), which is literally 'putting up with bad things'.

209. On the contrary, while there may be ways of benefiting from false abuse, it is not obvious what they are, or which ones Simplicius has in mind. Hadot's prize ms. A prints a different text here, which would remove the clause about benefiting from false abuse, and begin the clause about true abuse as though beginning a new sentence. Hadot does not follow it, but perhaps it is right?

210. Attributed to Plato at Athenaeus 11.507d.

211. cf. H411 / D118,50-119,15 for a less positive assessment of the value of love of honour.

212. Here is another variation on 'the child that is in us', a phrase at *Phaedo* 77e, which Simplicius takes to refer to the irrational parts of the soul as described in the *Republic* and *Phaedo* (cf. H249 / D31,40, H276 / D46,13). Simplicius also refers to the middle part of the *Republic* soul, i.e. the spirited part, at H300 / D58,11 as the 'dog within us' (see n. 248 below). At *Rep.* 440b spirit is called the 'ally' of reason when it represses appetites from a sense of resentment at their unseemliness, i.e. the love of honour. So, the 'ally that is in us' is another way of referring to the spirited part.

213. i.e. God; thus the tone of scandalised condemnation.

214. Again, God. Simplicius quotes Epictetus as saying *heôs an didôtai*, where our texts have *mekhri an didôi*. The meaning is clearly the same, but the textual divergence is quite striking. Did his text really differ, or was he simply not quoting directly?

215. caps 3, 12.

216. See H298 / D57,25.

217. Hadot suggests that this is a reminiscence of the pseudo-Platonic *Cleitophon* 408b1.

218. On charity to philosophers see H275 / D45,33 above.

219. *tonos* i.e. psychic tension; robustness of soul. cf. H233 / D23,3, H283 / D50,3, H296 / D56,53, and H304 / D60,11. Simplicius sometimes deploys this as an orthodox Stoic notion – the soul has a certain *tonos* (cf. e.g. *SVF* Cleanthes 128-9) – but sometimes as part of his anti-Stoic campaign for *metriopatheia* instead of *apatheia*: the passions can add vigour and efficacy to the commands of reason.

220. cf. H233 / D23,10, H245 / D29,15, H275 / D45,30, H282 / D49,25, H291 / D53,40, H405 / D116,1.

221. A reminiscence of a gnomic verse attributed to Epicharmus: 'be sober, and remember to be untrusting; these are the sinews of the wits' (DK B13).

222. *pneuma*.

223. See n. 219 on H281 / D48,49.

224. *Iliad* 6.236.

225. Right reason – cf. H353 / D87,5, H448 / D135,38.

226. See also cap. 1 §4.

227. e.g. Diogenes, Crates, Zeno, Socrates, etc.; see H282 / D49,30.

228. The lemma differs from modern editions of the *Ench.* in not having a word for 'forever' (*παντοτε*). Simplicius appears not to have found this word in his text of Epictetus, despite his agreement over the sense of the passage.

229. *First Alcibiades* 130c.

230. On dreams cf. Zeno in *SVF* 1.234 and *Rep.* 571c, 573a-b, 573e.

231. cap. 7.

232. *Paroemiographi Graeci* 1839, p. 24.

233. *Laws* 903d-904e.

234. The host here is God, so this is a reminiscence of the phrase in the *Encheiridion* passage, 'and you will be fit to be a fellow-diner with the gods some day'.

235. In Diogenes Laertius the ranking is reversed: Alexander says 'If I had not been Alexander, I should have liked to be Diogenes' (DL 6.32).

236. *Phaedrus* 246c, cited in a similar context by Proclus, *de Providentia* IV.24.

237. cf. DK 59A1, DK 59A33.

238. Accommodation is one of Socrates' virtues; see H230 / D21,25.

239. cap. 15.

240. cap. 16; so Simplicius wants to relocate cap. 18 between the current caps 16 and 17. The rationale seems to be that cap. 18, like cap. 16, warns us not to be persuaded that externals are bad, whether by other people (16) or inauspicious signs (18).

241. Simplicius offers a proof of what he takes to be the lesson of Chapter 18, roughly as follows:

(1) it is up to you to bring it about that you do not deal with external things

(2) if you do not deal with external things, you will not be worsted

(3) if you are not worsted, then you are not in a bad situation

(4) if you are not in a bad situation, then nothing is a sign of something bad for you.

So, it is up to you to bring it about that nothing is a sign of something bad for you.

242. *eurhoein*.

243. A spurious etymology; envy (*zēlos*) is a seething wish (*zē-ousa the-lēsis*).

244. Sophocles *Ajax* 157.

245. *tonos*; cf. n. 219 on H281 / D48,49.

246. *Phaedo* 77e, again.

247. cf. H281 / D48,35.

248. A reference to the intermediate part of the soul in the *Republic*, i.e. the spirited or *thumoeides* part. Structurally, the phrase 'the dog within' is a variation on 'the child within', which Simplicius frequently uses to indicate the lowest part of the soul from the *Republic*, i.e. the appetitive part (though the phrase comes from *Phaedo* 77e). Interestingly, the reference to 'the dog within barking' is not quite a quote from the *Republic*, but shows us something of how

the *Republic* was read. At 390d, Plato quotes *Odyssey* 20.17-18: 'he struck his chest and spoke to his heart / Endure my heart, you've suffered more worse things than this'. He then repeats the first line at 441b, in a context that makes clear that the reference is to the spirited part of the soul. If one reads the passage in the *Odyssey*, starting from line 14, then one finds 'And as a bitch stands over her tender whelps [15] barking, when she sees a man she does not know, and is eager to fight, so his *heart barked within him* in his anger at their evil deeds; and he struck his chest and spoke to his heart etc' So Simplicius' use of 'the dog barking within' as a short-hand for the spirited part of the soul in *Republic* psychology is the result of his assumption that Plato's quotations of Homer are meant to be read in their full context – and perhaps Plato himself assumed that we would know the passage from Homer well enough to think immediately of the comparison of the heart within to a dog barking. Plato may even have intended us to read the next few lines, which say: '... on that day when the Cyclops, unrestrained in daring, devoured my [20] mighty comrades; but thou didst endure until *craft got thee forth from the cave* where thou thoughtest to die.' As it turns out, a great deal of the *Republic* can be mapped onto those few lines of the *Odyssey*, and seems to have been by Neoplatonists.

249. Not otherwise attested, but cf. Seneca, *de Ira* III.13.3, III.11.2 and I.15.3; Plutarch *de Cohib. Ira* 455a-b and 461d.

250. *enstasis*, cf. cap. 23.

251. *Apology* 29a1.

252. Simplicius here glosses a word (*môkos*) already rare in his time.

253. The point of this convoluted and misleading sentence, as Schweighäuser notes, is that these people do not yet possess virtue, but think they do and are elated at the thought that they do. However, their very elation at this false belief is the result of their not yet possessing virtue, i.e. it is because they are not yet virtuous that they are the prey of vain delusions in general, and of the vain delusion of their superiority which is at the root of their false elation.

254. *Apology* 28e.

255. *Timaeus* 47a1-3.

256. *enstasis*.

257. Aristophanes *Frogs* 47.

258. *enstasis*, in the plural.

259. *tonos*; cf. H281 / D48.49.

260. Hadot prints *tetagmenôn* from ms. A, which would mean 'as if it, sc. what seems best, were assigned'. We prefer the *tetagmenon* of all other mss.

261. Simplicius obviously has the alternate text of the last phrase of cap. 23 *hikanon esti*.

262. cap. 13.

263. cap. 22.

264. Simplicius omits *ego*.

265. *perispôntai*, lit. 'dragged around and backwards', i.e. from their progress and turning back; knocked off track.

266. cap. 12.

267. *kathêkonta*, the basis of Stoic ethics. From Simplicius' standpoint, there is nothing wrong with fulfilling one's ordinary ethical duties in this way, but they are only a lower rung on the ladder of turning back, a sort of civic and political virtue which should be performed only incidentally in the course of one's pursuit of higher, contemplative and transcendental virtues. They can thus be a distraction from true turning back.

268. *Iliad* 9.441 (cf. *Gorgias* 485d5).

269. Hadot suggests H197-220 / D4.1-16,15.

270. On the 'hidden unity' (*kruphios henôsis*) cf. Proclus *Theol. Plat.* 2.42.11 *et passim*.

271. *Phaedrus* 250c8-d8.

272. The text here is extremely difficult, and the translation unavoidably awkward. But the sense is clear.

273. A rougher translation of the passage from the *Encheiridion* will help sort out Simplicius' machinations. Epictetus says 'it is not possible for you to be in a bad situation on account of someone else, not more than in a shameful one'. The natural way to take it, and Simplicius' first version ('not more'), involves reading the argument as though it denies that it is any easier ('it is not more possible', i.e. 'not any more possible', 'no more possible') to be willy-nilly plunged into the bad than into the shameful. Now he tries transposing the words to read 'more not', so that the argument positively claims that it is harder to be plunged into the bad than the shameful ('it is more not-possible'). One can almost imagine reading the Greek this way without changing the word-order if one puts quote-marks around the second 'not', i.e. 'it's not possible to be in the bad; 'not', more than with the shameful', i.e. I deny it of the bad, and I deny it more strenuously of the bad than I do of the shameful. So it is more not-possible, i.e. more impossible, with the bad than with the shameful. What is the philosophical significance of this? The first would be consistent with a tie; the second insists on the ranking the bad ahead of the shameful in impossibility. But there is no deep logical point to all this, nor is the second interpretation at all plausible as a construal of Epictetus.

274. cf. Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1397b12.

275. e.g. Aristotle *Rhetoric* I.9.

276. See H275 / D45,30.

277. Simplicius has added a *kai* ('too') to the end of this.

278. cf. Aristotle *EN* 1157b36; DL 8.10.

279. The word *agnômôn* can also mean 'ignorant' or 'thoughtless'. In Epictetus it seems to mean 'inconsiderate' in the sense of unfriendly and ungrateful, but Simplicius is here exploring the 'thoughtless/senseless' region of its meanings.

280. *Rep.* 434a9-c10.

281. Simplicius seems to think that the provision of virtuous citizens is not the job of every individual, but specifically the job of philosophers, as the provision of shoes is the job of the cobbler. That is why he imagines a philosopher asking a question, in order to give Epictetus' reply, 'If you provided it', a suitable context.

282. Contrasted with the more general answer Epictetus gave at H313 / D64,45.

283. Socrates: cf. *Symposium* 221b; Xenophon: cf. *Anabasis* *passim*.

284. Emperor from AD 81 to 96. The date of Epictetus' move is not known.

285. cf. *Rep.* VI.496d7-8.

286. The whole passage is based on *Rep.* 496a-e.

287. The wild beast metaphor continues Simplicius' exegesis via *Rep.* VI. It is noteworthy that Simplicius condemns 'Cynic' *parrhesia*, i.e. 'frankness of speech'.

288. cap. 48 §3.1; H254 / D34,5.

289. cf. *Meno* 99e-100b.

290. This seems to be the best rendering of a bad text. One vetter of this translation suggested wholesale changes to the text which improved the syntax but did not much alter the sense.

291. This remark is strikingly un-Stoic.

292. This is a reference to the formula of cap. 10: whatever happens, we have some power for dealing with it.

293. *Tim.* 30a2-3.

294. sc. the desire for universal benefit.

Bibliography

Editions, translations, fortuna

- Boter, G., *The Encheiridion of Epictetus and its Three Christian Adaptations: Transmission and Critical Editions*. *Philosophia Antiqua* 82 (Leiden 1999).
- Dübner, F., *Theophrasti Characteres, Marci Antonini Commentarii, Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano literis mandatae, Fragmenta et Enchiridion cum Commentario Simplicii, Cebetis Tabula, Maximi Tyrii Dissertationes graecae et latine cum indicibus* (Paris 1840, 1842).
- Hadot, I., 'La tradition manuscrite du commentaire de Simplicius sur le *Manuel* d'Épictète', *Revue d'histoire des textes* 8 (1978) 1-108.
- 'La tradition manuscrite du commentaire de Simplicius sur le *Manuel* d'Épictète', *Addenda et Corrigenda*, *Revue d'histoire des textes* 11 (1981) 387-95.
- *Simplicius Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète: introduction et édition critique du texte grec*. *Philosophia Antiqua* 66 (Leiden 1996).
- *Simplicius Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète: chapitres I à XXIX* (Paris 2001).
- Hadot, P., 'La survie du commentaire de Simplicius sur le *Manuel* d'Épictète du XVe au XVIIe siècles: Perotti, Politien, Stuechus, John Smith, Cudworth', in I. Hadot (ed.), *Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie* (Berlin 1987) 326-67.
- Isaac, D., *Proclus. Trois études sur la providence*, vol. 1: *Dix problèmes concernant la providence* (Paris 1977); vol. 2: *Providence, fatalité, liberté* (Paris 1979); vol. 3: *De l'existence du mal* (Paris 1982).
- Oldfather, W., *Epictetus*, vol. 2 (London 1928).
- Schweighäuser, J., *Epicteteae philosophiae monumenta IV & V* (Leipzig 1800).
- Schenkl, H., *Epictetus* (Leipzig 1916).
- Stanhope, G., *Epictetus, his morals, with Simplicius his comment, made English from the Greek* (London 1694).
- Wolf, H., *Epicteti Enchiridion ... Simplicii in eundem Epicteti libellum doctissima Scholia* (Basel 1563; the basis for the Latin translations by Schweighäuser & Dübner).

Simplicius' life and works

- Blumenthal, H., *Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Soul 3.1-5* (London & Ithaca N.Y. 2000).
- Cameron, A., 'The last days of the Academy at Athens', *PCPS* 195 (1969) 7-29.
- Foulkes, P., 'Where was Simplicius?', *JHS* 112 (1992) 143.
- Glucker, J., *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (Göttingen 1978).
- Hadot, I. (ed.), *Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie* (Berlin 1987).
- 'La vie et l'oeuvre de Simplicius d'après des sources Grecques et Arabes', in I. Hadot (ed.) (1987) 3-39.

- 'The life and work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic sources', in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence* (London & Ithaca N.Y. 1990) 275-303.
- Hoffmann, P., 'Damascius', in R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, vol. 2 (Paris 1994) 541-93.
- Huby, P. & C. Steel, *Priscian: On Theophrastus On Sense Perception with 'Simplicius': On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5-12* (London & Ithaca N.Y. 1997).
- Lameer, J., 'From Alexandria to Baghdad: reflections on the genesis of a problematical tradition', in G. Endress & R. Kruk (eds), *The Ancient Traditions in Christian and Islamic Hellenism* (Leiden 1997) 181-91.
- Luna, C., Review of Thiel 1999, *Mnemosyne* 54-4 (2001) 482-504.
- Tardieu, M., 'Sabiens coraniques et "Sabiens" de Harran', *Journal Asiatique* 274 (1986) 1-44.
- 'Les calendriers en usage à Harran d'après les sources arabes et le commentaire de Simplicius à la *Physique* d'Aristote', in I. Hadot (ed.) (1987) 40-57.
- *Les paysages reliques: routes et haltes syriennes d'Isidore à Simplicius*, Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, Sciences Religieuses, vol. 94 (Louvain & Paris 1990).
- 'Chosroès' in R. Goulet, *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, vol. 2 (Paris 1994) 309-18.
- Thiel, R., *Simplikios und das Ende der neuplatonischen Schule in Athen*. Abhandlungen der Mainzer Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Nr. 8 (Stuttgart 1999).
- van Riet, S., 'À propos de la biographie de Simplicius', *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 89 (1991) 506-14.
- Wildberg, C., 'Simplicius' in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London 2000).

The commentary

- Fuhrer, T. & M. Erler (eds), *Zur Rezeption der hellenistischen Philosophie im Spätantike*. Philosophie der Antike, Band 9 (Stuttgart 1999).
- Hadot, I., 'Die Widerlegung des Manichäismus im Epiktetkommentar des Simplikios', *AGP* 51 (1969) 31-57.
- *Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin – Hiéroclès et Simplicius* (Paris 1978).
- 'La doctrine de Simplicius sur l'âme raisonnable humaine dans le Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète', in H.J. Blumenthal & A.C. Lloyd (eds), *Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism* (Liverpool 1982) 46-70 (discussion 71-2).
- Lloyd, A., 'Parhypostasis in Proclus', in G. Boss & C. Steel (eds), *Proclus et son influence* (Zürich 1987) 145-57.
- Opsomer, J. & C. Steel, 'Evil without a cause: Proclus' doctrine on the origin of evil, and its antecedents in Hellenistic philosophy', in T. Fuhrer & M. Erler (1999) 229-60.
- Praechter, K., 'Simplikios' in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* III A, 1 (1927) col. 204-13.
- Rist, J., 'Prohairesis: Proclus, Plotinus et alii', in H. Dörrie (ed.), *De Iamblique à Proclus*. Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique XXI, (Geneva 1975) 103-17 (discussion 118-22).
- Sedley, D., 'The Stoic-Platonist debate on *kathekonta*', in K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), *Topics in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford 1999) 128-52.

- Steel, C., *The Changing Self: A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus* (Brussels 1978).
- Thiel, R., 'Stoische Ethik und neuplatonische Tugendlehre. Zur Verortung der stoischen Ethik im neuplatonischen System in Simplikios Kommentar zu Epiktets *Enchiridion*', in T. Fuhrer & M. Erler (1999) 93-103.

Other references

- Barney, R., 'A Puzzle about Stoic Ethics', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* (2003, forthcoming).
- Blumenthal, H., *Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity* (London & Ithaca N.Y. 1996).
- Bobzien, S., *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford 1998).
- Brennan, T., 'The Old Stoic Theory of the Emotions' in Sihvola & Engberg-Pedersen (1998) 21-70.
- Brennan, T., 2002a 'Moral Psychology' in Inwood (2002).
- Brennan, T., 2002b 'Demoralizing the Stoics', *Ancient Philosophy* (2002, forthcoming).
- Dillon, J., 'Plotinus, Philo and Origen on the grades of virtue', in id., *The Golden Chain* (Aldershot 1990) ch. 18.
- Dobbin, R., *Epictetus: Discourses I* (Oxford 1998).
- Cooper, J., 'Posidonius on Emotions', in Sihvola & Engberg-Pedersen (1998) 71-111.
- Graver, M., 'Philo of Alexandria and the origins of the Stoic propatheia', *Phronesis* 44 (2000) 300-25.
- Inwood, B., *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* (Oxford 1985).
- Inwood, B., *The Cambridge Companion to Stoicism* (Cambridge 2002).
- Long, A.A., *Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life* (Oxford 2002).
- Schissel von Fleschenberg, O., *Marinos von Neapolis und die neuplatonischen Tugendgrade* (Athens 1928).
- Sihvola, J. & T. Engberg-Pedersen (eds), *Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* (Copenhagen 1998).
- Smith, A., *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition: A Study in Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism* (The Hague 1974).
- Sorabji, R., *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation* (Oxford 2000).
- Westerink, L., J. Trouillard & A. Segonds, *Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon* (Paris 1990).

Concordance of Editions and Overview of Topics

Ench. chs	Simp. lemmas	Dübner pp.	Hadot 1996 pp.	Epict. subject	Simp. subject
–	–	1-4	192-7		introduction
1	i-vi	4-20	197-228	up to us & not	
1.1	i-ii	4-16	197-220	up to us our work	God &
1.2	iii	16	220	up to us free	determinism
1.3	iv	16-18	221-3	not up to us impeded	
1.4	v	18-19	223-7	costs of philosophy	
1.5	vi	19-20	227-8	test impressions	
2	vii	20-4	229-35	desire & avoidance	Stoic impulses
3	viii	24-5	235-8	attitude to child	
4	ix	25-7	238-42	attitude to actions	
5	x-xi	27-32	242-50	beliefs disturb	
6	xii	32-3	251-3	use of impressions	
7	xiii	33-5	253-6	sailing metaphor	
8	xiv	35-44	256-73	want what happens	evil & freedom
9	xv	44-5	273-5	physical impediments	
10	xvi	45-7	275-8	powers to use things	
11	xvii	47-8	278-80	dealing with loss	
12	xviii	48-50	280-4	attitude to slave	
13	xix-xx	50-1	284-6	reputation	
14	xxi-xxii	51-3	287-9	attitude to others	
15	xxiii	53-4	290-1	party metaphor	
16	xxiv	54	292-3	sympathy	
17	xxv	54-5	293-5	act role assigned	
18	xxvi	55-6	295-6	omens	
19.1	xxvii	56	296	invincibility	
19.2	xxviii	57	297-8	jealousy	
20	xxix	57-8	298-300	insults	
21	xxix	58	300	prior consideration	
22	xxx	58-60	301-4	mockery of philosophers	
23	xxxi	60-1	304-6	appearing a philosopher	
24	xxxii	61-6	306-16	social value of philosophy	cities & states
25	xxxiii	66-8	316-19	virtue own reward	
26	xxxiv	68-9	319-21	will of nature	<i>koinai ennoiai</i>
27	xxxv	69-82	322-44	no nature of bad	Manichees
28	xxxvi	82	344-5	others' judgements	
29	–	–	–	consequences of acts	
30	xxxvii	82-91	345-60	<i>officia</i>	relationships
31	xxxviii	91-109	360-92	piety	providence
32	xxxix	109-11	392-7	divination	
33	xl-li	111-22	397-419	behaviour in public	
34	lii	122-3	420-2	allure of pleasure	

Ench. chs	Simp. lemmas	Dübner pp.	Hadot 1996 pp.	Epict. subject	Simp. subject
35	liii	123-4	422	if act chosen, act	
36	liv	124-5	423-5	behaviour at parties	Stoic logic
37	lv	125	425-6	successful roles	
38	lvi	125-6	426-7	nail metaphor	
39	lvii	126-7	427-9	shoe metaphor	
40	lviii	127	429-30	attitude to women	
41	lix	127	430-1	attitude to gym	
42	lx	127-8	431-2	all act as think best	
43	lxi	128-9	432-4	handles metaphor	
44	lxii	129	434-5	pride in externals	
45	lxiii	129-30	435-6	judging others' acts	
46	lxiv	130-1	437-9	act as phil. not talk as	
47	lxv	131-2	439-40	recticent asceticism	
48	lxvi	132-3	440-3	3 kinds of people	
49	lxvii	133-4	444-5	Chrysippus vs. action	
50	lxviii	134	445-6	be steadfast	
51	lxix	135-6	446-9	act now	
52	lxx	136-7	449-51	ethics physics logic	
53	lxxi	137-8	451-4	4 quotations	
–	–	138	454	–	final prayer

English-Greek Glossary

abandon (to): *proiēmi*
able to (to be): *dunamai*
abuse (to): *hubrizō*
abuse: *hubris*
abusive: *hubristikos*
accident: *sumbebēkos*
accommodate (to): *sunkatabainō*
accommodating: *sunkatabatikos*
accommodation: *sunkatabasis*
accuse (to): *enkaleō*
acquire (to): *ptaomai, tunkhanō*
act (a part, role, to): *hupokrinomai*
act (to): *energeō*
acted on (to be): *paskhō*
action: *pragma*
activity: *energeia*
actor: *hupokritēs*
advantage (taking): *pleonexia*
advantage (to take): *pleonekteō*
advantage: *pleonektēma*
Aeon: *aiōn*
affair: *pragma*
affection: *pathos*
aggressive: *hubristikos*
aim: *skopos*
allow (to): *sunkhōreō*
ancient: *palaios*
angelic: *angelikos*
angry (to be): *thumoō*
animal: *zōos*
animate: *empsukos*
animation: *zōtikos*
annoyance: *duskheransis*
annoyed (to get): *duskherainō*
anomalous: *anōmalos*
anomaly: *anōmalia*
antecedent (in conditional):
hēgoumenon
appear (to): *phainomai*
application: *khrēsis*
appraisal: *dokēsis*

appropriate (action): *kathêkōn*
appropriate (to be): *kathêkō*
appropriateness: *oikeiotēs*
argue (demonstratively, to):
sullogizomai
argue badly (to): *paralogizomai*
argument (syllogism): *sullogismos*
argument: *logos*
arise as by-product (to): *paraphuomai*
arrangement: *sunthesis*
art: *tekhnē*
articulate (to): *diarthroō*
artificial: *tekhnikos*
assent (to): *sunkatatithēmi*
assent: *sunkatathesis*
assimilate (to): *homoioō, oikeioō*
associate (to): *koinōneō*
association: *koinōnia*
associative: *sunagōgos*
attain (to): *tunkhanō*
attend (to): *prosekhō*
attention: *prosokhē*
attentive part: *prosektikon*
authority: *exousia*
aversion (object of): *ekklitos, pheuktos*
aversion: *ekklisis*
avoid (to): *ekklinō, pheugō*
aware (to be): *sunaisthanomai*
awareness: *sunaisthēsis*
bad (to become): *kakoō, kakunō*
bad: *kakos*
badness: *kakia*
be (to): *huparkhō*
bearable: *phorētōs*
beautiful: *kalos*
beauty: *kallos*
become (to): *gignomai*
being: *on, ousia*
belief (object of): *hupolēptos*
belief: dogma, *hupolēpsis*

- believe (to): *doxazô, hêgeomai, hupolambanô*
believing: *doxastikos*
beneficial: *ôphelimos*
benefit (to): *ôpheleô*
benefit: *ôpheleia*
better of (to get): *pleonekteô*
blame (to): *memphomai, psegô*
blame: *psogos*
blamed: *psektos*
breath: *pneuma*
care for (to): *epimeleomai*
care: *epimeleia, epimeletês*
careful (to be): *prosekhô*
care-giver: *epimeletês*
carpenter: *tektôn*
cataleptic: *katalêptikos*
cathartic: *kathartikos*
cause (not the): *anaitios*
cause: *aitios (aitia)*
caused: *aitiatos*
chance: *tukhê*
change (to): *metaballô*
change: *metabolê*
chapter: *kephalaïos*
character: *kharaktêr*
characteristic (defining): *eidopoïos*
characterise (to): *kharaktêrizô*
choice: *hairesis*
choiceworthy: *exairetos*
choose (to): *prohairesô*
citizen: *politês*
city: *polis, politeia*
cognition: *gnômê*
cognitive: *gnôstikos*
collect (to): *sunagô*
combination: *koinônia, sumplokhê*
commensurate: *summetros*
commensurateness: *summetria*
common with (to have in): *koinôneô*
common: *koinos*
communal: *koinônikos*
compel (to): *biazô*
complete: *holoklêros, holotelês, teleios*
compose (to): *suntithêmi*
composite: *sunthetos*
concede (to): *endidômi, sunkhôreô*
conceive (to): *ennoeô*
conception: *ennoia, prolêpsis*
concern: *epimeleia*
concerned (to be): *epimeleomai*
concession: *endosis*
conclude (to): *sunagô*
conclusion: *sunagôgê*
condition: *hexis, katastasis, katastêma*
conditional: *sunêmmenon*
conjunction: *sumplektikos*
consequences: *episumbainô*
consequent (in conditional): *hepomenon*
consider (in advance, to): *promeletaô*
consider (to): *hêgeomai*
constancy: *tautotês*
contiguous: *prosekhês*
control (to): *krateô*
control of (in): *kurios*
coordination: *suntaxis*
corpse: *nekros*
correct: *orthos*
cosmos: *kosmos*
counsel: *boulê*
counter-impulse (to have): *aphormaô*
counter-impulse: *aphormê*
country: *patris*
craft: *tekhnê*
craftsman: *tekhnitês*
creation of the cosmos: *kosmopoïia*
criterion: *kanôn, kritêrion*
critical: *elegtikos, kritikos*
criticise (to): *enkaleô*
cure: *iama*
custom: *nomos*
deaden (to): *nekroô*
death: *thanatos*
defeated (to be): *hêttaomai*
deficiency: *endeia*
deficient: *endeês*
demeanour: *katastêma*
demiurge: *dêmiourgos*
demiurgic: *dêmiourgikos, genesiourgos*
demonstrate (to): *apodeiknumi*
demonstration: *apodeixis*
demonstrative: *apodeiktikos*
deprive (to): *stereô*
descent (level of): *huphesis*
desire (capable of): *orettikos*
desire (object of): *orektos*
desire (passionate): *epithumia*
desire (passionately, to): *epithumeô*
desire (to): *oregomai*
desire: *orexis*
die: *thnêskô*
differ: *diapherô*
difference: *diaphora*

- different: *diaphoros*
 differential: *diaphora*
 difficulties (to raise): *aporeô*
 difficulty: *aporia*
 disassociative: *diastatikos*
 discriminate (to): *diakrinô*
 discriminating: *kritikos*
 discrimination: *diakrisis*
 dishonour (to): *atimazô*
 disjunctive: *diazeugnumai*
 dispose (to): *diatithêmi*
 disposition (ethical): *enstasis*
 disposition: *diathesis*
 distinction: *diakrisis*
 distinguish (to): *diakrinô*,
diarthrôteos, dūstêmi
 distress: *lupê, lupêros*
 distressed (to be): *lupeô*
 disturb (to): *tarattô*
 disturbance: *okhlos, tarakhê*
 divide (to): *dihaireô, merizô*
 divided: *meristos*
 divination (result of): *manteuma*
 divination (to use): *manteuomai*
 divination: *manteia*
 divinatory: *mantikos*
 divine: *theios*
 diviner: *mantis*
 divisible: *meristos*
 division: *diastasis, dihairesis,*
merismos
 doctor: *iatros*
 doctrine: *theôrêma*
 educable: *didaskalikos*
 education (proper, good): *euagogia*
 education: *paideusis*
 elemental mass: *holotês*
 embrace (to): *sumplekô*
 emotion (to join in): *sumpathainô*
 emotion: *pathos*
 emotional: *pathêtikos*
 encounter (to): *peripiptô*
 end: *telos*
 err (to): *hamartanô*
 erring: *hamartôlos*
 error: *hamartêma*
 essence (to have one's): *ousioomai*
 essence: *ousia*
 eternal: *aiônios*
 eternity: *aiôn*
 events: *gignomena, sumbainonta*
 examination: *dokimasia*
 exercise (to): *gumnazô*
 exercise: *gumnasia, gymnasion*
 exile: *phugê*
 existence (form of): *hupostasis*
 existence (to get, come into):
huphistêmi
 existence: *huparxis*
 existent thing: *on*
 fail to attain (to): *apotunkhanô*
 failure: *apotukhia*
 familiar: *gnôrimos*
 fate: *heimarmenos*
 fault: *hamartia*
 fine: *kalos*
 flee (to): *pheugô*
 flight: *phugê*
 follow (logically, to): *hepomai*
 follow (to): *akolouthêô*
 force (to): *biazô*
 force: *bia*
 forethought (to exercise): *pronoêô*
 forethought: *pronoia*
 forgive (to): *sungignôskô*
 forgiveness: *sungnômê*
 form: *eidos*
 fountain: *pêgê*
 free: *eleutheros*
 freedom from disturbance: *ataraxia*
 freedom: *eleutheria*
 friend: *philos*
 friendship: *philia, philikos*
 frustration: *duskherantikos*
 general: *koinos*
 generate (to): *gennaô*
 generated: *genêtos*
 generation (the realm of): *genesis*
 genuinely: *gnêsios*
 genus: *genos*
 gnomic: *gnômonikos*
 goal: *telos*
 god: *theos*
 god-fearing: *theosebês*
 god-like: *theoeidês*
 good fortune (of): *eutukhês*
 good fortune (to be of): *eutukheô*
 good fortune: *eutukhia*
 good life: *euzôia*
 good: *agathos, kalos*
 goodness: *agathotês*
 governor: *dioikêtês*
 govern (to): *dioikeô, oikonomeô*
 governance: *dioikêsis*
 grace (to): *kharizomai*
 grace: *kharis*

- grasp (to): *katalambanô*
 grasp in advance (to): *prolambanô*
 haphazard: *hôs etukhe*
 happen (to): *gignomai*
 happen instead (to): *episumbainô*
 happens (what): *gignomena*,
sumbainon
 happiness: *eudaimonia*, *eurhoia*
 'happy' (to be): *eurhoeô*
 happy (to be): *eudaimoneô*
 happy: *eudaimôn*
 harm (to): *blaptô*
 harm: *blabê*
 harmful: *blaberos*, *blaptikos*
 heal (to): *iaomai*
 health: *hugeia*
 healthy (to be): *hugiazomai*, *hugianô*
 healthy: *hugieinos*, *hugiês*
 head: *henas*
 hinder (to): *kôluô*
 hindered: *kôlutos*
 hold as cause (to): *aitiateon*
 honour (lack of): *atimia*
 honour (love of): *philodoxia*,
philodoxos
 honour (to love): *philodoxeô*
 honour (without): *atimos*
 hypothesis: *hupothesis*
 hypothetical: *hupothetikos*
 ill fortune (to be of): *dustukheô*
 ill-fortuned: *dustukhês*
 illuminate: *eklampô*
 illumination: *ellampsis*
 image: *eikôn*
 impede (to): *empodizô*
 impediment: *empodios*
 impiety: *asebeia*
 impious (to be): *asebeô*
 impious: *asebês*
 important: *kurios*
 impotent: *adranês*
 impression (to be object of):
phantazomai
 impression: *phantasia*
 impulse (to have an): *hormaô*
 impulse: *hormê*
 impure: *akatharos*
 inanimate: *apsukhos*
 incidental: *parergon*
 inclination: *rhopê*
 incline (to): *rhépô*
 inconsiderate: *agnômôn*
 inconsistency: *anômalia*
 incorporeal: *asômatos*
 indestructible: *aphthartos*
 individual: *idios*
 inevitably: *anankê*
 inquire (to): *skopeô*
 insensate: *anaisthêtos*
 instrument: *organon*
 insult (to): *loidoreô*
 insult: *loidoria*
 intellect: *dianoia*, *nous*
 intend (to): *proballô*
 intensity (lack of): *atonia*
 intensity (to lose): *atoneô*
 intention: *gnômê*
 intently (not): *atonos*
 intermediate: *mesotês*
 investigate (to): *skeptomai*
 investigation: *skepsis*
 irrational: *alogos*
 irrationality: *alogia*
 join (to): *sumplekô*
 judge (to): *dokimazô*, *krinô*
 judge by standard (to): *kanonizô*
 judge: *kritês*
 judgement (to form a): *doxazô*
 judgement: *gnômê*, *gnôsis*, *krisis*
 judging: *diakritikos*
 keep in mind (to): *ennoeô*
 know (to): *gignôskô*
 knowledge: *gnôsis*
 known: *gnôrimos*
 law: *nomos*
 legislation: *nomothesia*
 legislator: *nomothetês*
 liberate (to): *eleutheroô*
 libertine (to be a): *akolastainô*
 licentious: *akolastos*
 licentiousness: *akolasia*
 life: *bios*, *zôê*
 like: *homoios*
 likening: *homoioûsis*
 live (to): *bioô*, *zôô*
 logical consequence: *akolouthia*
 loss (to be at a): *aporeô*
 love (to): *phileô*
 low-level (of descent): *huphiêmi*
 make explicit (to): *diarthrôtikos*
 manifest (to): *proballô*
 master (to): *despozô*, *krateô*
 master: *despotês*
 masterly: *despotikos*
 material: *hulikos*
 matter: *hulê*

- mean: *mesos*
 measure (to instil): *metreô*
 measure: *metron*
 medical treatment: *iatreia, iatreueô*
 medical: *iatrikos*
 minor wrong: *hamartas*
 miscalculate (to): *paralogizomai*
 mix (to): *kerannumi*
 mixture: *krasis*
 model: *tupos*
 moderate: *metrios*
 moderate (to): *metriazô*
 moderate emotional state:
 metriopatheia
 moderate feeling: *metriopatheô*
 moderation: *metriophrosunê,*
 metriotês
 monad: *monas*
 money: *khrema*
 mortal: *thnêtos*
 motion: *kinêma, kinêsis*
 move (to): *kineô*
 moved by something else:
 heterokinêtos
 mover: *kinêtikos*
 necessarily: *anankê*
 necessary: *anankaios*
 need: *khreia*
 noble: *kalos*
 nobly: *gennaios, kalôs*
 notice (to): *theaomai*
 object (to): *enistêmi*
 occasion (opportune): *kairos*
 offended (to be): *bareô*
 offence (to take): *barunô*
 offence: *baros*
 offensive: *barus*
 offspring: *gennêma*
 one's own: *oikeios*
 opinion: *doxa, doxastikos*
 oppose (to): *enantioomai, enistêmi*
 opposite: *enantios*
 opposition: *enantiôsis*
 oracle: *manteion*
 order: *taxis*
 orderly (to become): *kosmeô*
 ordinary behaviour: *idiôtismos*
 ordinary person: *idiôtês*
 ordinary: *idiôtikos*
 origin: *arkhê*
 originative: *arkhikê*
 our own (not): *allogtrios*
 pain: *lupê, lupêros*
 pained (to be): *lupeô*
 part: *meros*
 partial: *merikos*
 participation: *methexis*
 particular: *merikos*
 particularity: *idiotês*
 partless: *amerês, ameristos*
 passive: *pathêtikos*
 peculiar: *idios*
 per se: *prohêgoumenos,*
 prohêgoumenôs
 perceive (to): *aisthanomai*
 perceptible: *aisthêtos*
 perception (object of): *aisthêtos*
 perception: *aisthêsis*
 perfect (to): *teleioô*
 perfect: *teleios*
 perfection: *teleiôsis, teleiotês*
 permission: *sunkhôrêsis*
 permit (to): *sunkhôrêô*
 philosopher (to be a): *philosophêô*
 philosopher: *philosophos*
 philosophy: *philosophia*
 pious: *theosebês*
 place: *topos*
 please (to): *areskô*
 pleasure (to take): *hêdomai*
 pleasure: *hêdonê*
 plurality: *plêthuntikos*
 pluralise (to): *plêthunô*
 political: *politikos*
 posit (to): *hupotithêmi*
 position: *taxis*
 possession: *khrema, ktêma, ktêsis*
 power: *dunamis*
 practice: *askêsis*
 practise (to): *askeô*
 precede (to): *prohêgeomai*
 preconception: *prolêpsis*
 premiss: *lêmma, protasis*
 preservation: *sôtêria*
 preserve (to): *sôzô*
 primary: *prohêgoumenos,*
 prohêgoumenôs
 primordial: *prôtourgos*
 privation: *sterêsis*
 problem: *aporia*
 procreation: *gennêsis*
 produce (an artifact, to): *dêmiourgeô*
 produce (generate, to): *paragô*
 producer: *dêmiourgos*
 progress (to make): *prokoptô*
 progress: *prokopê*

- prohairesis: *prohairesis*
 prohairetic: *prohairetikos*
 project (to): *proballô*
 proof: *apodeixis*
 proper: *idios, oikeios*
 prophecy: *manteia*
 prototypical: *prôtotupos*
 proximate: *prosekhês*
 pure (to be): *katharô*
 pure (to make): *kathareuô*
 pure: *katharos*
 purification: *katharsis*
 purify (to): *kathairô*
 purity: *katharôtês*
 quality: *idiôma, poiôtês*
 rational: *logikos*
 reason (cause): *aitios (aitia)*
 reason: *logos*
 reasonable: *epieikês*
 rebuke (to): *epiplêttô*
 rebuke: *epiplêxis*
 receive (to): *hupodekhomai*
 receptacle: *hupodokhê*
 recognise (to): *gignôskô*
 relation (in): *prosallêlos*
 relation: *skhesis*
 release (to): *luô*
 renewal: *ekneamos*
 repent (to): *metamelei*
 repentance: *metameleia*
 reproach (to): *oneidizô*
 reproach: *oneidismos*
 reputation: *dokêsis, doxa, doxarion*
 requirement: *khreia*
 resolve (to): *luô*
 responsible (to hold): *aitiaomai, aitiaton*
 revere god (to): *theosebeô*
 right action (to perform a): *katorthoô*
 right action: *katorthôma*
 right reason: *orthos logos*
 right: *orthos*
 rule: *kanôn*
 safety: *sôtêria*
 sameness: *tautôtês*
 save (to): *sôzô*
 saviour: *sôtêr*
 science: *epistêmê*
 scientific: *epistêmonikos*
 see (to): *theaomai*
 seem (to): *dokêô, phainomai*
 select (to): *eklegô*
 selection: *eklogê*
 self-chosen: *authairetos*
 self-control: *enkrateia*
 self-controlled (to be): *enkrateuomai*
 self-controlled: *enkratês*
 self-determined: *autexousios*
 self-motion: *autokinêsia*
 self-moved: *autokinêtos*
 self-subsistent: *authupostatos*
 separate (to): *khôrizô*
 separated: *khôristikos, khôristos*
 separation: *khôrismos*
 servant: *oiketês*
 share (to): *merizô*
 shine out (to): *eklampô*
 show (to): *apodeiknumi*
 shunned (to be): *pheukteon*
 sight: *theama*
 similar: *homoios*
 similarity: *homoiotês*
 simple: *haplos, litos*
 simplicity: *haplotês, litotês*
 situated (to be): *enidruô*
 skill: *tekhnê*
 solution: *lusiis*
 sorrow: *lupê*
 soul: *psukhê, psukhikos*
 species: *genos*
 specific form (to take its): *eidopoieô*
 specific: *eidikos, idios*
 spectacle: *thea*
 spectator: *theatês*
 speech: *logos*
 spirit (anger): *thumos*
 spirit: *pneuma*
 spirited part: *thumoeidês*
 spontaneously: *automatos*
 stable: *katastêmatikos*
 stand apart (to): *diistêmi*
 state (condition): *hexis*
 state (republic): *politeia*
 station: *taxis*
 status: *axiôma*
 Stoic: *Stôikos*
 strictly: *kuriôs*
 strive (to): *ephiêmi*
 style: *lexis*
 subordinate (to): *hupotattô*
 subsist (to): *huphistêmi*
 subsist derivatively (to):
 parhuphistêmi
 subsistence (to give): *hupostatês, hupostatikos*
 subsistence: *hupostasis*

- substance: *ousia*
 substrate (to be): *hupokeimai*
 succession: *akolouthia*
 suffer (to): *paskhō*
 suffer emotion (to): *pathainō*
 suitability: *epitēdeiotēs*
 suitable: *epitēdeios*
 superior: *kreittōn*
 superiority: *huperokhē*
 suppose (to): *hupotithēmi*
 symmetrical: *summetros*
 symmetry: *summetria*
 sympathetic: *sumpathēs*
 sympathise (to): *sumpaskhō*
 sympathy: *sumpatheia*
 take (to be the case, to): *hēgeomai*
 target: *skopos*
 teach (to): *didaskō*
 teacher: *didaskalos*
 teaching: *didaskalia*
 technical: *tekhnikos*
 test (to): *dokimazō*
 theatre: *theatron*
 theorem: *theôrēma*
 theoretical: *theôrêtikos*
 thesis: *problēma*
 thing: *pragma*
 think (to be right-thinking): *phroneō*
 think (to): *dianoēō, dokeō, hēgeomai*
 time (opportune): *kairos*
 timely: *kairios*
 tool: *organon*
 topic: *problēma, topos*
 train (to): *gumnazō*
 training-ground: *gymnasion*
 training-master: *gumnasiarkhos*
 transcend (to): *exaireō, huperanekhō*
 transcendence: *exairesis*
 treatment: *khêsis*
 true (to be): *alêtheuō, alêthizomai*
 true: *alêthēs*
 truth: *alêtheia*
 turn back (to): *epistrephō*
 turning back: *epistrophē*
 unchanged: *ametablētos*
 understand (to): *epistamai*
 understanding: *epistēmē*
 undisturbed: *atarakhos*
 undivided: *ameristos*
 unfortunate (to be): *atunkhanō*
 unfortunate result: *apotukhia*
 unfortunate: *atukhēs*
 ungenerated: *agenētos*
 unhappiness: *kakodaimonia*
 unhappy: *kakodaimōn*
 unification: *henōsis*
 union: *koinōnia*
 unity: *henōsis*
 universe: *pan*
 unpleasant: *duskherēs*
 unpleasantness: *duskhereia*
 unstable: *astatos*
 upset (being): *duskheransis*
 upset (to get): *duskherainō*
 use (one should): *khreisteon*
 use: *khreia, khrēsis, khrēstikos*
 useful: *khrēsimos*
 value: *axios*
 vice: *kakia*
 vicious (to become): *kakunō*
 violent: *biaios*
 virtue: *aretē*
 vision: *thea, theama*
 visual: *theatrikos*
 vital: *zōtikos*
 want (to): *boulomai*
 weighed down (to be): *barunō*
 well-being: *euagogia*
 whole: *holotēs, holoklēros, holos, pan*
 will: *boulēma*
 wisdom (practical): *phronēsis*
 wise person: *epistēmōn*
 wise: *phronimos*
 wish (to): *thelō*
 wish: *boulēsis, thelēsis*
 word: *logos*
 worsted (to be): *hēttaomai*
 worthy of: *axios*
 wretched (to be): *kakodaimoneō*
 wretched: *kakodaimōn*

Greek-English Index

References are to the page and line numbers of Dübner's edition, which appear in the margin of the translation. This index covers both volumes of the translation.

adranês, impotent, 12,4; 76,2

agathos, good (divine),

5,4.7.12.16.53; 6,1.2.4.7.27.34.40;
11,44.45.47; 12,6; 13,43.45;
43,4.53; 69,52; 70,29;
71,2.9.17.22.24.40.41;
72,7.24.27.29; 73,11.13.31.32.34;
74,8; 75,36.41.47.48; 77,34.50;
80,46; 81,12.13; 91,38; 100,53;
101,36.52; 102,31; 104,12.31;
108,33.34; good (person), 24,41;
32,30; 36,2; 38,45; 45,26;
60,27.30.46; 61,8.9.48; 64,38;
67,41; 85,1; 86,36; 89,45; 95,39.46;
102,6.14; 104,37.40.43.50; 131,7;
good (of soul), 1,42.44; 2,10.14;
3,49; 4,31; 6,14.51.53;
7,2.3.5.8.9.21.23.24.28.52;
8,25.27.49; 10,19.30; 11,49; 13,46;
15,3.6.9.15.24;
16,34.37.47.48.50.52;
17,1.22.35.48; 18,6.8.12.30;
19,23.26.29.51.54; 20,25.45; 21,31;
22,18.23.24.40; 23,8.33;
26,28.30.41.52;
27,1.7.8.12.13.14.19.21.38; 28,30;
30,28.31.52; 31,6;
32,16.18.20.21.38.41.51.53;
33,1.2.8.11.12.14.27.28.33; 34,31;
36,12; 38,38; 39,17.29; 40,2;
41,10.29.31.37.39.43;
42,1.4.25.31.36.41;
43,2.6.19.39.41.48; 44,3.33;
45,6.23.53; 47,4.8.24; 48,21; 50,29;
52,37; 55,10.34.44.48.53;
56,27.35.41.42; 57,3.6; 58,37;
60,15.29; 61,22.34.52.53; 62,15.40;
63,1.33.5.37.47; 65,6.13.42;

66,35.47; 67,7.9.11.14.21.30.37.47;

68,22.23; 70,42; 71,3;

73,41.42.52.53;

74,2.4.7.16.27.28.43.44.

45.46.48.49.52;

75,5.6.14.16.18.19.22.24.31.43.51;

76,13.14.18.20; 77,2.9.25.28;

78,35; 79,9.34.47.48.49.51;

80,15.32.43.49; 81,17.24.45.47;

84,44.46; 85,32;

86,1.7.15.25.36.51;

87,4.7.18.44.49; 88,53; 89,8.20.50;

90,7.26; 91,53; 92,10.20; 99,45;

104,44; 105,42; 106,21.23.28;

108,35.47; 111,6; 117,21;

118,12.43.44; 119,14; 121,16;

123,52; 124,1.4.5.8; 128,24;

129,17; 131,22.50; 132,15.43.46;

133,17.23; 134,4.17.35; 136,21.47;

138,11; good (external; lesser),

1,43; 4,12; 17,2.5; 18,38; 19,24;

20,42; 28,34; 30,25; 31,5.8.11;

32,9.12.19.23.26.30.33; 33,35;

36,11; 38,34; 41,17.27.28.38;

43,12.27.40.46; 54,8.15; 56,38;

57,8.9.25; 58,5.6.29; 60,14;

61,44.46.47.49; 62,2.51;

63,3.9.36.48; 66,48.54;

67,5.42.46.49; 68,32;

75,12.31.41.50.51; 76,54;

77,7.13.14.15.19.20.21.23.24;

78,34; 79,22.23.54; 81,44; 86,44;

92,3.25.28.32; 93,25;

105,1.5.9.21.24.25.27; 109,33;

118,47; 119,16; 123,50; 124,12;

129,13.31

agathotês, goodness,

5,9.10.22.30.45.46; 6,4.6.33;

- 12,7.53; 41,22; 43,9; 60,31; 67,17;
70,35; 73,12; 75,41.50; 86,7; 93,50;
94,15.21; 100,50.53.54; 101,28;
104,8.19.22.28; 106,13; 107,33;
110,40
- agenētos**, ungenerated, 12,12.16;
71,39.42; 72,38; 96,39.41.43
- agnōmōn**, inconsiderate, 47,20;
63,39.43.49
- aiōn**, Aeon, eternity 71,33; 81,15;
95,37; 99,30.54
- aiōnios**, eternal, 77,34; 100,3
- aisthanomai**, to perceive, 7,6; 8,49;
9,48; 10,39; 31,52; 39,19; 58,10;
102,48; 105,11; 122,51; 123,3.7;
130,11
- aisthēsis**, perception, 9,22; 10,38;
37,47; 68,29; 78,13; 103,5;
112,21.26; 122,54
- aisthētos**, perceptible, object of
perception, 9,21; 10,38; 38,31;
123,2
- aitiōmai**, to hold responsible, 9,1;
30,3; 30,18; 31,49; 47,35; 79,29;
92,47; 127,23
- aitiateon**, to hold as cause, 11,41;
102,39
- aitiōtos**, caused, 83,29; 84,7.22;
91,34; 137,29
- aitios (aitia)**, cause, reason, 3,40;
5,13; 6,12; 8,41; 9,28; 11,39;
12,17.20.32; 13,33.43; 15,9; 16,46;
17,14; 19,45; 22,19; 24,16; 27,31;
28,4; 30,1.9.18.23;
31,7.14.23.31.35;
36,5.8.9.16.37.39; 42,5.6.26.29.34;
43,11.35.38.41; 44,2.3.5.8; 56,11;
59,30; 66,16; 67,13.36; 69,32.48;
70,1.30; 72,22.32.50.51;
73,7.16.18.24.25.28; 75,3.32.33;
76,42.51; 77,23.27.32;
79,18.20.25.31; 80,16.32.37.40.45;
81,18; 83,27; 84,6.22; 85,3.16;
86,19; 87,49; 89,1; 91,30.35.43.52;
92,7.12.14.22.37.42;
93,1.7.17.21.33;
96,2.3.4.7.9.12.30.36.37.38.42.44.47;
97,15; 98,18.44; 99,25.52;
100,2.8.28.42.46.48.51;
101,27.28.29.41; 103,53;
106,27.28; 108,32.49.54;
110,35.38; 117,51.53; 122,17;
127,40; 136,34; 137,24.29.41
- akolasia**, licentiousness, 17,52;
18,1; 20,34; 21,7; 32,51; 35,33;
106,29
- akolastainō**, to be a libertine,
116,37
- akolastos**, licentious, 9,4; 52,52;
89,19
- akolouthēō**, to follow, 2,3; 34,40.43;
36,34; 44,31; 70,37; 81,3; 95,31;
109,44; 113,29; 116,25; 121,41;
124,31; 126,48; 127,53;
128,1.2.25.29; 136,38; 137,28.38.43
- akolouthia**, logical consequence,
succession, 2,18; 96,12.18.29.32;
136,37
- alētheia**, truth, 2,27; 5,48; 19,42;
27,16; 28,4.17; 61,43; 62,35; 66,5;
70,18.19; 72,37; 73,10; 74,48; 87,3;
88,3; 100,23; 113,3; 118,1; 119,3;
121,39; 128,20; 134,38; 138,30
- alēthēs**, true, 3,16; 5,29; 7,7.27;
8,19.20; 9,14.18; 10,34; 11,15;
14,11; 16,35; 20,15; 23,36; 25,39;
36,46; 46,49; 48,48; 51,17;
57,11.45.46; 66,33; 68,27.35.44;
72,15; 73,9; 75,8.10; 79,46; 87,4;
88,30; 91,5; 104,39.42; 108,10;
110,47; 114,40; 120,40.43;
124,13.27.33.34; 132,44.47;
134,1.42; 136,21.43
- alētheuō**, to be true, 8,20; 9,33;
13,24
- alēthizomai**, to speak the truth,
91,40
- allotrios**, not our own, 16,34.43;
17,6.21.22; 24,13; 27,14; 28,30;
32,8.11.19; 33,34; 36,49; 42,11;
44,50; 45,12.47;
47,19.25.27.34.40-2.45.48; 48,17;
51,48.49; 52,11.34; 56,41; 58,36;
59,15; 68,7; 69,42; 76,31;
83,46.49.50; 91,9; 133,20
- alogia**, irrationality, 30,36.53;
31,1.21.27.42; 48,28; 78,43; 117,15
- alogos**, irrational, 1,41; 2,4; 7,30;
30,21.33.51; 33,18; 36,46; 57,19;
63,38; 69,15; 86,33; 89,22; 112,17;
115,1; 123,46; 125,45.50.53; 126,2;
129,3; 132,19.39.53; 138,26
- ameinōn**, better, 103,49; 125,38
- amerēs**, partless, 97,40; 99,29
- ameristos**, undivided, 86,51; 100,36;
132,48

- ametablêtos**, unchanged, 6,1;
76,6.21; 99,7.25.31.51; 107,31
- anaisthêtos**, insensate, 41,11
- anaitios**, not the cause, 11,54; 36,4;
42,42; 44,17; 79,26.29; 80,51;
106,29
- anakaïos**, necessary, 1,11; 3,14;
8,13; 24,24; 25,54; 33,41.46;
34,25.27.33; 35,8; 41,30.36; 42,44;
43,5.18; 45,20; 48,40; 50,33; 53,12;
77,10.13.23; 80,9.14.36.39; 81,25;
88,53; 89,46; 93,14; 110,9.19.21;
112,33.35.54; 114,35; 115,13;
118,48; 119,34.35; 136,20.31.46.50
- anankê**, necessarily, 3,36; 5,13.18;
8,8.53; 9,1.34.38.48; 10,47;
11,27.34.36.53; 14,31.39;
17,3.6.13; 19,14.16; 21,12.14.50;
22,3.33; 24,6.17; 26,6.10; 35,13.22;
40,23; 41,31.35.37.43; 42,6.41;
43,11.38; 49,16; 51,36; 52,3.10.40;
55,5.16; 56,15; 63,4.31; 69,13.26;
70,11.12.13.15.19.37; 76,3.15;
79,23.41; 80,3; 86,5; 87,10.13.26;
92,4.7.22; 96,38.52; 97,2.37.40;
99,28.33; 100,41; 101,4.6;
103,14.19.33; 105,6.20; 109,17;
111,21; 112,52; 114,28; 115,8;
116,16.18.35; 117,40; 119,26;
121,53.54; 128,25.29; 135,44;
137,28.40
- anataxis**, stretching (up), 77,15;
99,44; 104,31, 108,41
- anateinesthai**, stretch (up), 5,5.36;
70,20; 107,7; 109,4; 132,43
- angelikos**, angelic, 42,53; 45,54;
80,7
- anômalia**, anomaly, inconsistency,
20,8; 102,3; 102,13
- anômalos**, anomalous, 103,28
- aphormaô**, to have a counter-
impulse, 22,37.44.45; 23,15
- aphormê**, counter-impulse, 4,21.36;
15,30.49; 22,47.53; 23,18; 110,18
- aphthartos**, indestructible,
12,13.16; 71,21.39.42; 72,38
- apodeiknumi**, to demonstrate, to
show, 3,11.25; 12,14; 17,45; 27,54;
45,13; 58,28; 65,54; 66,33; 101,49;
104,43; 106,27; 111,9; 136,34;
137,1
- apodeiktikos**, demonstrative, 28,9;
101,7; 105,19; 137,4
- apodeixis**, demonstration, 20,48;
28,45.52; 44,45; 56,11; 95,24.48;
110,33.35; 136,25.26.33.36.37
- aporêô**, to be at a loss, to raise
difficulties, 16,9; 36,1; 41,45;
48,40; 73,14.30; 104,48; 105,9
- aporia**, difficulty, problem, 35,48;
42,28; 69,49; 115,31; 128,51
- apotukhia**, failure, unfortunate
result, 11,12; 26,22; 30,24; 43,36;
74,13.22.28.30.36.38; 75,31;
81,35.40.41.43; 82,7.9; 111,25
- apotunkhanô**, to fail to attain,
16,48; 17,3.5.12.30;
19,14.22.28.36; 21,19.46; 30,16.19;
38,28; 46,34; 52,12.14.20;
56,15.18; 57,18; 81,48;
82,6.13.17.18; 92,1.5.49; 93,15;
104,45.48; 105,7.41
- apsukhos**, inanimate, 6,21.49; 9,45;
14,9.10.15.16.36; 67,33; 98,43; 99,9
- areskô**, to please, 20,35;
35,15.16.18.20.24; 44,26; 60,24;
65,30.31; 91,37; 116,29; 118,30
- aretê**, virtue, 2,2.32; 3,1; 7,28; 11,51;
14,19; 18,35; 19,5.6;
32,3.25.26.29.31.36; 35,35; 39,21;
40,1.45; 42,35.37.45.50.53;
43,2.43; 48,49; 51,21; 57,2; 66,33;
74,10; 80,11.4; 82,50.51; 86,51;
88,4.6; 89,15.16.17; 103,44; 104,1;
108,17; 113,1; 135,43
- aristos**, best, 8,52; 39,32; 42,20;
86,23; 88,20.27; 91,38.49.51;
93,23; 95,7.8; 99,44; 108,45;
117,22; 125,24.25.33
- arkhê**, origin,
5,2.4.6.11.12.17.18.21.22.25.29.30.
32.36.40.44-52; 7,50; 8,23;
15,2.30.36; 16,6.8.10.31; 26,1;
27,40; 31,32; 32,9; 34,5; 36,34;
38,48; 39,2.12.43; 44,3.4; 48,20;
51,47; 53,15; 55,39; 58,2.41.42;
59,17.47; 62,7; 66,28; 68,33;
69,49.51; 70,10.19.20.21.22.26.28;
71,1.13.23; 72,23.36.38.51.54;
73,2.3.21.23.29; 75,3.36.40; 77,53;
80,50; 83,22; 87,43; 91,15.18;
95,50; 96,3.4.18.19.51;
97,21.25.26; 98,1.5.7.18.24.47.35;
99,36.40; 100,28.38.40.49.53;
101,1.2.12.21.22.24.25.26.27.40;
104,5.7; 107,16; 108,33.40.47;

- 110,11; 112,20; 113,20; 115,43;
119,10; 121,44; 127,25; 133,35.8;
134,3; 135,28; 138,10.11
- arkhikê**, originative, 5,50; 43,53;
69,53; 70,15.17.24; 78,31.38.45;
100,2; 101,15.20
- asebeia**, impiety, 69,48; 72,20
- asebeô**, to be impious, 15,51; 35,34;
73,8.20
- asebês**, impious, 16,2; 70,52; 72,35;
73,10; 93,18; 94,52; 107,1; 117,42;
130,33; 134,36.37.40
- askeô**, to practise, 88,39; 132,4
- askêsis**, practice, 18,35; 19,7; 23,5;
49,20; 88,4; 131,46; 132,17
- asômatos**, incorporeal, 96,1; 98,1;
132,47
- astatos**, unstable, 6,10
- atarakhos**, undisturbed, 24,18;
25,41; 26,19.46; 27,44; 28,15;
29,4.14.38.44; 32,6; 35,12
- ataraxia**, freedom from
disturbance, 27,48; 50,9.17.24;
109,37
- atimazô**, to dishonour, 29,30; 61,38;
66,26; 98,35; 119,17
- atimia**, lack of honour, 27,10; 41,24;
61,24.29.34.37.39.40.43.45.50.52;
62,4.9.10; 66,42; 67,41.9
- atimos**, without honour,
61,32.45.46; 62,5; 67,3; 76,1;
102,54
- atonêô**, to lose intensity, 19,42; 24,6;
25,5; 77,50
- atonia**, lack of intensity, 40,12; 136,3
- atonos**, not intently, 18,46; 40,41;
56,45; 135,53
- atukhês**, unfortunate, 20,50.52;
21,21; 22,16
- atunkhanô**, to be unfortunate,
21,13.16.50; 24,6; 25,4
- autexousios**, self-determined,
4,44.51; 8,37; 10,8.16;
11,28.29.30.33.43.45; 13,50;
14,29.30.44; 16,22.27; 20,44;
43,33.36.37.51; 58,38; 61,53;
67,21; 77,47; 78,52; 79,13.27.45;
80,41.45.49; 104,53; 108,46
- autexousiotês**, 79,51
- authairetos**, self-chosen, 20,46
- authupostatos**, self-subsistent,
96,43.44; 97,27.37.38; 98,48.3
- autokinêsia**, self-motion, 37,40
- autokinêtos**, self-moved, 6,26;
11,33.34.36; 13,52.53; 14,2.11;
15,4.8; 36,22.31; 37,37.52; 38,7;
43,37; 78,4; 96,47.52;
97,2.14.15.18.28.29.30.33.35;
98,2.5.17.22.48.53; 99,31.50;
100,2.29; 108,46; 110,46; 138,25
- automatos**, spontaneously, 8,17;
71,13; 96,6.8.35
- axiôma**, status, 2,23; 69,53; 70,24;
100,41; 101,15; 122,32.36;
124,26.28.45.47
- axios**, value, worthy of, 7,45; 12,37;
13,7.11.18; 18,18; 19,38; 20,32;
34,19; 36,36.40; 37,43; 38,2.8;
41,8.9.19.28.46; 51,42; 54,1.34;
57,44; 59,50; 60,15.33; 62,53;
63,2.6; 65,53; 72,14; 78,45; 80,40;
82,35.48.53; 83,4; 88,43; 90,2.12;
93,47; 99,42.48; 103,50.52;
104,3.14.38; 105,28.41; 106,13;
110,26; 116,42; 119,17.19; 121,43;
123,36; 124,50; 125,6.32.42;
127,41; 131,49
- bareô**, to be offended, 115,35;
117,28; 118,6; 122,10
- baros**, offence, 118,6
- barunô**, to take offence, to be
weighed down, 12,36; 58,45
- barus**, offensive, 118,7.14;
119,39.50; 122,36; 126,46
- beltiôn**, better, 28,40; 59,33; 103,47
- beltistos**, best, 26,29; 60,18; 68,18;
135,8; 136,13
- bia**, force, 35,34; 72,39.46;
79,14.19.28.30.46; 117,23; 132,9
- biaios**, violent, 10,49; 117,26
- biazô**, to compel, 17,36; 30,41; 43,30;
53,19; 72,43.49.52; 79,16.17.29;
86,42; 105,19; 132,7
- bioô**, to live, 61,32; 135,31; 136,15
- bios**, life, 1,5.8.39; 13,10.12.13.15.16;
14,23; 15,20; 17,42.45; 18,2.4.9.23;
19,33; 23,19.53; 26,2; 33,41.47.53;
34,25.35.47; 35,40.44; 38,3;
39,21.31.53; 40,49; 45,29; 50,46;
53,12; 55,1.28.32; 59,6.7.8.13.34;
63,30; 64,44; 65,3.50; 66,54; 93,17;
94,13.23; 105,34; 111,49.51;
113,5.31.34; 116,40.41.45; 119,36;
125,42.52; 126,8; 127,14.30;
128,48; 135,30
- blabê**, harm, 18,13; 27,5; 38,13;

- 41,20; 85,47.48; 92,17.18.19;
109,6; 123,11.26; 128,13; 132,37
- blaberos**, harmful, 8,26.34; 13,46;
16,49; 17,38.49; 18,14; 21,32;
23,38; 29,35; 36,7; 38,39;
39,2.3.6.15; 43,29; 44,37; 58,20;
62,40; 66,25; 87,9; 92,11; 122,47
- blaptikos**, harmful, 18,39
- blaptô**, to harm, 8,31; 17,33.37.38;
21,48; 23,36; 46,44.46; 49,2.10;
56,4; 57,48; 58,22; 78,19;
82,23.24.27.28; 83,25; 85,48.50;
90,45; 91,20; 92,15.16.35; 105,44;
106,38.40; 118,10; 125,44; 126,37;
128,7.9.10.11.15.19.22.26; 129,49;
131,51; 135,47; 138,7.13
- boulê**, counsel, 88,9; 109,51
- boulêma**, will, 68,38
- boulêsis**, wish, 13,42; 43,20;
67,13.16.20.24.27.33.34.37;
102,30.39; 103,52
- boulomai**, want, 1,27.40; 2,35.38.48;
3,47; 8,7; 9,5.7.21.38; 14,28;
15,40.43.50; 16,10; 17,28; 18,10;
21,45; 38,47; 40,34; 44,16.34.40;
48,6.7; 50,23.54;
51,7.9.10.45.50.51; 52,13.38;
53,39; 56,47; 58,45.50;
60,25.41.42; 61,25; 63,31; 64,48;
66,8; 67,7.15.21.26-30.34.47;
72,22; 84,51; 85,23.24; 86,50;
87,17; 89,21; 92,44; 95,16;
102,20.24; 110,46; 111,19; 112,23;
118,26.31; 120,46; 122,26; 126,50;
129,28.45; 130,17; 131,12.40;
132,7; 134,4.5; 136,14.16.18; 137,37
- dêmiourgeô**, to produce (an
artifact), 64,44
- dêmiourgikos**, demiurgic, 13,41
- dêmiourgos**, demiurge, 1,23; 35,51;
76,25; 81,14; 100,7; producer,
64,26; 65,1
- despotês**, master, 16,24; 19,17;
52,23.24.31.44.48.50.53; 53,4;
55,8; 64,3; 85,14.17; 101,36;
115,33; 116,26.35; 125,40; 138,22
- despotikos**, masterly, 78,46
- despozô**, to master, 1,25; 123,46
- diakrinô**, distinguish, 7,40; 19,24;
30,52; 63,45; 71,10; 83,38; 87,8;
100,8; 101,31; 125,49
- diakrisis**, distinction, 20,39; 31,37;
100,6.7.10.11.37
- diakritikos**, judging, 18,39; 87,6;
132,46
- dianoëô**, to think, 99,3
- dianoia**, intellect, 110,41
- diapherô**, to differ, 14,9; 21,30;
40,32; 49,50; 68,20.35; 114,46;
123,34; 132,41; 134,23
- diaphora**, differentia, 5,24.25.35;
difference, 12,23.32; 14,20; 20,36;
24,39; 27,17; 36,35; 38,3; 60,38;
63,45; 70,3; 82,46; 83,19.26.31;
89,31; 94,31; 100,20.26.29; 122,40;
137,45
- diaphoros**, different, 12,20; 13,20;
94,23; 116,11; 133,10.2.3
- diarthroô**, to articulate, 69,47;
73,26; 95,18; 109,3; 134,29
- diarthrôteos**, must distinguish, 2,30
- diarthrôtikos**, make explicit, 136,36
- diastasis**, division, 87,11
- diastatikos**, disassociative,
83,34.46.49.52;
84,11.12.15.19.24.26
- diathesis**, disposition, 8,54; 9,52;
11,38.41; 20,22; 28,24; 30,13.38;
38,4; 39,42; 42,48; 46,11; 47,37;
59,23; 74,1.3; 76,28; 77,4; 105,16;
106,30; 114,3
- diatithêmi**, to dispose, 15,29; 16,26;
20,17; 25,26.28; 27,18.22; 29,9;
31,27; 32,22.42; 35,23; 36,39;
39,13; 47,17.25.27.31.39.41; 49,2;
50,42; 55,13; 69,11.22; 76,10;
85,45; 91,40.50; 92,19; 103,19;
109,13.15; 115,21; 128,40
- diazeugnumenos**, disjunctive,
124,16.17.25.45.50.51
- didaktos**, trained, 4,14
- didaskalia**, teaching, 27,25; 117,21;
130,35
- didaskalikos**, educable, 117,50
- didaskalos**, teacher, 24,40;
55,3.31.33; 86,1.10.13.15; 110,29;
125,28.33; 130,51; 131,33.42;
133,32; 135,16; 137,19
- didaskô**, to teach, 3,7; 4,18; 11,18;
15,2.20; 20,4; 24,17; 32,5.7; 35,53;
44,22; 55,20; 64,37; 83,22; 84,21;
87,46; 113,1; 119,33; 126,28;
127,11; 130,35.40.44.46;
133,28.29; 136,30.37.46
- dihaireô**, to divide, 24,12.19; 58,3;

- 83,16; 98,40; 106,16; 109,11;
127,9; 132,33
- dihairesis**, division, 3,35; 8,1.3.4;
15,1; 16,12; 30,23.49; 51,47;
67,1.4; 102,17.27
- diistēmi**, to stand apart, 21,6; 70,6;
133,48
- dioikeō**, to govern, 17,15; 36,3.16;
91,43.51; 92,47.50; 101,47; 104,34
- dioikēsis**, governance, 35,51
- dioikētēs**, governor, 42,20
- dogma**, belief, 23,24; 28,5.21.28;
29,12.27.33.34; 30,2.5; 46,39;
54,22.23.28; 57,39.41.42; 58,21;
137,21
- dokeō**, to think, 1,43; 4,31.42; 8,26;
10,8; 11,3; 13,14; 14,32.35.43;
17,14.51; 20,31; 21,35;
22,28.41.43; 23,41; 27,49.54;
28,1.7.10.12.13.14.45;
29,4.15.19.22.35.50; 31,9;
32,8.11.16; 33,12.33; 34,9; 35,25;
36,17; 39,36; 41,2.5; 42,28; 43,52;
45,43.46; 46,5; 50,34.41.54;
51,1.6.7.10; 53,33; 54,5.8.43;
55,46; 56,1.2.31.49; 57,8;
58,19.31.32.46;
60,20.41.42.45.47.51; 61,2.8;
66,38.42; 67,9; 74,45; 76,29.53;
77,29; 86,42; 88,30;
92,12.13.16.22.25.27.28.33.36.50;
95,39; 101,20.43; 102,2.3.48;
104,38; 105,5.22; 107,48; 108,29;
112,7; 113,39; 114,10; 117,53;
118,5.25.40.42.50; 119,40;
121,13.54; 122,25.28.38;
128,5.12.29; 130,33; 132,3; 133,17;
134,38; 138,1
- dokēsis**, appraisal, 51,4; 61,5; 93,9;
reputation, 51,8.19
- dokimasia**, examination, 119,41
- dokimazō**, to judge, test, 40,31;
109,15
- doxa**, opinion, 4,16; 15,48; 33,25;
84,37; 91,41; 119,20; 123,51;
124,11; 126,12; 131,22; 132,17;
reputation, 50,51; 51,29; 60,43;
86,28.45; 117,3.53; 118,46.47;
119,14; 125,35; 126,27
- doxarion**, reputation, 16,39; 55,51
- doxastikos**, believing, 126,4; 136,22
- doxazō**, to believe, to form a
judgement, 4,13.14; 12,15; 15,50;
16,5; 29,46; 32,47; 33,24; 99,4
- dunamai**, to be able to, 1,43; 2,33;
4,4; 6,10; 11,43; 16,23; 17,18.38;
18,28; 19,4.19.27; 20,43; 23,7;
26,4.7; 28,15; 33,53; 34,6; 38,36;
40,31.39.46; 43,50; 44,27;
45,18.30; 46,3; 47,18.33; 48,25;
49,4.24; 51,17.54; 52,27.29.33;
53,26; 54,37; 57,33; 60,48.53;
62,11.14.23.25.33; 63,1.5.21.45;
64,15.18.46; 65,11.32.39;
67,24.25.33; 71,7.30.31; 73,28;
80,23.28.44; 82,12.45; 84,45;
87,32; 89,20.48; 90,33; 91,14; 92,8;
97,14.28.41.44; 98,4;
102,20.21.24.26; 103,36; 105,29;
107,35; 109,54; 110,49; 116,28;
117,15; 119,22; 125,37; 128,11;
133,9; 134,18; 138,7
- dunamis**, power, 1,40; 2,34; 5,18.19;
13,42.45; 19,44; 22,2; 23,13; 37,35;
40,37.40; 43,51; 44,15; 46,2; 49,19;
51,21; 57,33; 61,33; 62,50;
63,11.28;
67,7.12.13.16.18.20.28.35;
70,31.33; 73,32; 78,21.39; 87,28;
88,10; 89,1.22; 89,49; 90,34;
94,10.30.47; 95,5.12.27; 97,20;
99,32.53; 100,15.54; 101,1.2.3.52;
102,22.30; 103,8; 104,2; 120,20;
122,7; 137,46; 138,16
- duskerainō**, to get annoyed, 9,6;
39,37.39; 44,49; 45,11; 47,32; 48,4;
52,6; 53,19; 57,46.47.48; 67,40;
82,24.28.29.35.38.39; 92,38; 93,16;
101,17.19; 103,25; 122,39.46;
125,47; 128,42
- duskeransis**, annoyance, 45,12;
57,44; 67,45
- duskerantikos**, frustration, 35,14
- duskerēia**, unpleasantness, 24,25;
29,39; 105,24
- duskerēs**, unpleasant, 24,54;
26,5.34.37.39.52; 27,19.35.45.49;
28,47; 29,38.40; 39,43.53;
41,2.4.53; 44,44.46.48; 49,50;
65,52; 66,16; 109,39; 110,15;
121,40
- dustukheō**, to be of ill-fortune,
21,9.16.50; 22,3; 104,40.50
- dustukhēs**, ill-fortuned, 20,50.53;
21,3.12.22; 26,45; 116,13

- eidikos**, specific, 64,21
eidopoieô, to take its specific form, 7,43.48; 80,35; 129,37.48
eidopoios, defining characteristic, 20,43
eidos, form, 2,17; 5,37; 10,21; 12,53; 13,15; 37,54; 38,1; 40,32; 46,10; 73,39.40; 74,4.18.22.24; 80,5.12.21.43; 84,40; 94,5.11.13.44; 95,18; 97,45.48.50; 98,21.23.37; 99,17; 100,6.10.17.20.22.26.33.36.39; 101,2; 109,9; 110,8.39; 112,29.34.40.51.53; 113,15.44; 117,2; 123,15; 132,42.47.54; 133,22
eikôn, image, 98,31; 100,10
ekklinô, to avoid, 8,51; 14,6; 15,14; 16,51.54; 17,11.13.19.24.26.29.31; 18,16; 19,15; 20,4.11; 21,6.8.9.11.20.31.46.49.54; 22,4.6.11.45; 23,46; 24,15; 30,17.20; 31,9; 33,4.25; 39,22; 42,32; 45,25; 46,34; 52,21.31.39.42; 53,6; 55,7; 56,14.16.18; 57,19; 61,24; 65,39; 73,6; 92,2.4.5.7.10.49; 93,2.5.8.16; 104,46.49; 105,6.8; 109,19.25.28.49; 132,43; 135,11
ekklisis, aversion, 4,26.32.37.38; 7,34; 8,33; 9,41; 14,18; 15,13; 17,35; 19,12; 20,54; 21,15.19.52; 22,5.9.26.38.43.47.53; 23,18.28.49; 32,54; 33,2.17; 39,28; 42,33; 43,51; 44,32.33; 47,9.23; 62,52; 86,39; 92,1; 93,3.14; 109,17.21.30.48; 119,47; 133,3.16; 134,8
ekklitos, object of aversion, 4,27.35; 20,40; 109,34
eklampô, illuminate, 87,2; 88,8
eklegô, select, 17,50; 55,17.22; 79,6; 86,31; 115,24; 124,54; 125,6.42
eklogê, selection, 66,36; 86,22.25; 87,14.43
ektasis, stretching (out), 4,25; 10,43.50; 22,22
ekteneia, (vital) extension, 14,3
ekteineisthai, to stretch (out), 10,3.37.52
ekneamos, renewal, 37,1; 43,14; 76,35
elenktikos, critical, 117,47
eleutheria, freedom, 19,13; 29,19; 42,10; 52,37; 57,13.16.25; 66,20; 68,13; 125,19; 132,22
eleutheroô, to liberate, 29,19; 76,34
eleutheros, free, 1,22; 4,50; 16,19.21; 17,41; 23,52; 52,38
ellampsis, illumination, 66,26; 93,31.47; 94,2.28.46
empodios, impediment, 44,50.52; 45,2.4.8.22.41; 125,22
empodizô, to impede, 3,14; 4,4; 17,9; 18,15.29; 22,8; 32,40; 38,13; 45,7.8; 51,13; 66,29
empuskhos, animate, 6,21; 8,24; 98,14.15.42; 103,43
enantioomai, to oppose, 80,26
enantios, opposite, 4,26.35; 7,18.25.53; 8,50; 11,24.44.48; 15,16.54; 22,28; 29,22; 31,12; 36,48.53; 37,2.3.5; 38,24; 39,47; 50,3; 51,32; 61,50.51.52; 68,36; 69,54; 70,2.4.7.10; 71,25; 73,13-15.32.34; 77,10; 79,41; 84,8; 87,19; 92,43; 95,40; 97,10; 105,4.12; 106,31; 108,10; 114,5; 128,32; 135,37; 136,5
enantiosis, opposition, 19,35; 84,10
endeês, deficient, 6,2; 9,45.50; 10,24; 16,26; 19,50
endeia, deficiency, 8,41; 9,43.44.50.51; 10,6.14; 126,49
endidômi, to concede, 1,38; 4,46; 6,54; 10,13.47; 13,22; 23,16; 31,48; 35,10; 38,32; 44,15; 63,27; 78,43; 80,27.41; 82,36.37; 101,17; 127,13; 133,44; 136,16; 138,1
endosis, concession, 52,51.54
energeia, activity, 2,24; 3,12.20; 4,50; 8,9.12.23.25; 11,37.41; 15,5.9.10; 30,32; 33,29; 37,35; 38,13; 39,34; 40,6.7.9.15.33; 44,53; 45,18; 52,10; 64,22; 74,11.14.35.37.46.47; 76,5; 79,19; 80,30.47; 81,54; 82,20; 83,13; 93,51; 94,27; 99,1.28.32.53; 100,15; 105,50; 119,4.8; 122,53; 123,32; 127,38
energeô, to act, 4,50; 6,47; 8,19; 11,30.32; 15,18; 30,21.47; 40,6.8.11.13; 52,9; 67,24; 74,38.44.53; 78,44; 79,27.40; 80,24.29.40; 99,30; 104,29; 112,26; 135,10
enidruô, to be situated, 5,40.46; 6,6; 75,47
enistêmi, to object, 8,7; 50,35

- enkaleô**, to accuse, 17,40;
30,8.10.30.47; 31,22.35.52; 37,27;
91,52; 123,27
- enkrateia**, self-control, 23,19; 46,5,6;
92,29; 117,14.18; 123,14; 132,4
- enkratês**, self-control, 46,9
- enkrateuomai**, to be self-controlled,
123,28
- ennoeô**, to keep in mind, to conceive,
26,22; 46,45; 47,43; 54,7; 55,48;
59,32; 62,36; 68,54; 70,48; 72,42;
73,30.46; 79,43; 83,30;
85,34.41.51; 90,25; 92,40;
99,41.45; 103,36.42; 109,22; 110,2;
118,43; 120,50; 123,24; 128,24;
131,47; 134,3.12; 135,23
- ennoia**, conception, 20,14; 27,2;
31,1; 33,30; 47,37.39; 57,28; 59,37;
68,20.25.28; 69,4.25; 77,8; 87,18;
92,38; 93,35.45; 95,30.33;
99,37.42; 101,31; 102,11; 124,27;
137,40.51
- enstasis**, ethical disposition, 48,21;
49,48; 57,27.30; 58,44; 59,40.45;
60,5.25.35; 61,14.26; 63,12.32;
64,16; 65,53; 66,22; 87,27; 114,47;
objection, 9,41; 44,44; 45,15.21;
66,38.46
- ephiêmi**, to strive, 5,5.17; 6,28;
10,19; 19,37.47; 22,30.43.48;
41,34; 68,23; 74,43.50.52;
75,2.19.25; 89,27; 92,10; 100,52;
131,53; 132,49
- epieikês**, reasonable, 54,28.32;
66,16; 114,46
- epimeleia**, care, 10,27; 18,32; 19,21;
47,44; 48,46; 50,50; 51,26; 61,13;
65,10; 85,5.7; 87,38; 91,13;
102,1.37; 103,4.13.21.32; 105,41;
107,39; 127,15.29
- epimeleomai**, to care for,
3,48.50.51.53; 11,51; 20,2; 35,6;
39,25; 47,46; 48,16.25; 49,7.12;
65,40; 85,3; 87,41; 89,44; 90,9;
91,6; 93,1.4; 102,15.33.34;
103,14.16.22.34; 106,36.47;
115,19.42
- epimeletês**, care, 86,3; 103,20.31.38
- epiplêttô**, to rebuke, 95,43;
122,32.36.44
- epiplêxis**, rebuke, 129,42
- epistamai**, to understand, 50,54;
51,7.19; 60,41; 137,46
- epistêmê**, science, 30,47; 35,37;
39,21; 51,1.6; 86,51; 93,21; 94,49;
110,37
- epistêmôn**, wise person,
9,11.13.16.20; 51,16; 110,39
- epistêmonikos**, scientific, 30,43;
93,34; 108,18; 110,34.45;
136,20.25.47; 137,5
- epistrophô**, to turn back, 6,43;
34,41; 38,37; 39,17; 50,41.48;
58,53; 59,30; 60,36; 61,12; 66,40;
71,2; 95,28; 107,29; 108,53; 109,1;
112,15; 118,27; 119,13; 120,45;
133,23; 134,45.52
- epistreptikos**, turning backwards,
33,32
- epistrophê**, turning backwards,
33,39; 34,33; 62,18; 107,22.43.52;
113,46; 138,4
- episumbainô**, consequences,
25,52.54; 26,6.14.45; 27,19.35.45;
happen instead, 74,14.36.39.42.47
- epitêdeios**, suitable, 10,36.43; 12,47;
23,50; 29,48; 55,18; 86,43; 90,34;
93,46; 98,47; 105,49; 107,39
- epitêdeiotês**, suitability, 10,42;
104,18.25
- epithumeô**, to desire (passionately),
8,43; 56,44; 58,40; 59,27; 60,40;
63,11; 68,7; 74,50
- epithumia**, (passionate) desire,
4,41; 38,20; 53,21; 58,41; 78,15.25;
89,26; 114,34; 119,32; 132,54;
133,2
- euagôgia**, proper education, 11,40;
19,12; 23,50; 59,4; 66,28; 69,48;
82,54; 89,44; 95,22; 137,33;
well-being, 65,40; 66,30; 72,36;
81,23
- eudaimôn**, happiness, 2,1.11; 16,47;
17,41; 18,17; 105,12
- eudaimoneô**, to be happy, 104,41
- eudaimonia**, happiness, 16,45;
19,13; 20,1; 21,27; 116,15
- eurhoêô**, to be 'happy', 35,17.22;
38,52; 44,25.40; 56,31; 57,12;
95,40.47; 102,5; 105,14; 137,33
- eurhoia**, happiness, 102,6
- eutukheô**, to be of good fortune,
21,17; 95,43; 104,41
- eutukhês**, of good fortune, 20,52;
21,1.4; 105,11
- eutukhia**, good fortune, 21,43

- euzōia**, good life, 5,2; 23,33;
59,10.15.18; 66,5.27; 87,3; 93,44;
108,40; 134,40
- exaireō**, to transcend, 36,20.23;
37,36; 38,11; 43,18; 53,27.45.51;
54,3.43; 70,22; 78,33; 91,35;
104,11.32
- exairesis**, transcendence, 53,50
- exairetos**, choiceworthy, 125,2
- exousia**, authority, 4,2; 7,45; 10,28;
13,13; 14,46; 15,23; 16,21.33; 17,8;
21,21; 43,49; 52,25.32.35
- genesiourgos**, demiurgic, 19,43
- genesis**, generation, 2,45; 9,29;
12,42.52; 34,13.14.18.26.40; 36,18;
37,15; 40,37.38; 42,18.20.23; 46,1;
53,45.48; 73,25; 76,42.43; 86,8;
96,13.19.29; 128,31
- genētos**, generated, 37,14; 43,15;
98,23; 102,54
- gennaios**, nobly, 26,29.33
- gennaō**, to generate, 1,23; 34,23;
54,21; 115,38
- gennēma**, offspring, 102,35.43
- gennēsis**, procreation, 78,18
- genos**, nation, 34,21.23; genus,
70,3.6.8.9.11; 100,22; 115,36;
species, 78,18.26; family, 83,46.50;
89,54; 90,20; 105,3
- gignomai**, to become; to come to be,
8,9.27; 9,33.50; 11,50; 12,5;
13,23.29.46; 23,40.50; 25,5.7;
26,22.38.48; 30,36.44; 31,23.33;
32,20; 36,27; 37,6.7.8; 40,44;
42,39; 44,11; 49,5; 53,43.47;
56,20.21.23; 59,20.24; 62,2; 64,39;
70,38.52; 71,15; 73,49; 75,33;
76,23.37.39.42; 77,46; 79,53;
80,41; 82,2.14.19; 84,49; 86,19;
88,35; 89,12; 93,32; 94,26.28;
96,6.7.8.17.36.38; 97,6.7.8.49;
98,20; 103,48.51.54; 105,49;
107,10.34.42.52; 108,5.19.53;
110,34.35.39; 112,48; 113,40.54;
114,48; 118,8.35.46; 119,25.27.43;
120,16; 121,24; 122,54; 129,20;
130,45; 135,52; 136,25; happen,
18,44; 28,1.2; 29,35; 32,53;
35,26.45; 36,15; 39,41; 41,48.49;
44,23.35.38.41.42; 45,48.49; 46,29;
50,20; 56,6; 69,5.16.23; 75,39;
80,33.36; 81,36.38.39.42.50.52;
82,9.11.36; 92,36.46; 94,44.46;
102,13; 109,47; 119,47; 120,2.7.13;
123,1; 128,12; 137,31.32.49
- gignomena**, what happens, 4,6;
6,52; 16,31; 26,24; 29,35;
35,14.24.26; 36,1.10.12.13;
36,15.30; 37,27; 41,8.46.49;
44,24.30.41; 45,48; 53,17; 68,2.50;
69,1; 75,39.47; 76,2; 81,50; 82,47;
83,6.38; 85,49; 87,18; 88,52;
91,37.38.48.49.50; 93,6.22.24.46;
94,47; 96,6.14.30.35.37.40;
97,3.15; 98,18.20; 103,24; 107,23;
108,13.44; 119,45.46; 121,4.7.45;
129,51; 137,31.32
- gignōskō**, to know, 3,21; 13,10.34;
20,41; 30,28.29; 36,46; 46,42.50;
59,16; 71,8; 77,41; 101,8; 102,19;
106,15; 110,50; 124,4; 129,9;
136,21.47; 137,5.6; 138,32
- gnēsios**, genuinely, 41,51; 45,28;
63,4; 88,18; 89,38; 107,21; 108,22;
109,1; 119,25
- gnōmē**, judgement, cognition,
53,32.49; 55,33; 82,32;
91,38.49.51; 93,9.23; 108,45;
135,19
- gnōmonikos**, gnomic, 2,15
- gnōrimos**, familiar, 27,27; 119,27
- gnōsis**, judgement, 4,30; 23,23;
30,31.43; 32,54; 78,15; 91,39.41;
101,4.53; 102,29; 110,34; 136,25
- gnōstikos**, cognitive, 15,11; 78,13;
109,2; 136,20
- gumnasiarkhos**, training-master,
66,3
- gymnasion**, training-ground, 15,38;
24,43; 39,48.50;
40,2.8.14.16.21.28.32; 41,1.3;
46,23; 49,20; 66,1; 88,27; 105,26;
129,12; 130,38
- gumnazō**, to train, 3,10; 21,37;
27,29; 29,41; 39,53; 40,15.23.40;
41,6.14; 49,23.27.36.40; 66,32;
130,36; 132,5.11
- hairesis**, choice, 4,6.7.8;
6,31.36.39.45; 7,1.21.22-48;
8,12.39; 9,28.42; 10,23.24;
11,46.52; 12,10; 14,17.30; 15,18;
36,35; 39,28.31; 42,36; 43,50;
54,51.53; 55,15; 58,38; 59,34;
78,53; 79,2.5.38.40.42.44; 81,24;
94,13
- hamartanō**, to err, 30,30.45.50;

- 31,3.33.47.51; 70,41.50; 72,40;
87,26.35.36; 106,14; 107,18.21.27;
108,8.22; 111,39; 117,52; 118,32
- hamartas**, minor wrong, 87,31
- hamartéma**, error, 7,22.40; 18,44;
26,6; 31,31.52; 82,44; 106,26;
118,3.15.33.35
- hamartia**, fault, 72,48; 79,15; 87,34;
106,12; 108,15; 113,33
- hamartólos**, erring, 8,36; 31,26;
72,46; 73,47; 77,29
- haplos**, simple, 4,44; 6,45; 22,40;
25,1; 32,54; 36,42.54; 37,4; 41,12;
42,9; 60,13; 65,8; 70,3;
76,33.40.52; 77,1; 95,27;
97,21.22.23.44; 98,2
- haplotés**, simplicity, 5,10.22; 100,45
- hédomai**, to take pleasure,
7,11.12.14; 17,10; 29,8; 62,22;
123,3.6
- hêdonê**, pleasure, 7,4.5.6.13.15.19;
12,47; 17,43.50; 18,24; 20,27;
21,39.40.41; 24,20.24; 31,15;
38,25.40.44.54; 40,22.23; 62,20;
68,32; 74,49; 78,41; 81,45; 108,22;
117,13.18; 122,47.51.54;
123,2.4.7.9.14.15.18.21.28.34.36.38.
39.43.45
- hêgeomai**, to believe, 10,15; 15,52;
33,27; 47,49; 116,19; 124,8; take,
18,20; 101,10; 102,50; 132,44;
133,20; 135,35; consider, 119,19;
127,47; think, 16,4; 78,44; 87,19
- hêgoumenon**, antecedent (in
conditional),
124,30.31.33.35.36.39
- heimarmenos**, fate, 9,26.35;
12,9.40.51.54; 13,4.7.9.22.47; 34,15;
37,43; 38,4; 55,5; 93,13; 137,25
- henas**, head, 5,10.11
- henôsis**, unification, 85,54; 86,43;
89,12.13.14; 100,5.34.48; 138,29
- hepomai**, to follow (logically), 7,18;
17,20; 26,37; 27,32.46; 36,39;
50,44; 59,24; 102,7; 110,14;
119,15; 124,35; 127,17; 137,44
- hepomenon**, consequent (in
conditional), 124,31.32.37.38
- heterokinêtos**, moved by something
else, 4,23.43; 6,8.16.49.50.52; 9,9;
10,35.39; 11,35; 14,12; 15,5;
36,25.31; 38,4; 96,48.52;
97,3.15.19; 98,6.49
- hêttaomai**, to be defeated by, 25,4;
30,46; 46,8.11.29; 56,15.19.22;
58,52; 59,44.49; 60,4.22; 61,1;
81,4.5; 117,17; 118,5;
123,27.42.45; 125,47; 136,1
- hexis**, condition, 3,13; 9,3.8;
11,38.41; 12,27.33.49; 13,12.17;
39,33; 48,24; 50,25; 66,39; 105,52;
111,41; 122,21; 130,53.54;
131,2.6.34; 132,27.35; 133,42.48;
134,34
- holoklêros**, complete, 46,19; 100,15.18
- holos**, complete, 2,38; 3,42; 4,14.22;
5,40.42; 6,11.12.44; 8,24.38; 9,41;
17,15; 20,28.44; 22,3.24.36;
25,11.26.43; 30,11; 34,41.49.54;
36,13; 37,16.18.23.26; 38,32;
42,22.25; 43,13.15.29; 51,21;
53,21.23.50; 54,42; 55,15; 59,24;
60,41; 61,40; 62,52; 66,25.28;
70,2.14.26.28.32.33; 72,48;
73,1.36; 74,35; 75,27.34; 76,25.41;
76,45.49; 77,2; 78,39.43; 80,5.12;
81,13; 82,50; 83,16; 88,50; 90,20;
91,44.51; 92,47.48; 94,5; 96,34;
97,30.36.38.39.41.42.43; 98,23.33;
100,14.25;
101,7.8.10.11.13.16.19.47; 102,38;
103,13.16.19.22.23.25; 107,2;
109,16; 110,27; 111,51; 112,15;
123,3.43; 129,22; 132,14.50; 133,9;
135,29; 137,34.35.37.45.53.54
- holotelês**, complete, 88,6; 100,3.27.37
- holotês**, complete, 37,1; 42,10; 76,35;
83,27
- homoioô**, to assimilate, 44,12; 67,23;
77,48; 107,41
- homoios**, like, 5,9.20; 15,45; 21,13;
28,11; 48,4; 52,4; 56,44.50; 62,30;
70,8; 71,40.41; 73,51; 74,17.19;
77,37; 78,18; 83,17.33.41.42.45;
84,14.17; 89,23; 92,13; 96,46;
98,39; 100,21.54; 103,31; 112,39;
113,26; 122,21; 127,54; 133,47
- homoioôsis**, likening, 67,10; 107,41
- homoiotês**, similarity, 13,3; 39,19;
67,48; 78,37.50; 83,47.48.51;
84,32; 86,26; 89,41
- hormaô**, to have an impulse,
4,20.34; 22,33.34.37.43.45; 23,14;
57,29; 74,12; 85,27; 134,52
- hormê**, impulse, 4,19.21.22.33.36;
6,30; 7,34; 11,12; 13,54; 14,18;

- 15,13; 17,9; 22,37.46.52; 23,17;
36,14.24.35; 37,38.48.53; 38,8;
47,23; 58,39; 77,39
- hubris**, abuse, 57,45; 106,30; 129,8
- hubristikos**, abusive, aggressive,
58,20; 121,3
- hubrizô**, to abuse, 57,35.40.41.43.51;
58,22; 82,33; 85,19; 107,53; 116,32
- hugeia**, health, 8,44; 29,42;
41,34.39; 42,46.47; 43,3;
74,9.30.31.34; 75,18; 80,19.34;
93,10; 105,2.44; 128,47.51
- hugianô**, to be healthy, 15,44; 39,49;
40,3; 41,4; 102,4; 105,26
- hugiazomai**, to be healthy, 80,20
- hugieinos**, healthy, 39,48.54; 59,22;
80,34; 115,26.32
- hugiês**, healthy, 15,37; 39,53
- hulé**, matter, 32,39; 116,1
- hulikos**, material, 12,5; 36,29
- huparkhô**, to be, 2,12.47; 7,3; 16,22;
23,9; 29,29; 38,52; 47,52;
48,14.26.41.46; 50,7.14.35;
61,36.51; 62,42; 63,10; 67,13;
69,54; 70,22; 71,42; 74,8; 76,22;
77,22; 78,19; 85,15; 91,39;
97,41.54; 98,6.19.32; 99,9.12;
100,32.47.48; 102,34.42; 106,28;
109,21; 128,35
- huparxis**, existence, 6,6; 73,19
- hyperanekhô**, to transcend, 2,53;
10,6; 40,39; 46,4.19
- hyperokhê**, superiority, 32,20;
46,16; 53,45.50; 59,7.12; 85,20.28;
101,15; 102,47; 113,3;
121,13.29.48; 122,4; 130,32
- huphesis**, descent (level of), 5,31;
43,47; 70,25; 77,25
- huphiêmi**, low-level (of descent),
6,33; 41,40; 77,19; 125,29
- huphistêmi**, to subsist, 12,17; 36,31;
43,4.6.36.39.41.53; 44,5.6; 73,50;
75,28.47.49.51; 76,8.12.15; 78,3;
79,36; 80,44; 82,3; 97,38.39.43.44;
98,22.49.51; 103,43; 108,50;
128,14; 134,39; exist, 6,9.42;
20,44; 70,17; 72,23; 96,11; 112,45
- hupodekhomai**, to receive, 13,28;
69,31; 89,20; 93,47; 100,45; 107,5
- hupodokhê**, receptacle, 10,36;
125,26
- hupokeimai**, to be a substrate,
73,49; 85,14; 97,45.48
- hupokrinomai**, to act (a part, role),
18,49; 55,22.26.33; 125,39
- hupokritês**, actor, 55,1.17.21.23;
125,38
- hupolambanô**, to believe, 8,47.48;
9,10.14.15.17.18; 11,22;
15,13.22.51; 16,3.28.35; 32,46;
54,26; 85,30; 87,22; 95,5;
110,27.31; 128,8.18
- hupolêpsis**, belief, 4,10.16.29.32;
7,33; 8,38; 9,27; 10,54; 11,22;
15,11; 22,7; 32,17.43.44.45;
33,7.10; 51,15; 57,42; 91,41; 124,7
- hupolêptos**, object of belief, 8,44.49;
11,1.23
- hupostasis**, subsistence, 32,21;
42,45; 43,7; 44,21; 74,6; 81,28;
form of existence, 8,14; 69,46;
73,31; 75,26; 80,15; 81,19.29
- hupostatês**, to give subsistence,
104,35
- hupostatikos**, giving subsistence,
12,21
- hupotattô**, to subordinate, 30,34;
32,2; 48,28.36; 52,28; 53,1; 85,22;
91,33; 95,3
- hupothesis**, hypothesis, 3,7.15.25;
62,42; 73,5
- hupothetikos**, hypothetical, 124,14
- hupotithêmi**, to posit, to suppose,
2,8; 9,21; 49,27; 54,49; 71,19;
72,51.52; 75,23; 97,27.35; 99,36;
103,3.12; 121,39
- iamai**, cure, 38,24; 112,28
- iaomai**, to heal, 80,24; 137,54
- iatreia**, medical treatment, 38,23;
39,30; 41,18.54; 42,4.13; 44,39;
105,26
- iatreueô**, medical treatment, 38,28;
41,6.17.26.27.50.54; 43,15; 107,8;
131,44
- iatrikos**, medical, 35,41; 37,24;
39,35.46; 41,14.20.33; 106,43.44;
107,37
- iatros**, doctor, 29,1; 38,45; 39,32.37;
41,51; 77,18; 80,17; 91,7; 103,15;
106,37; 121,5
- idiôma**, quality, 5,50; 13,28
- idios**, one's own, proper, 3,23; 7,28;
15,23; 16,33.42; 20,37; 24,13;
28,30; 47,17.30.47; 63,49; 91,9;
116,28; 133,4.10; peculiar, 6,29;
113,29; 133,13.14.30; specific,

- 65,9; 66,50; 72,23; 75,54; 98,40;
102,47; individual, 68,28,39;
87,22; 88,7; 102,13;
- idiôtês**, ordinary, 114,54; 115,1;
122,20.22; 130,37.50.51; 131,20;
132,29.30.36; 133,12.33.49; 135,25
- idiôtês**, particularity, 5,34.38; 13,25;
70,15.16; 100,51
- idiôtikos**, ordinary, 114,47.53;
121,45; 122,21
- idiôtismos**, ordinary behaviour,
122,19; 133,34
- kairos**, timely, 1,10
- kairos**, opportune occasion,
opportune time, 12,45.48.50; 19,3;
22,21; 28,7; 33,50; 34,50; 35,2;
40,10.41; 50,49; 57,52; 58,2; 66,15;
88,41; 90,40; 94,24; 110,12;
114,48; 119,37.43; 120,32.34;
122,53; 123,28.41.44; 127,42;
130,45; 132,21; 133,32; 138,18
- kakia**, badness, vice, 11,51.54;
13,44; 14,19; 31,28;
42,29.35.42.43; 43,1.17; 44,17.25;
46,42.45; 49,11; 52,8.9; 74,9;
77,54; 79,26; 85,9; 103,45; 104,2;
105,17; 106,32.34; 108,16; 129,7
- kakodaimôn**, unhappy, wretched,
16,49; 20,51; 21,23; 49,5.17; 93,19;
105,14; 116,19
- kakodaimoneô**, to be wretched,
116,18
- kakodaimonia**, unhappiness,
16,45; 105,17
- kakoô**, to become bad, 70,50
- kakos**, bad (of rational souls), 4,31;
7,47; 11,50; 13,12.43; 14,41.48;
15,3.10.24; 16,35.47; 17,20.36;
18,7.50; 19,45; 20,46; 21,5.32;
27,13.14.40; 28,31;
30,9.17.18.28.31.39.53;
31,22.23.25.27.33.34; 32,51.54;
33,1.2.22; 36,13.44; 39,29;
42,12.26.32.44;
43,19.23.25.26.36.37.48; 44,33;
45,6.12.24; 46,49; 47,9.24; 48,22;
49,5; 54,24;
55,11.13.27.28.35.44.48-50.54;
56,6.11.21.22-4; 58,37; 61,34.53;
62,20; 65,30; 73,7.12.14.24;
74,15.27.47; 75,30.45; 76,22.27;
77,29.49; 78,36.47;
79,10.18.20.21.23.25.44.48; 80,10;
81,22.25.26.33.35; 82,37; 84,44.45;
91,53; 92,10.12.19; 93,25; 95,46;
102,14; 103,48; 104,41.47.48;
108,31.36.47; 116,39; 118,23.37;
119,23; 128,24; 132,43.46;
133,17.18.24; 138,12; (of irrational
souls), 77,38.39.40; 78,29;
(external), 4,12; 15,6; 16,37; 20,42;
27,6; 28,32.33; 30,11.26;
31,5.7.11.14; 32,14; 35,27.54;
36,2.3.10.17.41; 37,9.15.27.30;
38,49; 39,37;
41,5.7.9.11.13.16.26.30.42; 42,7;
44,51; 45,48; 54,9.13.14.16.22;
55,41.43.46; 56,1.4.7.10.28;
57,32.52; 58,6.29;
61,41.43.45.50.52;
62,3.9-11.23.26.28.29.34.40.44.
47-8.51; 63,41.49; 67,1.5.39.43.48;
74,54; 75,2.3.13.15.16.17;
76,29.30.36.50.51.53.54;
77,4.8.9.12.19.26; 82,36.40;
92,3.23.26.29;
105,1.4.6.9.22.23.25; 109,34;
121,15.5.8; 124,9.12; 127,17;
128,23.9; 129,53; 130,4.15; (god
not cause of), 36,4.5.16;
42,5.27.41; 43,35.38.41;
73,41.46.47.51.54; 75,35; 76,17;
77,23.35; 79,26.28.30.33.35.36.37;
80,16.31.38.51; 106,24.28; 109,5;
(not per se existent), 43,31.33;
44,21; 69,46.51.52; 70,29; 71,2.8;
73,21.23.26.29.33.36.42.45;
74,2.4.7; 75,6.20.26;
81,19.40.41.43; 82,1.7.10.14.19;
108,32; (person), 36,15; 49,17;
85,2; 95,39.43.47; 102,3.14;
104,38.40.44.51; 105,10.45; 107,8;
129,6; 137,27; (Manichean views),
70,38.42.49; 71,4.9.17.18.24.29.
32.34.37.38.39.42.53; 72,8.16.22.
23.27.30.32.38.39.45.49.51.52.53;
73,1.2.3.4; 80,51; 81,4.8.17.18
- kakunô**, to become bad, vicious,
10,22; 12,1.6.8; 38,22.25.35;
42,27.52; 46,47;
81,1.2.9.10.12.15.49; 106,37;
107,31
- kallos**, beauty, 5,28; 24,30.33; 59,42;
100,23; 101,24.25
- kalos**, beautiful, 3,6; 5,26.47; 8,50;
24,34; 60,29; 70,17.18;

- 98,26.30.32.33-5; 116,5; 127,31;
129,31.39; good; better; well,
11,38; 15,28; 19,8; 20,40;
23,31.41.43; 25,8; 26,26; 40,51;
44,28; 49,7.10.44; 50,26; 52,5;
55,13.14.22.26.27.32.34; 56,3;
59,7; 60,10.37; 64,51; 65,35;
66,52.54; 71,36; 79,8; 86,18; 91,44;
95,22.44; 105,30; 108,43; 109,40;
113,14; 114,31; 115,11.47;
120,11.42; 121,4.7.44.46; 123,46;
125,29.32.39; 127,53;
128,1.4.5.7.8.21; 129,53;
130,3.4.15; 134,18; 135,14.35.37;
fine; noble, 21,26; 22,20; 23,54;
24,4; 26,27; 28,11; 29,13.37.39;
45,26; 48,42; 51,14; 60,11;
62,15.36; 63,9; 64,38; 66,7.13.27;
83,11; 86,35; 88,23; 89,12; 116,48;
121,9; 123,44; 129,4.15.17; 134,42;
rightly; correctly, 7,50; 14,21.51;
15,2; 17,21; 21,5; 23,47; 24,55;
25,41; 27,41; 30,9.13; 41,36; 44,50;
47,51; 49,19; 50,12; 51,6; 60,20;
61,27; 64,33; 69,12.47.50; 80,26;
82,38; 83,21; 89,15; 114,45;
117,26; 137,45
- kanôn**, criterion, rule, 20,23.28.35;
28,29; 87,5.8.12; 132,45; 133,12
- kanonizô**, to judge by standard,
20,49
- katalambanô**, to grasp, 130,13
- katalêptikos**, cataleptic, 130,12
- katastasis**, condition, 31,13; 36,39;
130,6
- katastêma**, demeanour, condition,
31,38; 112,6; 119,49
- katastêmatikos**, stable, 114,2
- kathairô**, to purify, 23,50; 28,26;
63,24; 89,21; 93,37.38.39; 108,3;
113,46; 130,27; 133,20
- kathareuô**, to make pure, 59,30;
117,37; 120,54
- katharoô**, to be pure, 93,40; 98,32;
111,18; 115,4
- katharos**, pure, 7,26; 14,50; 23,35;
61,6.23; 78,42; 89,11; 93,49;
94,35.36.37; 98,25; 111,34.36;
115,5.6.25; 123,29
- katharotês**, purity, 48,50
- katharsis**, purification, 105,48;
108,11.12; 129,13; 138,25
- kathartikos**, cathartic, 2,33; 28,17
- kathêkô**, to be appropriate, 35,5;
83,23; 85,31; 90,28.39.43
- kathêkôn**, appropriate (action),
26,38; 61,22; 65,47; 82,47.54;
83,2.6.7.10.15.21.22.52;
84,40.42.43.50; 85,2;
86,1.10.16.20; 87,46; 88,44.48.54;
89,32.33; 90,17.38;
91,1.23.25.28.32; 109,7.9.10.43;
111,47.49; 114,19; 120,50; 121,28;
127,14.49
- katorthôma**, right action, 7,23.40
- katorthôô**, to perform a right action,
8,35; 18,36; 51,36.39; 108,20;
111,38; 125,37.40
- kephalaïos**, chapter, 2,19; 55,37;
60,50; 91,21; 95,19; 116,39;
121,31; 125,41; 127,10; 137,9.31
- kerannumi**, to mix, 21,40
- kharaktêr**, character, 111,48.51;
112,9.13; 132,36; 133,25
- kharaktêrizô**, to characterise,
62,37; 105,1; 126,10
- kharieis**, pleasing, elegant, clever,
72,53; 105,37; 122,26
- kharis**, grace, 40,54; 41,17; 45,33;
63,19; 65,49; 66,3; 77,18; 114,9
- kharizomai**, to grace, 2,51
- khôrismos**, separation, 35,1; 38,51;
69,28.30.39
- khôristikos**, separated, 83,50
- khôristos**, separated, 2,5; 37,36
- khôrizô**, to separate, 52,50; 55,47;
107,28
- khreia**, need, 9,54; 15,20; 16,13;
18,52; 29,44; 40,10; 46,32; 90,32;
105,27; 108,21; 109,23; 112,37.48;
114,7.50; 115,22.39;
116,7.8.12.22.44.47.53; 117,4.11;
119,42; 120,28;
126,26.32.33.34.37.44.53; 127,2;
use, 24,23.24.45; 25,18.22.42;
29,24; 39,36; 40,42; 60,50; 61,7;
95,15; 110,54
- khrema**, possession, 3,52; 16,9.14;
24,44; 29,18.31; 31,3; 32,28; 38,26;
43,27; 45,4; 49,38; 51,28;
63,10.14.16; 64,47; 89,10.49;
98,46; 105,36; 123,5; 126,23; 133,6
- khresimos**, useful, 34,35; 46,54;
53,12; 63,13.54;
64,1.11.13.31.33.8.40.44;
117,20.37; 118,50; 119,10

- khṛṣis**, use, 1,42; 2,23; 16,21.22;
18,53; 32,44.49.52; 33,6.27; 35,11;
55,10.13.15; 86,23; 87,14.45;
88,27; 106,41; 115,9;
126,24.25.26.30.31; 127,9.11.16;
treatment, 86,44.49; 88,14.18;
application, 134,33.43; 135,7;
136,32
- khṛṣteon**, use (should), 116,21
- khṛṣtikos**, 19,6
- kinēma**, motion, 4,5.17.38.47.49;
51,35; 62,23; 78,53; 79,3; 118,22;
120,12; 133,43
- kineō**, to move, 3,44.45; 4,7.23.45.51;
6,12.17.19.20.22.23.24.25.27.28.51.
52; 8,39.45.51.52.53; 9,1.7.49;
10,33.35; 11,34; 12,17.20;
14,2.10.11.12.13.15; 18,42; 19,47;
20,12; 22,30.49; 36,22; 37,54;
43,11; 46,7.14; 47,10; 48,9; 50,22;
52,46; 56,53; 83,14; 86,36; 95,53;
96,47.48.51.53;
97,3.13.19.28.29.30.31.
32.34.36.42.43; 98,8.9.10-16.
18.20.40.50.53; 99,1.4.10.54;
101,35; 104,38; 108,48; 113,26.37;
118,21; 120,33; 122,17.19.22
- kinēsis**, motion, 3,10; 4,9.23;
6,9.30.49; 7,36; 8,24; 10,2.47.53;
14,7; 15,8; 20,9; 21,37; 22,31;
29,41; 30,35; 36,27.34;
37,41.45.48; 40,4; 44,8; 74,15;
96,46.54; 97,13.17; 99,1.5.8.23;
100,23
- kinētikos**, mover, 1,11.30; 98,5;
137,25
- koinōneō**, to associate, to have in
common with, 38,6; 126,5; 132,40
- koinōnia**, association, combination,
28,42; 114,40; 125,3.10.12.14
- koinōnikos**, communal, 125,2.7
- koinos**, common, general, 20,37;
35,27; 51,24; 58,18; 60,22; 61,28;
64,21.45; 65,4.30; 66,49; 68,19.40;
69,4.54; 70,3.6.7.11; 83,32; 84,36;
87,6.7.12.53; 88,5.6; 89,35; 90,2;
95,30; 101,14.20.25; 102,11.16.27;
113,48; 116,53; 124,27; 125,10;
128,3; 131,46; 132,40; 133,12.13.22
- kōluō**, to hinder, 8,14;
16,20.23.28.31; 17,25.34; 19,19;
43,50; 45,24; 77,31; 95,23
- kōlutos**, hindered, 32,10
- kosmeō**, to become orderly, 127,27
- kosmopoia**, creation of the cosmos,
71,44.53
- kosmos**, cosmos, 43,40; 71,14; 75,52;
79,48; 79,50; 80,47; 81,36; 81,39;
81,42; 81,49; 82,2; 82,9; 82,11;
82,14; 82,19; 96,35; 100,6; 100,7;
100,21; 100,24; 103,13; 104,23;
104,31; 104,32; 104,34
- krasis**, mixture, 4,42; 100,35; 130,5
- krateō**, to control, to master, 25,9;
40,23; 46,10.54; 86,34; 103,9;
111,27; 117,15; 118,51; 123,44
- kreittôn**, superior, 2,38;
10,12.18.22.23; 18,51; 28,35.43;
30,40; 33,23; 38,32.38; 39,19;
42,22; 48,52; 49,5; 53,46.48; 60,25;
61,15.48; 67,36; 77,33;
78,30.37.47.49.50; 79,6.7; 83,17;
84,34; 88,8; 89,14; 91,13.26; 96,44;
98,3.43; 99,31.33.35; 103,31;
118,1; 129,35
- krinō**, to judge, 7,6; 11,42; 21,33.38;
27,40; 28,30; 51,17; 68,45.49;
69,5.41; 79,10; 111,23; 113,31;
120,39; 124,8; 129,51; 130,9;
132,52; 133,43.44
- krisis**, judgement, 4,6; 18,48;
20,20.29.30; 50,43; 51,12; 59,25;
61,3; 62,38.41.43; 113,32.33;
117,54; 118,29; 125,49; 126,12;
129,44; 130,14; 133,10.13
- kritērion**, 31,36
- kritēs**, judge, 60,33.37.43.47; 61,8;
118,8.33.35
- kritikos**, discriminating, 20,23.36;
113,30; 119,53
- ptaomai**, to acquire, 16,15; 19,6;
32,29; 63,22.23.26.33; 64,19;
115,8; 126,31.50
- ktēma**, possession, 24,44; 49,37;
87,49; 103,1; 123,5; 126,23
- ktēsis**, possession, 15,28.45; 18,30;
33,36.47; 34,29; 41,31; 115,10;
123,6; 126,24.28.30.32.43.54;
127,4.9.11
- kurios**, in control of, 4,1.45; 7,37;
15,25.33.41; 16,22.53; 33,3;
36,24.35; 37,38; 38,8; 42,38;
44,1.36; 51,53.54; 52,24.36; 54,48;
56,17; 58,38; 64,16; 67,29; 85,45;
116,17; important, 76,47; 83,19;
93,20; 94,48; 96,5; 112,14.45.46

- kuriōs**, strictly, 2,47; 3,24; 6,24;
7,29; 10,20; 11,19; 14,37; 15,11;
19,48; 21,40; 31,40; 32,52; 36,30;
41,29; 53,51; 67,10; 80,45; 96,41;
97,38; 98,10,12; 101,26; 105,25;
128,13
- lēmna**, premiss, 61,42
- lexis**, style, 32,14; 70,46;
129,24,30,36,37,39,40
- litos**, simple, 115,25,46; 126,34;
127,30; 131,48
- litotēs**, simplicity, 23,20; 40,49;
45,30; 48,42; 49,32; 116,45;
131,43,46; 132,16
- logikos**, rational, 1,36,40;
2,22,37,39,46,51; 3,4,16,33,49;
4,29,46; 7,26; 10,8,31; 12,13,16;
18,23; 19,40; 29,24; 36,22,44;
37,35; 38,7; 39,26; 45,5; 50,45;
63,35,37; 69,16; 78,30,42,45; 89,6;
102,53; 103,2; 108,18; 110,33;
115,12; 117,14; 126,8; 127,37;
129,33; 134,6; 135,12;
136,29,35,46; 137,2
- logos**, rational capacity, 17,36,54;
18,41,44,48; 19,2; 20,20;
21,32,34,35,36; 22,8; 24,1; 26,54;
30,32,34,35,41,43,46,51;
31,20,21,27,44; 33,15;
46,8,11,14,15,28,31; 48,28,36;
52,46; 57,23; 60,12; 68,32,46;
75,37; 86,34; 87,44; 98,32;
117,18,21;
132,19,38,40,42,44,45,49; 133,22;
138,23,29
- logos**, word; argument; speech,
1,13,21,30,34,47; 2,15,21,24,28,31;
3,2,14,35; 8,15,20; 9,43; 15,1;
19,41; 21,18,24,45; 22,35;
23,43,51; 25,25; 27,15,16,27;
32,9,37; 33,29,45,48; 35,50; 36,1;
44,20; 45,42,45; 47,38,39;
48,9,21,23,48; 50,47; 51,42; 53,1;
54,30; 57,27; 58,18,28; 60,35,52;
62,31,35; 63,7; 66,21,37; 67,39;
69,44,47; 71,7; 72,20,35,53;
73,9,19; 75,33; 77,21; 79,43; 80,9;
87,15,25,33,43,50; 89,26; 92,10,37;
94,43,44,45; 95,11,18; 96,45;
97,25,27; 98,7,19,26,43,47;
99,11,50; 100,11; 101,6,51; 102,17;
106,2,5,16,27; 107,1,3,11,15,52;
109,12; 110,17;
112,15,25,40,42,46,48,50,51,53,54;
113,9,13,15,20,24,27,29,30,42;
114,39,45; 115,19; 116,21;
119,19,43; 120,4,7,18,25;
121,5,22,33,36; 122,42; 123,36;
125,10; 127,40; 129,23,26;
130,19,22,38,40,41,45,49,54;
131,1,3,27,34,35,45,46,49;
132,2,25,33; 133,27,33,53,54;
134,2; 135,9,33; 136,12; 137,10,12;
138,18,21
- loidoreō**, to insult,
46,38,40,42,43,45; 57,34; 82,33;
85,18; 92,23,27,36; 128,21,27
- loidoria**, insult, 46,36,38,47; 58,22;
129,8
- luō**, to release, to resolve, 34,42;
41,46; 44,44; 45,15,20; 60,24;
61,33; 63,12; 64,16; 84,49,53
- lupé**, pain, sorrow, 7,13,16,19; 30,4;
38,27,54; 39,4,9; 40,25;
46,22,27,35; 48,1; 56,40; 88,25;
91,9; 108,21; 113,53; 123,8
- lupeō**, be distressed, be in pain,
experience pain, 1,24;
7,12,10,13,27; 24,5,52; 26,23;
30,11; 46,32,33; 47,18,20;
52,13,20; 56,47; 65,7; 69,21
- lupéros**, pain, 7,10; 17,47; 19,37;
21,39; 38,39; 39,16; 40,25; 45,50;
46,20,25; 47,15; 49,52,54;
69,36,39,40; 87,9; 90,8; 93,17;
112,7
- lusion**, solution, 66,49
- manteia**, divination, prophecy,
55,45; 109,11,18,24; 110,22
- manteion**, oracle, 111,16,30
- manteuma**, result of divination,
109,13,46
- manteuomai**, to use divination,
109,12,13,16,23,24,26,36,37,52;
110,3,11,13,17,23,27,53; 111,9
- mantikos**, divinatory, 110,40
- mantis**, diviner, 109,19,29,31
- memphomai**, to blame, 17,14,39;
42,38; 47,19,21; 91,51; 92,7,50;
93,17; 111,3; 124,2
- merikos**, partial, particular, 5,40;
37,17; 42,15,21; 70,20;
101,9,17,18,22,23; 136,39
- merismos**, division, 137,53
- meristos**, divided, 6,10; 86,46; 97,40;
133,5

- merizō**, to share, 46,17; 70,16; 94,20
meros, part, 2,40.41.43.53; 3,18;
 5,42; 12,38; 37,16.17; 38,17; 39,46;
 66,37; 70,40.43.51; 71,5.16;
 76,7.45.48.53; 77,1; 80,54;
 83,2.3.15.29; 90,45; 94,14;
 97,29.31.32; 100,14.44.45;
 101,7.9.11; 103,14.17.18.22.23;
 111,50; 120,8; 124,54; 126,4;
 134,22; 137,38.45
mesos, mean, 5,7; 6,14; 12,2; 23,12;
 37,50; 38,5; 43,5; 44,11.15;
 75,42.53; 76,1.5; 77,35.42; 83,35;
 84,28.31; 86,32; 96,20; 106,35;
 109,9.14; 111,41; 114,31
mesotēs, intermediate, 10,9
metaballō, to change, 11,50; 17,53;
 34,11; 36,28.41; 37,5.7;
 76,7.9.36.38; 97,1.5.12; 98,54;
 99,6.7; 135,30
metabolē, change, 25,12; 26,47;
 36,28.41; 37,6.10.30; 76,40; 99,8
metamelei, to repent, 107,21.28;
 108,14.22; 121,42; 122,1
metameleia, repentance, 19,36;
 107,23.49; 108,7.11; 123,26
methexis, participation, 6,7.27;
 13,46; 33,36; 54,47; 70,14; 73,44;
 77,44; 97,48.52
metroō, to instil measure, 1,45;
 30,33; 31,44; 48,35; 69,41; 95,7;
 114,35; 115,40
metriazō, to moderate, 66,11; 129,42
metriopatheia, moderate emotional
 state, 19,9
metriopatheō, moderate feeling,
 24,1
metriophrosunē, moderation, 66,12
metrios, moderate, 19,47.49;
 22,30.48; 27,36; 41,1; 53,3; 59,40;
 66,8; 106,49; 118,54; 120,38
metriotēs, moderation, 19,1; 118,25;
 119,22; 128,54
metron, measure, 18,43; 54,35;
 93,46; 95,6; 104,25; 121,18;
 122,40; 126,29.30.31.32.44;
 127,6.11
monas, monad, 5,43.51; 70,16
nekroō, to deaden, 1,31; 40,10
nekros, corpse, 3,43; 6,13; 98,43
nomos, custom, law, 7,38; 14,22;
 43,24; 72,47; 79,9; 85,20;
 103,37.41; 106,4;
 117,22.33.41.42.45; 119,37;
 130,48; 135,35
nomothesia, legislation, 95,21; 104,7
nomothetēs, legislator, 103,37
nous, intellect, 50,28; 77,44; 128,4
oikeiō, to make one's own, to
 appropriate, 38,16; 91,32; 107,43;
 115,29
oikeios, one's own, 1,32.42;
 2,10.14.23.24; 3,20.49; 5,25.36;
 7,31; 9,9; 10,15.6.18; 11,23.37.52;
 12,22.39.54; 14,26; 15,16.31;
 17,1.4.6.21.22;
 19,21.22.25.29.51.54; 22,17;
 31,23.30; 32,38; 34,9; 38,20;
 42,36.9; 45,10.12; 47,21; 48,38;
 53,31; 59,5; 63,33; 70,44; 75,22;
 76,34.35; 78,7; 79,2; 82,44; 87,39;
 88,11; 90,9; 91,11; 100,16.20;
 101,30; 102,34.42; 109,47; 112,13;
 122,21; 126,6; 127,33; 129,31;
 138,20
oikeiotēs, appropriateness, 13,3;
 24,22.45; 82,26; 89,54; 90,3.20;
 92,24; 93,30; 94,31; 107,13
oiketēs, servant, 18,30; 48,13; 49,39;
 50,10.15; 52,4.6; 61,18; 64,1;
 85,18; 116,21.29.43.46
oikonomēō, to govern, 50,44; 55,34
okhlos, disturbance, 103,29
on, being; exist; existent,
 5,1.4.17.23.32.49; 7,54; 8,1.2.5;
 15,11; 19,41.42; 20,43; 22,7;
 32,47.49; 43,21.32; 44,10.11; 45,7;
 69,51.53; 72,51; 73,37;
 75,32.34.35; 76,30; 78,48; 80,2.11;
 88,2; 92,9; 94,12; 95,27;
 96,2.4.40.41; 100,48; 101,30.40;
 102,18.31.36; 106,24; 108,29.33;
 109,4.5; 110,30.43; 113,3;
 124,17.18; 133,21.22; 137,44;
 138,30; real, 4,31; 8,25; 21,32;
 27,6.9; 34,35; 74,45; 92,11.13;
 131,3; 137,44; 138,30
oneidismos, reproach, 58,52;
 59,1.31; 117,49
oneidizō, to reproach, 58,48; 122,12
ōpheleia, benefit, 17,33; 20,26;
 22,15; 24,20.23.40; 27,7; 41,21.48;
 66,35.51; 75,7.21; 85,46.48;
 123,14.28; 129,22; 132,37; 136,10
ōpheleō, to benefit, 8,31; 21,47;
 44,30; 46,48; 49,9; 56,1.2.4.5; 58,7;

- 64,48.49; 73,43; 90,14; 92,36;
109,39.40; 129,19.49; 131,7; 132,18
- ôphelimos**, beneficial, 8,27.32;
16,48; 17,44.48; 21,31.38; 22,17;
24,22; 26,38.53; 29,23.33.36;
31,42.45; 36,8; 42,16; 44,47; 62,39;
68,22; 87,9; 92,13; 106,21; 122,7;
125,1; 129,15; 134,35
- oregomai**, to desire, 4,33.44;
6,34.35; 8,42.50.54;
9,2.4.6.37.47.48;
10,2.20.25.32.45-7.51; 11,19.21.49;
12,43; 15,14; 16,28.36.50.53;
17,1.7.19.24.25.31; 19,15.23.30;
20,54; 21,13.46.49;
22,20.21.22.33.36.45; 23,47.54;
24,3.4.7; 30,16; 33,3.12.24; 42,32;
43,27; 46,34; 52,16.21.25.39;
53,20; 55,11; 56,14.18; 57,14.18;
58,33; 59,9; 60,45; 61,24; 63,8;
73,42; 75,1.7; 86,47; 92,1.3.6.49;
93,1.4.8.15; 104,46.49; 105,5.7;
109,18.25.28.48; 115,17; 133,1.4;
135,10
- orektikos**, capable of desire, 9,47.50;
10,48; 15,12; 20,3.11; 78,14
- orektos**, object of desire, 4,26.34.36;
8,29.44.52; 9,9.39.48;
10,33.41.44.45;
11,1.2.3.4.6.8.15.16.19.23; 18,42;
19,18; 20,40.48;
21,3.14.19.28.38.43.47; 22,23;
30,20; 31,9; 33,13.19; 38,22;
52,27.41; 56,15; 63,38; 92,4;
109,34; 133,3.13.17
- orexis**, desire, 4,25.27.32.37.38.40;
6,30.45; 7,34; 8,33.38;
9,7.27.32.34.41.44.50.51;
10,2.7.13.16.18.21.26.33.36.49.50.
53; 11,5.13.18.21; 12,28.39.44.49;
13,4.9.54; 14,18; 15,12; 17,35;
18,15.40.47; 19,1.12.16; 20,53;
21,15.18.33.37;
22,12.14.19.22.24.25.26.27.32.33.
38.40.42.46.49.52; 23,18.30.48;
24,15; 31,45.47; 32,53;
33,2.7.10.14.15.17; 35,22;
36,14.45.47; 37,38.40.48.52;
38,7.20.25; 42,33; 43,30; 44,32;
47,9.23; 48,29.35; 51,2; 52,45;
53,16.31; 54,50; 57,20.22; 62,52;
63,39.43; 68,31; 77,38;
78,7.23.29.41; 80,25.27; 86,35.39;
91,54; 93,3.14; 109,16.21.29.36.47;
113,10.37; 114,54; 115,2.3.5;
117,16.23.25.28.30.35; 119,47;
123,31; 133,15; 134,8
- organon**, instrument, tool, 1,37;
2,3.40.54;
3,17.29.30.31.45.46.51.53.54;
12,18.22.23.29.30.32.33.37.38;
13,8; 16,38; 24,35; 32,28.36.39;
38,11.17; 45,5; 78,33; 93,39;
115,12.20.21.39.42; 127,37.41;
134,7; 138,27
- orthos logos**, right reason, 27,3;
50,43; 68,25; 86,40; 87,5.7.12;
91,47; 110,52; 111,3; 115,42;
123,39; 124,8; 132,52; 135,10.38;
136,4
- orthos**, correct, right, 15,13; 16,36;
17,18; 27,3; 29,27.32.46; 32,43.47;
33,7.10.17.24.25; 50,43; 56,24;
68,26; 69,42; 74,10; 86,39;
87,4.7.12.15.43; 91,41.47; 93,44;
108,42; 110,52; 111,3.37; 115,41;
123,39.53; 124,1.2.4.6.8; 132,52;
135,38.9; 136,4
- ousia**, being, 36,26; 100,22; essence,
2,5.7; 3,13.23; 6,48; 13,51; 20,44;
31,2; 37,34.42; 43,38.51; 55,44;
76,5.6.9.20; 77,43; 78,5.30; 98,54;
99,31.34.53; 100,15; 112,43.45;
128,24; substance, 6,8.26;
73,33.37.48; 79,46; 80,45.49;
81,17; 89,6
- ousioomai**, to have one's essence,
1,37; 2,39; 3,4; 7,26; 13,52; 45,23;
52,47; 127,37; 129,30.33; 132,38
- palaios**, ancient, 34,13; 85,19.26;
87,25; 106,3; 110,29; 137,13
- pan**, universe, 5,37; 13,18; 17,46;
23,54; 29,48; 33,12.39; 34,17.30;
35,16.18.23.28; 36,7.33; 37,11;
42,17; 49,52; 53,53; 60,26; 61,21;
65,6; 73,40; 74,15.43; 75,33;
80,26.43; 81,52; 84,34; 85,39; 92,9;
94,14; 100,27; 101,31; 102,51;
103,43; 105,16; 106,23; 114,30;
126,27; 132,1; 135,35; 136,11;
whole, 12,3; 44,13
- pankakos**, utterly bad, 72,33
- paragô**, to produce, to generate,
5,7.9.20.21.23.53; 6,5.32;
12,1.19.22; 34,10; 73,13.15.17.18;
75,41.50.51; 76,25; 80,13.53;

- 81,16; 91,43; 94,12; 100,8; 101,5;
102,31.32.36.38.44.46; 104,36;
107,2; 114,25; 131,8
- parakolouthô**, to pay attention to,
to follow, 39,40; 96,21; 103,34
- paralogizomai**, to argue badly,
miscalculate, 75,13; 78,54
- paraphuomai**, to arise as
by-product, 78,36
- parergon** incidental, 18,20.21;
33,48; 34,7.27.34.49; 35,9; 53,13;
114,39; 127,46
- parhuphistêmi**, to subsist
derivatively, 43,7.19.34; 44,14;
74,7.14.26.29.40; 75,28.31; 81,27
- paskhô**, to be acted on, to suffer,
1,20.34; 14,27.37; 17,15; 19,30;
23,4.43; 30,12; 40,12; 52,5; 57,32;
66,22; 68,41.45; 69,14; 70,48;
78,40.51; 82,34; 102,2.7;
103,38.49; 104,41; 107,45; 111,22;
114,13; 128,23; 133,45; 134,6
- pathainô**, to suffer emotion, 38,18;
54,44
- pathêtikos**, emotional, 46,12; 80,47
- pathos**, emotion, 1,32.41; 2,35; 7,30;
14,26; 17,42; 30,21.33.37.42.46.51;
33,18; 39,9.11.12;
46,7.10.17.19.29.30.41.54;
47,1.2.3; 54,38.39.44; 56,43;
57,2.14.20; 59,28; 80,22.29; 86,33;
89,22; 102,40; 105,47.50.51;
112,17; 113,26.29;
118,39.42.50.51.54; 119,3.7.9.11;
123,46; 125,45.47.50.53; 126,2.11;
128,54; 129,20; 130,26;
132,19.39.53; 138,26; bodily
emotion, 2,4; 38,9.29; affection,
8,9; 15,7; experience, 23,44; 68,40;
69,14; 102,2
- pêgê**, fountain, 5,4.28.30; 43,4;
70,34; 75,40; 77,25
- peripiptô**, to encounter, 16,47.49;
17,13.29.31; 18,16;
21,1.2.4.9.12.20.29.39.46; 22,4.10;
28,47; 29,39; 30,17.20; 39,5; 46,35;
52,21.42; 56,16; 57,18; 92,2.5.6.49;
93,5.16; 104,46.49; 105,8.10.40;
111,14.27; 129,14.15.16
- phainomai**, to appear, 7,18; 27,14;
28,38; 32,46.49; 33,1.2; 35,51;
36,2.10.16; 42,14.16; 43,17; 44,45;
57,38; 58,17; 59,19; 60,18.34.48;
61,10; 68,18; 72,26.27; 74,49.51;
75,8.11; 79,22.23.47; 86,41; 89,48;
92,25; 94,51; 103,20; 106,35.44;
110,30; 111,1; 119,39.50;
120,37.42; 121,8.22; 122,26.34;
123,41; 127,53.54; 128,1.25;
130,13.15.45.51; 132,6; 134,3;
135,35
- phantasia**, impression,
20,3.5.7.11.14.19.21; 25,25; 26,24;
27,16; 32,45.49.53; 33,6.27; 47,8;
49,42.50.54; 50,35; 53,2.21; 54,13;
57,51; 58,25.30; 59,12; 69,20.39;
78,14; 81,46; 82,25; 112,39;
113,9.36; 119,6; 123,18.22.35;
127,53; 130,11
- phantazomai**, to be the object of an
impression, 20,18.22.36.40.48
- pheugô**, to avoid, 2,34; 17,47; 21,1;
23,23; 26,13; 28,15; 36,8; 72,32.34;
82,16; 84,25; 107,35; 111,15;
123,54; 124,1.9
- pheukteon**, thing to be shunned,
20,33
- pheuktos**, to be shunned, 8,45;
11,5.9; 19,20; 21,29.44.48.50;
52,42; 54,8; 81,28; 82,16; 92,20;
124,9; 129,11; 133,18
- phileô**, love, 36,5; 41,51
- philia**, friendship, 35,36; 63,15.20;
84,45.50; 86,24.27.31.45;
87,27.35.49; 88,45;
89,8.11.16.18.20.25; 120,26
- philikos**, friendship, 86,43; 87,46;
88,40; 89,2
- philodoxeô**, to love honour,
118,41.43
- philodoxia**, love of honour,
118,38.51; 119,1.4.21.29
- philodoxos**, love of honour, 122,13;
130,25
- philos**, friend, 1,15; 24,46; 26,11;
51,50; 61,25;
63,6.9.12.14.22.24.27.42.46.51.53;
64,3.6.7.9.10.12.13; 65,41; 82,24;
84,15.18.20.48.51; 85,52;
86,20.22.31.48;
87,4.8.14.16.23.25.31.37.38.42.47.
52; 88,1.12.15.18.20.21.22.24.25.
27.29.31.34.36.37.39.47;
89,11.21.50; 92,48; 110,51;
111,13.17.20.23.29.31.35; 114,29;
116,52; 133,46; 137,49

- philosopheô**, to be a philosopher, 13,14; 45,28; 60,34.40; 63,4.18; 64,32.53; 68,3; 110,5; 111,42.47; 113,21.49; 116,43; 121,26; 129,25.29.40; 136,18
- philosophia**, philosophy, 1,11; 35,35; 58,40; 59,10.15.18.27.36.37.41.52; 110,44; 131,28; 133,35; 134,40; 135,13; 136,31
- philosophos**, philosopher, 9,32; 28,18; 59,39; 60,24.26; 63,25; 109,33; 111,44; 118,17; 125,28; 130,22.30.31.34.35; 131,8; 132,30.31; 133,18.28.30.49; 134,21
- phorêtos**, bearable, 24,53; 39,51; 128,33.36.38.40.45.49.50.52.53; 129,1.8.12
- phroneô**, to think, to be right-thinking, 29,36; 35,27; 41,42.49; 46,17; 51,43; 55,36; 129,29
- phronêsis**, practical wisdom, 13,27; 17,54; 18,39.45.53; 19,9; 42,51; 46,30; 51,20; 88,10; 107,42; 110,1; 125,20; 132,50
- phronimos**, wise, 13,35; 84,37
- phugê**, flight, 4,27; 8,27; 81,24; 90,49; exile, 27,10; 58,16.25; 137,53
- pleonektêma**, advantage, 88,5; 119,28; 131,51
- pleonekteô**, to take advantage, 28,24; 36,49; 106,8; 125,16.43
- pleonexia**, advantage, 36,53; 106,29; 125,11.22
- plêthunô**, to pluralise, 5,24.45
- plêthuntikos**, plurality, 5,41
- pneuma**, breath, spirit, 50,1; 114,1; 115,37
- poiôtês**, quality, 9,45; 13,19; 28,27; 37,5; 55,21; 70,10; 97,5.11; 129,53; 130,2.9; 136,43
- polis**, city, 12,44; 29,16; 35,31; 64,27.32.42.46.53; 65,10.12.28; 83,3; 89,35.42.54; 90,2.54; 103,37.41; 120,21; 125,29
- politeia**, city, state (republic), 12,35; 15,32; 16,7; 65,13.29.35.44.54; 66,7.24.31
- politês**, citizen, 24,46; 64,35.38.51; 65,1.42; 83,24.44.45; 89,33.36.38.43.52.53; 90,4.5
- politeuô**, be part of household, dwell, be a citizen, 53,49; 55,2; 65,31
- politikos**, political, 3,1; 51,21; 62,50; 63,11.16.28; 82,54; 86,45; 89,49; 103,18; 112,31; 115,33
- pragma**, action, 99,46; 135,46.49.51; 136,6; affair, 65,30; 102,3.51; 103,2; 109,53.54; 110,2; 114,24; thing, 4,10; 9,11; 19,8; 25,27.30; 28,1.4.29; 54,33; 59,2; 65,34.48; 68,20.27.37; 69,12.14.43; 71,29; 101,19; 104,27; 110,37; 112,42.53; 121,15; 124,11; 125,36; 128,31; 129,44
- proballô**, to intend, 1,24; to manifest, 9,33.35.36.51; 10,1.7.12.18.21.26.30; 11,1; 12,40; 114,54; 115,3; to cite, 11,13; 61,15; 69,25; to project, 26,28.41.44; 31,31; 72,2; 109,17.48
- problêma**, thesis, 95,20.25; 101,39; 108,39; 109,2; topic, 120,22
- prohaireô**, to choose, 67,22
- prohairesis**, prohairesis, 6,38.39.40; 7,24.33.35.39.42.48; 8,12.39; 13,21; 14,18; 34,42; 36,23.36.38; 38,9; 41,9.47; 42,40; 45,2.7.11.22.41; 46,46; 51,27.29; 62,1.2.21; 79,2.6.11.12.16.17.18.31; 81,2.8; 82,44; 84,44.46.47.48.52.53; 85,33; 86,6; 87,36; 89,2.3; 90,26; 96,14.30.34; 105,32; 110,20; 111,22.25.37.38; 121,37
- prohairesitikos**, prohairesitic, 37,37; 83,33; 84,14.16.20.23.26.29.35.43.54; 89,4.5.6
- prohêgeomai**, be primary, 3,4; 33,50; 34,31.32; 35,9; 36,26; 40,15.33; 41,40; 43,7; 73,31.37; 74,6.11.13.17.31.33.40.41.45.51; 75,26; 77,20; 81,28.35.39.42.49; 82,3.8.11; 88,53; 101,44; 127,47; 129,40; be per se, 8,14.18; 14,30.46.47; 41,29.34; 96,7.11.34.39; 101,50; 118,45; 119,14; precede, 4,29; 7,10; 22,38.46; 30,31; 97,22; 99,28; 116,25
- proiêmi**, to abandon, 50,23.29.30.31; 70,44; 127,3; 132,22

- prokopē**, progress, 25,14; 49,38;
51,13; 53,22; 131,33; 133,36;
135,34.49; 136,3.4.7
- prokoptō**, to make progress, 25,43;
34,6; 49,26; 50,36.52; 56,45.54;
58,39; 59,47; 61,19; 63,7;
111,42.47; 119,11; 121,20; 122,28;
130,21.25.29.36; 132,31.34;
133,26.50; 135,13.24.33.34
- prolambanō**, to grasp in advance,
100,47; 110,8
- prolēpsis**, preconception, 95,40.49;
108,42
- promeletaō**, to consider in advance,
26,13.40; 27,46; 29,51; 49,48
- pronoō**, to exercise forethought,
15,28; 91,43.45.46.47; 95,22;
101,47; 102,18.19.20.45;
103,15.41; 104,6.36; 105,49;
106,5.46; 108,29.30.42; 115,15
- pronoia**, forethought, 34,18; 39,30;
53,48; 76,24; 91,38;
102,12.15.23.50; 103,28;
104,11.30.39; 106,1; 107,36.38;
113,4
- prosallēlos**, in relation, 2,17; 5,24;
35,36; 43,47; 83,33.42; 84,1.10;
87,10; 89,39; 98,44; 100,4; 128,33
- prosekhēs**, proximate, 36,28;
contiguous, 4,41; 5,9.23; 6,32;
81,13; 91,27; 97,15.24; 98,22
- prosekhō**, to attend, to be careful,
54,34; 78,54; 119,24; 123,41;
135,22
- prosektikon**, attentive part, 112,25;
114,52
- prosokhē**, attention, 114,51; 119,44
- protasis**, premiss, 82,5; 136,27.28.43
- prōtotupos**, prototypical, 97,50.53
- prōtourgos**, primordial, 97,47.48;
98,2.21.24.37; 99,46; 100,38
- psegō**, to blame, 62,43; 79,12;
113,13.18; 122,43; 129,45; 130,18;
133,30.31
- psektos**, blamed, 55,36; 62,37
- psogos**, blame, 13,20; 14,20
- psukhē**, soul, 6,19.22.25; 98,39;
human soul, 1,12.22.36;
2,8.22.41.44.51.4;
3,12.16.33.36.44.47.48;
4,5.26.38.46; 5,27; 6,41;
7,26.28.36; 9,54;
10,3.9.20.29.31.33.35.43;
11,10.39.48.54;
12,6.13.16.22.35.36.41.43.52;
13,2.4.11.17.19.50.51; 14,3.8.51;
15,26.34; 18,23; 19,40;
23,2.6.11.13.36; 24,25.54;
26,46.53; 27,9; 28,17.32.42;
29,24.37; 30,38; 34,15.18.21;
36,44; 37,29.48; 38,7.22.31.49;
39,26.31.41.43.52; 40,3.36.43;
41,4; 42,1.3.12.13.17.24.25.29.31.
43.50.53; 43,14.21.25.26.33.36.38;
44,2.8; 45,5.44.53; 46,22.26; 47,3;
50,22.29.48.50; 51,2.36; 52,8.9.19;
53,52; 59,20; 60,9; 61,5; 63,35.37;
66,25.29.31; 67,18; 68,33;
69,16.34; 72,43; 74,9; 75,49;
76,20.25; 77,30.40.42;
78,4.10.30.38;
79,2.6.18.20.27.28.45;
80,3.23.28.42; 82,22.29; 83,1.2.14;
85,10.11; 86,8; 87,1.8.52;
88,1.3.33; 89,11.14.22; 91,5.20;
93,33.39;
98,14.16.17.30.34.35.38.46;
102,52; 103,2.48; 104,1.30.33.35;
105,50.51; 106,30.32; 107,24;
108,15.18.46; 110,27.36.47.50;
112,16.22.25.27.36; 113,16;
114,3.52; 115,11; 117,14.20;
118,11.26.39.42; 119,2.12;
122,13.48.49; 123,11.15; 125,7.44;
126,1.2.4.5.9; 127,36.38; 128,14;
129,12.18; 130,54; 131,6; 138,3;
divine soul, 6,31; 11,45; 75,48;
77,33.43; 98,44; 100,27; irrational
soul, 36,19; 37,32.50; 77,35.37;
Manichean soul, 70,40.46.48;
71,29.32; 72,10.39; 80,53; 81,8.16
- psukhikos**, soul, 14,19; 18,29; 20,25;
24,40; 29,43; 41,40; 43,17; 44,24;
77,43; 86,51; 89,6; 98,24; 99,2;
100,11; 101,23; 107,6; 108,40;
113,53; 128,54; 138,32
- rhēpō**, to incline, 38,40; 77,53; 78,39
- rhōpē**, inclination, 38,36; 44,14;
53,9; 80,3
- skepsis**, investigation, 95,50
- skeptomai**, to investigate, 95,49
- skhesis**, relation, 10,10; 12,21.54;
16,42; 76,23; 77,47; 78,10;
83,25.26.30.32.35.36.37.40;
84,12.16.26.28.32.38.40.44.46.49.
52.54; 85,38.53; 86,16; 88,43.48;

- 89,1.4.30.31.33; 90,15.38;
91,1.2.29.34; 94,1
- skopeô**, to inquire, 65,41; 85,43;
99,3; 106,18
- skopos**, aim, 1,19; 2,21; 8,19.22;
35,10; 39,25; 40,22;
74,11.29.32.36.37;
81,30.31.35.36.38.40.41.43.44.48.
50.52; 82,1.5.7.9.13.14.16.18;
86,14; 96,10.12.15.16.31; 101,44;
108,38; 118,26.47; 127,1;
129,46.54; 130,2.8.10
- sôtêr**, saviour, 13,29; 106,3.4; 138,31
- sôtêria**, preservation, 37,23; 46,16;
76,49; safety, 26,42.44; 74,34;
salvation, 31,32
- sôzô**, to preserve, 11,37; 14,43; 37,26;
103,41; 108,49; 125,15; 135,50;
136,4; save, 20,32; 49,6
- stereô**, to deprive, 37,47; 74,1; 89,3;
90,48
- sterêsis**, privation, 6,53; 74,8.21
- Stôikos**, Stoic, 4,36; 12,15;
124,15.28; 137,18
- sullogismos**, argument (syllogism),
81,34; 82,4; 124,14.45.51;
136,26.43
- sullogizomai**, to argue
(demonstratively), 28,10; 61,33
- sumbainon**, event, 26,16.17.18;
27,27.39; 35,28; 41,53; 46,25;
54,16.17.22.26.36; 58,4; 68,42;
69,4.9.13.36; 76,50; 90,52; 121,43;
what happens, 37,29; 44,27; 58,9;
104,37; 121,36.40.42
- sumbebêkos**, accident, 73,48.52;
75,30
- summetria**, commensurateness,
symmetry, 5,48; 100,24; 114,5
- summetros**, commensurate,
symmetrical, 5,28; 10,40;
13,26.28.34; 24,8.11; 34,51; 38,1;
49,20.22; 116,44; 112,31; 120,32;
121,19.4; 125,25.37
- sumpaskhô**, to sympathise, 17,16;
39,14; 69,42; 127,45; 129,7
- sumpathainô**, to join in emotion,
55,41
- sumpatheia**, sympathy, 14,26;
38,26; 47,44; 48,8; 54,35; 59,5;
65,45; 69,15.38.41.44; 85,5; 87,45;
88,40; 89,52; 111,24; 113,27;
120,15; 127,44; 129,3; 133,44
- sumpathês**, sympathetic, 2,26;
54,30; 87,38; 88,44; 121,9
- sumplekô**, to embrace, to join, 58,14;
66,3; 76,24; 78,11.49;
124,16.29.33.36.42.47.52; 125,4;
128,17.19
- sumplektikos**, conjunction, 58,15
- sumplokê**, combination, 32,50;
124,52
- sunagô**, to collect, 12,37.46; 49,54;
53,29; 84,9; 89,12; 112,24; 132,10;
to conclude, 3,29; 72,54; 96,33;
136,27
- sunagôgê**, conclusion, 21,17
- sunagôgos**, associative, 13,2;
83,34.41.52.54; 84,1.6.7.14.21
- sunaisthanomai**, to be aware, 1,32;
27,17; 43,43; 82,43; 94,23
- sunaisthêsis**, awareness, 14,5;
27,28; 123,1; 127,24
- sunêmmenon**, conditional, 82,12;
124,16.42.46
- sungignôskô**, to forgive, 7,45; 43,23;
72,47; 106,14; 107,18
- sungnômê**, forgiveness, 79,14;
87,33; 99,48; 106,19; 118,17
- sunkatabainô**, to accommodate,
54,30.39
- sunkatabasis**, accommodation,
54,35
- sunkatabatikos**, accommodating,
21,24
- sunkatathesis**, assent, 14,3; 124,40
- sunkatatithêmi**, to assent, 130,14
- sunkhôreô**, to allow, to permit, 1,44;
9,25.42; 24,52; 34,1; 42,1; 43,19;
46,22; 51,5; 79,29.32;
106,11.14.22; 114,14; 118,44;
135,41
- sunkhôrêsis**, permission,
106,18.23.33
- suntaxis**, co-ordination,
83,32.41.45.47.50.53;
84,5.7.11.14.19.20.23.35; 85,38;
138,5
- sunthesis**, arrangement, 136,29.44
- suntithêmi**, to compose, 14,6;
36,42.48; 37,12; 41,13; 42,9; 76,39;
77,1; 97,21.23; 98,51; 136,27
- tarakhê**, disturbance, 28,3; 30,1;
30,3; 48,30; 71,53; 72,3; 87,11
- tarattô**, to disturb, 17,9;
25,12.28.35; 26,16; 27,39.42.50.51;

- 28,2.5.20.22; 29,26.28; 30,10;
49,41.45.46; 58,43; 69,13.20;
82,33; 103,29; 112,39; 121,45
- tattô**, place, assign, fix, 53,24; 55,39;
60,19; 67,19; 70,3; 103,37; 111,48;
112,10; 130,35.48
- tautotês**, constancy, sameness, 95,9;
99,23; 100,23; 112,2; 114,5; 120,35
- taxis**, order, 2,17; 23,46; 33,40;
48,32; 96,12.1.28.32; 99,12;
137,24; position; status, 3,46;
8,13; 36,33; 43,46; 55,38; 77,20;
78,33; 85,29; 115,1; 130,34;
station, 58,52; 59,53
- tekhne**, art, craft, skill, 2,20;
3,32.44.45; 8,21; 9,53; 10,1;
12,28.30; 13,39; 15,19; 24,33;
32,33; 35,36.39; 37,24; 76,44; 83,7;
103,15.22; 110,2.7.18.20;
115,19.20; 127,42; 129,38
- tekhnikos**, artificial, technical,
12,23; 24,31; 25,30; 32,37; 33,29;
64,2; 136,27
- tekhnitês**, craftsman, 3,45; 12,24.27;
127,40; 129,38
- tektôn**, carpenter, 12,25;
32,30.32.36; 33,28.29; 35,41;
81,32.52; 115,14
- teleiôô**, to perfect, 3,9; 3,23; 32,42;
96,27; 104,33; 131,2
- teleios**, complete, perfect, 12,3;
18,36; 22,1; 30,44.50; 31,6; 33,37;
36,25; 37,41.51; 38,8; 39,49;
43,31.33; 46,12.13; 53,9; 54,40.42;
62,6.47; 66,32; 67,1.27; 71,30;
75,52; 77,3; 80,29; 81,28; 83,38;
99,6; 100,25.30; 101,42.53;
108,3.11; 114,8.15.27; 116,16;
122,52; 127,33; 130,22; 131,8;
133,20; 135,8.19.31.33; 136,3;
138,31
- teleiôsis**, perfection, 94,49; 108,40
- teleiôtês**, perfection, 2,7.9.13; 15,16;
31,20; 32,1.36; 40,6; 44,13; 48,54;
73,39.41.54; 74,3.20; 75,54; 88,8;
108,18.50; 109,1; 134,8; 136,19;
138,4
- telos**, end, goal, 5,6; 8,22; 20,54;
26,31; 34,53; 39,30; 59,18.41;
74,32.34.38.40.41.46; 75,4; 80,35;
81,31.37.50.54; 96,18; 104,32;
108,12.14.34.41; 109,53; 110,2.15;
129,30.32.34.36; 130,42;
- 132,16.26; 133,53; 135,8.32;
136,50; 138,2.6.10.20
- thanatos**, death, 2,2; 4,11; 27,24.51;
28,8.13.19.22.45.48.49.51.53;
29,3.7.52; 38,50; 49,14; 50,5;
58,16.25; 64,7; 88,35; 90,52; 93,11;
102,5; 111,20; 129,5
- thea**, vision, spectacle, 19,43;
120,1.7.12.13.15.17
- theama**, vision, sight, 24,29; 77,52;
119,32
- theaomai**, to notice, to see, 4,39;
68,43; 75,13; 100,3; 117,9; 130,16;
137,21
- theatês**, spectator, 55,32
- theatrikos**, visual, 119,35
- theatron**, theatre, 119,34.36.44
- theios**, divine, 6,6; 12,53; 15,52;
16,1; 20,30; 38,15; 41,22; 42,54;
43,9; 46,1; 54,2.4; 66,26.31; 69,47;
70,17.18; 72,20.35; 80,8.21.31;
85,28.34; 86,7.17; 89,10; 90,23;
93,18.20.27.31.47.50;
94,2.10.15.21.25.27.31.34.45.54;
95,2.7.9.13.15; 100,33; 101,51;
102,15.18.22.29.47.49; 104,8;
106,5.13; 107,18.22.31.33;
109,42.51; 117,5; 131,17; 137,41.46
- thelêsis**, wish, 44,7; 56,41
- thelô**, to wish, 6,47; 8,43; 12,8;
14,5.6.17; 35,26.44.45; 36,14;
41,49; 42,27; 43,22; 44,6.23.35.41;
45,3.41.48; 47,34; 48,3; 50,36.41;
52,7.25; 55,49.53; 56,6.7.10.25;
60,47; 62,53; 65,13; 68,6; 68,8.14;
75,39; 77,53; 78,3; 80,48; 89,18;
103,54; 109,3; 110,23; 118,43;
119,46; 130,51; 132,4.6; 137,32.34
- theoeidês**, god-like, 112,31
- theôrêma**, doctrine, theorem,
131,19.23; 135,12.14; 136,32
- theôrêtikos**, theoretical, 2,36
- theos**, god, 2,50; 5,12.13; 7,37; 11,54;
20,31.35; 26,28.33; 33,39; 34,17;
35,41.51; 39,25; 40,37.40;
41,18.20.23.48; 42,42; 43,23.35;
44,9; 53,29; 54,4.48; 55,3.31;
59,17.34.35; 60,19; 61,48; 65,48;
67,10.12.19.20.23.25.48;
70,30.36.51; 72,23.41.47;
73,7.9.10.11.20.23; 75,35.40;
79,8.26.27.28.33.54;
80,13.36.52.53.54; 81,16.18; 83,27;

- 85,4.27; 86,11.19; 89,13;
 90,16.18.23.25.31; 91,4;
 93,28.41.43.47;
 94,6.7.9.12.22.26.46.50;
 95,16.20.28.34.42.49.51; 99,44;
 100,7.49; 101,28.34.40.48;
 102,9.45;
 103,1.14.20.27.29.33.42.53;
 104,2.9.22.26.33.35;
 106,1.23.27.43;
 107,1.3.4.9.12.26.27.39.41;
 108,12.48.51; 109,8.10.43.45;
 110,36.38.46;
 111,2.12.16.23.26.31; 113,3;
 114,21.22.25.31.34; 118,30;
 122,49; 131,9; 134,52;
 137,23.49.53; 138,1.4.33
- theosebeō**, to revere god, 95,30
theosebēs, pious, 12,45; 72,21; 102,53
thnēskō, to die, 28,40; 52,3; 54,20;
 111,17
thnētos, mortal, 2,7.12; 24,25; 52,2;
 54,21; 69,7.16.26; 76,13;
 78,1.10.11.12.15.20; 110,28
thumoeidēs, spirited part, 46,39
thumoō, to be angry, 58,12.23.49;
 59,7
thumos, spirit (anger), 4,40; 14,53;
 18,51; 30,40; 33,23; 38,1.19; 41,19;
 78,14; 118,19.20.22; 132,53; 133,1
topos, place, 12,45.49.51.54; 13,1;
 15,38; 34,21.22; 36,18.49; 42,11;
 62,51.54; 71,23;
 76,13.17.7.23.32.34.47; 78,1.11;
 90,2; 94,16.20.23.32; 97,5.6.12;
 103,46; topic, 120,21; 136,31.45.53
tukhē, chance, 42,41; 56,51; 66,34;
 85,13; 90,42; 96,6.11
tunkhanō, to attain, to acquire,
 1,19; 2,13; 7,24; 13,20;
 16,46.52.53; 17,1.11.28; 19,27.54;
 20,54; 21,3.5.14.28.43;
 22,15.16.17.23; 38,21.41; 41,35.44;
 52,41; 53,6; 57,54; 62,7.8;
 67,6.40.42.43.45.47.48.53; 68,4;
 73,38; 74,37; 81,38; 82,17; 86,48;
 89,14; 90,24; 92,43; 93,4.29; 94,6;
 101,50; 102,37; 103,38.46; 105,15;
 107,8; 118,48; 121,43; 122,23.34;
 125,13; 129,28; 135,2; be; happen
 to be, 24,38.45.54; 26,34; 28,39.50;
 35,49; 37,49; 39,6; 44,37; 53,40;
 63,18; 65,17; 84,39; 85,1; 86,15.21;
 90,1.46; 91,16; 98,28; haphazard,
 8,10.18.28.30; 96,8.35; 130,18;
 chance or ordinary person, 28,54;
 48,10; 60,16; 82,25.32; 113,5.6;
 134,37
tupoō, to imprint, 25,26
tupos, model, 86,17; 121,50
zōē, life, 2,21.32.37.39; 3,8; 4,24.41;
 10,4.12.14.17; 12,19; 13,11.19;
 20,8; 25,26; 27,17; 28,18.35;
 36,21.45; 37,34.41.46; 44,54;
 45,42; 46,10; 49,33; 53,46; 59,51;
 70,54; 77,45; 78,13.31.40; 81,14;
 91,40.50; 93,11.35.49; 94,13;
 108,16; 112,3.8.18; 113,11.44;
 120,53; 121,18.20; 126,5; 129,33;
 130,31; 131,10; 134,6; 135,29
zōō, to live, 1,28; 2,9.33.52; 10,17;
 12,47; 13,14; 14,10; 17,36.43;
 18,52; 21,27; 22,16; 25,35; 26,51;
 28,40; 29,2; 30,16; 31,47; 33,42.44;
 35,14; 38,11; 48,54; 50,41.44;
 51,3.50; 52,8; 66,8; 69,17; 88,13;
 93,17; 98,42; 110,6; 112,18;
 118,28; 120,46; 135,26; 137,52
zōos, animal, 2,47.50; 10,4; 12,18;
 17,46; 23,54; 35,30; 36,7;
 37,17.49.50; 43,45; 50,45; 58,38;
 67,32; 71,19; 74,11.35; 77,35;
 78,5.12.15.16.20.23.28; 79,52;
 86,6; 92,9; 94,19; 95,26; 96,17.25;
 98,28; 99,15; 102,34.42.52.54;
 110,5; 112,37; 114,44;
 115,27.52.54; 126,10; 132,39;
 136,39
zōtikos, animation, vital, 14,3;
 15,12; 76,27; 77,46; 109,3; 136,20

Subject Index

References are to the page and line numbers of Dübner's edition, which appear in the margins of the translation. The index is cumulative, listing entries and all proper names for volumes 1 and 2 of this translation.

- affections: arising of necessity or spontaneously, 8,8-10; 15,8; 38,10-30; *see also* emotions
- aim: of the commentary, 2,24.29; 101,44; 108,38; 138,15.21; of the *Handbook*, 1,19; *see also* Simplicius
- Akrothoitai (legendary tribe of atheists): 95,34; *see also* atheism
- Alcibiades: 3,5
- Alexander (the Great): 53,38.41.43; 88,19; 121,23
- Anabasis* (Xenophon's): 90,53
- Anaxagoras: 54,19
- Antigonus: 121,23
- Anytus: 138,6.9
- Apollodorus: 131,14
- appropriate actions: 61,22; 82,47; 83,10; 109,7-8; 127,49; three categories, 83,10; how to find, 83,22-3; towards citizens, 90,1-10; towards God, 91,29-30; 109,8,43; to oneself, 111,46-7; *see also* brothers, friends, teachers
- appropriation: natural, 92,24
- archetype: 75,11
- arguments: from life, 45,41-2; on the basis of possibility, 67,50; short, 81,22-3; by division, 102,17; educational, 112,15; *see also* demonstration
- Aristophanes (in Plato's *Symposium*): 89,24-5
- Arrian: 1,6.10.14.17
- assent to origins: 99,35
- assent: 14,2-24; lemma lxiii (*Ench.* 45); 130,14; 135,15
- assimilation to God: 93,30
- assumptions: invalid, 68,32
- astrologers: sometimes correct, 13,12.24.31
- atheism: 106,5; 108,2; atheists, 95,35
- attachments: 34,51
- awareness: 14,5
- axioms: 124,28
- bad: knowledge of good and bad, 30,31; its source and cause of growth, 31,33-5; the cause of, 36,5; qualified bad, 43,32-3; involuntary, 43,26; nature of, 71,8; an accident, 73,48; origin, 69,59-70,1; 72,38; and the creation of the cosmos, 71,40; not involuntary, 72,40; God not cause of, 73,1; 79,20.26; (mis)conceived as substance, 73,31; derivative existence, 73,50-74,5; failure to attain target, 81,40; inarticulated conception of, 77,8-9; never any choice of, 79,40-2; origin of, 69,45-79,20; not a nature, 81,49-51; a deprivation of the good, 74,1; 81,20; not chosen per se, 75,2; 79,40-1; prohairesis is origin, 79,10; 80,40-81,1; *see also* gods, good, soul, virtue
- bearing things lightly: 29,4
- belief: comes first, 4,29; 8,38; 32,1; 32,4; lemma xxix (*Ench.* 20-1); natural use of, 32,44.48-9; 33,5-6; or supposition, our own doing, 57,42-3; true, 32,43; disturbs people, lemma x (*Ench.* 5), 28,2.5; true or false, 9,12; correct, 29,27;

- 91,41; distortion of believing
 faculty of the soul, 126,3-4; up to
 us, 16,35; 110,30-40
- benefactors: 31,15-16; 91,01-10
- beneficial things: 8,32
- benefit: 64,49
- blame: 130,18
- blasphemy: 70,36; *see also* gods,
 impiety
- boasting: harmful, 131,47
- body: is not the human being, 1,41;
 2,41; 3,39; 31,2; 38,7-24; 68,34;
 82,22; 126,2; good of, 2,10; 'lives'
 of, 4,41; 10,14; 78,10; 126,5;
 inanimate, 6,7; not up to us,
 lemma ii (*Ench.* 1); 15.26-45;
 105,2; part of mortal animal,
 12,18; source of wars, 16,13;
 training of, 25,1-18; 29,40-3;
 lemma lxxv (*Ench.* 47); disease of,
 42,7; lemma xv (*Ench.* 9); 44.50;
 80.17; 103,15; dedication of, to
 God, 93,36; 107,24; use of, lemma
 xliv (*Ench.* 33); 115,112; lemma
 liv (*Ench.* 36); 125,46; lemma lvii
 (*Ench.* 39); 122,26; lemma lvix
 (*Ench.* 41); pleasure of, 122,47;
 126,1
- bonds (releasing): 34,40
- brothers: 83,40; appropriate
 behaviour towards, 85,40
- cathartic life: 2,33; 28,17
- Cato (Uticensis): 26,1
- cause: necessary to generate
 anything, 73,2-5; per se, 96,30-40;
 primary and superior, 91,35;
 self-moving, 99,50; *see also* bad,
 gods
- Chaeronea (birthplace of Plutarch):
 129,21
- child: having children, 1,37-39;
 18,32; 33,35-6; love of, 24,45;
 treatment of, 80,26, *see also* us
- choice: internal motions from, 4,6,7;
 78,53; proper motion of the soul,
 6,31; of first souls, 6,36; 11,46;
 prohairesis, choice of one thing
 over another, 6,38; of pleasurable
 good cause of errors, 7,21-48;
 79,2-24; real choice, 8,24; human
 virtue & vice according to choice,
 11,52; 79,25-42; of involuntary,
 self-determined, 14,30; good and
 bad in choice and aversion, 39,28;
 of good called 'virtue', 42,36; *see
 also* prohairesis
- choiceworthy: 32,8
- Christians, possible references to:
 16,1; 35,34; 106,14
- Chrysippus: 134,9.12.14.23.25.34;
 137,19
- citizen: respectful, 65,1; appropriate
 actions to, 90,1-10; *see also* politics
- Cleanthes: 137,17-18
- Clinias (father of Alcibiades): 3,6
- commensurate things: 24,37
- conception: imparts disposition to
 words, 47,37-8; common
 conceptions, 68,19-20.40; 69,4;
 95,30; 102,11; individual
 conceptions, 68,28; underlying
 word, 101,31; (pre)conceptions of
 god, 95,40.49; 108,42
- conjunction: lemma liv (*Ench.* 36);
 124,29
- consideration (of the corollaries of
 actions): 26,51-2; *see also*
 expectations
- controller and master of each person:
 52,24
- conviction: firm, 110,30-40
- co-ordination: 83,20; natural,
 83,41-50; (dis)associative of
 (dis)similars, 83,40-84,1;
 prohairetic, 84,10-30
- correcting ourselves: 120,10
- cosmos: 8,5.6; creation of, 71,44;
 75,52
- Crates (of Thebes, the Cynic): 23,8;
 29,15.18; 45,28; 49,28.31; 53,38;
 116,4
- criteria: lemma vi (*Ench.* 1); *kanôn*,
 20,28.49; 28,29; 87,5; 132,46;
 133,12; *kriteriôn*, 31,36
- Crito: 137,48.50
- cultural decline: 35,30-40
- Cyrus: 90,52
- daily actions: 25,49
- death: greatest source of
 disturbance, 27,51; 28,13.19.45;
 58,25; good, 28,33.44
- deficiency, the cause of desires: 8,41
- Delium: 65,19
- Delphi: 111,13
- Demiurge: 1,23; *see also* gods
- demonstration: 44,45; demonstrative

- argument, 101,7; necessity, 105,19-20; proofs, 95,48-9; (hypothetical) syllogism, 124,14,51
- Demosthenes: 26,26.29.42; 134.2
- desire: internal motion, 10,53-4; and aversion, 16,50; and impulses, 36,14; and choices, simple and unconflicted, 6,45; for fasting, 10,26; habituated by reason, 18,40; 21,33; vanquishes reason, 18,47; 52,45-6; irrational desire, 48,35; 63,4; 68,3; 117,17; for honour, 8,38; 56,44; genuine and perfect desire, 67,27; 91,54-92,1; many-headed, 114,34-5; bodily, 114,36-7; irrational desires, for food and sex, 119,31-2
- Diatribes* (Arrian's collection of Epictetus' lectures): 1,6.18
- diet and food: 78,18; 106,38; 110,3; lemma xliii (*Ench.* 33); 114,35-50; 115,22-46; 122,50; 126,23; lemma lxiv (*Ench.* 46); 130,51-131,6
- Diogenes (of Sinope, the Cynic): 23,8; 40,44; 45,27; 49,31; 53,38-42; 54,1; 117,7
- Diomedes: 50,28
- disease: of the body, 42,7; bodily disease a medical treatment for the soul, 42,13; bodily disease good for the whole, 76,30-1; bodily disease necessary, 77,10; incurable disease (of cities), 65,34
- disjunction: lemma liv (*Ench.* 36); 124,16
- disposition: soul cause of good or bad disposition, 8,54-9.14; 11,38-42; of educated and uneducated people, 30,6-40; natural disposition the good of each thing, 32,20-7; healthy, 59,23; unnatural disposition the bad of each thing, 74.1-5, 76,28; 77.3; 105,15-18; 106.30; fated dispositions, 38.4; acractic, 42,48; words dispose conceptions, 47,36-9
- dissolution of the composite: 43,8-9
- disturbances, causes of: 30,1
- diversion of soul: 43,1; 44,3-20; of gods by gifts, 106,6; *see also* inclination, turning
- divination: 109,24; 110,20-30; proper subjects for, 109,52; 110,26-32
- divine lot: 66,32
- division: scope of, 8,3; argument by, 102,17
- doctor: causes the soul to turn away from things, 38,46; *see also* medical art
- Dog-Star: 130,6
- Domitian: 65,36
- duality: 98,50
- earnestness: 19,10
- earthquakes: 37,12
- eclipses: 72,4
- educated people: lemma xi (*Ench.* 5); 30,15; 31,22.53; 44,28; 46,12-33; 48,26; 133,28; *see also* philosopher, progress
- education: 31,40; correction of the child, 31,41-2; 34,5; educational accounts, 137,12; educational arguments, 112,15; *see also* progress
- elation: a belief, 32,13.17
- elements: equilibration of, 37,11; mass of, 37,1; recirculation of, 37,13-14; 42,18
- emotions: 30,37; human attributes, 107,30; irrational, 1,41; 2,4; 30,51; 48,29; 86,33; 113,37; 115,3; 123,46; 125,45-54; 132,19.39; 132,55-133,1; 138,26; muscular, 30,36; tyrannical, 30,36-7; intense, 118,51; identifying with, 125,49-50; animals', 8,8-10
- Encheiridion*: 1,9; 1,26; 101,45
- encounters: with social superiors, lemma l (*Ench.* 33); 121,34; with the masses, lemma li (*Ench.* 33); 122,3-4
- endurance: 46,21
- envy: 56,32.40
- Epictetus: 1,5.6.9.12.15.17; 3,6.15.19; 7,50; 10,31; 19,39; 26,32.34; 27,25; 28,44.52; 29,14; 31,17; 35,50.54; 44,20.23.54; 45,35; 47,37; 48,8; 50,6.47; 55,30; 61,27; 65,36; 81,21.34; 88,48; 89,30; 91,10.21.22; 95,44; 101,45; 110,48; 114,42; 116,41.49; 121,20.27; 123,18, 124,43; 137,30, 138,15; 114,41, 129,21; 137,18.20; his life, 1,1; 44,53-4; 45,35-40; 55,30; 65,35; 116,48; style of teaching,

- 27,25-28; 110,48; *see also* Simplicius
- epilepsy, cured by divine illumination: 93,52
- equilibration in divisions: 8,3
- error: 7,22; 30,50; consciousness of, 87,34; *see also* bad
- essence: human, in accordance with a rational soul, 1,30; 2,5.39; of a thing, 112,45
- Eteocles: 92,30
- eternal motion: 40,9
- ethical disposition (*enstasis*): 49,48; 58,44; 59,40; lemma xxxi (*Ench.* 23), 60,5.10.25-6; 63,32-3; 65,53; 114,47
- Euripides: 137,39; *see also* Medea
- Euripus: 112,4
- examples, *see* similes
- excess: must be removed, 117,1; two forms, 117,2-4
- exegesis: 3,18; 75,38; extending the argument, 125,1-2
- exercise: 40,14; same as eventual activity, 40,32; 49,20
- exhortations: 137,9-10
- expectations: 26,28.30.41; 49,50; *see also* consideration
- external things: by nature trivial, 18,22; acquisition of, 47,13-14; 52,1-2; 56,13; treasured by most people, 53,36-7; dependent on external judgements, 61,3; 132,15
- family: 34,21.23; 59,5; 87,38; 88,11-12; 89,54
- fate: does not compel rational souls, 13,4-5; grants nothing bad, 13,21-2; 55,5; fated revolution, 9,25-39; 12,9-13,48; 93,13; destiny, 34,15; 137,25; plant souls subject entirely to fate, 37,32-38,4
- father: lemma xxxvii (*Ench.* 30); 26,10; 83,23-28; 84,1-4.51; 85,3; 92,26; 114, 49; one must yield to one's, 85,10; cause of existence, 85,3-4; gods compared to, 1,23; 76,24; 85,11; 138,22; philosopher compared to: 65,4; fellow-citizen should be to orphans, 89,48
- first mover: 98,10
- forbearance: defence against insults, 46,36-7
- forethought (divine): steers universe & descent of souls, 34,18; medical treatment of, 39,30; 107,38; allows good souls to share governance, 53,48; produced rational soul, 76,24; what happens is in accordance with, lemma xxxviii (*Ench.* 31); 91,38; argument for, 95,22; 101,47-106,2; *see also* gods
- forms: prototypical, 97,49; primordial and distinct in the soul, 98,37-8; archetypal, 100,33
- frankness: tasteless, 66,14
- freedom: 16,21-3; from emotions and disturbance, 50,24; a state, 50,25
- friends: 84,50; selection of and appropriate behaviour towards, 86,20-87,40; best teachers, 88,20-1; training-ground for learning, 88,27-8
- friendship: 87,49; augments virtue, 86,53; desire and friendship, 86,35; great power of, 89,1-2; pure, 89,11
- genus (opposites belong to same): 70,6,11
- goal (of actions): 130,41-2
- gods: not cause of vice, 11,54; 33,40; agency of, 41,48; aim of, 39,25; artful contrivance of, 44,9-10; assistant of souls: 39,52; cause of every power, 67,13; cause of everything, 5,13; director and producer, 55,2-3; director and writer, 55,31; eternal, 104,7-14; admonition to Know Oneself, 59,16; assimilation to, 67,10; medical treatment by, 41,20-2; our host, 54,48; pilot, lemma xiii (*Ench.* 7) 34,16; sent human souls down, 40,36; superabundance of goodness, 43,9; the first thing, 5,13; turning back to, 33,39; turns us back, 33,32-3; 34,32-3; 94,22; 100,40-50; 110,36,38; 111,2; produces everything, 70,30; not cause of the bad, 43,35; 72,22-3; 80,17; composer of truth, 73,10-11; fount and origin of all goodness, 75,40-1; exercises forethought, 101,47; 103,15; doesn't turn away, 107,27; his superiority, 113,3; cause of goods, 106,23-4; knows all things,

- 118,30; reverence for, 114,21;
 what the name signifies, 95,51;
 divine beings, 101,51; divine
 forethought, 102,49-50; his
 forethought enfolds everything,
 104,10-15; providence not tedious,
 103,29; divine honour, 94,31;
 divine illumination, 93,40; divine,
 superiority of the, 85,28; divinity,
 107,12; *see also* forethought, origin
- good: 5,4; 100,50; by participation,
 6,7; produces everything, 5,7;
 knowledge of good and bad, 30,3;
 is in what is up to us, 57,9;
 133,23-4; not in external things,
 105,1; everything strives for, 68,2;
 74,43; first souls situated in,
 11,44; first, intermediate, lowest
 goods, 43,5; 75,40; 76,14 *see also*
 turning, virtue
- Greece (Hellas): 65,24
 Greeks (Hellenes): 95,32
 habituation: 49,49; 69,28; 135,25
Handbook: see Encheiridion
 health: bodily health a source of
 harm for bad people, 105,44-5; of
 souls, 41,40
 henad: 5,10.11; 100,48;
 Heracles: 40,43
 Heraclitus: 54,1
 Hermes: 132,40
 Hipparchia: 116,6
 Hippocrates (of Cos): 23,34; 40,5;
 91,7; 131,13
 Hippocrates (sophist): 131,13
 historical research: 93,30
 Homer: 14,51; 50,27; 61,32; 134,24;
 138,33
 honour, reputation: not up to us,
 15,48; 51,8; lack of, lemma xxxii
 (*Ench.* 24); love of honour called
 "last tunic", 47,2; 118,54; desire
 exclusive possession, 86,50;
 desiring good for its sake, 118,45;
 123,52; bases of, 131,40
 human condition: lemma xxxiv
 (*Ench.* 26); 69,3.6
 husband: 84,27; 88,47; 117,38; 127,28
 illustration: *see* similes
 impediment: lemma xv (*Ench.* 9);
 44,50
 impiety, 15,51; 16,2; 35,34; 69,48;
 70,52; 72,20.35; 73,8-20; 93,18;
 94,52; 107,1; 117,42; 130,32;
 lemma lxviii (*Ench.* 50); 134,36-40
 impression: 32,45; lemma vi (*Ench.*
 1); 20,2; irrational, 20,7; true,
 20,15; rule for all impressions,
 20,37-8; use of impressions,
 lemma xii (*Ench.* 6); 32,45; lemma
 xvi (*Ench.* 10), 47,8; 49,42-50,5;
 lemma xxiv (*Ench.* 16), 54,13;
 lemma xxvi (*Ench.* 18); lemma
 xxviii (*Ench.* 19); lemma xxix
 (*Ench.* 20), 57,50; constitutive of
 mortal animal, 78,13-14; each
 person follows own, 127,50-4;
 lemma lxiii (*Ench.* 45), cataleptic,
 130,11-12
 impulse: 4,19.33.36; impulses and
 counter-impulses, 22,42-3;
 towards God, 134,50-9
 inclination, declination of soul:
 6,37.44.53; 23,10; 38,45; 44,14;
 48,29; 80,3; 131,6; *see also*
 diversion, turning
 inconsiderate: 63,39.43.49
 indulgence: 102,40; 126,47
 insatiability: 126,52
 instrument: body as an instrument,
 1,36; 3,26-54; 115,21
 insults: 46,36; not getting disturbed
 over, 82,20
 intensity, lack of: in reason leads to
 error, 18,46; causes descent of
 rational soul, 19,42; 77,50;
 intermittent activities need
 exercise to prevent, 40,12.41;
 harms progress, 136,3
 intermediate goods: 75,42; 76,1;
 unchangeable in essence, 76,4-8;
see also souls
 interpretation: part of the art of
 grammar, 134,22
 interpreter: 134,11
 irrational animals: 2,50; no share of
 self-motion?, 37,39
 irrationality: motion of, 30,35-6;
 childlike, 31,27.41-2; 48,28;
 bestial, 66,18
 judgement: 4,6; of the many, 62,38
 justice: of universe, 36,33; art of
 curing wickedness, 39,35; 41,50;
 103,46; 106,43; divine justice,
 avenging, 80,21; all-inclusive
 virtue, 82,50-3; civic, 83,3;

- elegant, 105,37; to oneself, 108,19;
 trace of, 125,18; Simplicius relates
 chapters to justice, 125,21.41;
 127,10.48; 130,20
- knowledge: of good and bad, 30,31; of
 God, principal cause of reverence:
 93,20-1; *see also* scientific
- lack of education: 30,12
- laughter: 58,50; of the unjust, 60,4;
 113,52; 122,16
- laws: written, 79,9; ancient laws of
 the Romans, 85,19-20
- laziness: 135,5
- letters: 94,43
- life: of a good person, 17,45; of
 frustration, 35,14; is a stage, 55,1;
 according to nature, 66,8; *see also*
 cathartic life
- light of the moon: 72,9
- light of the truth: 88,3; 138,30; *see*
also gods
- limitlessness: 126,45
- logic: logical demonstration, 110,33;
 as example, lemma liv (*Ench.* 36);
 124,16; lemma lx (*Ench.* 42);
 128,15; logical theorems: 135,12;
 division of philosophy, lemma lxx
 (*Ench.* 52); 136,26.35-44; 137,2
- Manichees ('those who posit two
 origins'): Bad, 69,50-1; 71,33-6;
 73,41-5; cosmogony, 71,44-72,20;
 God, 70,28-71,33; 72,20-35; on
 myths, 71,47; souls, 70,39-71,5;
 80,41-81,14; *see also* bad, gods,
 origin, soul
- marriage: 1,38; 33,35; 127,14
- Massalena: 1,13
- Medea: 18,49; 30,40; 33,20
- medical art: 36,40; 37,24; therapeutic
 and hygienic part, 39,45-7;
 surgery, 75,16; treatment, 131,44
- Meletus: 138,7; 138,9
- Menoceus: 27,23
- merchant: 84,22
- method: for bearing misfortunes,
 26,33; of logic, 136,35-8
- mockery: 58,52
- moment for departure: 35,2
- monad: 5,43
- money: 63,10
- money-lover: 9,31
- mythological accounts: 71,47
- name: 101,14,18; applied to a
 discrete conception, 101,32-3; of
 God, 99,45-6; 101,34;
 honourable, 101,32
- natural relations: 88,40-50
- nature (a): 'what subsists in
 accordance with nature and
 primarily': 82,2-3
- necessary things in life: 33,41
- necessity: internal, 11,32-3; two
 kinds, 11,27-8
- Nicholas Damascenus: 83,12
- Nicopolis: 65,37
- object of choice: falsely named, 7,31;
 motion towards, 4,25-8; 8,44; does
 not compel choice, 10,33-11,20
- object of perception: commensurate,
 10,38-40
- objection from deficiency: 9,43; 61,26
- obscene language: 122,27
- Oedipus: 92,30
- Olympics: 66,4.23; 117,32
- opportune time: 34,50
- opposites: 128,32
- oracle: 109,16
- ordinary people: 130,50; 131,20;
 132,28; *see* progress, educated
 people
- Orestes: 55,19
- origin: Good is first origin, 5,2-52;
 soul origin of diversion, 44,3; one
 origin, not two, 68,33; 69,51;
 70,10-28; 71,1.13; 72,23.51;
 73,2.21-29; 75,3.36; must be
 simple, 97,20-5; unextended,
 primordial, self-moving,
 self-subsisting, 97,50-98,1; origin:
 100,40.49.53; 101,12; *see also* bad,
 gods, Manichees, soul
- pain: 29,9-10
- parents: 34,23; 85,7-36; 86,1; 88,46;
 95,29; 114,29
- partaking in divine goodness:
 94,15-16
- participation: 97,51
- participle: connective, 58,15; negative,
 62,32
- party: lemma xxxiii (*Ench.* 25)
- pattern: 121,17
- Paxamos: 115,28
- perception: in healthy people,
 inerrant, 9,22; active given
 commensurate object, 10,38;
 fallible source of conceptions,

- 68,29-30; and impression, cognitive 'lives', 78,13; leads soul outside, 112,21-7
- perfection of the rational soul: 108,40; obviously persists, 2,7; 15,16
- philanthropy: 90,19
- philosopher: the genuine philosopher, 63,4; 64,32; 130,31; 132,30; 133,18,30; place in the city, 64,53-4; his task, 64,2-11; unbribeable judge, 65,26; a shepherd, 65,15; an advisor, 65,16; commitment required to be one, *Ench.* 29; uses divination, 109,32-3; uses externals, 116,43; 129,25; *see* educated people, progress
- philosophy: greatest gift from God to men, 59,35-6; its beauty and magnitude, 59,42; 136,18; most necessary topics of, 136,30-1; practice of, 60,40; 64,32
- pillars (cosmological): 71,44; *see also* Manichees
- Pindar: 19,52
- Plato: 3,5; 17,46; 28,34; speaking in his own persona, 28,41; *Apology*, 138,8; *Crito*, 137,50; *First Alcibiades*, 2,5-54; *Laws*, 28,41; *Phaedo*, 28,37; *Protagoras*, 131,14; *Theaetetus*, 131,15; *see also* Socrates
- pleasure: a shadow-tracing of the good, 7,6; false, 7,8; pleasure-lover, 9,30; abstaining on account of fear, 39,1-2; intensity of, 78,40; bodily, 122,47; 122,54-123,2
- Plutarch of Chaeronea: 129,21
- poet: 129,32
- poetry: 120,19
- politics: political honours, 63,11; political office, 53,15; 62,50; political power, source of harm for bad people, 105,44-5
- Polynices: 92,30
- possession: 33,36; wife and children incidental to our journey, 33,46-7; 126,30
- poverty: 29,1; 45,2.31
- powers: lemma xvi (*Ench.* 10); 63,16-17; superabundance of, 5,19
- practice: 49,40-1; 57,54
- precepts: 2,16; for philosophers, 113,48-9; of Chrysippus, 134,34
- preparation: 24,50
- privation, a failure of form: 74,21-2
- Prodicus: 131,16
- progress: ordinary people, progressors, philosophers, lemma xi (*Ench.* 5); 30,6; 132,27; begin with little things, 25,23-4; 48,12; and proceed gradually, 49,20; lemma xviii (*Ench.* 12); 49,26; 136,4; degrees of progress, 50,52; 111,47; 130,21,29-30; lemma lxvi (*Ench.* 48); 132,31; 133,36; lemma lxix (*Ench.* 51); 135,13; beginners, 25,14.43; 132,33; some progress, 34,6; 50,52; 58,38; 61,19; 63,7; 111,42.47; 132,34; 135,13; still in progress, 121,20; 131,21; constant and uninterrupted progress, 135,33-4; *see* educated people, ordinary people, philosopher
- prohairesis, 6,38-9; 8,39; 25,40-50; 38,9; 41,9.47; 42,40-1; 45,7.22; 62,1.2; preservation of prohairesis, 51,29-30; 111,22; correct, 81,2; 96,30-5; 111,35-7; 121,37; self-determined, 79,10-13.30-3
- prosecutor: 84,22
- Protagoras: 131,14
- proverbs: 25,2; 53,25; 72,33; 132,40; 134,32
- providence: *see* forethought
- purification: 108,11; 138,25
- Pythagoras and Pythagoreans: 2,16, 63,41, 89,15, 112,19.30, 134,50; on silence, 112,19-21
- reader (addressed): 61,3; 79,1
- realm of generation: 34,13; 40,37; 46,1; 53,45
- reason: a teacher, 31,43-4; makes emotions harmonious, 30,41-2; perfection of, 31,20-1; has scientific knowledge, 30,43-4; victorious, 46,28; correct, 91,48; strives for incorporeal and undivided forms, 132,47-9; right reason, 111,3; 132,52
- reasoning: technical, 33,29; unwarranted, 68,31
- relation: definition of, 83,30

- remembering (continually): 24,50
 repentance: 49,29; 107,10-50;
 genuine, 108,7-8; pangs of
 conscience, 108,23
 reputation: external, 131,31-2; good,
 131,40
 rhetoric: 120,18
 rhetoricians: 45,16; 62,35-7
 Rome, Roman: 26,1, 45,37, 65,37,
 85,19, 126,40, 137,21
 Sallustius: 40,29
 sameness: 99,23
 scientific: cognition, 110,34;
 knowledge, 136,25-8; conceptions
 of God: 93,3
 self-control: 117,14; lack of, 117,43;
 123,14-15; exercising, lemma xvi
 (*Ench.* 10); 46,5; 123,28-30
 self-determination: of human
 desires, 4,40-52; 10,16; 67,21;
 78,52; compatible with internal
 necessity, 11,26-33; does not
 always require two-sided
 possibilities, 11,42-4; what is up
 to us is free through, 16,22;
 defining characteristic of human
 essence, 20,44; 79,48; 104,59;
 creation of self-determined
 substance (soul) not bad, 43,36;
 79,27; 80,41
 self-movers: as such, 96,47;
 97,28-31.33.35; 98,5; rational
 souls essentially, 6,22-31;
 13,49-14,24; 37,37; internal
 necessity in, 11,33-7; own cause of
 their good and bad, 15,8-10; seek
 truth autonomously, 110,46;
 138,25
 Seri: 115,54
 servants: 18,30; 49,36-50,31; 64,1;
 116,21-52
 sex: lemma xlv (*Ench.* 33); before
 marriage, 117,36; desire can be
 controlled, 117,30; avoid
 unconventional, 117,40; pleasure
 fleeting, 122,52; women's roles
 restricted to, lemma lviii (*Ench.*
 40); 127,20
 shadow: pleasures, 7,8; 21,40; of arts,
 35,42; follows cause in disposition
 and value, 36,37; 37,45; 43,10; of
 existent things, 133,21
 shame: 82,40-50
 shameful: more evident than the
 bad, 62,19-20
 silence: 112,14.19; cure for diffusion,
 112,28; Epictetus advises social
 form of, 112,31-2; 113,50; *see also*
 Pythagoreans
 similes, examples, and illustrations:
 actor, lemma xxv (*Ench.* 17); 55,1;
 125,38; amphibian, 78,5; archer,
 lemma xxxv (*Ench.* 27); 74,32;
 banquet (dinner-party), lemma
 xxiii (*Ench.* 15); 53,28; 54,6;
 lemma liv (*Ench.* 36); 125,10;
 carpenter and adze, 32,32; 115,15;
 craftsmen and tools, 12,35;
 invitation-list: lemma xxxiii
 (*Ench.* 25); logic, lemma liv (*Ench.*
 36); 124,16; lemma lx (*Ench.* 42);
 mother weaning infant, 38,45;
 pot, lemma viii (*Ench.* 3); 25,23;
 price of lettuce, lemma xxxiii
 (*Ench.* 25); sailing-trip, lemma xiii
 (*Ench.* 7); 34,10-50; ship pulled to
 rock, 107,45; shoes, lemma lvii
 (*Ench.* 39); 127,5; two handles,
 lemma lxi (*Ench.* 43); twisting
 one's foot, lemma lvi (*Ench.* 38);
 126,6; vomiting food, lemma lxiv
 (*Ench.* 46); 130,51-131,6; wolves
 and sheep, 106,50
 Simplicius: his prolixity, 91,20-2; on
 Epictetus' use of similes, 25,40;
 27,25; 28,44; 34,10; 48,7-13; 50,18;
 68,11.46; 82,21.46; 83,13; 125,10;
 see also aim, of the commentary
 Socrates: on the nature of man,
 3,5.26; on death, 28,14.34.37;
 137,50; on pain, 38,15; as
 exemplar, 40,44; 58,12; 65,19;
 112,5; 115,47.49; 120,48.51;
 121,12.17.21; 131,7; 136,9.14; on
 divination, lemma xxxix (*Ench.*
 32); 110,48; on harm, 138,8.9;
 dealt with sophists: 131,13;
 Socratic, 3,5.26; 21,24;
 28,14.34.37; 38,15; 40,44; 58,12;
 65,19; 110,48; 115,47; 120,48;
 121,50; *see also* Plato
 sons: 84,4-5; complete authority of
 fathers over, 85,20
 soul: 1,22; 6,19; 98,14; 113,16;
 motions of, 4,5; moves itself and
 bodies, 6,26; 98,16-17; 108,48;

- motions peculiar to souls
 (striving, desire, impulse, and choice), 6,29-30; human souls, 6,41; 67,18; related to higher and lower, 10,8-9; 77,42-4; 78,3; desire as a self-mover, 10,33; self-determining, 13,50; 43,51-2; 103,54-104,1; 80,41-52; in the bodies, 37,32; 76,24; turns around towards itself, 38,37; body its instrument, 1,37; 38,9; contests for souls, 40,39-40; good of the soul, 42,31; virtues of the human soul, 42,50; originative, 43,53; well-endowed, 45,44; 98,45-6; angelic, 45,54; 80,8; thinking part, 46,18-19; attraction of souls, 52,19; made muscular, 66,31 (cf. 125,49); relation to God, 67,23; 138,4-5; shaped by what is present, 69,33-5; harmed in two ways, 125,44-5; projection of lives of, 78,10-13; and the truth, 110,40-50; attentive part, 112,25; God made it a self-mover, 108,48; purification of, 129,12-13; given over to the bad 70,48-9; *see also* turning
- Spartan youths: 29,5; 40,27
- species: 100,17
- speech: Epictetus' own, 1,13.30; 2,15; correct form, 112,40; licence in, 113,40; permissible subjects, 112,34-5; prolixity, 112,43; uttered speech, 112,25; *see also* argument, rhetoric, style, word
- spirit (*thumos*): and desire, 'lives' of the body, 4,40; 38,19; 78,14; 132,53-133,11; of lion, 38,1; God doesn't act with, 41,19; anger, 118,19
- Stewards of the bad: 71,18; *see also* Manichees
- Stoics: 4,36; 12,15; 124,15.28; 137,18
- student: beginning, 22,34; 34,2-8; intermediate, 60,34-49; 61,15-27; turning the soul inside, 50,48; 84,21; *see also* progress
- style: 129,30-3
- substrate: 97,45
- suitability: 10,42; suitable receptacle, 10,36
- superciliousness: 113,30; 120,54
- Symposia* (by Plato, Plutarch, and Xenophon): 114,40
- Syria: 121,24
- target (primary): 35,19-10; 81,40
- teacher: 31,14; 80,26; 84,20; appropriate behaviour towards, 86,1; obey as if god, 86,10-11
- temperance: 46,5-6
- Thearion: 115,28
- Theophrastus (of Eresos, the Peripatetic): 95,34
- theoretical person: 2,36
- Theseus: 40,44
- token, sign, evidence (*tekmêrion*): 31,17; 56,9; 60,14.46; 61,8; 68,39; 69,21; 107,23; 108,7; 117,43; 120,14; 131,22
- trace of self-motion: 37,39.53
- triviality: 32,13
- truth, the light of: 88,3; 138,30
- turning, of soul, towards or away from self, god or good: lemma xvi (*Ench.* 10); 6,43-46; 33,39; 34,33; 38,37-53; 39,7.17; 50,48; 51,45; 60,23-44; 61,11; 62,18; 66,40; 71,3; 75,44.49; 76,9.14; 77,7.53; 80,6-49; 81,47; 95,28; 107,22-53; 108,53; 109,1; 112,15; 113,46; 118,27.40; 119,13; 120,45; 126,48; 133,23; 138,4; *see also* diversion, inclination
- tyranny (political): 14,26; 65,36; 92,33; 138,19
- undisturbed, reason for remaining: 27,48; 32,6
- uneducated: person, 49,15; youths, 31,13; untrained and soft, 29,11-12; *see also* progress
- unfortunate: 20,52-3
- unification with real existents: 138,29
- unity: hidden unity of the fine and the good, 62,16
- universe: (*to pan*), 35,15; agency of, 35,23; justice of, 36,33; *see also* whole
- up to us: what is up to us, 4,1; is self-determined, 16,27; strong, 16,27; sufficient, 16,25; invulnerable, 18,12; locus of our good, 18,8-9; 57,9; unimpeded, 18,12; 132,38-9; what is not up to us, 24,19-20; 63,13; desire and

- aversion are up to us, 42,33-4;
47,23
- us: the real 'us', 3,51; 27,6-7.9; the
ally in us, 47,10; the child in us
31,40-32,1; 46,13; the dog in us,
58,11-12
- vehemence (of impulses): 22,52
- virtue: rewards of, 2,2; proper good of
the soul, 7,28; of an adze, 32,30-1;
human vs. angelic, 42,53; 80,7;
etymology of, 42,36; tension of the
soul, 48,49; dependent on soul,
80,1-30; augmented by friendship,
86,50; 88,6
- vital extension (of soul): 14,3
- vital organs: 37,23
- weakness of will: 33,13
- wealthy: punished by wealth,
105,32; less healthy than poor,
115,30
- whole: world, 37,17; preservation of,
37,23; parts in relation to whole
37,17.23
- wife: 84,27; *see also* marriage
- wisdom: 18,39
- wise (person): 41,36
- words: educational, 134,2; once
digested nourish the soul, 130,54;
shape the way conceptions are
disposed, 47,39; spoken, 132,25;
see also argument, speech
- writer: 132,33
- Xenophon: 65,22; 90,52; 114,41
- Zeno (of Citium, the Stoic): 23,8;
45,28; 49,31; 120,48.51;
121,12.18.21.26.50; 137,19